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Abstract 
THE “SOCIAL FACTORY” IN POSTWAR ITALIAN RADICAL THOUGHT FROM  
 
OPERAISMO TO AUTONOMIA 
 
by 
 
DAVID PETER PALAZZO 
 
Adviser: Professor Jack Jacobs 
This dissertation examines the “social factory” as it developed conceptually within postwar Italian 
Autonomist Marxism. This concept is defined historically as an outgrowth of the critique of political 
economy that accompanied a rethinking of Marxism in postwar Italian working class political thought 
through the experience of Quaderni Rossi, which culminated in the theoretical and practical work of Potere 
Operaio, with fragments in the area of Autonomia. Historically, this dissertation locates the “social factory” 
as derivative of two figures: Raniero Panzieri and Mario Tronti, as well as two subsidiary movements that 
were articulated, separately, by Antonio Negri and Mariarosa Dalla Costa. Conceptually, the “social 
factory” is understood in two differing modes: as the result of capitalist accumulation and, the other, as the 
consequence of the increasing tertiarization of economic life. Both are problematic and unresolved within 
Italian workerist thought; Negri and Dalla Costa contribute to the discussion of a “social factory” critique 
of political economy in terms of extending the conceptualization of class and the understanding of social 
relations within advanced, post-Fordist capitalism. The idea of the “social factory” is understood 
historically to signify the relationship between capital and class, to understand the role of capital as an 
element of command within a particular, historical mode of production. In this regard, the development of 
operaismo is delineated in terms of the critique of political economy and its secondary concept: class 
composition. The history of a rather rich and varied political orientation constitutes the substantive matter 
of this work, with the conceptual apparatus forming the definitive characteristics of a distinct political 
movement: operaismo. In short, the “social factory” is explained historically through its articulation in 
	   v	  
Quaderni Rossi, Classe Operaio, the student movement, the “hot autumn,” Potere Operaio, and 
Autonomia. Between the early-1960s and the mid 1970s Italy was the country of class conflict. This 
dissertation tells a story of that historical moment as understood through the development of its main 
concept, the “social factory,” as a critique of political economy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is a historical reconstruction of the “social factory” concept as 
developed within the intellectual tradition of Italian operaismo in the postwar period up 
through the end of the Bretton Woods period. As a critique of political economy, the 
“social factory” was formulated in order to understand how those living in advanced 
capitalist economies were subjected to capital’s unceasing pressure to develop individual 
and collective capacities and focus ones efforts and energies towards the needs and goal 
of capital accumulation. One purpose of introducing this concept is that it served as a 
unifying concept under the rubric of class that provided an open and fluid framework for 
heterogeneous social groups. Its fundamental thrust informs us that regardless of identity, 
ethnicity, gender, sexuality, or status, we are forced to sell ourselves, and in turn become 
that particular commodity, labor-power, that generates capital. Traditionally, the socialist 
conception of technological progress sought to lesson the burden of work, yet this has not 
occurred. Rather, with the achievements in technological development, work life has 
increased, with the amount of time spent on such items increasingly penetrating 
traditionally “private” realms of being. At the core of this phenomenon is not simply the 
role of money as the coercive tool of capital; nor is it the widespread dissemination of 
technological devices such as computers and hand-held devices that allow us to remain 
constantly “plugged-in” to work life. The critique of political economy developed as the 
“social factory” directs attention instead towards the making of the working class (class 
composition) and the behaviors and attitudes that this class presents. Thus, working class 
liberation is dependent on the working class and its “refusal” at collaboration in the 
ideological commitment and practice that capital relies upon. Resistance to capitalist 
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domination is a matter of altering values, of breaking its disciplinary strictures, and of 
creating new modes of living that generates new values around the affirmation of our 
human existence. In short, anti-capitalist projects are, in this sense, fundamentally, 
utopian.  
 During the 1960s and 1970s, Italy was characterized as the country of class 
struggle. Its “hot autumn” of 1968-1973 generated the most sustained and radical class 
movement in the Western capitalist countries. It was this aspect of the country’s history 
that first attracted me to this topic. Yet, relatively little is known about Italian political 
theory, and much less with regards to operaismo. For the most part, academic work in the 
Anglophone countries has focused on Euro-communism and Palmiro Togliatti’s Italian 
Way to Socialism, with little attention to the more anti-statist tendencies of this period. 
This oversight has recently begun to be addressed, most prominently, in Steve Wright’s 
work, but also in a multitude of web pages and activist-oriented circles.1 Wright offered 
the first historical reconstruction of Autonomist Marxism, which focused on the concept 
“class composition” as the key to understanding their revolutionary politics (2002). Other 
works have emphasized the cultural and sociological nature of this period (Cuninghame 
2002; Lumley 1990). To date, no work has treated the critique of political economy as a 
theoretical tool for the radical politics that exploded during Italy’s “hot autumn.” This is 
the state of affairs, despite Negri’s insistence that the “social factory” as the “successive 
abstraction of work” was the fundamental thesis of operaismo.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, the webpages for the  “Affinity Project” and “Class Against Class.”  
 
2 In this chapter, I use the term Resistance to refer to both the anti-fascist resistance and 
the armed resistance. The former dates from the murder, in 1924, of Senator Giangiacomo  
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I do not want to omit the importance of Negri’s work, particularly his 
collaboration with Michael Hardt. Yet, this work, like Empire and Multitude, are recent 
and differ considerably from the material that he penned in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
The same could be said for contemporary Italian theorists whose works are being 
translated into English—for example, Sergio Bologna and Paolo Virno [the same cannot 
be said of the more well known Italian feminists like Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Silvia 
Federici]: they are, for the most part, being read without an understanding of the 
foundational components of their thought that is intimately connected to the tradition of 
operaismo as developed in journals such as Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks), Classe 
Operaia (Working Class), and Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power) and in the movements 
that this intellectual belonged to. That some of these authors are now being discussed in 
Anglophone countries [caveat: the United Kingdom has long engaged this material in a 
far greater extent than the United States, particularly through the work of Ed Emery]  
speaks to the potential for deepening the discussion to include the historical genesis and 
background that is Italian Autonomist Marxism.  
There is a practical reason for undertaking this investigation of the “social 
factory” as well. Resistance, in the rich countries (and poor as well, though it began there 
well before the former) has been slowly building over the last twenty years, to the post-
Bretton Woods, neo-liberal order: the defeat of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
in the mid-1990s, the late 1990s global justice movement; successive targeting of the G8, 
Davos, and other elite global capitalist conventions; the recent Occupy movement; and 
the “disobedient” and “indignant” movements attest to the practical implications of this 
idea. Most of the organizational work in these movements is based on something like the 
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libertarian tradition of “affinity groups”—the immediate history for this is, inter alia, the 
autonomous movement in the 1970s in Italy. Moreover, the general thrust of the 
contemporary activist scene is decidedly trying to overturn what is perceived as the 
dominating control that capital has on our social order.  
This dissertation seeks to build on previous academic work by placing the critique 
of political economy as the core component of the theoretical tradition that is operaismo, 
or “Autonomist Marxism.” That tradition, as Wright correctly emphasizes, survived the 
Cold War and what some sanguinely identified as the “failure” of communist and 
socialist ideologies (2002). This is, at best, an oversight. Italian workerism developed as a 
critique of the traditional left institutions and tried to construct organizational forms that 
are on par with some of the best of the libertarian tradition of the working class (i.e., the 
IWW). This tradition survived the horrors of the Russian example, as recent history 
within the class movement demonstrates that need the libertarian element needs to 
become prominent in working class culture. That said, the “social factory,” in its best 
formulations, was utilized as a theoretical tool for interconnecting vast sections of society 
under the rubric of class struggle. In its worst moments, it remained imprisoned behind 
factory walls, unable to conceive of advanced capitalism outside of the figure of the 
salaried worker, with little discovery of the happenings within the household and 
community. In order to develop, and assess the merits of, the “social factory” this 
dissertation locates the tradition of Autonomous Marxism within the historical period 
within which it emerged and developed; it is located within the broader context of 
postwar Italian Marxism, working class political culture, economic development, 
generational changes, and, to a lesser extent, international politics.  
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Chapter one begins at the end of WWII and the “long nightmare” of Italian 
fascism and Nazi occupation. This baseline is utilized to situate the parameters of postwar 
working class history and political thought. Through the writings of Rodolfo Morandi 
(Socialist Party) and Palmiro Togliatti (Communist Party), steeped within the historical 
context of their time, the framework for a discussion of operaismo is established. While 
the former held a councilist position and the latter adhered to a statist variation, their 
positions are useful to interrogate the problem of constructing a postwar working class 
politics. In no small measure the early development of operaismo was a direct response 
to the unfolding of these two viewpoints. Chapter one spans the course of a decade, a 
crucial period of postwar reconstruction, economic planning, constitutionalism, and 
social upheaval. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate the waning of working 
class power within the social relations of postwar capitalism, the general difficulties that 
the institutions of the left had in responding to the developments of the period, the 
transformative nature of the early stages of the “economic miracle,” and the state of the 
working class in gli anni duri (the hard years) of the 1950s—all determinant factors in 
the rise of operaismo.  
Chapter two develops and examines the contribution of Raniero Panzieri as the 
founder of Quaderni Rossi, the original journal that gave rise to the tradition of 
operaismo. As member of the PSI, his work is situated in continuum with Morandi’s 
class politics. Panzieri’s emphasis on a free workers’ culture is emphasized in the 
historical context of the events of 1956. Particularly, Panzieri advocates, through the use 
of “workers’ inquiry,” the need for the development of Marxism as a “science of 
revolution” that originates from within the class movement, and understands the working 
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class as analytically distinct from capital. In short, Panzieri puts forth a democratic 
alternative that permeates the workplace, community, and culture. Last, in this chapter we 
see the beginnings of the critique of neo-capitalism and the initial steps of the “social 
factory” concept. The birth of Quaderni Rossi is highlighted along with the initial 
composition of the group in order to shed light on the heterogeneous make-up of early 
workerist thought.  
Chapter three is the theoretical centerpiece of the dissertation in that it establishes 
the two original formulations of the “social factory” as constructed by both Raniero 
Panzieri and Mario Tronti. Their respective understandings of the “social factory” are 
situated in the “return to Marx” that consisted of a re-reading of Capital—with attention 
on large industry and technology—and the Introduction to the Grundrisse. I argue that 
both Tronti and Panzieri understand the “social factory” in terms of control by capital on 
the working class, despite their different understandings of how and why capital is 
capable of such effects. In short, the “social factory” was the unifying theme behind the 
Autonomist Marxist understanding of neo-capitalism as a social order where factory 
relations became generalized to the entire society. This chapter approaches both Panzieri 
and Tronti’s understandings from their historical context and their immediate intellectual 
influences. The “social factory” critique is then utilized as a heuristic to understand the 
background for the renewal of workers’ struggles and the emergence of a decade-long 
development of revolutionary working class struggle. This is understood through the 
development of complementary concepts such as the antagonistic and radical articulation 
of the workers’ “refusal of work. The chapter concludes with the first split in Quaderni 
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Rossi, which occurred partly as a result of the different configurations of the “social 
factory” but also from the different understanding of the class’s behavior.  
Chapter four analyzes the experience of the journal Classe Operaia (Working 
Class) as an organ of “the workers in struggle” leading to an understanding of class 
composition—of a fluid working class subjectivity that was constantly composed, 
decomposed, and recomposed in the process of class struggle. Mario Tronti’s writings are 
the focal point of this chapter with particular attention on his conceptualization of the 
social factory, organization, theory of the party, and role of working class refusal in 
capitalist planning and development. He was the leading figure of CO, yet it is within this 
milieu that the writings of Toni Negri gained importance, as well as the continued view 
of Alquati. Undoubtedly CO was centrally concerned with organization, a question that 
subsequent movements also grappled with as a primary concern. Yet, the main point in 
this chapter is Tronti’s “Copernican revolution”—that attributed the primacy of the 
working class as the leading, dynamic subject of capitalist development—and its 
overwhelming importance within the trajectory of operaismo, primarily, I argue, as 
constructing a theory of revolution that contained decisive “passages” that was so abstract 
it lent itself to the control of an external “party-guide,” in Panzieri’s use of the phrase. 
This discussion is situated within the context of Italy’s first Center-Left government—
with the inclusion of the PSI—of the postwar period. In this context, the strategic 
importance of the wage became a central point of workerist theory and practice—leading 
to major wage gains during the “hot autumn” of 1969-1973.  
Chapter five focuses on the “student movement” and its conceptualization of the 
“social factory” as a means to enlarge the conception of working class composition to 
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include the student as part of the working class. Importantly, the student movement was 
not so much a theoretical movement as it was a social movement, with practice informing 
its politics to a greater extent than theoretical formulations. In particular, the students’ 
appropriation of sociological inquiry (“sociology of the base”), class composition, the 
social factory, and aspects of revolutionary theory (i.e., organizational questions such as 
the critique of centralized authority, the need for revolutionary party to emerge from the 
movement and live in the movement, and the rejection of external vanguards) provide a 
framework for examining the trajectory of operaismo as it found space in the student 
movement. The chapter begins by discussing particular, generational features of the 
student movement—children of the “economic miracle.” It is argued that the students’ 
conception of the “social factory” emerged as a totalizing system based on despotism and 
control—the core power features of social capital. Within this configuration, the role of 
the university, the role of the student, and the political obligation or commitment for 
revolutionary struggle developed. The students appropriated the conception of the “social 
factory” in order to critique the university within a particular phase of neo-capitalism and 
to situate their struggle within a class analysis. Their connection to operaismo is made 
explicit, both theoretically and historically in the continuity of idea—particularly 
Panzieri’s influence in Pisa and Turin (the future nexus of Lotta Continua [Continuous 
Struggle]). The universities of Trento, Turin, and Pisa are examined by utilizing a loose 
understanding of the “social factory” to include such terms as “the Plan,” “despotism,” 
“social capital,” et cetera. Differences or variations in usage are explained in terms of the 
university movement’s own particular focus and theoretical expression.  
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Chapter six develops the intellectual work that primarily took place within the 
group Potere Operaio, with emphasis on the role of Antonio Negri’s writings. His 
contributions to operaismo are many, but emphasis here is given on theory of the State as 
a “Planner-State,” his formulation of the Marxian concept of “crisis,” and his insistence 
on the connections between production and domination as the premise of a political 
praxis of working class revolution. The centerpiece of Negri’s contribution resides in his 
understanding of the “social factory” as capitalist command over “social labor” in the 
post-Bretton Woods era, with what he identified as the subsequent demise of the theory 
of value. Importantly, this chapter explains the historical trajectory of operaismo in terms 
of how their critique of political economy began to entail both the production and 
reproduction of capital. The culmination of this social transformation resulted in the 
displacement of “worker centrality” towards a broader configuration of working class 
subjectivity. 
Chapter seven centers on the question of “worker centrality,” of the position of 
the paid worker within the composition of the working class that derives from the “social 
factory” analysis that, to this point, has been broadened to include both the production 
and reproduction of capital. The chapter begins with the women’s movement, the rise of a 
feminist critique of housework, of capitalist despotism in the home and, particularly, in 
the lives of housewives and in the community. Important here is the “wages for 
housework” campaign and Mariarosa Dalla Costa’s contribution to operaismo. The 
second part of this chapter elaborates on the “end of the parliamentary groups” and the 
birth of autonomia as a direct response to the organizational failures of the mass worker 
and worker centrality. That is, autonomia emerged as the organizational expression of an 
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acceptance of the “social factory” as the proper critique of political economy. The last 
part of the chapter is concerned with Negri’s conceptualization of the “social worker” as 
an expression of class composition within the “social factory” that sought to introduce, 
within a class politics, the theoretical and practical possibility of unity within diversity. 
What is of interest here is understanding the practical culmination of the “social factory” 
as a critique of political economy that is open and fluid, allowing for the incorporation of 
diverse segments of the working class into its ambit of antagonism to capitalist command 
and working class revolution. This	   dissertation	   reconstructs	   the	   “social	   factory”	   as	   a	   critique	   of	   political	  economy	  within	  Autonomist	  Marxism	  in	  postwar	  Italy.	   In	  general,	   it	  contributes	  to	  our	   understanding	   of	   the	   Italian	   radical	   theory	   and	   working	   class	   politics.	   More	  narrowly,	   it	   examines	   the	   changes	   within	   Marxism	   as	   a	   theory	   of	   working	   class	  liberation.	   Others	   have	   made	   notable	   contributions	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	  Autonomist	   Marxism.	   Such	   contributions	   have	   focused	   on	   the	   role	   of	   workers’	  inquiry	   (Borio	   et	   al	   2002),	   the	   conceptualization	   of	   class	   composition	   (Wright	  2002),	   and	   the	   “refusal	   of	   work”	   as	   the	   strategic	   aspect	   of	   the	   autonomous	  movement	   (Cuninghame	   2002).	   This	   dissertation	   seeks	   to	   broaden	   our	  understanding	  of	  Autonomist	  Marxism	  by	  focusing	  on	  their	  conceptualization	  of	  the	  postwar	  neo-­‐capitalist	  social	  order	  as	  a	  “social	  factory.”	  At	  a	  minimum,	  the	  analysis	  should	   be	   of	   interest	   to	   those	   concerned	   with	   the	   effect	   of	   capital	   on	   our	   daily	  activity	   and	   as	   a	   determinant	   of	   social	   cooperation.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   this	  dissertation	  speaks	  to	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  understand	  capitalist	  social	  relations	  and	  replace	  this	  order	  with	  something	  more	  humane	  and	  decent.	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Last,	  a	  note	  regarding	  texts	  and	  language.	  Throughout	  the	  dissertation,	  I	  have	  relied	   on	   the	   original	   Italian	   texts	   and	   have	   included	   English	   translations,	   when	  available,	   for	   convenience.	  These	   references	  are	   sparse	  as	  much	  of	   the	  material	   is	  unavailable	   in	   English.	   The	   translations	   are	   the	   author’s	   own,	   unless	   otherwise	  indicated.	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CHAPTER 1  
WORKING CLASS POLITICS FROM THE RESISTANCE  
TO THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE 
 
…[it is] the principle of authority which must perforce be respected… Now the concept of 
workers’ control threatens that principle of authority; it is the superior who must control the 
inferior, never the inferior who controls the superior.—Angelo Costa, Confindustria 
 
The committees of liberation are the authority of the people, the only legitimate and the only 
guardians of the interests and liberty of the people: they are as such the true foundation and the 
incoercible force of the new democracy.—Rodolfo Morandi, Italian Socialist Party 
 
…when we speak of the new party we intend, before everything else, a party which is capable of 
translating in its politics, in its organization, and in its daily activity, those profound changes that 
have occurred in the position of the working class with respect to the problems of the national 
life.—Palmiro Togliatti, Italian Communist Party 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the theory and politics of the working class from the Resistance to 
the onset of the so-called “economic miracle” in postwar Italy. I begin with the 
Resistance in order to locate the workers’ movement, as a political force, in the 
construction of the postwar order. In setting forth a general position of the workers’ 
movement, I demonstrate the nodal points of continuity and rupture that occured with the 
rise of Autonomist Marxism. It is important to demonstrate how the crisis of the 1950s 
was rooted in the immediate postwar years in order to shed light on the cultural and 
theoretical shifts that gave rise to operaismo; it is not sufficient, as Negri has claimed, to 
locate the birth of operaismo in the crisis of the workers’ movement during the 1950s, as 
this was predicated by the failures of the left to be an effective political force during 
reconstruction and the renewal of Italian capitalism (2007, 36-7). Rather, we have to 
examine working class politics in the immediate postwar period in order to understand 
how the hopes spawned by the Resistance gave way to the bitter disappointment 
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characteristic of the “hard years” of the 1950s (Bermani 1997, 141). This chapter begins 
with the workers’ role in the Resistance in order to highlight their determinant role in the 
liberation of Italy. These contributions are then examined in the theoretical positions of 
Rodolfo Morandi and Palmiro Togliatti, two prominent figures in working class politics 
of the postwar era. I focus on the latter’s new party (nuovo partito) and the former’s 
councilist position to highlight their views on the role of the working class in the postwar 
order. These two position help situate the theoretical and political questions that emerged 
later in operaismo. This chapter concludes with the onset of the economic miracle as 
providing the contextual framework for self-reflection and criticism within Italian 
Marxism. While many have correctly pointed out that 1956 was a critical point of 
departure for operaismo, this chapter argues that the success of postwar capitalism, and 
the failure of the left to understand the dynamism of the postwar capitalist order, posed a 
far greater burden for postwar Marxism (Crainz 2005, 48-54; Ginsborg 1990, 204-209).  
The Resistance 
The Italian Resistance2 was composed of a politically diverse group united around the 
common goal or ridding Italy from Nazi-Fascist domination and occupation, and 
restoring Italy’s reputation and dignity in world politics (Ginsborg 1990, 71; Cooke 1997, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In this chapter, I use the term Resistance to refer to both the anti-fascist resistance and 
the armed resistance. The former dates from the murder, in 1924, of Senator Giangiacomo 
Matteotti for his denunciation of fascist brutality. The anti-fascist resistance was a relatively 
small, well-organized faction whose political views were shaped by the Bolshevik Revolution and 
the biennio rosso (red two years) of 1919-1920. During fascist rule, they experienced exile, 
internal confinement, imprisonment, assassination, and the Spanish Civil War. The armed 
resistance refers to the “spontaneous” formation of direct action groups, partisan brigades who 
took to the mountains, and other anti-fascists who formed after the implosion of the Royalist-
Badoglio government on September 8, 1943. It is reasonable to uphold the claim that they derived 
their anti-fascism from the “undisguised exuberance” they felt with the fall of Mussolini on July 
25, 1943, the horror of Nazi occupation, and the forced enlistment in Mussolini’s puppet regime 
in Salo (Quazza 1972, 11; Delzell 1961, 233; Monelli 1943, 131-6; Horowitz 1963, 181-4). This 
“exuberance” is well captured in Giuseppe Tornatore’s film Maléna (2000) when the protagonist, 
Renato, overturns Il Duce’s bust, which tumbles down the stairs, cracking upon its final descent. 
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4; Delzell 1961, 285-88). The former was a clear-cut goal, the elimination of the fascist 
regime and defeating the Nazi occupation. However, restoring Italy’s reputation and 
dignity in world politics required a politics within the Resistance that was palatable to the 
allies’ goals3 for the postwar order. The political importance of the working class within 
the Resistance was a point of tension. Indeed, workers assumed the lead in the Resistance 
by forming agitation committees, workers’ councils, and internal commissions, and in 
direct action through strikes, work stoppages, and sabotage. As workers assumed this 
lead role—beginning with the strikes of March 1943—the allies expressed concerns 
about workers’ power and its possible affect on reconstruction and the postwar order. 
Below, I discuss three key events of working class militancy during the Resistance in 
order to shed light on the discussions of the working class in the postwar order.  
In early 1943 workers took the lead in striking against the fascist regime. Local 
workers’ cells had previously engaged in strikes, but in March and April of 1943 strikes 
erupted throughout Italy, with the majority of strike action occurring in Piedmont and 
Lombardy4 (Massola 1973, 167). This mass strike was the first sign of worker protest 
since the beginning of fascism, and pointed the way to a clear rejection of fascist politics 
and Italy’s position in the war (Vaccarino 1966, 164-5; Foa 1975, 26-7; Polo 2003, 1).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ginsborg characterizes the Allied position towards the Resistance as one of needing to 
“minimize its role as far as possible, and on no account to allow partisan action to lead to 
unpredictable political consequences” (1990, 42). For a general account of the relationship 
between the Resistance and the Allies, see the excerpts in part VI of Cooke’s The Italian 
Resistance: an anthology (1997, 144-62). James Miller’s The United States and Italy, 1940-1950 
offers an excellent account as well (1986).   
 
4 Located in the central and western areas of the North, Piedmont and Lombardy 
comprise the two regions of the “industrial triangle,” a term used to denote the mass industrial 
expansion in Turin, Milan, and Genoa, that began in the early twentieth century under the liberal 
government of Giovanni Giolitti government (he was prime minister five times between 1892 and 
1921). 
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However, this strike not only facilitated the demise of fascism, but it also effected a 
change in workplace regulation and a renewal of workers’ power in the workplace. After 
the fall of Mussolini’s regime (July 25, 1943), fascist unions were replaced by Internal 
Commissions—representative bodies of all the workers in a factory, elected by the 
workers (Foa 1975, 27). In September, worker “agitation committees” began to emerge 
as more democratic or representative bodies, as the Internal Commissions had direct 
connections to political factions within the Committees for National Liberation5 (Delzell 
1961, 304-306; Woolf 1972, 227). By September, workers had organized themselves 
around these two focal points for further anti-fascist activity. The fruits of their work 
culminated in the political strikes of March 1944 and the general insurrection of April 
1945.  
 The general strikes of March 1944 continued, and were the effect of, clandestine 
agitation that demonstrated the capacity of the Resistance to shutdown industrial 
production and shift the balance of forces within Italian society. The success of the strike 
varied by region, but it established the principle that workers had the freedom to strike. 
This is not to deny that reprisals by neo-Fascists and German occupying forces took 
place. They did, and Liberals and Conservatives used such reprisals to express their 
displeasure with the Communist and Socialist factions in the Resistance who had leading 
roles in the strikes. However, one could point to the shifting political power of the 
workers and the Resistance by noting that industrialists declined to take punitive action 
against their employees, and often paid striking workers (Delzell 1961, 371-2).  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The Internal Committees quickly became the scene of political intrigue from neo-fascist 
forces as well as the diverse parties who formed the Committees for National Liberation. The 
latter comprised six anti-fascist parties: the Actionists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, 
Communists, and Republicans.  
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strikes of 1944 successfully led to the declaration of trade-union unity under the aegis of 
the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (General Confederation of Italian 
Labor, CGIL). On June 3rd, 1944 the three dominant factions within the labor 
movement—Communist, Socialist, and Christian Democrat—established the CGIL as a 
“union of all workers without distinction of political opinion or religious faith” in order to 
defend the “economic and moral interests of the workers” and to “guarantee their more 
efficient contribution to the immanent work of reconstruction” (Foa 1975, 50-52). This 
body lasted until 1947 when the Cold War and postwar political divisions put an end to 
the unity politics of the Resistance era. It is important to note that by 1944 workers had 
constructed an institutional presence in the Resistance in order to ensure their 
participation in the overarching call of the postwar order, “reform and reconstruction” 
(Ginsborg 1990, 82).  
 With the end of the war in sight, the Committees for National Liberation (CLN) 
organized a general insurrection in April 1945. From the beginning the insurrection was 
hampered by political divisions between the more conservative elements—primarily the 
Liberals and the Christian Democrats—who feared the consequences of radical social 
change advocated by the Socialists, Communists, and Actionists. The conservative 
position became aligned with a policy of attesismo6 (wait and see what the allies do), 
which left the military obligation to the allies and gave the partisans a secondary, or 
defensive, role in protecting industry and infrastructure from retreating Nazi sabotage 
(Delzell 1961, 475). Countering this position, the more radical components of the 
Resistance, led by the Communists, were insistent on liberating the North before the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Roberto Rossellini’s film Roma Città Aperta (1945) depicts the futility of this “wait and 
see” policy during the period from September 9, 1943 to September 23, 1943 in which Rome was 
declared an “open city” by terms of an armistice with Germany.  
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allies arrived. It must be noted, however, that even the more radical elements did not seek 
a social revolution, as the Greek experience, stated allied concerns, and the prevailing 
political balance of forces, sobered even the most ardent revolutionary (Ginsborg 1990, 
82). Rather, the radicals were concerned with ensuring that the CLNs were recognized as 
the legitimate governing body of Italy and would have the lead in any postwar settlement 
with the allies (Bocca 1995, 516).  
 In early April, the Communist Party (PCI) issued Directive No. 16 that expressed 
the purpose of the general insurrection. The document called for a general strike against 
fascism combined with an attack on Nazi-Fascist headquarters and the occupation of 
public offices. It laid out a “surrender or die” edict to Nazi-Fascist forces. Last, it called 
for a complete struggle against attesismo and preparations of what to do in the face of 
allied withholding of arms and support (Secchia 1973, 486-9).  The character of the 
insurrection varied according to the capacities of the Resistance in their respective 
localities. However, in general, there was widespread success in the North as public 
buildings were occupied, utilities and industrial infrastructure was taken over and 
maintained by workers’ councils (consigli di gestione), and the CLNs began 
administering their respective region’s affairs. The insurrection can be understood, in 
performative terms, as the embryonic expression of the postwar order based in the 
regional CLN bodies and workers’ management of industry, as expressed in the Socialist 
Party by Pietro Nenni and Rodolfo Morandi, and by some Communist cadres. In this 
sense, the Resistance was an affair of the Center and North of Italy (Woolf 1972, 213). 
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But the insurrection also played a symbolic role in marking the last phases of Nazi-
fascism, and in this sense, it can be said to have attained a national scope.7 
 The final event of the Resistance, and the symbolic end of fascism, occurred in 
the late days of April when Resistance forces captured Mussolini as he attempted to flee 
with retreating Nazis. Upon a sentence of death proclaimed by the Milan CLN, partisans 
shot Mussolini, his mistress Claretta Petacci, and a Fascist Party secretary. The three 
cadavers were then hung upside down in Piazza Loreto8 for the public to witness the fall 
of fascism. Rather than evoking fear and terror, the piazza presented a macabre display to 
all that the “long nightmare” of fascism was over (Bocca 1995, 523). Mussolini’s 
execution and the public theater that followed might have been the “ceremonial end of 
fascism,” but, as in the end of Bertolucci’s film Novecento, the padroni [bosses] 
remained, and they still had power (1976; Chessa 2005, 121).9   
As the Resistance to fascism morphed into the politics of reconstruction, with the 
need to ease the suffering and misery that fascism, war, and occupation had wrought, 
what role would workers play? How did the working class emerge as a political force in 
postwar reconstruction? To answer these questions it is useful to examine the theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A dualism that marks Italy’s history is the separation, geographic as well as culturally, 
between the North and the South. The process of liberation reaffirmed this duality as the South 
was “liberated” by the Allies while the North experienced German occupation. On this matter, 
Cooke writes, “[e]ffectively, the country was divided into two, a fact that was to have a great 
influence, not only on the military campaign of 1943-1945, but on the entire development of post-
war Italy” (1997, 3). 
 
8 The location was the scene of a Nazi execution of partisans the previous August, and 
thus had particular symbolic importance as a political statement.  
 
9 For two accounts of the daily struggles and resistance to Nazi-fascism that highlight the 
role of much less dramatic events than the workers’ affairs discussed above, see Origo’s War in 
Val D’orcia (1947) and Roberto Rossellini’s Roma Città Aperta (1945).  
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and strategic visions of the working class by Rodolfo Morandi and Palmiro Togliatti, two 
dominant political figures in the Socialist Party and Communist Party, respectively.  
Morandi’s “class politics” and Togliatti’s “nuovo partito” 
As the war ended the Resistance gave way to the needs of “reform and reconstruction.” 
The overall societal need was for reform of the political, social, and economic structures 
suited towards a form of constitutional democracy, and both moral and economic 
reconstruction of Italy and the Italian people from the twenty-year experience of fascism, 
war, and occupation. The story of this period has been amply documented, so the purpose 
here is not to provide a rich historical reconstruction of the inter-party and intra-party 
positions, or of the numerous changes of governments (Amyot 1981; Di Scala 1988; 
Spriano 1975). Rather, in this section I examine how the two dominant “left-wing” 
parties (the Psiup/PSI10 and PCI) envisioned the role of the working class in the postwar 
order. In particular, the councilist position of Rodolfo Morandi (Socialist Party) is 
juxtaposed to Palmiro Togliatti’s (Communist Party) articulation of the “new party.” 
These positions are useful to interrogate the problems of constructing a postwar working 
class politics, and how both these positions provided the historical context for the 
emergence of operaismo and Autonomist Marxism. That is, Morandi and Togliatti 
envisioned a postwar order based on the centrality of the working class as a political 
subject, but the defeat of this position and the consequent decimation of the working class 
as a political force provided the impetus for a vibrant rethinking of working class politics 
in the late 1950s.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity existed from 1943-1947. During the 25th 
Congress in January 1947 Giuseppe Saragat led a “right-wing” or social democratic faction that 
split the Psiup between his newly created Italian Socialist Workers’ Party (PSLI) and the “left-
wing” worker-centered politics of Nenni, Morandi, and Lelio Basso which formed the Italian 
Socialist Party (PSI) [Di Scala 1988, 47-65].  
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 Both the Communist Party and the Socialist Party found themselves in a new 
situation by the end of the war. As CLNs assumed governing power with the formation of 
the Parri government in May 1945, the Communist and Socialist parties had to shed their 
historically oppositional posture and create an agenda for reconstruction. Togliatti had 
anticipated this, when, in March 1944, he returned to Italy after 18 years of exile and 
inserted himself into national politics by recognizing the Badoglio government, and 
persuaded the other anti-Fascist parties to put institutional questions on hold until after 
the defeat of Nazi-fascism. After his infamous “svolta di Salerno”11 [change of tack at 
Salerno], Togliatti gave a series of addresses in order to establish the nature and roll of 
what he called the “nuovo partito” [new party]. Togliatti informed his communist cadres 
that the basis of the new party would no longer be that of an oppositional party as 
prescribed by the Third International, and that it was no longer possible, or necessary, to 
struggle for a “dictatorship of the proletariat” in Italy. Rather, Togliatti, in line with the 
Popular Front strategy of the 7th Congress of the Comintern (or Third International), 
advocated a policy based on the class alliances that had formed during the Resistance 
with its objective of, first, defeating fascism, and then ensuring the PCI as a legitimate 
participant in national politics (Togliatti 1945, 95-6, 331; De Grand 1989, 97; Harper 
1986, 19).  
 The “new party” rested on the assumption that progressive forces needed to unite 
in order to defeat fascism and establish a “progressive democracy” as a transition to 
socialism. To this end, the Socialists and Communists maintained a unity of action 
agreement, and with the formation of the CLNs, the so-called progressive forces united to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For discussions of the importance of Togliatti’s svolta, see (Quazza 1972, 24-7; 
Spriano 1975, 314-337). 
	   21	  
defeat their common foe. This need for a unitary politics based on the CLN model would 
be a defining feature of the PCI’s political strategy until their expulsion, along with the 
PSI, from government in May 1947. In an address to communist cadres in Naples on 
April 11, 1944, Togliatti outlined the basic elements of the new party. Addressing the 
question of the party’s postwar program, Togliatti offered a program for instituting a 
republican constitution with guaranteed liberal rights based on respect for multiple parties 
that would effect a “rapid reconstruction in the interests of the people” (1945, 45-6). The 
priority was set forth that the Communist Party would put its energies into the 
construction of a “progressive and democratic regime” (Ibid, 46). This position did not 
abandon the long-term goal of achieving a socialist and then communist Italy. Rather, 
Togliatti’s “new party” sought to institutionalize the transition to socialism by 
constructing a political regime that was democratic and progressive, while using those 
same political tools to eliminate the structural base of fascism and change the power 
dynamics of the economic structure (Amyot 1981, 34-44; Sassoon 1981, 20-25).  
In the same address, Togliatti called for the need to protect small and medium 
sized economic groups against the “avid and egotistic groups of the plutocracy,” or 
“grand monopolistic capitalism.” The latter must be uprooted since therein resided the 
“birth of fascism” (1945, 46). The immediate objective was to reform the institutional 
structures in order to prevent the return of fascism, which was seen as a necessary 
safeguard to ensure the PCI’s legitimacy and existence. However, Togliatti remained 
opaque about the connection between a transition to socialism or communism from this 
defense of small proprietors.  
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In his address at a PCI convention on economics in Rome, dated August 23, 1945, 
Togliatti offered broad outlines of the communist’s position for the postwar period that 
focused on avoiding inflation, a renewal of production, and the support of private 
initiative in both production and exchange (331-334). These positions rested on a 
conception of the State in liberal-democratic terms; Togliatti expressed his preference for 
the model offered by England and the United States. Rather than engaging in factory-
level struggles or advocating for any type of workers’ control (which was viewed as 
utopian given the “actual state of affairs”), the need was to “conduct a struggle for the 
conquest of the State apparatus, in order to improve it.” Togliatti continued, “[w]e need 
to request a form of intervention, of surveillance, of absolute limitation on the speculative 
liberty of private enterprises” behind a “line of national solidarity” (Ibid). In dealing with 
the economic problems of reconstruction, Togliatti preferred to transform the economic 
question into a question of State politics (1945, 335). In this construction, the foreseeable 
contradiction of capitalism would occur in some indeterminate future, not by an internal 
flaw of capitalist production, but between capitalism and democracy (De Grand 1989, 
88). Togliatti sought an extension of democracy through the institutional structures of 
postwar Italy as the means for making the transition to socialism and communism 
(Spriano 1975, 386-419). But Togliatti’s understanding of democracy rested on a Statist 
vision of politics, with a rather narrow approach to the institutions of capitalist society.   
 To achieve the goals of democratizing the institutions of the postwar order, the 
party was to play the central role in representing and guiding workers’ interests. In the 
address cited above, Togliatti maintained the role of the party as providing “a guide for 
the people…of which they need” (1945, 48). It was not that the workers had needed 
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guides to organize in the factory to resist fascism, but they needed the party as a guide to 
build a unitary politics that would include workers, peasants, white-collar workers, and 
vanguard intellectuals (Ibid, 131). The role of the party was to serve as a guide in 
realizing the political line of unity. To this end, the party would build its organizational 
apparatus in order to spread propaganda that would channel workers’ power and interests 
into the PCI’s goal of political unity (Ibid, 132). Thus, the worker militancy displayed 
throughout the Resistance was to be guided into the predetermined goals of the party. The 
working class, as a political agent, was viewed as responsible solely for preserving the 
discipline of production, order, and social peace.  
Trade unions were given the explicit function of ensuring industrial harmony by 
channeling the party’s political goals into the workplace to ensure a rapid economic 
reconstruction. The possibility of harnessing worker militancy toward realizing a 
democratic change of workplace organization was absent from Togliatti’s formula. 
Indeed, the “new party” envisioned a sharp demarcation between political and economic 
struggles, preferring, as Vittorio Foa writes, to propose all issues concerning the party in 
the manner of an “electoral function” (1973, 449). By directing working class militancy 
toward the national unity goals of the party, and thus toward an electoral strategy, the PCI 
left the “transformation of the balance of class forces…to the future parliament,” which 
effectively sapped the revolutionary potential of the workers’ movement (Foa 1974, xix). 
In other words, as a party for the class, all militancy was, at best, verbalized in 
propaganda as a means for increasing the Communist’s electoral strength in national 
politics.  
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 Throughout the immediate postwar period the Communist Party maintained, as its 
primary goal, the politics of national unity and collaboration of the anti-fascist alliance as 
a means to ensure its legitimacy in national politics. To this end the PCI popularized a 
myth of the Resistance as a “second Risorgimento,” 12  a more democratic and 
representative process of national unification than that which had occurred 90 years prior 
during the initial unification of Italy. The working class played a central role in this myth 
as the heroic liberators of Italy from the vicissitudes of fascism that would reconstruct 
Italy as a republic that respected “honest labor.”13  The Pact of Rome that established 
trade union unity was envisioned as a model of the type of unity that the PCI based its 
hopes upon for a broader national political unity. But, as we will see below, this process 
of collaboration accepted a naive view of the Christian Democrats as a progressive force 
in national politics, and, consequently, served to restrain the workers’ political 
momentum. Moreover, the PCI’s focus on national politics failed to mobilize the workers 
as an effective power bloc against the capitalist push, led by the industrial group, 
Confindustria, to take sole control over the politics of economic reconstruction. By 
locating workers’ demands as secondary to political goals, the PCI set the table for a 
series of compromises that gave control over reconstruction to the capitalist class, which 
led to a decimation of workers’ power in the 1950s. But before turning to the capitalist 
restoration and the postwar order, I want to discuss the work of Rodolfo Morandi, as a 
theorist of workers’ councils, who laid out a schema for a more bottom-up, democratic 
transition from the Resistance to postwar reconstruction.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For example, see (Battaglia 1957, 127, 268).  
 
13 See Pier Paolo Pasolini’s depiction of those who perform “honest labor” against the 
petty thieves (or “scroungers”) in Rome’s shanty towns during the 1950s in his premier film 
Accattone (1955).  
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The most significant attempt to build on the workers’ movement of the Resistance 
came from Rodolfo Morandi, who was a member of the Socialist Party, President of the 
National Liberation Committee for High Italy14 (CLNAI), and later Minister of Industry 
and Commerce from July 1946 to May 1947. Morandi shared with Togliatti the need for 
unitary politics, but until 1948 he openly differed from the PCI’s approach as based on 
abstractions devoid of any understanding of working class subjectivity. In particular, 
Morandi objected to nature of the Communist Party as a party for the class, and sought 
instead to establish a party of the class. He argued that, in the immediate postwar period, 
the workers’ councils were the proper democratic organisms, along with the CLNs, that 
were capable of establishing a decentralized form of economic planning to meet the 
interests and the needs of the class and the people. It was these organisms, with their 
political experience in the Resistance, Morandi argued, that should have formed the basis 
of the postwar order.  
Upon his return from exile in Switzerland, Morandi began editing the clandestine 
journal Politica di Classe (Class Politics). In the journal’s first number, Morandi laid out 
his critique of the Communist’s conception of the masses and the role of the party. While 
his position had formed during the 1930s in his work at the Centro socialista (Socialist 
Center), the anticipated demise of fascism and role of the left in the Resistance provided a 
unique opportunity for his critique. In “An open letter to the communist comrades,” 
Morandi criticized the party’s decision-making procedures as separate from the practical 
experience of the masses; in short, the PCI lacked any respect for democratic procedures. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  The National Liberation Committee for Northern Italy (CLNAI, Comitati di 
Liberazione Nazionale per l’Alta Italia), was the central body of the CLN for the German 
occupied North dating from November 1943 until the end of the war. In January 1944 the CLNAI 
attained formidable governing powers in the Northern regions and was responsible for 
coordinating the Northern Resistance.  
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Rather, in confronting the masses, the party was viewed as an “instrument to maneuver” 
the masses behind a political line that was determined within the party (quoted in Merli 
1958, 567). As a result of this top-down approach, Morandi charged that the communists 
failed to take account of “certain necessities” felt by the workers. In the same edition, 
Socialist Lelio Basso, wrote an article based on an inquiry of workers’ concerns in the 
summer of 1944 in several Milan factories. Basso, supporting Morandi’s critique, found 
that workers were “hostile towards the introduction of political organisms (in this case, 
the CLN of the factory)” as these groups failed to respect the “autonomous initiative of 
the workers” (Merli 1958, 569). The Communists, Morandi argued, did not claim their 
power as a class party, but as a party for the class. In this self-proclaimed role of being 
for the class, Agosti notes that Morandi viewed the Communists position as “supported 
by a concept of power separate from the masses”: for them the party was seen as “an 
instrument … for the conquest of power with support from the masses, more than for the 
exercise of power by the masses” (1971, 453-4). By locating power in the ability of the 
party to direct the masses, the PCI acted more like commanders of an army, where the 
role of the masses was to follow orders.  
This relationship between power and the party was central to Morandi’s vision of 
how the Socialist Party should have conducted itself in the postwar period. The role of 
the party, he wrote in the same letter noted above, should have been that of an organism 
in which the “masses express their political interests and the means by which the party 
should lead” (Merli 1958, 567). Power had to be located in the masses with the party 
serving as an instrument of their will. Thus, for Morandi, the party must be a place for 
debate, discussion, and proposals for political action (D’Agostino 1988, 57-80). This 
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understanding and respect for the will of the people did not rest on an abstract or 
nonexistent situation. Rather, Morandi saw in the Resistance the affirmation of these 
democratic principles and the organizational potential upon which to establish a postwar 
order based on a democratic renewal of economic and political life.   
Taking his cue from the political experience of the Resistance, Morandi saw the 
possibility for a democratic renewal derived from the popular energy that was so 
emphatically displayed during the April 1945 insurrection and liberation of the North and 
the organizational apparatuses central to those affairs. During the insurrection, workers 
established management councils for the preservation of industry and production against 
Nazi sabotage and destruction, as managers and bosses fled in fear of reprisals. These 
councils were given juridical recognition by the CLNAI, and brought with them into the 
postwar period a commitment by the anti-Fascist parties to employee participation in the 
workplace. The establishment of the management councils added a further lever to 
workers’ power and representation in the workplace, building off the committees for 
agitation and internal committees that had already been established in previous years. 
Morandi interpreted the institutions of the Resistance—the management councils, the 
committees of agitation, the committees of national liberation, et cetera—as not only the 
nascent forms of self-governance, but as embodying the only legitimate and “thus the true 
foundation and incoercible force of the new democracy” (1958, 141). It must be noted 
that he did not view these organisms as indelible institutions, but as the organizational 
response to a “fleeting situation” (Ibid, 74). Further, they were not seen as model 
organizations, but as entities capable of evolving into instruments of political action 
directed by mass participation in the postwar order. The push towards a democratic 
	   28	  
renewal in the postwar had to derive from the energy and organizational work of the 
Resistance. In short, the workers’ organizations that derived from the Resistance 
provided the political space for the potential of workers’ control and a decentralized, 
councilist form of economic planning. 
 Morandi’s position was embedded within the generally accepted position of 
political unity between the antifascist parties of the CLNs and in the proposed 
Constituent Assembly, held in April 1946. Morandi stated his preference for autonomy of 
the political parties’ conduct without breaking unity, but this position, much like the 
position of the PCI during the period, represented an unrealistic assessment of the 
political forces at hand. The clearest example of this was in the widespread acceptance of 
the central State, by the majority of the parties, with its residues of the fascist prefect 
system intact, as the proper political arena for the new democratic order. The PCI’s 
prospect of “progressive democracy” did not see the restoration of the bourgeois state as 
an obstacle, but as a foregone conclusion. The Christian Democrats, along with the 
Liberals, wanted a return to the pre-1918 liberal state.15 Only the Actionists supported 
Morandi’s vision, but they lacked the necessary political weight to have a significant 
effect. His position was further hampered when, in the autumn of 1945, as the first 
postwar government (the Parri government) hobbled along, the CLNs were dissolved. 
The Liberals (with support from the DC) effected a change in government, as they 
withdrew support for Parri, leading to the first De Gasperi government in December 
1945. During the autumn, Agosti writes, “the theme of the CLNs as organs of popular 
initiative, matrices for the creation of new revolutionary institutions, was abandoned by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Philosopher and prominent Senator of the Liberal Party, Benedetto Croce interpreted 
fascism as a twenty year “parenthesis” that interrupted the historical march of liberty as embodied 
in the Giolittian era (Duggan 1995, 6).  
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all” (1971, 417). While the anti-fascist alliance slowly eroded the hopes for Morandi’s 
vision of a postwar democratic order, he focused his efforts on the newly formed 
management councils as organs of democracy within the economic order.  
Morandi viewed the management councils, legally established by an order of the 
CLNAI at the end of the Resistance, as the basis for developing a rationally managed 
socialist society. They were essential in the transitional period as organs to maintain 
production which, given the bosses failure to do such, was seen in itself as a radical 
expression of workers’ power (Foa 1973, 446). But, as the bosses regained control over 
the production process, Morandi was left to defend these councils as “instruments of 
democratization” within the restoration of capitalist control over reconstruction (1958, 
126). Yet, as workers began to lose political clout, Morandi increasingly insisted on the 
need to legalize the councils as necessary guarantees for workers’ liberty within the 
national economy. Increasingly, Morandi’s vision was more and more untenable as 
power relations between the capitalist class and the worker and popular classes shifted in 
favor of the former. Importantly, as Vittorio Foa highlights, the councils began to assume 
an increasingly collaborationist line, with workers’ representatives not only chosen by 
management, but they also served as a disciplinary force to control the workforce within 
the factory (1973, 455). Whether the councils could have served a different purpose is a 
question that was overcome by contingent historical factors, which we turn to next. But 
their main importance here is in demonstrating how they served, within Morandi’s 
formulation of a democratic renewal of Italian economic and political life, as an example 
of a possible alternative to Statist capitalist reconstruction.  
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 For both Morandi and Togliatti, the central difficulty of the period resided in the 
tension between constructing a socialist society without rupturing the Resistance 
coalition. The empirical record of each demonstrates this as they held important 
ministerial positions in the immediate postwar period, but had little effect or control over 
reconstruction. In fact, at each crucial turn, both the Socialist Party and the Communist 
Party sacrificed economic control over reconstruction, and compromised major 
components of their political goals in order to maintain political unity. Moreover, when 
they were expelled from government in May 1947, they were not only dismayed, but they 
put most of their energy in trying to regain a united politics. That is, the shifting balance 
of power in economic and political terms effectively put the PCI and the PSI on the 
defensive. As a result, both parties rescinded or watered down key aspects of their 
political positions in order to retain their political space and power within the 
government. This strategic decision had fateful consequences for the nature of 
reconstruction and, particularly, the ability of the workers to exercise any control over the 
formulation of development policy.  
The “fourth party” and the end of political unity 
The unity politics that characterized the first phase of reconstruction (1945-1947) 
stumbled through a series of questions that concerned the nature of reconstruction. With 
the restoration of capitalist power in the workplace, and subsequent bosses’ attack on 
workers’ power, and the failure of the left to link worker militancy to a concrete political 
program, the balance of forces within the government shifted toward a respect and 
deference to the needs of what De Gasperi called the “fourth party,” the captains of 
industry. In addressing the myriad problems of reconstruction—unemployment, monetary 
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stability, industrial production, and control over the economy—the resounding defeat of 
the working class took place in the crucial years of 1947-8 with the expulsion of the left 
from government and the formation of a DC-business alliance that assured a postwar 
social order controlled and led by the needs of private enterprise and the state. This 
postwar order was based on a law and order governing philosophy that coincided with 
massive workplace repression. The main import of this period is that the political and 
economic affairs developed into the governing pattern that dominated the 1950s.  
  As we saw above, political concerns were expressed in the name of unity and 
focused primarily on national problems. The Resistance had put off the institutional 
question of the monarchy and the structure of government until after the defeat of Nazi-
fascism. This position was solidified with the Palmiro Togliatti’s “svolta di Salerno,” 
which gave recognition to Badoglio’s military-Monarchist government in April 1943. All 
questions were set aside until after the war, when the CLNs held a national election to 
determine the composition of a Constituent Assembly, which deliberated on the course of 
the postwar political order. But the recognition and participation by the CLN parties in 
national government signified that by the end of the war the political structure would 
remain centralized in Rome, rather than follow a position along the lines of Pietro 
Nenni’s (and Morandi’s) call for a federated structure of power based on the CLN model. 
This option was virtually nullified by the “Protocols of Rome” agreement between the 
CLNAI and the Supreme Allied Command, which stipulated, inter alia, that the CLNAI 
relinquish all authority and powers of local governance upon liberation (Ginsborg 1990, 
57). And, in fact, as noted above, the CLNs were stripped of power by fall of 1945, with 
politics centralized in the first postwar government, a provisional National Council led by 
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the Actionist, and well-liked resistance leader, Ferruccio Parri. In this manner, the 
structure of governance was centralized in the National Council at Rome, with any 
further considerations to be taken up by the Constituent Assembly.  
 Political developments in the fall and winter of 1945 produced major setbacks for 
the left’s hopes of realizing their political agenda in the postwar order. In December 
1945, the Parri government fell as the Liberal Party withdrew from government. The 
agreed replacement, DC leader, and Foreign Affairs Minister, Alcide De Gasperi, 
proceeded to water down the function and purpose of the upcoming assembly. Reversing 
a previous agreement signed by the CLN leaders in June 1944 that stipulated the 
functions of the Constituent Assembly as a legislative body, De Gasperi limited the 
functions of the assembly to the drafting of a constitution. Further, the question of the 
monarchy was to be settled by a referendum in the national election rather than by the 
assembly. Last, the date for the national election was put off until April 1946. Each of 
these decisions went against the left’s position. In particular, the latter was directly aimed 
at weakening their electoral support, and possible control over the assembly, by, in the 
words of the Allied Command, letting the “molten lava of 1945” cool off (quoted in 
Ginsborg 1990, 45). The left acceded to these changes lest they risked a governing crisis, 
which could have possibly led to an Allied intervention or Monarchist and Fascist 
provocation.  
 The general election of April 1946, and the subsequent drafting of the 
Constitution, established the working class and the PSI and PCI as central forces in the 
postwar order. The referendum, however, while favoring the republic by a measure of 54 
to 46, demonstrated regional differences between the North and the South with the latter 
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overwhelmingly favoring the monarchy. This outcome can be explained not only by 
historic differences between the two regions, but also by the difference experiences of 
liberation and occupation. That the Resistance failed to exert a salient affect in the South 
did not, however, prevent the left from gaining a majority of the national vote. In 
determining seats to the Constituent Assembly the PSIUP and PCI, respectively, gained 
20.7% and 19% of the votes, while the DC received 35.2%. The former parties were 
bound together by a unity of action pact, and, as such, had the capacity to control the 
majority vote in the assembly. The result of the left’s power can be seen in the 
Constitution, which enumerates a few pro-worker provisions. For example, Article 4 
claims the “right to work” and to promote the means necessary to ensure this right. 
Article 39 guarantees trade-union liberty and the juridical recognition of unions. Article 
46 guarantees the right of workers to participate in factory management. Article 45 favors 
the artisan class against speculators. And article 42 stipulates the legality and juridical 
recognition of private property, but allows for its expropriation. Thus, the Constitution, 
while not a socialist document, gave formal recognition to the centrality of work and the 
worker in the postwar order.  
 These worker protections, however, when put to the test by the difficulties of 
economic reconstruction, were not sufficient to prevent the shifting balance of power in 
favor of the bosses and political control by the Democratic Christians. As a matter of 
principle, the leading industrial trade group, Confindustria, sought to reestablish absolute 
freedom in the workplace. The group took aim at the CLN laws establishing the 
management councils and a statute that prohibited firings. Regarding the former, Angel 
Costa, President of Confindustria, proclaimed that, in the workplace, “[it is the] principle 
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of authority which must perforce be respected…. Now the concept of workers’ control 
threatens that principle of authority; it is the superior who must control the inferior, never 
the inferior who controls the superior” (in Ginsborg 1990, 74).  
Following Costa’s lead, industrialists waged three years of class war against the 
principle of workers’ participation that changed the councils from organs whose primary 
function was to ensure a well-disciplined workforce and efficient production, to mere 
consultative bodies, until they were dissolved in the late 1940s. For Confindustria, the 
councils were, in principle, a threat to their control in the workplace, and had to be 
rejected on these grounds, regardless of their economic or productive merits. The 
councils were composed of four representatives from the workers and four from 
representatives of capital, with final authority residing with the company president. By 
1947 there were approximately 500 management councils, but they lacked juridical 
recognition and they lacked guidelines for proceeding. In late 1946, Morandi introduced 
legislation to establish the councils in law and to regulate the functioning of the 
management councils, to ensure the participation of workers, as a political force, in 
reconstruction.16 But Confindustria retained a hostile attitude towards the legislation that 
included the intimidation of businesses that supported the councils (Morandi 1958, 239-
240). In the end, the automobile company Fiat took the initiative by imposing a 
consultative role on the councils. The De Gasperi government approved Fiat’s position, 
effectively breaking the CLN agreement to ensure worker participation in the workplace 
(Harper 1986, 150; Ginsborg 1990, 97). Morandi’s bill failed to pass through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Despite their collaborative role in capitalist reconstruction, Morandi defended 
legalizing the councils in order to “affirm a new conception of industry as a social phenomenon 
and collective force of work” (1958, 125).  
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conservative legislature, and, by 1947, with the expulsion of the left from government, 
the councils were, for all intents, finished.  
 The capitalist class also targeted the April 1945 statute pronounced by the CLNAI 
that prohibited firings. The prohibition was seen as a necessary safeguard of workers 
political gains against massive postwar unemployment (Foa 1973, 438). But the 
industrialists used this safeguard to attack worker protection as a hindrance to the renewal 
of productivity and, by extension, as an obstacle to job creation. The bosses directed their 
energies to working out an agreement with the trade unions. In September 1945 the CGIL 
conferred a partial agreement that became formalized in January 1946, which 
progressively relaxed the prohibition on worker firings. This reversal was of significant 
political value for the capitalist class; “the unblocking of firings,” Foa writes, 
was much more than a problem of costs for the companies involved, it was a general 
political problem … of not making a minimal concession on the bosses full control over 
labor power … it treats the right to fire as a preliminary condition for the capitalist 
reconstruction (1973, 439).17  
 
Thus, while the Constitution guaranteed the right to employment and committed itself 
towards those ends, these imprecise “fundamental principles”18 of the new republic 
foundered against the more powerful “right to fire,” a central feature of the “fourth 
party’s” exclusive right to the “principle of authority.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 One consequence of bosses’ power was that in October 1946 workers were forced to 
accept a temporary (a six-month, renewable) wage freeze, despite a 50% inflation rate. There 
were waves of spontaneous strike actions against unemployment and inflation, but there were no 
organized work stoppages at a national level, never mind any action that was directed towards 
political goals of the working class. Indeed, the left did not want to be identified impeding 
reconstruction efforts, nor did it want to upset the governing coalition.  
 
18 The “right to work,” stipulated in Article four of the Constitution was part of the 
“fundamental principles” of the republic. In January 1948 the Court of Cassation effectively 
eliminated the importance of these principles, as they interpreted the “fundamental principles” as 
long-term goals that could be superseded to meet the immediate economic needs of the country.  
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 The problem of unemployment and the ban on firings was only one subset of 
problems confronting Italy’s postwar economic recovery. The industrialists’ bid to retain 
the right to fire was a political result that was peripherally connected to the more 
fundamental problem of industrial production. 19  In the 1940s Italian industry was 
characterized by technological backwardness and a lack of dynamism.  From the end of 
the war to 1948 production went from less than one-third to 80 percent of its 1938 level.20 
The key difficulty resided in the lack of natural resources necessary for industrial 
production. Thus, monetary policy became a determining feature of reconstruction, as 
Italy needed to achieve monetary stability in order to be able to acquire the necessary 
imports that would allow industry to increase production and become competitive in 
international markets.  
 The decision to establish an open economy was agreed upon by the leading 
orthodox economists. But the question of whether Italy would integrate into the budding 
European market was not decided until 1947-8 when the United States’ Marshall Plan, 
and expulsion of the left parties from the government, ensured Italy’s participation in the 
pro-West, Cold War bloc. Prior to those events, leading economists had continuously 
argued that the authoritarian and autarchic nature of government control experienced 
during the rule of fascism was a significant enough argument in favor of open trade 
(aside from the need for natural resources that made the “self-sufficiency” aims of 
Mussolini utterly absurd). The remarkable feature for the working class, in terms of trade 
policy, was the complete lack of influence by the left in affecting policy in a desirable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Much of this discussion draws from the introduction in Augusto Graziani’s L’economia 
italiana (1972).  
 
20  For the problem of industrial recovery and production and its connection with 
monetary policy, see Bruno Foa’s Monetary Reconstruction in Italy (1949).  
	   37	  
manner. The left consistently failed to control industrial renewal and monetary policy, 
resulting in a greater control over the economy by business interests (Graziani 1972, 25). 
This was evident with respect to inflation and stabilization of the lira. The importance of 
these policy areas, Vittorio Foa notes, was that “behind the veil of monetary measures 
[were] hidden the decisive choices for the economic structure of the country” (1973, 
435). In dealing with each question we will see how the bid for control over the 
determination of these policies established the essential premises for the expulsion of the 
left from government in May 1947.  
 Inflation plagued the Italian economy throughout postwar reconstruction. Both 
money and price inflation were central problems that led to difficulties in maintaining a 
favorable balance of payments for the necessary imports for industrialization that resulted 
in massive deficit spending by the government and disastrous devaluation of the lira in 
currency exchange markets. For example, the price index, taking 1938 as the basis, rose 
to 858 in 1944, but then exploded to 2060 in 1945 and 2884 in 1946 before almost 
doubling at 5159 in 1947 (Graziani 1972, 26-7). Initially the government responded by 
establishing rations of basic goods and supports for crucial necessities such as bread.  But 
the question of how to solve the problem of inflation was mired in ideological battles 
over the role of the state in regulating the value of the lira in the National Council as the 
two important ministries, the Treasury and Finance, were in the hands of the Liberal 
Epicarmo Corbino and Communist Mauro Scoccimarro, respectively.  
 How to confront inflation was necessarily derived from an understanding of its 
causes. In the winter of 1945, Treasury Minister Scoccimarro proposed a plan aimed at 
eliminating, what he considered, an excessive amount of money in the economy. His plan 
	   38	  
included a progressive government tax on monetary exchange in order to reduce the 
amount of money in circulation and give the government some control in redistributing 
money for reconstruction. The measure met opposition from the newly appointed 
Treasury Minister, the economist and Liberal Party member, Epicarmo Corbino. The 
latter was able to effect liberalization of currency exchange and served to prevent 
Scoccimarro’s plan. The liberal economists saw the problem of inflation primarily in 
terms of government expenditure and thus were not apt to meddle with liquid currency 
(De Grand 1989, 103; Graziani 1972, 28-9).   
 The liberalization of the economy proceeded in another important direction, 
international exchange and the question of control over profits from exports. It will be 
recalled that most parties favored a form of free exchange; as Togliatti noted, Italy was 
not in an appropriate situation for control (1945, 331-4). But the left did want to control 
speculation, which was rampant after a boom in exports in 1945 (primarily in the textile 
sector). In March 1946, the assembly drafted a law on profits from exports that granted 
industry the free use of 50% of the foreign currency while the government would buy the 
other 50% at 125 lire per one dollar (Foa 1949, 48-54). As a result, the government ceded 
control of reconstruction to the private sector, vitiating the possibility for an effective use 
and distribution of funds for reconstruction (Ibid, 51). But inflation plagued the export 
sector throughout the fall of 1946 until September 1947 forcing a serious governing crisis 
that reached its zenith in May 1947. 
 The question of exchange rates and value of the lira were of particular concern in 
order to ensure economic reconstruction. As noted above, Italian industry was dependent 
on the importation of primary sources for industrialization. Under the Bretton Woods 
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system the Italian lira was pegged to the dollar. From the period of 1945 to 1949 the lira 
suffered serious devaluation as it went from a rate of 100 lire to the dollar to 625 lire to 
the dollar, reaching the outstanding low of 900 lire to the dollar in November 1947 
(Sassoon 1986, 25). The continued weakening of the lira was part of a vicious cycle of 
deficit financing and inflation that threatened the economy in the early months of 1947, 
and that climaxed in the governing crisis of May 1947 and the deflationary policies led 
by Einaudi in September 1947.  
 In early 1947 both inflation and the exchange rate matters suffered rapid 
deterioration. Inflation throughout the first half of 1947 was at 50% and the value of the 
lira fell from 528 in January to 909 in June. The inability to resolve divisions between the 
Treasury and Finance Ministers was overcome in January when De Gasperi consolidated, 
as part of a reshuffling of the cabinet to reduce the influence of the PCI, the two 
ministries and appointed the position to DC member, Campilli. This was part of an 
increasing recognition by De Gasperi that he had to expel the left in order to enact the 
type of “tough internal measures” that the Americans demanded in turn for further aid. 
As an exclamation point on the utter failure of the parties of the left to control the process 
of reconstruction, De Gasperi, in a speech to the Council of Ministers on April 30, 
invoked the “fourth party” that needed to be part of the governing process. De Gasperi 
stated:  
There is in Italy a fourth party other than the Christian Democrats, Communists and 
Socialists, which is capable of paralyzing and rendering vain every effort by organizing 
the sabotage of the national loan, the flight of capital, inflation and the diffusion of 
scandal campaigns. Experience has taught me that Italy cannot be governed today unless 
we bring into the government, in one form or the other, the representatives of this fourth 
party, which disposes of the nation’s wealth and economic power (in Sereni 1948, 27).  
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In order to confront economic problems, De Gasperi remained committed to leaving 
reconstruction in the hands of private initiative (which had been established throughout 
but was strengthened in March 1946 with the exchange control measures), he weakened 
the power of the left within the ministries, and began to promote a more intimate 
relationship with a technocratic apparatus capable of ensuring the interests of the “fourth 
party” in its attempt to control Italy’s run-away inflation and monetary problems.  
 Just weeks after his April 30th speech, De Gasperi resigned as President of the 
National Council; Italy’s economic problems had produced a veritable governing crisis. 
Perhaps the immediate cause of the crisis was the Communist’s refusal to go along with 
any new proposals put forth by De Gasperi. But a more likely scenario was that De 
Gasperi had been under pressure from the Vatican, the United States, and domestic 
industry and finance sectors to run the country without the PCI and the PSI (Harper 1986, 
130-3).21 In any case, De Gasperi resigned on May 12 and the Constituent Assembly was 
unable to form a government until De Gasperi agreed to head a new government based on 
collaboration between the DC and a technocratic administration, with the exclusion of the 
PCI and PSI. On May 31, De Gasperi formed a new government that included two 
important appointments, Luigi Einaudi as Minister of the Budget (a newly created post) 
and Mario Scelba as Minister of Interior. The government passed a vote of confidence in 
June, establishing the parameters of governing power for the next 15 years.  
 Einaudi had previously been president of the Bank of Italy, and in the new 
government he assumed full control over the government’s expenditures. As head of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The international climate and onset of the Cold War were important factors in these 
decisions, among which must be considered the coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1947, the 
enunciation of the Truman Doctrine in March, and the embryonic stages of the European 
Recovery Plan and the Marshall Plan. 
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newly created Budget Ministry, Einaudi confronted rampant inflation that approached a 
fifty percent rise in retail prices along with an increasingly devalued lira in the 
international exchange markets. His immediate duties were to stop and root out the 
inflationary problems in the economy, and to stabilize the lira, so that Italy could open 
the currency to free exchange as per its obligations as a member to the IMF (Italy joined 
the IMF in March 1947). Throughout the summer of 1947 the Budget, Finance, and 
Treasury Ministers, all seasoned economic liberals, formulated a plan of action that was 
fine-tuned with consultation by the commercial banks in August. The resulting agreement 
imposed credit controls targeted at reducing the amount of credit inflation in the economy 
with banks holding a dangerous amount of illiquid assets, backed by an increasingly 
“insolvent government” (Foa 1949, 120). The terms of the August 1947 agreement 
resulted in mandating banks to invest a determined (initially 15, leading to 25) percent of 
their total deposits in government securities.  
 Einaudi’s credit controls had far-reaching consequences: it was successful in 
halting inflation, it stabilized the dollar exchange, and put an end to widespread 
speculation in the stock market. But the credit controls also had a strong deflationary 
effect and produced an industry recession, cutting production by 20-25%, and damaged 
small business. But Einaudi’s intervention in the credit markets was a departure from his 
laissez-faire ideology and, as such, was at odds with the large industrial groups. The 
latter, represented by Confindustria, preferred to eliminate social spending as the 
appropriate policy to attack inflation. As we will see in more detail below, industrialists 
and big business were able to strike a series of measures to ensure their support for 
Einaudi’s deflationary policies, including the suppression of workers’ councils, the 
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freedom to fire workers, and full control over the workforce backed up with a “law and 
order” police force to suppress any protest by workers (Harper 1986, 138-9, 163).  
The most telling consequence of Einaudi’s credit controls was to shift the 
responsibility for investment from the private sector to the government. As Bruno Foa 
wrote in his account of Italy’s postwar monetary policies, “an unexpected by-product of 
the policies of Governor Einaudi … has been to increase the already large area of 
government power, and ultimate control, in the industrial field” (1949, 118). In order to 
finance large industry, the government was compelled to establish a special fund, the 
Istituto Mobiliare Italiano, to bolster heavy industry, particularly the ailing mechanical 
sector. In this way fascist industrial power was reinforced, as the IRI (Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale, Institute for Industrial Reconstruction), an industrial body 
created by Mussolini in 1933, became the principle base for industrial recovery and 
investment that served to revitalize Italian industry in the 1950s and 1960s. Thus, behind 
Einaudi’s credit controls we find the turn towards industrial reconstruction that favored 
large-scale corporate industry at the expense of small and medium businesses with the 
government assuming a central role in determining investment. This deflationary policy 
had the effect of producing a more general economic climate that crippled workers’ 
bargaining power, and when combined with the reassertion of the bosses’ demand for 
absolute freedom of control in the workplace, decimated the political power of the 
working class.  
 The weakening of workers’ power, from the high point of worker initiative at the 
end of the war, throughout the period of reconstruction was discussed above in terms of 
the failure of the PCI and PSI to utilize this militancy for real social and economic 
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reforms, favoring, instead, a strategy of electoral politics. This also marked the PCI’s 
policy during the fall of 1947 leading to the election of April 1948. During the fall, Italian 
industry, as part of its general consent to Einaudi’s credit deflation, launched an all-out 
campaign to eliminate workers’ power in the workplace that coincided with De Gasperi’s 
political attack on the organized working class and established an atmosphere that 
permitted the capitalist class to establish the basis for future capital accumulation. During 
the previous fall, the CGIL had agreed to a six-month wage truce, which was renewed in 
May 1947. With the onset of deflation in September, and industrial recession, 
unemployment rose to 1.6 million. Confindustria took advantage of this climate to launch 
an offensive and push for the right to fire workers, to eliminate the workers’ councils (see 
above), and to co-opt the workers’ Internal Commissions and turn them into instruments 
to regulate the workforce, in line with management’s political goals (Morandi 1958, 232). 
Workers protested throughout the fall and winter, but they were put down by the Scelba’s 
caribinieri22, and the working class was left to the electoral politics of the PCI.  
 The general election of April 1948 signified the defeat of the left and the 
installment of a Democratic Christian government that oversaw the transition from 
reconstruction to the economic development through the 1950s and early 1960s. In the 
build up to the election the DC initiated a split in the GCIL over worker protests, and 
communist influence in them, during the winter. The mass protests were widely viewed 
on the left as expressions of discontent that would transfer into an electoral victory for the 
PCI and PSI as they formed a Popular Front ticket on the ballot. But international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 One of the more important features of Scelba’s tenure as Interior Minister was his 
purging of former partisans from the caribinieri in the summer of 1947, which paved the way for 
the use of the police forces to suppress popular protest against the government’s economic 
policies.  
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events—the February coup in Czechoslovakia, the announcement of the Marshall Plan, 
and the further intensification of the Cold War—did not augur well for the left-wing 
parties. The details of American influence in the campaign are well known, and it will 
suffice to note here that American intervention consisted of an extensive anti-communist 
propaganda campaign, timely injections of financial assistance to Italy’s ailing economy, 
continued threats to withdraw aid should the left win, weapons transfers to the 
caribinieri, contingent plans for military invasion, the denial of emigration to the US for 
communist members and supporters, and immense funding of the Christian Democrats 
(Harper 1986, 155). Internally the campaign by the right was marked by a Manichean 
battle between the forces of freedom against totalitarianism, but, crucially, support for the 
DC was linked to future aid from the United States. In essence, the election looked more 
like a referendum on Italy’s incorporation into the recently announced Marshall Plan and 
European Recovery Program. The left, for its part, was, in the words of Paride Rugafiori, 
“delusional” (1974, 93). Their campaign was dismissive of the Marshall Plan, and they 
grossly underestimated the support for it among those who were not politically active. 
Indeed, the “crucial factor,” as De Grand notes, was the lower-middle class vote in favor 
the DC and the prosperity associated with the United States and the Marshall Plan (1989, 
114). The Christian Democrats won an outright majority with 48.5%, while the Popular 
Front won 31%, with the PCI earning the majority of the lefts’ votes (Ginsborg 1990, 
118). The election confirmed Italy’s participation in Western European recovery and its 
alignment with the American-led capitalist bloc.  
 Italy’s inclusion in the European Recovery Program signaled the international 
context and course of its economic reconstruction. For the next five years Italian industry 
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underwent a process of restructuring in order to become internationally competitive, with 
the export sector designated as the engine of economic growth. This process was aided by 
the administrative competencies of a host of leaders from the fascist era, as well as an all 
out attack on workers’ organization within the factory (Daneo 1975, 230). The bosses’ 
counteroffensive was well underway in the immediate postwar period, as discussed 
above, but took on a renewed sense of purpose as De Gasperi advocated the inclusion of 
the “fourth party” while simultaneously pushing the left out of government. This 
appeared to be inevitable, as the PCI represented a basic obstacle to De Gasperi’s vision 
of reconstruction, for which, “it was indispensable to have full confidence for the 
capability of free economic initiative at all levels, without discouraging efforts and 
investments” (Andreotti 1977, 82). This type of approach, while recognizable in the 
government’s failure to affect any type of control over course of reconstruction before 
Einaudi’s management of monetary policy, came into direct conflict with the hopes of 
social and economic reform maintained by the working class.  
Through the unitary trade union, which operated on the basis of consent between 
the three main parties—DC, PCI, PSIUP/PSI, the working class was deprived of its 
political initiative as early as January 1945 when, at the CGIL’s first national congress, it 
was agreed upon to have the power of contract centralized in the CGIL for all national 
categories of work. From this arrangement it was possible for the CGIL to not only 
connect the working class to the political problems of the national government, but also 
meant that the trade union negotiated all aspects of labor relations with trade groups, such 
as Confindustria, on a national basis, ultimately depriving local or provincial shops from 
the ability to effectively assert their particular demands (Foa 1975, 59-62). The 
	   46	  
consequences of this arrangement became evident, as trade groups were able to rest 
considerable concessions from the union. We have seen above the overturning of the 
prohibition on firings, the negation of workers’ participation through the watering down 
and ultimate removal of the management councils, and the wage-truce enacted during a 
time of rampant inflation (Fall 1946-Fall 1947). Moreover, trade groups were able to 
reinstall the system of piecework, and they established the gabbie salariale, which 
established wages scales according to industry, region, sex, skill, and age (Barkan 1984, 
20-5).  
After the defeat of the left in the April 18 elections, the situation for the working 
class was made increasingly tenuous. The unitary trade union fell apart in August 1948 as 
the Catholic factions left the CGIL in protest over the political nature of union activity by 
the Socialists and Communists. The DC had consistently held the view that the union 
should be concerned solely with the matters inside the workplace, in that they had rights 
in the workplace and that they could make statutory claims through contractual 
negotiations; in no manner should the union, according to the DC, make political strikes, 
or hinder the “free economic initiative” of capital. As political strikes mounted in the 
winter of 1947-8, the Catholic faction of the CGIL sought avenues for leaving the trade 
union, and, in August, after workers responded to the attempted assassination on Togliatti 
in July with massive protests and insurrections, the catholic faction split, putting an end 
to trade-union unity. The worker protests of July have been heralded as the last act of 
partisans in the factory (Foa 1973, 447). In the following years, working class militancy 
would be beaten asunder as industrialists began modernizing the production process by 
importing American technology under the guise of the Marshall Plan, and gearing 
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production needs toward the export markets of Europe, enhanced by the ongoing 
integration of European economies as part of the ERP. Now that the left had been 
removed from political power, it was time for the bosses to exercise the “principle of 
authority,” in Angel Costa’s words, and break any attempt at worker insubordination and 
impose its strategy for capital accumulation and market expansion.  
The “hard years” and the politics of the “economic miracle” 
The general elections of 1948 established the Christian Democrats as the governing body 
for the next 15 years. A series of factors interwove throughout this period that generated a 
climate conducive to the restoration of capitalist development and accumulation. We 
have seen above the control by liberal economists over the core governing ministries of 
the economy. Simultaneously, the Italian economy became positioned within an 
international setting that would give rise to the “golden age” of international trade, with 
Italy firmly entrenched in the budding stages of European economic integration that came 
out of the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan). Moreover, the international 
economic climate was abetted by an increasingly polarized Cold War climate that 
provided an ideological cover for a domestic wave of anti-worker and anti-communist 
attacks. Thus, the Italian reconstruction and economic renewal of the 1950s was marked 
by an attack on workers and the left parties combined with state and private economic 
activity that generated a veritable revolution in Italian society over the course of the next 
generation.  
 It has been remarked that the period of the so-called “economic miracle” was 
premised on either “labor docility” or the relative low wages of Italian workers vis-à-vis 
other European nations (Wright 2002, 10; Barkan 1984, 37). But, as Sassoon argues, 
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these positions fail to account for the central role played by the State in investing in basic 
infrastructure that facilitated private sector expansion (1986).23 To make things more 
clear, it is useful to distinguish between two phases: 1952-1958 as a preparatory phase 
marked by industrial restructuring and a “long and intense phase of capital accumulation 
and investment,” and the period of economic expansion—based on exportation, 
investment, and consumption—from 1958-1963 (Salvati 1984, 14).  
The initial phase of industrial restructuring coincided with the beginning of the 
Marshall Plan and control over credit and investment funds by the IRI. The latter, by 
1952, had vast control over the banking system, cast iron and iron mineral production, 
and armament production, along with significant holdings in engineering, electricity, and 
radio broadcasting sectors. But the primary role of IRI in this early phase was as a lender 
to private firms, and, to a lesser extent, as an investor in housing and public works 
programs (i.e., construction of the highway system, autostrade). The Marshall Plan was 
primarily responsible for providing Italian industry with advanced technology that began 
a sharp phase of modernization and investment in industrial plants. The upshot of the 
Marshall Plan was the intense application of Fordism to Italian industry. The construction 
of factories for the manufacturing of mass goods destined for mass consumer markets 
with workers performing a particular function within the overall product’s assembly, 
though widely applicable in industrial countries before WWII, was a new phenomenon to 
Italian industry (a consequence of this process, which will be discussed in greater detail 
in the following chapter, was the mass deskilling of the work force, and the creation of 
structural mechanisms to incorporate the large mass of unemployed hand workers from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For the role of the State in protecting the automotive sector, and Fiat’s monopoly, see 
Francesca Fauri’s “The Role of Fiat in the Development of the Italian Car Industry in the 1950’s” 
(1996).  
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the South). The restructuring of industries along Fordist lines was a widespread 
phenomenon for Italian industry, as they sought to reduce internal costs in the production 
process. However, the State played an essential role in the renewal of industrial 
production in this early phase by creating the bases for industrial production (Salvati 
1984, 61).  
The leading political parties, as noted above, were anathema to State planning and 
intervention in the economy. But, after the deflationary policies of Einaudi, state firms 
took a lead role in providing investment that, combined with Marshall Plan funds, led to 
the expansion of key economic sector.24 In particular, the central growth areas of the 
1950s were in the production of consumer durable goods and, later, luxury goods. The 
winners of this process were giant industrial firms that focused on the production of steel, 
automobiles, electricity, petrochemicals, oil refineries, and synthetic fibers. Within these 
sectors, the role of the State was evident, as noted above with the role played by the IRI. 
However, as Sassoon emphasizes, the key moment occurred, in February 1953, with the 
creation of Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI) as a State industry controlling newly 
discovered methane gas in the Po Valley.  With the creation of the ENI, headed by Enrico 
Mattei, the State became an “authentic” participant in industrialization. In fact, ENI 
became a dominant actor in national investment accounting for as much as one-third of 
all investment by 1964. Through the establishment of state industries that could guarantee 
investment, the state-industrial sector, Sassoon writes, “succeeded in establishing those 
industrial infrastructures (cheap steel, cheap petrochemicals, a motorway system, cheap 
energy) which allowed rapid Italian economic growth” (1986, 41). Thus, economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Regarding the role of Marshall Plan funds and targeted industrial development, Joanne 
Barkan notes that “[b]etween 1948 and 1951, 70 percent of the plan’s loans went to the 
metallurgical, chemical, electrical, and mechanical industries” (1984, 37).  
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growth was directly influenced by large investments from the State sector and the 
introduction of additional funding and technological transfers by the Marshall Plan 
(Martinelli 1980).  
However, low wages, combined with the structural underpinnings of high 
unemployment and a “decimated working class,” to use Morandi’s expression in 1947, 
were also factors in the economic development of the 1950s. Since the end of the war, 
Italy had been characterized by high rates of unemployment, hovering around nine 
percent throughout the early 1950s. The process of industrial restructuring only worsened 
the situation as firings exceeded the generation of new jobs. However, the introduction of 
Fordist production allowed for a significant influx of unskilled agricultural workers from 
the South into Northern industry, where industrial renewal was largely concentrated. But, 
this high unemployment had the predictable effect keeping workers’ wages relatively 
low. Indeed, wages were largely stagnant throughout the 1950s, with the exceptional year 
of 1955 (Salvati 1984, 48). The ability to suppress wages while production increased was 
affected not only by unemployment, but also by an all out attack on the working class by 
the Italian business class and their political allies (see below). But a more general policy 
of wage suppression had been the unwillingness of the governing parties to industrialize 
the South, thus leaving the persistent dualism that characterized the division between 
North and South. Rather, policy was crafted to utilize the poor and unemployed in the 
South as a reserve army of labor to break the political power of workers in the North 
(Sassoon 1981, 36; Partridge 1996; Ginsborg 1990, 217-33). Low wages, however, were 
not only the product of masses of unemployed, but of the general weakening of the 
working class throughout the 1950s.  
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 The 1950s are known in Italian working class history as gli anni duri (the hard 
years), for the decimation of workers’ power that took place in the factories. The previous 
sections have illustrated the broader class war in the immediate postwar period, but with 
the expulsion of the left from government, the onset of the Cold War, and the 
deflationary policies of Einaudi, business leaders found themselves in an advantageous 
position to wipe out the vestiges of worker gains from the Resistance and realize their 
control over the work force.  Indeed, the basic premise of the bosses’ vision of 
reconstruction was based on the idea of absolute liberty in the workplace. Further, with 
the rejection of fascist autarchy and integration into international markets, it was 
necessary to restructure Italian production in order to compete.   
The immediate target, as alluded to above, of the bosses’ attack was the ban on 
layoffs and the need to fire redundant workers. The fall of 1947 marked the beginnings of 
mass firings in northern industry (c. 50-60,000 in Milan and 30-40,000 in Genoa), and 
were met with worker protests, which were met by the heavy repression of Interior 
Minister Scelba’s police as bloody encounters with law enforcement became a standard 
spectacle in the early 1950s. This police-state atmosphere led Camillo Daneo to remark 
that by the “winter of 1947-48, the Interior Minister and the police became instruments of 
political economy” (1975, 244). The trend was established, and during the next six years 
an estimated 75 protesters were killed and more than 5,000 wounded protesting economic 
conditions and government policy (Barkan 1984, 46). Thus, the bosses quickly 
established their right to fire, which was aided by the suppression of strike actions and 
public protests by the forces of law and order.  
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Within the workplace, bosses attacked workers’ representative bodies, as well as 
launched an all out offensive against militant workers.  Since strikes were being 
repressed, workers began occupying factories to prevent mass firings. The bosses’ 
responded with a compromise—workers would be suspended or offered a voluntary leave 
package (with the likely occurrence that the workers would be fired at a later date.) But 
the process of occupation led to an identification of militants who were then the direct 
target of persecution. The case of Fiat is demonstrative of the established pattern to 
punish militants. Under the leadership of Vittorio Valletta, Fiat began transferring 
militant workers to isolated sections of the factories. More drastic measures were soon 
enacted which included a general attack on the workers’ Internal Commissions. Militants 
on the commissions were targeted for firing, and in the early 1950s, thousands of CGIL 
members on the commissions were fired. The bosses were buttressed by the American 
position aimed at eliminating all communists from the commissions (Partridge 1986, 74). 
But the general activity of the Internal Commissions was also significantly curtailed: 
delegates were prevented from walking around the factory floor during work hours, they 
were prevented from posting any material about their activities, and management stopped 
consulting with the commissions. The climate was draconian. For example, all literature 
was banned from the factory (Accornero 1974, 28-36). Franco Platania, who worked at 
Fiat during the 1950s, captured the mood of the period:  
[y]ou were forced to be an individualist in that period. As the days went by, you found 
that you were losing your workmates, the comrades who could have helped you out…. 
[There was] permanent control of your private life: they [the security guards] watched 
you if you were talking with a mate; they checked how much time you spent in the toilet; 
who you talked with; how you dressed, etc. Needless to say, there were a whole number 
of individual acts of rebellion… (Red Notes 1979, 174-5).    
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Indeed, with security forces patrolling the shop floor, and repression continuing apace, it 
appeared that, substantively, little had changed from the years of fascism. 
The trade union movement did little to help the situation. In the late 1940s trade 
union unity gave way to the political factions of the Cold War. Aided by the United 
States and the Vatican, the Christian Democrats broke from the CGIL leading to the 
formation, on April 30, 1950, of the CISL. Their vision of trade unionism was based on a 
non-political role of putting forward basic wage claims (i.e., linking wages to 
productivity and profit) that could aid capital accumulation as a means for increasing 
domestic demand. Simultaneously, the Union of Italian Workers (UIL) was established 
(March 5, 1950) as a means of promoting a middle ground between the perceived 
government union (CISL) and communist faction (CGIL). For its part, the CGIL 
remained dominated by the PCI and also retained the largest following of workers. 
However, their political role continuously emphasized and reflected the international 
political situation of the communist movement as defined by the 1947 Cominform. Thus, 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, the CGIL launched political strikes against the 
Marshall Plan, Nato, the Korean War, and the general struggle for “peaceful 
coexistence.”25  
The split in the trade union movement did not represent a genuine shift in 
ideological vision, but rather was a direct reflection of power politics among the leading 
political parties. Hence, all of the unions remained in agreement on the need for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 The exception to this characterization, of course, was the mass campaign launched by 
the CGIL against the so-called legga truffa (“swindle law”). The governing DC coalition, in 
anticipation of the 1953 general elections, introduced a law that would give two-thirds of the seats 
in the Chamber of Deputies to any coalition that won more than 50 percent plus one of the 
national election.  
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production as the basis of workers politics (particularly short-sighted was the Communist 
position that emphasized the transition to socialism through the expansion of 
productivity, neglecting any understanding of workers’ control as central to the socialist 
project26) [Partridge 1996, 77]. Rather, the main concern of the three unions was that of 
competing for the bosses’ favor as workers’ representatives, seeking to defend the 
workers’ place within the hierarchical framework and disciplinary structure of capitalist 
control in the workplace. The bases of this defense, which would last well into the project 
of operaismo in the early 1960s, were the Constitutional provisions that stipulated the 
rights of labor. However, after the Court of Cassation ruling in January 1948, these 
provisions remained dead in practice as no formal labor relations system was established 
(Duggan 1995). The only mechanism for defending workers’ rights was protest, which, 
as we have seen, was violently suppressed. The consequence of this situation for the trade 
unions resulted in electoral competition for control of the internal commissions as part of 
the supine role of acquiring representative legitimacy by the bosses.  
In the climate of the Cold War, elections for the Internal Commissions took on 
epic proportions. The historic moment of the CGIL’s loss of control over the internal 
commission at Fiat in 1955 offers a telling example. In months before the election, 
management began an intense propaganda campaign combined with overt threats to 
anyone who might support the CGIL. Company guards were widely known to have 
conducted surveillance in working class quarters and to have monitored activity at the 
local FIOM headquarters, the metal-mechanics union. Further, the established routine of 
worker transfers and so-called “exile departments” was intensified. Last, political firings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Connected to the productivist ethic that underpinned the Communist position, was their 
view, held until the late 1950s, that the Italian economy would not recover or expand, thus 
leaving the working class as the “solution” to a degenerating economy (Daneo 1975, 320).  
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in the preceding year were unprecedented, with the CGIL reporting around 1,800 
militants and Internal Commission members fired (Barkan 1984, 45). The election was 
devastating for the CGIL, as it lost its position in the commissions, and workers defected 
en masse from the union. But the campaign was only one cause, and certainly not the 
determining factor. A more comprehensive understanding of the CGIL loss was the fact 
that the union had become a cinghia di trasmissione, a “transmission belt,”27 for PCI 
politics. The electoral defeat was a wake-up call for the CGIL as it confronted the stark 
realization that its neglect of worker concerns at the plant level had manifested itself in a 
loss of clout among the workers. In short, and as will be further developed in the next 
chapter, the 1955 loss of control in the Internal Commissions by the CGIL sparked a turn 
toward the factory within the trade union movement, which, after a few years of left-wing 
political tumult, would coincide with the sociological project of workers’ inquiry that 
would spark a new wave of worker militancy.  
Thus, the combination of State industry, Marshall Plan aid, investment in 
technological restructuring of production and plants, and decimation of workers’ power, 
provided the essential foundations for the massive expansion of productive activity 
during the years 1958-1963. The so-called “economic miracle” radically changed Italian 
society, producing a rupture with past modes of being that set off a period of intellectual 
and cultural ferment unparalleled in the country’s history. Not only had Italy entered a 
Fordist-consumerist phase of economic production, which, with a doubling of the 
national income between 1954 and 1964, brought consumer durable goods into homes 
(i.e., televisions, automobiles, refrigerators). The immediate industrial context was that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The phrase “transmission belt” was utilized to indicate the process by which decisions 
made within the hierarchy of the PCI would be put to the CGIL as the basis for its union activity.  
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the Italian economy became a leading exporter in key industrial sectors that were able to 
exploit the international market established by the European Common Market. The 
expansion of exports fed a doubling of investment (an average of 14% a years) in new 
machines and technology and the construction of industrial plants.  
In his book, Storia del miracolo italiano, Guido Crainz writes: “in Italy more than 
in other European countries old aspirations and elementary existence began to realize 
itself at the same time an explosion of new consumption and needs began occurring” 
(1996, 88). In a concrete manner, this was represented by the massive internal migration 
of southerners to the industrial North. But there was a more fundamental shift at play in 
the psychological outlook of the country. The rampant pessimism and fear that shaped 
people’s views in the early 1950s gave way to optimism, a desperate and radical hope 
that sought the possibility to attain a better condition of life. For the working class, and 
the left in general, the cultural and intellectual ground took another dramatic shift with 
the events of 1956 giving way to an intense period of self-criticism and creative 
experimentation. In the next chapter we will see how the intellectual ferment of the 
Destalinization period gave rise to a renewed democratic push from the working class 
and how theoretical innovation sought to influence this movement with a critique of 
postwar capitalism that became conceptualized as the “social factory.” As the postwar 
years demonstrated a failure to realize the more democratic goals of the Resistance, the 
period that began with the “economic miracle” witnessed an attempt to revitalize those 
ideas in a new historic moment. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CRISIS OF 1956 AND THE BIRTH OF AUTONOMOUS MARXISM: RANIERO 
PANZIERI AND THE ORIGINS OF QUADERNI ROSSI    
 
In these months, almost alone, we asked that the results of the XX Congress and the Khrushchev 
report be discussed together by the militants of the two parties, and in the meantime by the 
intellectuals of the two parties and by those intellectuals that will make a return to Marxism. 
Otherwise, we will have had, as we have had, silence.—Franco Fortini, “Letter to a communist”  
 
We need to fully recognize the urgency and necessity of a critical presence, of a scientific work, 
of a new stimulation and scientific equipping of the workers’ movement, in its politics and in its 
culture…. This means, substantially, a “return to Marx,” … as a “critique of ideology,” as the 
demystification of every ideological, political, and sociological absolutism, as free research and 
free scientific development; his vigorous force of emancipation or of liberation needs to be 
recovered today.—Raniero Panzieri, “Politics and culture” 
 
While the call to Marxism is becoming for the most part (from right to left) a cover for an 
ideological emptiness without precedent, and Leninism as an occasion to make citations, 
revolutionary theory needs to be constructed from the base, in praxis and in social analysis.—
Danilo Montaldi, “Sociology of a Congress” 
 
 
Introduction 
The facts of 1956 fundamentally altered the course of the Italian left. The “hard years” of 
the 1950s were characterized by a defensive workers’ movement and a stale and 
bureaucratic left-wing politics, culminating in the events of 1956—the XX Congress of 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Polish workers’ uprising in Poznan, and 
the Hungarian Revolution—which provided the conditions for a wave of self-criticism 
and a vibrant intellectual debate over the nature of socialism and communism in the 
postwar order. In this chapter, I examine the central tendency that emerges from this 
rupture within the theoretical and political activity of Raniero Panzieri, whose vision and 
energy focused on elaborating a way out of the cultural rigidity and moral and political 
degeneration that the left had become embroiled in during the course of postwar 
reconstruction. Panzieri focused his attention on generating an autonomous culture of the 
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left as an alternative to the bureaucratic and authoritarian politics of both Stalinism and 
revisionism (i.e., social democracy). In his alternative, the working class was the central 
political subject that could guarantee the generation of autonomous base institutions, 
which would expand in tandem with worker militancy and consciousness. This vision 
began to take full shape in the “workers’ control thesis” (1958), a small classic co-
authored with Lucio Libertini, which is usually the starting point for discussions of 
Panzieri’s thought, thus his close association with the tradition of operaismo.28 The 
purpose of this chapter, however, is to shed light on Panzieri’s operaismo as one 
component of a more elaborate explanation of working class culture and political action 
within that culture. This chapter demonstrates the rise of an autonomous left that emerged 
out of the events of 1956 and culminated in the experience and theoretical work of the 
journal Quaderni Rossi (Red Notebooks). And while this journal marks the beginning of 
a new tradition of operaismo, or of the “new left,” its real value resided in Panzieri’s 
original vision of it as a cultural “point of reference” dedicated to the renewal of the 
workers’ movement.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 With regards to the term operaismo: I leave it in Italian for the most part, at times 
substituting the lesser term “workerism”; for the most part the term is used interchangeably 
throughout the dissertation with “autonomous Marxism.” For the connection with Panzieri and 
the “new left,” see (Revelli 2005, 7-8; Balestrini and Moroni 1988). One of the purposes of the 
publication of Panzieri’s early writings in L’alternativa socialista and Dopo Stalin was to 
demonstrate the shortcomings of this view of Panzieri read only through the birth of the “New 
Left” (1982; 1986; Merli 1986, vii). Ironically, the term operaismo was attributed to Panzieri as a 
pejorative remark, that derived form the PCI in the postwar year to describe those members who 
wanted to work where workers were the dominant force, against his writings on workers’ control 
and autonomous cultural and political institutions (Ferrero 2005, 157). Nonetheless, Panzieri 
clearly distanced himself against the claim of being an operaista (Panzieri and Libertini 1958b, 
160). From within the Autonomist Marxist movement, Massimo Cacciari claimed Panzieri was 
not an “operaista” because he did not theorize the priority of the political and historical 
movements of the working class (Mangano 1992, 101). See chapter 4 and Mario Tronti’s 
“Copernican revolution.”  
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1956: towards an autonomous working class culture? 
Reflecting on the tumultuous events of 1956, Mario Tronti, a life-long member of the 
PCI, stated: “[they] allowed for a great mental opening” (2001, 1). At the nadir of left-
wing power in postwar Italy, the process of Destalinization and the sobering experiences 
of Poland and Hungary broke the mold from which the PCI and PSI had shaped left-wing 
culture. In this period, the culture of the left focused on electoral politics, class alliances, 
a renewal of the South as necessary to completing bourgeois democracy, an intellectual 
apparatus subservient to the party’s strategic needs, and unconditional support for the 
Soviet Union in the Cold War. Togliatti’s caustic remark that culture should contain the 
“imprint of the party” captures the party’s suffocation of culture in the 1950s (Merli 1986 
xxvii-xxviii). As we saw in the first chapter, Togliatti and the PCI defined the workers’ 
role in the “Italian Way to Socialism” in Third Internationalist terms: workers were to 
produce and be part of the advancement of productive forces, technologically and 
organizationally, and were, as such, the guarantors of economic development, which, at 
some point, would lead toward socialism. The chief enemies of the postwar PCI vision 
were the monopolists, who were posited as the backbone of the “long fascist nightmare,” 
and, by nature, incapable of effecting economic development. By the mid-to-late 1950s 
this interpretation was widely viewed as incorrect: monopolies, such as Fiat, proved to be 
the dynamic engines of economic growth and cultural transformation. This failure to 
understand the economic dynamics underway, along with a complete lack of 
understanding of the transformations taking place in the productive process and its effects 
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on the working class, came sharply into focus as the events of 1956 exposed the 
shortcomings of the PCI’s party-dominated culture.  
 In his “secret speech” to the CPSU during the XX Congress, Khrushchev 
denounced Stalin’s “cult of personality” and the crimes committed by Stalin against 
Communist Party comrades. In Italy, the Congress produced the usual discussions and 
analysis of Soviet affairs, but the secret report was virtually unknown (Nenni 1956; 
Panzieri 1956a). Throughout the spring, Togliatti and the PCI sought to avoid any 
discussion of the denunciation, preferring to focus on positive themes—the Italian Way 
to Socialism and the Gramscian heritage—in preparation for the elections that were held 
in late May. In fact, the only discussion of Stalin within the PCI took place in late March 
among the Party’s leadership, and this discussion was highly censored and controlled by 
Togliatti. Meanwhile, the report was leaked to the Western press and seized by anti-
communist propagandists to extol the citizenry about the evils of communism. The long 
silence of the PCI was breached when, in early June, the United States Government 
published a copy of the report, leaving little doubt about the fact of Khrushchev’s 
denunciation. With the May elections behind and the “secret speech” published, Togliatti 
was obliged to offer his remarks and understanding of the significance of the XX 
Congress.  
 Togliatti’s formal response was published in the June 17th issue of Nuovi 
Argomenti (“New Arguments”) in an essay entitled, “9 domande sullo Stalinismo” (9 
questions on Stalinism). In his assessment, Togliatti executed a political tract that 
defended the greatness of the Soviet Union as the home and leader of the international 
communist movement, as the leading democracy in the world (a theme widely held in the 
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left’s postwar culture), and he also put forward his notion of “polycentrism” as the way 
forward for the national communist parties and the international movement. It is 
noteworthy that Togliatti chose to speak of Stalin’s “errors” rather than crimes. The 
principal “errors” of Stalin consisted in the systematic “illegality” of the leadership. The 
resulting “negative errors” and their effects, Togliatti noted, did not displace the 
fundamental superiority of the Soviet model of democracy vis-à-vis the Western 
bourgeois democracies. In fact, he lauded Khrushchev’s report as an exemplary feature of 
the Soviet leadership’s commitment to expanding the already existing democratic 
features of their society (1956, 114, 116). Togliatti’s chief criticism of the report, which 
set the PCI apart from its Western counterparts, was aimed at the misleading criticism of 
the “cult of personality” as responsible for the “errors” that had occurred. By focusing on 
the attributes of one individual man, Togliatti wrote, “they avoid the true problems, 
which reside in the ways that, and why, soviet society was able to reach a certain form of 
departure from the democratic and legal path that they were following.” To amend this 
situation, and to ensure that these “errors” did not arise again, Togliatti called for the 
Soviets to study and understand how these “errors” arose through “the diverse stages of 
development of their society,” and not rely on the spurious claims that attributed this 
“degeneration” to the acts of an individual man (Ibid, 126).  
 Despite this criticism of Khrushchev’s report, Togliatti remained faithful to the 
role of the party as the capable arbiter of judgment and director of political action. This is 
evident from a variety of points, but this same article suffices. First, his prescriptions for 
the renewal of Soviet society depended on the emanation of a “critical energy from the 
top,” in order to instruct the masses about how to live in a democratic society. Second, 
	   62	  
the international communist movement needed to maintain an “unlimited trust in the 
Soviet Communist Party and their leaders.” Indeed, so depraved had the PCI become in 
its logic of party dominance and electoral politics, that this “trust” was the highest form 
of “revolutionary activity” that the working class could perform during this period (Ibid, 
132). Thus, the nature of “democratic” renewal from Togliatti’s perspective resided, not 
in any new form of participation, or engagement by the base of the party, never mind 
from the workers, but was based on a top-down model with the initiative coming from the 
top, the leadership of the party. Within the international communist movement he 
articulated an unbound faith in the Soviet Union, but introduced a break with the 
prevailing Cominform politics. In the last section of the article, Togliatti introduced the 
concept of  “polycentrism” as the correct path to follow, against the idea of Soviet 
leadership and guidance: “in the communist system one cannot speak of a unique guide, 
but of a progress that often works by following diverse paths” (Ibid, 139). The 
international communist movement, for Togliatti, needed to be autonomous from the 
USSR while retaining its essential faith in, and historic respect for, the soviet model. 
Through this interpretation of the XX Congress, Togliatti sought to maintain an historic 
continuity of the international communist movement based on the central role of the 
Russian Communist Party as a guide, albeit given a certain measure of autonomy to the 
national parties of the communist movement. However, the subsequent events in Poland 
and Hungary gave lie to this polycentric vision.   
 Togliatti’s conception of democratic renewal after 1956 is best described as a 
polycentric model based on party domination of the communist movements in their 
respective countries. In effect, he renounced the Soviet Union’s role as leader and guide 
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of the international communist movement, but supported and upheld the system of party 
rule in the diverse national communist movements. The type of  “renewal” that Togliatti 
envisioned was aptly demonstrated in the PCI’s position with regard to the Polish 
workers’ uprising of June 1956 and the Hungarian Revolution of October-November 
1956 and subsequent Soviet invasion. In both cases the PCI supported the official Soviet 
line: in the Poznan incident, Togliatti published his infamous article, “La presenza del 
nemico” (“The presence of the enemy”), in which he insidiously proclaimed the Polish 
workers were agents of the capitalist West; in the case of Hungary, the workers were 
judged as being “outside the ambit of socialism” (Togliatti 1956a; Ajello 1979, 389-90; 
Settembrini 1960, 1745). In Hungary, the PCI placed blame on the errors of the 
Hungarian leaders and the mistaken views of the Hungarian workers. Here, again, the 
principle that the party was the final arbiter of socialism was brazenly expressed to their 
Italian comrades: Togliatti warned his readers in an editorial in “L’Unitá” that they 
should not be confused by the fact that it was the workers who were revolting because 
“the workers are not always right” (Settembrini 1960, 1745). In the end, Togliatti’s 
analysis of the XX Congress, and subsequent faith in the continuity of an authoritarian, 
party-dominated communist movement, demonstrated quite clearly how little had 
changed within the PCI.  
 Within the left there were other elements that saw in the XX Congress, and events 
of 1956, not a process of continuity, but the substance of a veritable rupture. A myriad of 
small reviews—Ragionamenti (Arguments), Passato e presente (Past and present), 
Opinione (Opinion), and Mondo Nuovo (New World)—became the center of lively 
exchanges that dealt with the left’s lack of democracy, and, in particular, the need for an 
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autonomous left-wing culture to effect a democratic shift away from what was widely 
perceived as a political movement dominated by an administrative bureaucracy that 
concentrated power within a small group of leaders and exercised control over cultural 
production in order to ensure that the political line was upheld (Mangano 1992). In this 
vain we find the poet, literary critique, and prose writer, Franco Fortini who, in his 
“Lettera a un comunista” (Letter to a communist), asked: where in the left is the 
“democratic spirit, the refusal of Stalinist teleology, the refusal of democratic centralism, 
and of the magical-ceremonial practice of communism” (1973, 292)? For Fortini, 1956 
signified a “qualitative leap in the history of communism” that could only be positively 
realized if workers stopped deferring to the “prerogative of the party,” with all of its 
illusions and mystifications of reality (Ibid, 297). What was needed, according to Fortini, 
was an open dialogue and action from the base constituted as a process of “invention, by 
men and women, of reestablishing and recreating institutions” of the left. In contrast to 
the party dominated model, the left needed to redefine their communications, their 
production of knowledge, and the modes in which decisions were made (Ibid, 298). This 
process could only take place if the intellectual climate became disassociated with the 
customary practice of the left-wing parties. Yet, Fortini was unable to offer a vision that 
did not risk marginalization, which would have rendered the work of renewal as the 
project of a small isolated group of intellectuals (Mangano 1992, 25-30).  
Panzieri’s exit from Stalinism 
Perhaps more than any other actor of the period, Raniero Panzieri constructed a positive 
way forward for a left culture that was based on direct democracy, autonomous cultural 
institutions, and workers’ control. For Panzieri, 1956 marked a rupture with the politics 
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of the Third International where the working class movement was viewed as a subsidiary 
to party politics. His analysis sought to maintain a continuity of the international workers’ 
movement based on a rereading of Marxism that highlighted the tradition of the Gramsci 
of “L’Ordine Nuovo,” the Lenin of State and Revolution, Luxemburg on democracy 
within socialism, and Rodolfo Morandi’s class politics (Merli 1986 xxxiv; Mancini 1977, 
ch.1). For Panzieri, the workers’ council tradition represented an example of workers’ 
direct democracy, organized and informed from the bottom-up through the practice of the 
workers’ struggle. Moreover, he thought that this general position was the only plausible 
basis for continuity in the international workers’ movement after 1956. That is, only the 
working class was capable of its own liberation and, given the historical moment under 
investigation, only the working class was capable of being the basis of a revolutionary 
transformation from capitalism to socialism.  
Raniero Panzieri was born in Rome to Jewish parents in 1921. After the fall of 
Mussolini and the onset of the German occupation, he went into hiding with other youths. 
During this period, 1943, he had his first encounter with reading Marx, which prompted 
him to join the PSIUP (Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity) and, by 1946, upon 
the request of Rodolfo Morandi, he became the secretary at the Istituto di Studi Socialisti 
(Institute of Socialist Studies), as well as copy editor of the journal Socialismo 
(Socialism).29 He continued to work at the ISS editing journals—Bolletino dell’Istituto di 
studi socialisti (the Bulletin of the Institute of Socialist Studies), Studi Socialista 
(Socialist Studies)—until 1948 when the Institute was dissolved, following the Saragat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  During this period Panzieri was introduced to reading Marx, Marxism, and the 
workers’ movement outside of the orbit of Stalinism. It was this experience that led to the 
translation of several of Marx’s works, primarily during the 1950s, by Panzieri and his wife, 
Giuseppina, who was a prolific translator of German works into Italian (Merli 1987, IX).   
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split of the previous year. At the bequest of Marxist intellectual Galvano Della Volpe30, 
Panzieri and his wife, Giuseppina “Pucci” Saija, moved to Messina, Sicily where he 
began a teaching position that lasted three years. His years in Sicily marked the beginning 
of his active engagement in politics, as he often took part in peasant’s struggles and 
occupations of land. From this activity, Panzieri assumed the role of political militant and 
activist. But his work was not the kind of detached intellectual who goes to the workers 
to rouse them to action31; rather, he viewed himself as an active participant within an 
already existing political struggle. It was also in the South that he met Danilo Montaldi, 
who figured important for, among other things, his emphasis on sociological 
investigations of the base as the “place where the political problems are seen in terms of 
daily struggle” (Montaldi 1956, 31).32 But Panzieri, unlike Montaldi, who remained 
committed to the margins of the workers’ movement and the political struggle, soon rose 
in the PSI, as he was nominated to the Central Committee in 1953 for the Committee on 
the Press and Propaganda. During the next couple of years he focused on the question of 
how to develop a free cultural within the Italian left.  
 Panzieri’s nomination to the Central Committee of the PSI as head of Press and 
Propaganda allowed him to attain a forum through which to articulate his ideas on culture 
and its relation to politics. It was in this relationship between culture and politics that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 See below for discussion of Della Volpe and his influence on Quaderni Rossi and their 
readings of Marx.  
 
31 For example, see Mario Monicelli’s i compagni (“The Organizer” US title), which 
portrays the role of Professor Sinigaglia (played by Marcello Mastroianni) as an “external” 
intellectual rousing and exhorting the workers to strike and take control in the workplace (1963).  
 
32 Romano Alquati, sociologist and self-described “accidental Marxist,” and a major 
figure in the Quaderni Rossi group and others, praised Montaldi’s work for resolutely developing 
the methodological tool appropriate for the renewal of the left (Alquati 2002, 2; Merli 1977, 48).  
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scholarship on Panzieri as an operaista (“workerist”) misses the central point that, for 
Panzieri, a free culture was essential to the realization of a democratic socialism. By a 
free culture, Panzieri was concerned with the development of institutions within the left 
that carried forward the tradition of Marxism as a theory of “permanent critique,” that, by 
the mid-1950s, simply did not exist in the culture of the Italian left (Panzieri 1957a, 47). 
Before considering Panzieri’s position, I want to briefly describe the official left 
culture that was the target of his critique. The left, Panzieri argued, was dominated by 
party politics. One of the effects of party domination (what he called the “party-guide”) 
was the abandonment, in the workers’ movement, of the class struggle. But not only had 
the left abandoned class struggle (i.e., under the guise of “peaceful coexistence”), they 
had also dominated the entire workers’ culture, including the trade unions, who were 
largely “transmission belts” for party politics. Moreover, given the focus on party politics 
and a top-down culture, neither the political parties nor the trade unions possessed any 
understanding of the workers’ daily conditions and political problems (Accornero 1974, 
39). Rather, the trade unions had become politicized by the politicians’ ideological Cold 
War battles, with the result that the more “moderate” CISL and UIL had become 
competitors for the bosses’ favor and recognition, thereby achieving the highest form of 
collaboration, akin to the Fascist monopoly on trade unions that resulted from the “Pact 
of Palazzo Vidoni” which solidified Fascist-Confindustria control over the direction of 
the economy (Bonaccini 1974, 47). Thus, with the entrance of the Cold War climate into 
the trade union movement, a logic of party politics subsumed any conception of “class 
struggle” or a “class politics” beyond that of what Fortini called the “magical 
ceremonial” display. But, as chapter one sought to establish, the dominant sectors in the 
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PCI and, to a lesser extent, in the PSI were more than content to render class struggle 
subservient to the needs of electoral politics. When the rupture of 1956 occurred there 
existed the very real threat that this tendency within the postwar left would fall into the 
politics of social democracy and reformism, or a defense of the tired and condemned 
Stalinist line.  
 For Panzieri, the events of 1956 produced a qualitative rupture. His fear on the 
morrow of these revelations was that the left would become fractured between those who, 
being afraid to move forward, pushed toward Social Democracy and those who remained 
wedded to the “allure of the formal coherence of the old system” (Panzieri 1956, 62-4). 
Neither of these positions was desirable to Panzieri. The Stalinist vision condemned man 
to the logic of history, which, given the “science” of the Party and its revealed 
teleological view of mankind’s “historic role,” established a system of “forced 
production,” that, contrary to liberating man, had enslaved him to the so-called historical 
forces of production. The XX Congress and events in Poland and Hungary clearly 
demonstrated, for Panzieri, the “dogmatic and oppressive ideology,” of Stalinism and its 
residues, what Panzieri would describe as the “Party-guide” in subsequent years. On the 
other hand, the turn toward social democracy, largely influenced by the ideas of writings 
on technocratic management derived from intellectuals in the United States and “New 
Deal” politics, which was being executed within the leadership of the PSI, signified the 
abandonment of the traditional values of the working class movement. Indeed, one of the 
basic propositions of what was described as “neo-capitalism” propagated the rejection of 
class conflict as necessary to capitalism. The alternative that Panzieri constructed 
combined the class politics of Morandi that emphasized the working class as the 
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constructive agent of socialism, with emphasis on direct democracy in the workplace and 
community, a critical renewal of Marxist theory and practice, and a “free culture.”  
Panzieri’s way out of Stalinism, and for a renewal of democratic socialism, 
resided in the crucially important relationship between culture and politics. In two early 
pieces Panzieri explained how an “autonomous culture” related to the renewal of a 
working class politics—an article “una discussione redazionale sui problemi attuali della 
cultura marxista in Italia” (An editorial discussion on the current problems of Marxist 
culture in Italy), and in an unedited contribution to a debate within the PSI on the themes 
of political action and culture (1956b; 1957a). The question of culture, Panzieri premised, 
was fundamentally concerned with practical matters; as such, he was not concerned with 
the formation of cultural organizations as appendages of a political party executing 
propaganda to regulate or direct the masses. Rather, the proper role of culture was in the 
establishment of a critical presence within the political practice of the class. In order to 
realize this, Panzieri emphasized, drawing on his experience in Sicily, the need for 
cultural work that took place within, and derived from, the class movement (1956b, 38, 
40). Only in this manner could the working class develop itself as a leading national 
power. Anticipating oral history, and workerist historiography of the 1970s, in Italy, 
Panzieri exalted the need to “critically reconstruct the history of the workers’ movement 
in these years, in a way to correct, objectively and internally, the errors and to propose 
and realize the new problems posed to the movement” (1956b, 40).  
 The “errors” Panzieri was referring to derived from the domination of culture by 
the political parties. Through the use of the class as a “tactical instrument” the left-wing 
parties had reduced the cultural significance of the workers’ movement to abstract 
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ideological slogans that served the “bureaucratic direction” of left-wing politics. One 
effect of this “dogmatic closure” of culture, Panzieri wrote, was the utter weakness and 
backwardness of the workers’ movement in relation to the economic and social 
transformations in postwar Italian capitalism (a critique shared by the leadership in the 
CGIL in the aftermath of their loss at Fiat) [Panzieri 1957a, 43-5; Accornero 1974, 32]. 
Drawing on the legacy of Gramsci, Panzieri offered a proposition for cultural production 
that was strikingly similar to Fortini’s call for new institutions. The framework for this 
cultural production was based on the shared desire of effecting a revolutionary 
transformation of democratic society—as distinct from the tradition of revolutionary 
“rupture,” or what we might call “apocalyptic Marxism,” which views violence and 
dictatorship as necessary for socialism—developed by the cultural and scientific 
dominance of society by the working class and carried out within the existing structures 
of capitalist society (Panzieri 1957a, 46). Through this recapturing of the “thought of 
Gramsci in his originality,” Panzieri sought to elaborate a way out of Stalinism, from the 
left, that could realize the revolutionary potential inherent in the tradition of the Italian 
workers’ movement (1956, 64). The central node of Panzieri’s claim resided in his 
advocacy of the capturing of scientific knowledge as the key to avoiding bureaucratic 
control and a turn towards “old reformism.” He wrote: “only if the action of the class in 
itself is permeated by this concrete capacity of scientific and practical dominion, in its 
instruments, in its institutions, in its daily action, and in its struggle” could the working 
class avoid reformism (1957a, 46). But as long as party politics dominated the left 
culture, the capacity for the working class itself to become the active subject of a political 
knowledge and practice remained limited.  
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Not only did Panzieri’s “autonomous culture” reject the “party-guide”, but he 
generalized the separation between strategy and culture by making clear that the 
production of culture within the left should not parallel in any concrete manner the 
various political alignments within the left. Rather, cultural production should assume a 
collective character bound by the core value and desire of promoting the “unity of 
Marxist culture” (Ibid, 50). Moreover, the collective culture could not be bound by the 
old culture, but needed to strike up new themes of inquiry (i.e., research in psychology 
and sociology), construct a renewal of the structures of culture, and obtain an “authentic 
presence” in the workers’ movement (see below). This cultural schema marked an 
important turn toward the placement of cultural solutions in parallel with the “solution of 
economic problems.” In short, economic problems could only be solved by concurrently 
dealing with the problems of culture as an essential component of the “material 
structures” of society (Ibid, 54). Anticipating the “social factory” analysis, and its 
appropriation in the student and university struggles later on, Panzieri placed attention on 
the educational institutions as crucial elements of cultural development. But while he laid 
out a framework for an autonomous culture as necessary to the democratic renewal of the 
left and expanded this conception to the “material structures” of the schools he focused 
his political energies within the working class movement. We turn to this focus, now, in 
order to highlight the ways in which Panzieri sought to renew the workers’ movement 
and affirm its historic continuity against the decay of Stalinism and party-domination 
and, in particular, to demonstrate the connection between workers’ autonomy as political 
practice and cultural research, which was key to Panzieri’s work, and to see how this 
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nexus was understood within the particular “material structures” of the productive 
apparatus.  
 In his reflections on the rise of operaismo Antonio Negri explained its genesis out 
of the crisis of the workers’ movement of the 1950s (2007, 36). Much of my discussion 
thus far agrees with this interpretation. However, in failing to clarify what the actual 
“crisis” was, Negri missed the decay, or better, the betrayal, of the workers’ movement in 
the process of capitalist reconstruction throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, among 
other things. We have noted that part of the crisis was the distance of the parties from the 
actual conditions and needs of the working class.  But from Panzieri’s perspective, which 
was shared by some on the left of the PSI, the actual crisis was far more endemic than the 
gap that existed between the parties and the trade unions and the class. The fundamental 
problem was culture, of which the working class’s political estrangement was the effect 
of the party’s strategies and practice. To repeat, the left culture, for Panzieri, was based 
on the “mystification and repetition of Marxist and Leninist texts,” that, in Togliatti’s 
words, provided “a guide for the people” (Togliatti 1945, 48; Panzieri 1957, 71; Merli 
1977, xxv-xxvii). The PCI and the left culture had vitiated the working class of its 
political agency, of its character as a political subject. Panzieri, influenced from the more 
libertarian elements of Morandi’s thought in the 1940s, rejected what he called the 
“party-guide” since it contained within its formation the usurpation of working class 
culture for the prescribed strategy of the party, that inevitably resulted in the “dogmatic 
crystallization” of left politics (1957, 65). It was this stale and closed culture that became 
identified with Stalinism and party domination.  
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 The question of renewal began with the question of culture, but the culture that 
concerned Panzieri was a specifically left culture that existed within the workers’ 
movement. Thus, an examination of the workers’ movement became a necessary 
component to the renewal of democratic socialism, and in this early article, Panzieri 
alluded to the type of “workers’ inquiry” as the correlative to a new “sociology of the 
base” that was developing in the Italian left (Merli 1977). In his January 1957 article in 
“Mondo Operaio” (Workers’ World), “Appunti per un esame della situazione del 
Movimento Operaio” (Notes for an exam of the situation of the Workers’ Movement), 
Panzieri began his more specific focus on the working class (1957). This article sets out 
for a renewal of the workers’ movement against the obstacles presented by, and inherited 
from, Stalinism. His concern was to sustain the historic continuity of the movement 
within an understanding of workers’ history in relation to the new developments of 
capitalism, and the problems this generated for the working class. These two realms, the 
workers’ movement and what was termed “neo-capitalism”, each had the effect of 
alienating the working class from its potential as a political and economic force (1957c, 
102).  The chief culprit of the postwar failures was the disjuncture between a “professed 
ideology” of socialism and the reality of which was “profoundly invalidated by 
dogmatism” (i.e., the party-guide, Cold War political strikes, et cetera). What was needed 
was a shift in the values within the workers’ movement. Particularly noteworthy was 
Panzieri’s focus on the large mass of new workers, most of whom were either young, 
immigrants from the South, or both, who went unrepresented by the unions (a point 
which would later influence the focus and allure of Italian Marxists to the experience of 
the IWW in the early 20th century in the United States), a sentiment expressed also by 
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Fortini in his Lettera when he criticized the communist worker who remained indifferent 
to the other workers (1957, 297). Within this unrepresented sector, Panzieri found the 
need to cultivate a “radical refusal of all guides, authority of direction from outside, and 
from the top of the workers’ movement” (1957, 35). The organizational expression of this 
“radical refusal” was to be found in the need for direct democracy in the workplace, or, 
anticipating the Comitati Unitari di Base (United Base Committees) of the late 1960s, in 
the need to advocate for and construct “new base organisms … by which to control the 
work cycle and productive relationships” within a workplace, and to generalize these 
relationships throughout the productive life of the society. The proper term for this was 
workers’ councils, understood, not in the abstraction of constitutional guarantees, “but as 
new instruments of conquering power, at the real structural level, by the working class” 
(1957c, 101).  
 In the spring of 1957 Panzieri was nominated to co-director, with Pietro Nenni, of 
Mondo Operaio. Ironically, under his keep the journal became a lively reference point for 
the left wing of the PSI—and for a revival of interest in left wing communism, which, 
among others, highlighted Trotskyism, Lukacs, and Luxemburg—at the same time when 
the party leadership was aggressively pushing its program toward a social democratic 
formation and seeking alliances with Saragat’s PSDI and parts of the DC. Within this 
debate it was Panzieri’s insistence on the primacy of the working class, as the central 
political agent of socialism, which remained a dominant theme, albeit still under the trope 
of the “Italian Way to Socialism,” as a “democratic and peaceful” construction of 
socialism. For Panzieri, however, the latter did not mean parliamentary action in itself, 
but, as we saw above, it mandated a focus on the working class and its institutions. The 
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necessary element for the working class was subsequently developed between Panzieri 
and Lucio Libertini, a dissident leftist within the PSI, around the theme of workers’ 
control in their seminal article “Sette tesi sulla questione del controllo operaio” (Seven 
theses on the question of workers’ control) in the February 1958 issue of Mondo Operaio.  
 The workers’ control thesis generated considerable discussion within the left. Its 
basic premise was that the workers’ movement needed to be reexamined beginning from 
the assumption that it is the working class itself that was the “leading force of democratic 
development in Italy” and that any politics of the working class must derive from the 
class itself. While not rejecting parliamentary institutions, or the need for a party (thus 
avoiding the critique of anarcho-syndicalism, or economic centered, or any of the paltry 
epithets that the PCI bureaucracy derisively used to dismiss its critics and avoid genuine 
debate), these institutions needed to transformed by pressure exerted from the base 
through the development and renewal of workers’ initiative. Parliamentary action, in 
itself, was insufficient. Any type of parliamentary activity, moreover, needed to be based	  
on “substantive rights,” on the basis of economic and political power expressed jointly. 
For Panzieri and Libertini, this could only have occurred from a development of new 
worker institutions, as cultural organisms that existed by and for the workers.  
 In order to execute a peaceful and democratic transition to socialism, Panzieri and 
Libertini posited autonomous workers’ institutions as the basis for building and affirming 
workers’ political and economic power. These institutions were envisioned as a bulwark 
against any external “guide” of the class, whether that “guide” took the form of the State, 
the Party, the intellectuals (understood here in Gramsci’s concept of the “traditional” 
intellectual), or the bosses (1958, 111-3). It was in this sense that Panzieri critiqued 
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Giorgio Amendola (PCI) on the relationship between intellectuals and the working class. 
Against Amendola’s functional distinction between the “concrete positions” each 
assumed in the struggle, Panzieri asked how this fit within the party’s formula of 
centralism and discipline (1957b, 97-8). From this perspective, Panzieri remarked that 
any type of “workers’ autonomy” that discarded the question of power, in terms of 
“worker control” would remain “a completely external and sterile request” (Ibid, 98). 
Rather than adapting the newly introduced bourgeois sociological methods to study the 
working class and theorize it from afar, research and analysis could only take place 
“through participation in struggles” (1973, 254). Anticipating his later development of 
workers’ inquiry, Panzieri grounded the intellectuals in the experience of the working 
class as the basis for the articulation of an “authentic” culture and “presence.”  
 The workers’ control thesis did not reject party politics in itself, but defined the 
party in purely instrumental terms. Seeking to renew the dialectic relationship between 
the party and the base, Panzieri defined the party as the “educator that needs to be 
educated” (1958d, 202). The education of the party derived from the developmental 
process of the class, whereby the working class, through its struggles and the 
establishment of new institutions and organisms of the base, educated itself. The contents 
of the workers’ self-education were seen as being learned in the course of political action 
and practice, in the economic sphere, and in terms of economic and political power. In 
anticipation of those who argued that the working class needed to be “prepared,” Panzieri 
and Libertini wistfully asked: “who would play the role of the educator”?  For them, the 
role of an external enlightening force was absurd: “the only way to learn to swim is to 
jump in the water” (1958, 111). They assumed, as we will see in more detail below, a 
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rational order within the capitalist mode of production in which the workers were 
“thrown” into the productive process. And while we may agree with the axiomatic 
expression “the history of man is … a continual process in which each day they affirm 
new values,” there is no guarantee that the workers will want to learn how to swim or 
swim well, or that the values that are developed will reaffirm socialism (Panzieri and 
Libertini 1958a, 149). Many workers, in fact, allowed for and consented to the guiding 
hand of the party, which is evident from the genuine sadness and sense of overwhelming 
loss that workers felt upon the deaths of Stalin and, later, Togliatti (Ginsborg 1990, 198-
9).33 However, Panzieri was concerned, not with those workers who were directed by 
external guides and leaders, or who did not care to engage at all, but with those workers 
whose struggle stemmed from their real situations and had the “democratic spirit” to 
affirm their participation and power (and as we see below, it is this hypothesis that he 
seeks to verify in his investigations of the working class). It was through their struggle 
that workers, it was assumed, would gain an understanding of their “adversary” and thus 
generate the seeds of an ideological apparatus, as the expression of the class’s overall 
unifying claims to political and economic power, which formed the backbone of 
Panzieri’s conception of the party. In this manner, the dialectic between the class and 
party was established on the basis of workers’ struggle as expressed in a general 
ideological understanding about the nature of class struggle (i.e., against who, for what, 
how, et cetera). In this same relationship the workers also would educate themselves 
through their political practice in their autonomous cultural and workplace institutions. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For images of workers at Toglatti’s funeral procession, see the final scene of Pier Paolo 
Pasolini’s comical rendition of the Manichean morality of Italian politics in Uccellacci e 
Uccellini (The Hawks and the Sparrows, 1966).  
	   78	  
was this dialectical practice that Panzieri sought to reestablish in the working class 
movement on the dawn of the post-Stalinist era.  
 Within Panzieri’s theoretical framework there remained an unitary conception of 
class politics. The “unity of class,” a concept strikingly similar to his appeal for a cultural 
unity of the left, was founded on the rejection of the  “rigid party conception” and the 
“closed dogmatism” attributed to Stalinism. However, this did not imply a rejection of 
the maintenance of the “unity of action” pact that the defined the relationship between the 
PCI and PSI from the Popular Front period until the PSI replaced it with a  “consultation 
pact” in October 1956. Panzieri affirmed this unity not out of a desire to construct party 
unity, but based on the desire of the Marxist left to work together in the class struggle. He 
feared, in short, the type of sectarian politics that marked the decay of working class 
movements in the 1920s and 1930s—a fear that he would carry with him when 
organizing the group around Quaderni Rossi. Indeed, he read the famous split at the 
Livorno Congress in 1921, which, after the socialist faction refused to expel the 
reformists (which was the policy handed down from the Comintern), prompted the birth 
of the PCI, as the moment that “consecrate[d] the defeat of the class movement” in Italy 
(1958d, 198). After this moment, and aside from the “long nightmare of fascism,” the 
politics of the workers’ movement was tied to party politics. Thus, Panzieri looked to the 
workers’ movement of the Resistance as the genesis of workers’ autonomous struggle 
that served the proper baseline for his theoretical delineation of class unity. This “unity of 
the class” was not the expression of any particular political alignment; rather, it was 
realized in political struggle, in the mass struggle, and he assumed that one could identify 
its unity in class terms insofar as it attacked and broke the capitalist structure, or, in 
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Panzieri’s words: “the force of the class movement [could be] measured in the amount 
and capacity of exercising a leading function inside the productive structure (1958, 111).  
The “unity of class” was, for Panzieri, the struggle for control over production 
based on the conscious understanding of the workers’ “function in the system of 
production.” Workers’ control was linked with the workers’ understanding of his role as a 
producer within the relations of production. Moreover, it was the consciousness of this 
particular relationship that formed the basis of the way forward: only in this conscious 
struggle for control could the working class “become the subject of a new political 
economy” (1958, 114-5).  In this struggle for control the working class would learn and 
develop new values, replacing the capitalist profit motive with new, ostensibly, socialist 
values. Thus, class unity was a necessary ingredient established in the class struggle, 
which, when successful, demonstrated its ability to exert a leading role in the productive 
process, and generated a working class political economy. This rendered a politics of 
development that could have only taken place and been elaborated from within the 
workers’ struggle, from which it would continue to grow and develop in parallel to the 
existing institutions until they became the dominant force for the direction of the 
economy. Panzieri anticipated the objection about “partial claims” and “general claims.” 
Against this separation of general claims from particular claims, and against the 
imposition of abstract, state-led development, he emphasized that values change through 
practice and experience. Particular claims did not exist unto themselves, he wrote, as if 
workers’ struggles were “supported by the idea of a king socialism that appears on the 
day as a miraculous dawn to coronate the dream of man” (Ibid, 114). Rather, the “ideal of 
socialism moves day by day, conquering now for now in the struggle; this develops the 
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more in which struggles mature and advance institutions born from the base, the nature of 
which already is the affirmation of socialism” (Ibid). The political economy of socialism, 
for Panzieri, could only have emerged out of the workers’ struggles; the ideal was not an 
absolute dogma to which the left could have aspired to and never have reached, but the 
ideal was born, and developed, in the experience and understanding of struggle.  
Panzieri’s early thoughts on neo-capitalism 
There remains hidden, up to this point in the discussion of Panzieri’s thought, the object 
of workers’ antagonism. Though Panzieri had committed himself to writing about the 
crisis of the workers’ movement, he had only begun to theorize the actual state of 
economic transformation underway in the Italian economy, and, more critically, he had a 
very limited understanding of what was actually occurring within the productive process, 
that is, what workers’ lives were like inside the factory. But within these initial writings 
in “Mondo Operaio”—particularly in the workers’ control thesis and later articles—we 
can decipher some early signs of his critique of neo-capitalism that, centering on the 
power of monopolies and the theme of control, would later develop into the “social 
factory” critique of political economy.  
The early Panzierian critique of postwar Italian capitalism came out of a political 
culture that widely held a critique of monopoly capitalism as incapable of meeting the 
needs of the Italian people. Rather than monopolists, the working class was understood as 
the only force capable of leading a truly national project for development and production. 
Against this critique from the left, the restoration of capitalist control had produced an 
ideological tale about the wonders of “neo-capitalism” as capable of solving Italy’s 
problems. Largely influenced from the technocratic and managerial politics of the New 
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Deal in the United States and, in particular their affirmation of corporate control and its 
implications for class politics, neo-capitalism was propagated as the solution to the 
national problems of unemployment, to the achievement of workers’ and labor’s 
integration into capitalist production, and to the overcoming of the so-called “Southern 
question,” the historic disjuncture between the developed North and the undeveloped 
South. Against this view, and its manifestations within the social-democratic formation, 
Panzieri asserted the view that, in Italy, the bourgeois class could never be a “national” 
class (1958, 106; 1958d, 156). Moreover, given the complexity of the national economy 
in the 1950s, it was inconceivable that the bourgeois were capable of administering a plan 
to overcome the national problems. Rather than constructing a national plan, monopolies, 
Panzieri wrote, “plan … in certain ambits”; in pursuing the “law of concentration of 
capital and production,” they create “little islands” from which they exert their control 
and decision making on the national economy. Thus, monopoly production evinced a 
geographically fixed locus of control and production (i.e., the “Northern triangle”).  
A second feature of Panzieri’s critique, which can be deduced from the power 
dynamics of monopoly control, was that, in order to have their needs met, monopolies 
sought to extend their relation with, and direct control over, the State. The automobile 
industry of the 1950s and 1960s provided an instructive example as Fiat, the leading 
automobile producer in the postwar Italy, was effectively rendered control over state 
policy on tariffs, import barriers, and highway development for its particular business 
(Fauri 1996). In this new role of the State as a “hospital to private industry,” Panzieri 
viewed monopolies using their “economic power” to control the “political function” of 
the State (1958d, 157; 1958, 112). The concentration of power within the monopoly, and 
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its complete liberty of power to control and determine its internal matters, bred the 
establishment of a nexus between monopolies’ economic power and the State’s political 
power.  
For Panzieri, this power function of monopoly capitalism posed the danger of 
neo-capitalism as a “totalitarian” system with its functions based in the factory. The 
modern factory, he wrote, was characterized by the complete “enslavement of the 
worker’s body and mind” to the control of the boss and his “planning.” Outside of the 
factory, in the “material structures” of society, the “totalitarianism of monopoly 
capitalism” took shape in the requisite arenas responsible for the formation of public 
opinion: the new human relations industry, the printing press, television, mass culture, 
cinema, and the schools (anticipating the “social factory” analysis, while also rendering 
his debt to Pollock and Adorno) [Fondo Panzieri 15; Meriggi 1978, 104-111]. In his pre-
Quaderni Rossi writings this totalitarian phenomenon of monopoly capitalism was only 
described as a tendency within the system toward more total control over the economic, 
social, and political spheres (1958c, 170; 1958d, 205; 1959, 248). Panzieri’s solution for 
overcoming workers’ “enslavement” resided, still, in the workers’ control thesis, and the 
fusion of workers and technicians within the productive process, old themes of the 
workers’ council tradition. However, anticipating his later critique of technology as 
developed under capitalism (see chapter 3), Panzieri considered the working class as 
guarantors of technological development, but in order to assume this role, workers 
needed to strike at the heart of monopoly capitalism. That is, the workers’ struggle 
needed to begin, not on the margins of economic power, but within the most 
technologically advanced and powerful centers of the economy. For this reason, after 
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Panzieri arrived at Turin, Fiat became the central testing ground for Autonomous 
Marxism.  
Much of this analysis derived, at least within Italy and for Panzieri, from the 
Morandian focus on the working class as a political subject, albeit applied to a new 
situation and analysis (Merli 1977, 10). However, this focus on the working class, and 
workers’ control, as the “substance and form” of socialist democracy estranged Panzieri 
from the internal politics of the PSI. If the distinction for the left in the post-Stalin era 
was between bureaucratic socialism and a democratic conception of socialism, then the 
leadership of the PSI wanted neither of these options, as Nenni pursued integration with 
the social-democrats and placed entry into the government as the leading priorities of the 
party. At the PSI’s national convention at Naples in January 1959, the left of the PSI lost 
the majority giving way to, in Paznieri’s words, a “resurgent adoration of bourgeois 
democracy” (1958, 134). As a result of the unfavorable turn in the direction of the PSI, in 
April 1959, Panzieri took a position with the Eiunaudi Publishing House in Turin, leading 
him to the center of Italian neo-capitalism. Upon his arrival in Turin, he furnished new 
political contacts and continued to develop his theoretical work and embarked on 
sociological inquiry into the workers’ condition in the modern factory. The culmination 
of this transfer to Turin gave birth to Quaderni Rossi, widely understood as the central 
review that influenced the course of workers’ politics and struggles over the next two 
decades. Thus, as Panzieri’s work within the PSI had begun to exhaust itself, and after a 
nervous year of anxiety mixed with depression that, he mused, went so well with the 
aesthetic climate of Turin, he constructed a cultural organization that would promote and 
engage in the type of autonomous culture of the left working with the workers’ 
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movement that had been the consistent focus of Panzieri’s political work since, at least, 
1953.  
Quaderni Rossi: its initial development and composition.  
“I see all the streets blocked, the ‘return to private’ chills me, the possibility of a small 
sect terrorizes me,” Panzieri confessed in a letter to Maria Adelaide Salvaco (1973, 271). 
His estrangement from the PSI forced him to look for new channels through which to 
conduct his work. Two important factors determined the course of Panzieri’s political 
work and the development of Quaderni Rossi, the disillusionment among those who 
sought a “left” solution in the post-Stalin workers’ movement, and the renewal of worker 
and student militancy, or the new “anti-fascism” that erupted from July through 
December 1960 (Bermani 1997, 148-226). When Quaderni Rossi emerged with its first 
issue in the fall of 1961, the workers’ movement and struggle became the central focus of 
the review. Indeed, only through the workers’ movement could a democratic renewal of 
socialism have taken place.  
Throughout 1960, Panzieri maintained contacts with the union movement and 
participated in numerous reunions around the theme of the renewal of the workers’ 
struggle. He also circulated the idea of a review with like-minded comrades in Rome, 
Milan, and Turin, and organized exploratory meetings for such a possibility throughout 
1959 and 1960. In constructing a review, Panzieri intended to form a group that would 
not be the “mouthpiece of a line already elaborated, but as a base of information and of 
analysis on the crucial political problems for the formation of a class consciousness” 
(Fondo Raniero Panzieri 45.) Confirming his earlier respect for direct democracy and for 
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establishing an “authentic presence” in the workers’ movement, Panzieri, in a letter to 
Albert Asor Rosa (Dec. 17, 1959), wrote:  
if the crisis of the organizations—party and union—is in the increasing divide between 
them and the real class movement … the problem can only be confronted by beginning 
from the conditions, structures, and movement of the base, where the analysis is 
conducted only by participating in the struggle (1973, 254).  
  
The problem was to find the key to the problem of the “northern question” and develop 
this problematic into a revolutionary movement from the base (Panzieri 1956b, 41).  
Panzieri had entertained the idea of constructing an organization that would 
promote collective research since, at least, the beginning of 1957 (Fondo Raniero 
Panzieri 23). By 1959-60, with his role in the PSI completely marginalized, and his 
former collaborator, Lucio Libertini, “completely assimilated” to the party line, he put 
forth a sustained effort to form a review that could serve the as a new cultural institution 
for the workers’ movement (Panzieri 1973, 251). The Quaderni Rossi group formed as a 
diverse group of dissident socialist, communist, and trade unionists that, while not 
sharing a homogenous ideological view, shared the same perspective about the problems 
of the workers’ movement and a common desire to inaugurate action that could renew the 
class struggle (Ibid, 272, 282-4).  
Since the group was ideologically heterogeneous, and was sustained and 
determined by a range of views, even if these views were shaped by “strong 
personalities,” it is necessary to first consider the background and influences of the 
leading personalities in the review (Di Leo 2000, 1).34 We can begin by distinguishing the 
composition of QR from three distinct groups, that for sake of utility can be indicated by 
region: Roman, Turin, and Milan group. The Roman group, primarily Albert Asor Rosa 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This material draws mostly (aside from Panzieri) from interviews in the cd-rom 
accompaniment to Borio et al (2002). 
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and Mario Tronti, came out of the Communist Party’s youth federation at the University 
of Rome, of which Tronti was head until 1956. As members of the PCI, they were, 
however, closer to the analysis of Marxism adumbrated by philosopher Galvano Della 
Volpe and his student Lucio Colletti. Against the idealist and historicist tradition that 
derived from Antonio Gramsci and Benedetto Croce and became appropriated in 
Togliatti’s “Italian Way,” Della Volpe sought to demonstrate a “materialist logic” that 
was the key to Marx’s critique of political economy (1980). Colletti took this analysis a 
step further by arguing that not only was Marx’s analysis not idealist, its historicism was 
limited to a critique of “this society” from which Marx generalized about the capitalist 
economic and social formation of modern capitalist society (1972, 140).  Colletti also 
used Della Volpe’s conception of “unity of heterogeneity” to demonstrate the 
fundamental logic that united economics and sociology, and within this unity, Marx, 
Colletti argued, produced an historical subject, the species or the social classes (Ibid, 
146). Colletti’s contribution was to demonstrate the sociological nature of Marx’s 
analysis: “all of his [Marx’s] concepts … are economic and sociological together” (Ibid, 
144). Thus, the Roman group was influenced by a reading of Marx that focused on the 
“materialist logic” of Marxism as sociology. This reading drew them to the working class 
as the dominant character in this Marxian sociology. It was this background that attracted 
them to Panzieri, which largely came to fruition as a result of the worker’s control thesis 
(Asor Rosa 2001, 2; Tronti 2000, 1; Mangano 1992, 82). The group from Milan, 
particularly Pierluigi Gasparotto and Giairo Daghini derived from institutions of the 
Socialist Party (cultural centers, the Turati club, the Lelio Basso library, et cetera) with 
formative political experience in making interventions and inquiries in the workers’ 
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movement of the 1960s, and, in general, sought a multifaceted approach to the workers’ 
movement. Romano Alquati, who became politically important upon his arrival in Milan 
(from Cremona, south-east of Milan), began making factory inquiries with Gasporotto in 
1960. Alquati had previously worked with Danilo Montaldi—“a decisive encounter,” 
according to Alquati—from which he learned to place emphasis on the need to “do 
something effective,” from the perspective of “economics and sociology,” rather than 
history and philosophy (Alquati 2000). Montaldi, who had inaugurated a “base politics” 
that brought together a method of political work from the base with a Marxism based on 
research or inquiry into the base, most forcefully developed the need for an “internal 
presence” in conducting research (Merli 1977, 17-28; Montaldi 1956).  Last, the Turin 
group consisted of adherents to the left wing of the PSI—Romolo Gobbi, Claudio Greppi, 
and Vittorio Rieser— and focused on the sociological method of inquiry, which had 
derived from their participation in student manifestations in the late 1950s in support of 
workers’ contractual struggles. Upon his arrival in Turin, Panzieri became the dominant 
influence that shaped their reading of Marx (Rieser 2001).  
 The two intellectual tendencies that emerged from the individuals that composed 
Quaderni Rossi were: a reading of Marx that stressed “materialist logic” against an 
historical or idealistic reading that postulated the relationship between capital and class as 
the key social relations of capitalist production, and the sociological method of inchiesta 
(inquiry) as a tool of research on the actual workers’ condition. These positions derived 
out of the unified focus on the factory as the necessary locus for understanding the 
conditions, attitudes, and behaviors of the working class. The choice of methodology, as 
alluded to above, had deeper roots in the culture of the left throughout the 1950s, of 
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which many of the original actors in QR had, in some way or another, familiarity and 
experience (Apergi 1978, 113-25; Wright 2002, 22-30). I have alluded to this somewhat 
diverse group of individuals in order to establish the point that they derived from diverse 
backgrounds that did not necessarily lend itself to a working ideology. Thus, the 
conceptual apparatus that was deployed in subsequent years often contained tensions and 
contradictions that inevitably emerge in any attempt at collective work.  
Between conricerca and “workers’ inquiry”  
Through an understanding of Marxism as sociology, the Quaderni Rossi group began 
their point of entry into the workers’ movement based on Marx’s “workers’ inquiry” 
(1880). In this piece, Marx emphasized that it was the workers “alone [who] can describe 
with full knowledge the misfortunes from which they suffer and that only they, and not 
saviors sent by providence, can energetically apply the healing remedies for the social ills 
which they are prey” (Ibid).  This general agreement of “workers’ inquiry” contained 
within it the tension of two different themes that developed in the group, the need for the 
sociological use of “inquiry” and the more radical practice of conricerca (co-research). 
This tension, which produced the rupture between the Turin group and the Roman group 
in 1963, centered around the role of the researcher and the connection between the 
research and the generation of political activity by the workers. Following Vittorio 
Rieser’s description, inchiesta (inquiry) was understood as the initial tool for capturing an 
understanding of the facts that one is trying to investigate. Thus, in the seminal phases of 
QR, the traditional use of questionnaires and interviews was the central focus by which 
they could understand what was happening in the modern factory. The idea of co-
research implied a more advanced relationship, where an “organized force” existed 
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between those conducting research and the subject of research. Montaldi understood the 
latter to signify the point at which the intellectual becomes “organic” to the class 
movement (Merli 1977, 17).  Rieser noted that conricerca was more properly the 
“fundamental method … available to an organized force, that you make with the workers 
that are being organized or that are organized and thus tied strictly to a practice of 
struggle” (2001). We can see from an early example of Quaderni Rossi’s use  of 
interviews that their method of inquiry was consistent with Panzieri’s early desire of the 
review to be a “point of reference” or a “place of information” rather than a “direct 
instrument of ‘political propaganda’” consumed by the work of constructing an 
ideological program from above (Lanzardo 1965, 128). Despite this desire, there existed 
within QR the need to generate a radical politics from the workers’ base. And, as Alquati 
rightly emphasized, the purpose of both workers’ inquiry and co-research, aside from the 
abstract theoretical distinction above, was that they emphasized the value of being a 
“method of political action from the base” that, ultimately, sought to create a “self 
transformation of the objective force into subjective force, politically conscious, to a 
prospect of overcoming the actual system” (Alquati 1961, 199).  
Panzieri’s “socialist use of workers’ inquiry”  
Panzieri was quite aware of the tension that existed between generating political action 
and conducting workers’ inquiry. Since it was, essentially, within his thought that the rise 
of Quaderni Rossi took place, and in the context of the determinant place that workers’ 
inquiry had in his theoretical architecture, I end with a discussion of his understanding of 
workers’ inquiry and its role as an instrument within Marxism as a theory of workers’ 
revolution. For Panzieri, Marxism was a theory of the  “science of revolution.” He made 
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the crucial distinction that the latter could only be determined by “social facts” and not in 
the fancies of metaphysics, which he equated with the construction of grand narratives 
that offered ideological reassurance to the faithful masses. Those who based their 
analyses from “metaphysics,” Panzieri argued, obscured the reality of the working class 
behind a veil of its “historic mission” and other mystical notions (Panzieri 1964, 69).  
The fundamental component of Marx’s analysis resided in defining capitalist 
society as a society divided into classes. From this, Panzieri highlighted two operative 
categories to examine: capital and class. Analysis, as we saw above, must take place at 
both levels in order to capture the dialectical relationship between these two groups. The 
emphasis on the reality of the working class as a starting point was essential to Panzieri’s 
rejection of the external force of the “party guide” that he identified as the heredity of 
Stalinism. The Togliattian view, that relegated the class’s action inside the trade union 
sphere, but not capable of producing a political understanding of the class in this action, 
relied on the assumption that workers’ consciousness needed to arise from an external 
element. According to Panzieri, Togliatti’s view of the working class located workers’ 
consciousness in the realm of capital and the particular claims made within the factory 
struggle; that is, workers’ “consciousness” was generated through an understanding or 
agreement with the party line which would include its political strategy and determined 
role of the trade union in support of that strategy. It followed from this view that workers 
were incapable of generating and expressing a political subjectivity outside of the party. 
It was in polemic with this view that Panzieri and those in Quaderni Rossi emphasized 
that an essential point of the inchiesta resided in its capacity to generate worker 
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consciousness as a political subject, as the only actor capable of arriving at a socialist 
transformation of capitalist society.  
A basic feature that gave importance to the use of workers’ inquiry, and the key to 
examining the potentiality and existence of working class subjectivity, for Panzieri, 
resided in the capacity to analyze the working class as an analytical category separate 
from capital. By studying the working class as a separate category of analysis, Panzieri 
argued that workers’ inquiry could shed light on working class subjectivity and capture 
an understanding of the “concrete form” in which the contradiction between capital and 
class was present. This contradiction could only be demonstrated by studying capital as 
well as class. The inquiry was used to gather or collect information about the attitudes 
and behavior of the working class, but this analysis could only be verified by an analysis 
of capital. It did not suffice to merely study the politics or potential for struggle of the 
working class. The two essential categories, capital and class, Panzieri emphasized, could 
not be studied apart from each other; rather, when studying the workers’ movement, there 
was always the need to “look at the adversary” to see how it responds to the level of the 
workers’ struggle (Panzieri 1973, 248). His particular concern was raised against those 
who focused solely on the workings of capital, whether by ignoring the realities of the 
working class or reflexively ascribing to working class subjectivity the determinants of 
capital (a position attributed to Colletti) [Apergi 1978, 108-110]. In his “Socialist use of 
workers’ inquiry” Panzieri wrote:  
the fact of treating labor-power only as an element of capital, according to Marx, from 
the theoretical viewpoint, provokes a limitation and also a deformation internal to the 
system that it constructs…. [By] refusing the identification of the working class as 
beginning from the movement of capital, [he] affirms that it is not possible to go 
automatically from the movement of capital to the study of the working class: the 
working class … exists as a scientific observation absolutely separate (1965, 70).  
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In this regard, Ferrero correctly notes the analysis of the relationship between capital and 
class that Panzieri established: “the class lives inside a dialectic of object-subject that is 
present in the diverse phenomenon but which is never fully overcome” while capitalist 
social relations exist (2005, 28). Thus, as a necessary part of understanding the possibility 
of revolution within neo-capitalism, workers’ inquiry performed the essential role of 
collecting information about worker subjectivity and determining or forming an 
understanding about the potentiality of the working class to assume an antagonistic 
position in its relationship with capital. Whether inquiry alone was capable of generating 
antagonism became the focus of contention after the strikes of 1962 provoked different 
interpretations about the “potentiality” of the working class which, in part, would lead to 
the rupture of the Roman and Turin groups over the role of co-research and the 
promotion of a revolutionary organization to propel the formation of an autonomous 
workers’ party (see below, ch. 3). But in this latter contention, Panzieri remained tied to 
the more traditional use of inquiry to identify and determine the behavior of the class, and 
to sustain the use of Quaderni Rossi as a point of reference and information for the 
working class.  
We saw above, in the early delineations of Panzieri’s class politics and 
revolutionary transformation of capitalism to socialism, the manner in which workers’ 
control and direct democracy from the base served an educational function in expanding 
the workers’ struggle. The use of inquiry represented the intervention in the workers’ 
movement of an external force of socialist intellectuals and militants who were interested 
in renewing the workers’ struggle. Yet, there still remained the contradiction, in 
Panzieri’s formulation, between the intellectuals who sustained the analysis of capital—
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the so-called “objective” aspect of society—and the workers’ expression and 
understanding as captured in the processes of workers’ inquiry. In Panzieri’s work, and in 
his personality, there existed the type of sentiment and value-commitment that left the 
development of workers’ consciousness to the workers. The role of inquiry, in this view, 
was seen as generating discussion about questions that would provoke workers to think 
about their place and role in the productive process that would, hopefully, lead to further 
advancement through struggle. On the question of the analysis of capital, Panzieri 
maintained that Quaderni Rossi, and the historical moment in which it existed, was not 
the proper organ for the elaboration of a socialist ideology, but, rather, it was the 
appropriate forum to generalize the political themes relevant to the workers’ struggle, as a 
reference for the movement. The questions that determined which political themes to 
focus on, ostensibly, were driven by the inquiry conducted. But what would guarantee 
this outcome? As Liliana Lanzardo pointed out in her article “Rapporto tra scopi e 
strumenti dell’inchiesta” (Relation between the scope and instrument of inquiry), the key 
difficulty in conducting inquiry resided in the transformation of workers’ consciousness 
from an understanding of the factory relations into the more general understanding of 
what to do, or what to construct out of those relations (1965, 118). Thus, while the 
problem for Panzieri was resolved by allowing for the workers to determine new values 
in struggle, the immediate problem was that of understanding not only how this could 
take place, but of sustaining the relations and conditions that could produce this change in 
workers’ understanding of the productive relations within neo-capitalism in such a way 
that could generate or bear the fruit of an alternative vision generated from below.  
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The limits of inquiry and co-research resided in the relationship between the level 
of understanding of the objective elements of neo-capitalism along with the development 
of workers’ political subjectivity. The practitioner of inquiry and co-research had to 
possess a certain amount of respect, and patience, for the workers’ capacity to develop 
their own political consciousness. In line with Fortini, Panzieri sustained an ambiguous 
position enveloped in the uncertain role of the intellectual that moved within the 
dialectical relationship between class and capital. Panzieri’s response resided in the 
formation of an autonomous culture that would be part of the renewal of workers’ 
institutions as part of a renewed militancy of the workers’ movement and self-
development of institutions that could sustain and expand workers’ power. Ideally, the 
type of inquiry conducted by external intellectuals would generate a situation where it 
would be possible to engage in co-research, or the joint production of social knowledge 
from below. However, it remained too easy to proclaim that this situation had already 
occurred within the workers’ movement, that the workers movement had matured over 
the course of a couple of years’ struggles, virtually without the appearance of their own 
base institutions from which to build. As we will see in the next chapter, the project of 
collective research that constituted QR was destined to fall apart, as the old intoxicating 
fumes of workers’ revolution blinded some of the group to the more important goal of 
sustaining a long educative period of workers’ struggles that could lead to a socialist 
transformation of the existing institutions. But before we get to this, we need to develop 
and understand the key themes of Quaderni Rossi. Remembering that workers’ inquiry 
was only one component of the “return to Marx” made by Quaderni Rossi, we now turn 
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to the critique of political economy and the generation of the “social factory” analysis of 
neo-capitalism.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE “SOCIAL FACTORY” AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTION IN THE 
THEORETICAL AND POLITICAL WORK OF QUADERNI ROSSI 
 
With generalized planning capital directly extends the fundamentally mystified form of the law of 
surplus value from the factory to the entire society, now each trace of the origins and roots of the 
capitalist process seem to disappear. Industry reintegrates … at the social level the form that 
specifically in it assumes the extortion of surplus-value: as the “neutral” development of the 
productive forces, as rationality, as planning –Raniero Panzieri, “Surplus-value and planning,” 
286 
 
The expanding progress of capitalist socialization carries itself to a point in which the production 
of capital needs to give itself the work of constructing a specific type of social organization. 
When capitalist production is generalized to the entire society – the entire social production 
becomes the production of capital – only now, on this base, a true and proper capitalist society 
arises as a historically determinant fact—Mario Tronti, “The plan of capital,” 52 
 
The fabric of “social life” as the “piazza” is the occasion for circulation and comparison of 
methods and organized forms, for the construction of a strategy of insubordination that overturns 
the structures that combine to orchestrate international capital. With the development of worker 
insubordination … it will be possible to carry the analysis outside from the immediate and begin 
the true “analysis of the factory” in the scientific sense of political analysis of the class, of the 
social relations of production… Romano Alquati, “Composition of capital and labor-power at 
Olivetti,” 185.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we saw how Quaderni Rossi derived from a diverse collection of 
individuals who came together around the common goal of developing a revolutionary 
theory relevant to the historically determinant situation of neo-capitalist relations in 
postwar Italy. This chapter investigates the group’s “return to Marx” as a tool of research 
in “workers’ inquiry” as well as the appropriate body of theoretical work from which they 
derived their critique of political economy. The idea of workers’ inquiry and co-research 
developed, in part, out of their commitment to realizing a new revolutionary practice 
from the “base,” from an understanding of workers’ experience and struggles in the 
factory, or, from the “workers’ point of view.” This chapter begins by examining the 
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theoretical formulation of capitalist relations of production as derived from Marx’s 
Capital and 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse. From this rereading of Marx’s critique 
of political economy Quaderni Rossi—in particular the theoretical work of Raniero 
Panzieri, Mario Tronti, and Romano Alquati—introduced their conceptualization of the 
factory-society relationship, what Harry Cleaver coined as the “social factory,” as well as 
the idea of the “class composition” to explain the subjectivity of the working class (2000, 
70-1; Wright 2002). The “social factory” analysis identified neo-capitalism as an attempt 
to control and dominate society in the interests of capital accumulation, and it was 
informed by a series of articles on capital’s ability to plan—the planning function of 
capital. This was particularly evident in the first three issues of Quaderni Rossi, which 
demonstrated not only a theoretically rich discussion, but also constituted the issues that 
preceded the group’s eventual rupture.  
In the summer of 1963 the group split, in part, over their interpretation of the 
renewal of workers’ struggles. But the split also derived from theoretical differences that 
had emerged from their reading of Marx. The dispute stemmed from Mario Tronti’s 
theoretical elaboration of workers’ “strategy of refusal” in contrast to Panzieri’s 
“workers’ control” position. Yet, in the development of this theoretical work, there 
remained the central themes of neo-capitalism as a control society along with an 
agreement on the revolutionary potential of workers’ antagonism to capitalist domination. 
This framework, which emerged from the collective work of Quaderni Rossi, provided 
the theoretical background for a generation of revolutionary working class struggle 
during the course of the subsequent decade (c. 1963-1973). This chapter examines the 
beginnings of this theoretical development through the political thought of the principle 
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actors in Quaderni Rossi, including the renewal of the workers’ struggle (1960-62), and 
the implications that this had on the rupture in the initial group of Quaderni Rossi. 
The “social factory” as a critique of capitalist control 
After their expulsion from government, and up through the period of the “economic 
miracle,” the left in general considered monopoly capital to be a hindrance to national 
and economic development. The facts of the “economic miracle” demonstrated that this 
interpretation was incorrect; partly based on technological and organizational changes 
within large industry throughout the 1950s, the Italian economy proved to be one of the 
most dynamic economic world powers by 1960. The Quaderni Rossi group returned to 
the discussions of large industry and technology in Marx’s Capital I in order to develop 
an understanding of neo-capitalism and to generate the theoretical tools appropriate for a 
science of workers’ revolution.  Their critique produced two key turns that were decisive 
in demarcating the trajectory of operaismo as a distinct theoretical movement within the 
Italian left. The first derived from Panzieri’s seminal article that introduced the theory of 
“technological rationality” from the Frankfurt School in an attempt to dispel what he 
considered to be the myth of technological neutrality and progress in capitalist 
development. The second point, which partly developed out of the first, focused on the 
planning capacity of capital, and achieved its mature expression in Tronti’s formulation 
of “social capital” (1963, 44-73). These two moments were fundamental to the theoretical 
development of the “social factory,” which was the unifying theme behind the 
Autonomist Marxist understanding of neo-capitalism as a social order where the social 
relations of the factory became generalized to the entire society. But while the “social 
factory” analysis was shared within this movement, the analysis conducted by Panzieri 
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and Tronti differed in their phenomenological understanding of the factory-society 
relation. In short, Panzieri’s understanding focused on the expansionary effects of 
capitalist concentration; Tronti’s analysis examined the increasingly tertiary nature of 
capitalist expansion that increased the proletarian character of society (Turchetto 2001, 
4).  
In his seminal article “Sull’uso capitalistico delle macchine nel neocapitalismo” 
(The capitalist use of machines in neo-capitalism), in the first number of Quaderni Rossi,  
Panzieri attacked the position of those in the “historic left” who viewed technology from 
an “objectivist” lens that depicted it in a “pure” or “idealized” form (1961, 53-72).35 
Consistent with his previous rejection of theoretical approaches that did not originate 
from concrete material conditions, he contrasted the “objectivist” approach by locating 
technology within the “general and determinant elements of power” (Ibid, 57).36 While 
Panzieri’s article was a directed critique of the position established within the CGIL by 
Silvio Leonardi, the broader attack was against the Nennian faction of the PSI, which was 
pushing for a Center-Left government (Ibid).37 This faction of the PSI had adopted a view 
of technology that stressed its role as an integrating force between capital and labor, a 
position that, Panzieri maintained, was central to the ideological framework of neo-
capitalism. Given the integrating function of technology, and the end to class conflict as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Originally published in the first number of Quaderni Rossi, “The capitalist use of 
machinery” was later published in English in Slater’s Outlines of a Critique of Technology 
(1980). 
 
36 The idea of “concrete” is understood here in the sense that Marx used it when he wrote 
in the 1857 Introduction to the Grundrisse: “the concrete is concrete because it is the 
concentration of many determinations” (1973, 101).  
 
37 Leonardi was a representative example of the “turn” by unions on the question of 
technological progress and workers that was debated during a Convention at the Antonio Gramsci 
Institute from June 29 through July 1, 1956.  
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an inherent characteristic of capitalism, the “objectivist” approach effected three moves: 
technological rationalization of the production process was a “painful but necessary” 
passage where the orthodox “stages of development” was supplanted by “objective 
rationality”; the flowering and harmonizing of “moral relations” between the 
entrepreneur and workers through the new industrial sociology of “human relations”; 
trade union intervention in the “human relations” system to break capitalist use of this 
system. This position, strikingly similar to the Marxist position that focused on the 
property relation, accepted the “technological rationality” of the new order, but sought to 
put this rationality under the direction of a new authority, the Party and the State.  
Panzieri countered the “objectivist” position with theoretical and empirical 
arguments. He began with a simple recounting of Marx’s discussion of the work 
process—cooperation and division of labor—from Capital I in order to establish that 
within the factory the capitalist assumed a role of “absolute control” and “authority.” 
From this relationship of authority, he found that “strictly connected to the development 
of the capitalist use of the machine was the development of capitalist planning. To the 
development of cooperation, of the social process of work, corresponds, in the capitalist 
leadership, the development of the plan as despotism” (Ibid, 56 italics in original).  In this 
plan, technology or machinery was viewed as instrumental to the bosses’ exercise of 
control and authority in the production process. But this was only one component of their 
control: Panzieri argued that it was “not only the machines, but also the ‘methods’, the 
technical organization … as a foreign rationality” imposed through “information” and 
“manipulation of workers’ attitudes,” that formed a more comprehensive picture of 
capital’s despotism in the factory.  
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Given these techniques, Panzieri noted that it would be possible to find more 
“advanced” relations (i.e., workers’ participation), but he did not envision these as being 
capable of dealing substantively with the question of “alienation” (Ibid, 61-3). That is, the 
only genuine type of “advanced” relations had to be that of workers’ power vis-à-vis the 
capitalist. The question of “alienation” was not a philosophical question about the 
workers’ self or being, but focused exclusively on the question of power in capitalist 
social relations. For example, the worker was not further alienated from the productive 
process because he was even more remotely connected to his product. Rather, for 
Panzieri, alienation was an increasing problem because capitalism as a system was 
expanding its controlling function towards, what Alquati later called, the “micro-
movements” of the worker.  
Italian capital demonstrated its capacity for dynamic development and expansion 
in the mid 1950s, utilizing new forms of technology and organizational techniques. 
Panzieri found in this movement a general tendency toward capitalist planning that 
included the “use” of technology. This position went against the commonplace view of 
the left in the postwar period that monopolies and concentrations of capitalism were 
destined to collapse as stagnant deadweights on the economy. Moreover, it overturned the 
view that technological progress was at odds with capitalism and would, one day, lead to 
the necessary passage to socialism (Mancini 1977, xviii).  Indeed, as the writer and 
intellectual Franco Fortini emphatically pointed out in the second issue of QR, socialism 
was not inevitable; capitalist relations of production were capable of development and 
also were capable of planning this development with technology used, not as a liberating 
force for the worker (i.e., freeing her or him from the drudgery of work), but as another 
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component in capital’s despotic power (1962, 115-7). In this sense, Panzieri went against 
his own previous distinctions as well as a much longer historical identification that 
negated the connection between capitalism and development and found that not only was 
capital capable of development, but its development was “progressively extending itself 
from the planning of the factory to the market, to the external social area” (Ibid, 56). As 
technology was no longer considered to be at odds with capitalist development, Panzieri 
moved beyond his workers’ control thesis in emphasizing that workers’ revolt had to take 
place at the conceptual level of “living labor,” and not necessarily through the 
development of labor as a productive force. The chief potential for socialist revolution 
had to come from “workers’ insubordination” as capital was now seen as being capable, 
given capital’s concentrated power in large industry, of planning development within the 
factory system to such an extent that it could also extend itself into society.  
In his discussion of Panzieri’s “dramatic about-face” from considering capitalism 
as incapable of development, to viewing it as capable of an indeterminate quantity and 
quality of development, Steve Wright highlighted the importance of Mario Tronti’s essay 
“La fabbrica e la società” (the factory and society) on Panzieri’s changed views. But this 
assertion seems, at a minimum, wide of the mark. Tronti’s essay did not appear until the 
second number of Quaderni Rossi, which Wright mentions. But this aside, it would be 
more accurate to surmise that Panzieri’s shift came from within group discussions of 
Marx on the role of large industry and technology, as the group focused on reading the 
fourth part of Capital I which reveals the central dynamics of Panzieri’s analysis (Negri 
2007, 52).38 Moreover, there is nothing in Panzieri’s correspondence or notes that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Marx’s focus on the power and despotism of the capitalist centered not only the 
domination of “dead labor” over “living labor” but also on the use of technology by the capitalist. 
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highlights Tronti’s particular contribution on this point. Rather, what stands out, as is 
clear from the discussion of Panzieri’s earlier theoretical work in the previous chapter, is 
Panzieri’s reliance on the theoretical work of the Frankfurt School’s discussion of 
“system” and the “totalitarian capitalist system” [in particular Adorno and Friedrick 
Pollock] (Meriggi 1978, 93). Indeed, from Pollock, Panzieri derived his understanding of 
“despotism” as a fundamental factor tied to the incorporation of techniques of automation 
in the productive process. From Adorno, Panzieri utilized the discussion of integration 
and the production and reproduction of the “inauthentic life.” In his introduction to the 
Italian edition of Pollock’s writings, Giacomo Marramao wrote of Panzieri that he was 
“the first to associate the analysis of automation by Pollock to the Adornian description 
of the phenomenology of the “authentic life” in advanced capitalism” (cited in Meriggi 
1978, 106). Meriggi’s and Marramao’s points only touch upon one element of the 
theoretical formulation and synthesis that Panzieri executed. If we look at Panzieri’s 
reading notes on the despotism and rationality of the factory we find his arrival at 
capitalist planning derived from a myriad of views: for example, the idea of human 
relations within Taylorism and Fordism was derived from the American industrial 
economist Seymour Melman (Fondo Raniero Panzieri, fasc. 15); the role of technology, 
management, ideology of alienation and consumption was derived from Adorno (Ibid, 
fasc. 15, 121, 186-7); Pollock’s discussion of automation and specialization in relation to 
power within the workplace; the relation between despotism and rationality in Lukacs; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Modern industry,” as a more developed stage than simple co-operation and manufacture, Marx 
wrote, “makes science a productive force distinct from labour and presses it into the service of 
capital” (1967, 341). Capital, he wrote later on, uses science “with intelligence and will” and is 
“animated by the longing to reduce to a minimum the resistance offered by that repellent yet 
elastic natural barrier, man” (Ibid, 380). For more general observations in section four see (1967, 
360, 364, the “economic paradox” of machinery 384-5, 399, 404-6).  
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and Baran and Sweezy’s analysis of monopolies and neocapitalism (Ibdi, fasc. 15; Fondo 
Raniero Panzieri, fasc. 40, 99); and the role of Hobson’s discussion of monopoly and the 
“planning of needs” (Fondo  Raniero Panzieri, fasc. 40, 72). Therefore, it is incorrect to 
attribute Panzieri’s shift on capitalist production as “determined by his encounter with 
Tronti’s” analysis of “factory and the society” as Wright does (2002, 36). This is 
particularly evident, aside from the facts noted above, by examining the constructive 
component of Panzieri’s article on “the capitalist use of machines” and reading this in 
conjunction with his later contribution to Quaderni Rossi in his “Plusvalore e 
pianificazione: Appunti di lettura del Capitale” (Surplus-value and planning: Notes from 
reading Capital), which came out in the fourth volume of Quaderni Rossi (1964, 257-
288).  
 Unlike the Frankfurt School, Panzieri did not envision the capitalist use of 
technology as complete domination, or as performing a totalizing function over the 
modern condition with no hope for radical change. Rather, as Meriggi notes, “the 
Panzierian notion of the working class is determinant and materialistic and cannot thus 
intersect with that “philosophic” proletariat as the “negation of the negation” … from 
Adorno’s analysis” (1978, 107).39 Panzieri, against Adorno’s theorization of the “eclipse” 
of the working class, situated his thought in the belief of the power of the working class 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The critique from the Autonomist Marxist argument against a “philosophical” reading 
of Marx was based on the latter’s “ideological reading” that derived “from capital’s perspective” 
alone. The challenge for the Autonomist’s, which was evinced in this potential contradiction in 
Panzieri’s formulation, was in the tension between workers’ strategic struggles and power and 
their ability to generalize a set of complementary understandings in these struggles that one could 
call “class consciousness” (Cleaver 2000, 31-77). For a discussion of a similar concern with 
workers’ inquiry and co-research see the discussion of Alquati below.  
 
	   105	  
to radically confront capitalist domination. “The fundamental factor of the workers’ 
struggle,” Panzieri wrote,  
is the consciousness … of the unity of the two moments, “technical” and “despotic” in 
the current productive organization. With respect to technological “rationality,” the 
relationship between it and revolutionary action is of comprehending it, but not to 
recognize and exalt it, rather to submit it to a new use: to the socialist use of the machine 
(1961, 63).  
 
The possibility for overcoming capitalist “rationality” resided in the political action of the 
working class; that is, in the class’s capacity to break capital’s domination of “living 
labor” or “variable capital” by “constant capital.”40 In order to submit technology to a 
“socialist use,” the class struggle needed to be capable of producing a “political rupture 
of the system,” by the augmentation not of incomes, or of satisfying predefined 
“consumer needs,” but by the demand of political power, which was premised on the 
rejection of the working class’s “political servitude” to capital (Ibid, 66). Consistent with 
Panzieri’s earlier formulation of the construction of new values in the daily class struggle, 
the workers’ struggle for political power, and thus for workers’ control, was capable of 
realizing a “radically new rationality” in the use of technology (Ibid, 54). The first goal of 
the workers’ struggle was, for Panzieri, to prepare itself for attaining political power 
within the productive process, as the development of a “dualism of power” until the class 
could conquer complete power over the productive process. From this situation the 
“socialist use” would construct a science and technology applicable to a new work 
activity that would overcome salaried work and capitalist social relations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 In Capital I, chapter VIII Marx defined “constant capital” as “that part of capital then, 
which is represented in by the means of production, by the raw material, auxiliary material and 
instruments of labour, does not, in the process of production, undergo any quantitative alteration 
of value.” On the other hand, “variable capital” is “that part of capital, represented by labour-
power, does, in the process of production, undergo an alteration of value. It both reproduces the 
equivalent of its own value, and also produces … a surplus-value….” (1967, 202).  
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While Panzieri’s thesis was not without problems and difficulties—the obscure 
nature of the abstract juxtaposition between “capitalist use” and “socialist use,” or the 
tendency to slip into the Frankfurt School’s totalizing analysis (thus demonstrating 
contradictions between the philosophical analysis with the political objectives)—we can 
see in it the foundations of the “social factory” in the concentration of capital in large 
industry, in its rational application and use of technology (and other means), and an 
allusion to the role of surplus-value as the determinant factor of capitalist despotism 
(Wright 2002, 43-4).  
With the analysis of technology and the role of “constant capital” as one of the 
techniques of capitalist despotism and planning, Panzieri, in his penultimate contribution 
to Quaderni Rossi, sought to explain capital’s dynamism in terms of its ability to plan the 
production of surplus-value by controlling the processes of the circulation of capital and 
thus potentially ensuring an almost unlimited capacity for capital accumulation. 
“Plusvalore e pianificazione: Appunti di lettura del Capitale” (“Surplus-value and 
planning: Notes from reading Capital”) was published in the fourth number of the review 
and represented his last major theoretical work before his untimely death at the age of 43 
in October 1964. The piece should not be considered exhaustive, but rather as the 
culmination of an intense intellectual period that included collective readings of Capital 
and Panzieri’s attempt to grasp the ability of capital, in the stage of neo-capitalism, to 
collectively plan in order to ensure its continued survival.  
Based on the advanced stage of large industrial capitalism, with its “law of 
concentration and centralization,” Panzieri asserted that collective capital was forced to 
develop a “generalized plan” that “extended the fundamentally mystified form of the law 
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of surplus-value directly from the factory to the entire society” (1964, 286). This 
conclusion derived from an understanding, as we have seen throughout the discussion of 
Panzieri, and is present in the works of Marx and Lenin, that capitalist planning manifests 
itself at the level of the factory within the direct process of production. The traditional 
Marxist-Leninist theme stressed the social relations of production, as cooperative, along 
side the anarchic nature of circulation (Marx 1967, 337). However, Panzieri argued that 
there was a logic to capital that brought about this tendency of increasing expansion of its 
control over society that neither Marx nor Lenin had been able to discern. Critiquing 
Lenin, Panzieri wrote: “he did not see how the law of capitalist development (relative 
surplus-value, maximization of profit) that, in the age of competition, made the individual 
capitalist the spring of development for the total social capital.” In particular, the 
“capitalist appropriation of science and technical methods” was virtually absent in 
Lenin’s construction (1964, 260). Through its appropriation of these “intellectual 
powers” capital began exercising its plan (i.e., despotism) to better command labor—both 
living and “dead”—in order to extract more surplus value (Ibid, 267-70).  
By highlighting the “general tendency” of capitalist development to plan its 
dominion over labor, Panzieri identified the logic of capitalist control to extend from the 
direct process of production through means of surveillance, leadership, and coordination, 
and with the appropriation of the “intellectual powers” of science and sociological 
methods, capital could extend this planning function in order to intensify its exploitation 
of labor. Panzieri, in laying out this logical plan of capital, offered a picture of a linear 
rationality of capital, embodied with almost extraordinary powers for coordination—
albeit hidden in an unclear “spontaneous and natural system”—where the capitalist class 
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is portrayed as being able to extract surplus-value “without limit” (Ibid, 267; Mancini 
1977, 95; Palano 1998).  
Perhaps more damning was Panzieri’s methodological approach that was based in 
the abstract “tendency” of capitalist development, while leaving behind the actual, or 
empirical, state of factory-society relations in the early 1960s. This reliance on the 
“tendency” of capitalist development pervades the work of Autonomist Marxism, and 
stems from their Leninist definition of the concept “factory,” which, as Panzieri wrote, 
“is not a collection of empirical data … [it is] the development of industry at a 
determinate stage of capitalist development” (1972, 41). This understanding of the 
factory allowed for a class perspective that could capture the “entire social development” 
of capital (Ibid). As we will see below, this generated a conception of working class 
revolt that, within operaismo, necessitated the class’s ability to foresee and anticipate the 
tendency of capitalist social development in order to pose itself as a general antagonist to 
this plan.  
 The idea of the “social factory” emerged from a broader ambit of Western 
Marxism in the work of Antonio Gramsci and Georg Lukacs, and was more fully 
developed in Mario Tronti’s writings in Quaderni Rossi (Bologna 1974; Palano 1998). 
Gramsci had established a framework for the “social factory” critique in his essay on 
“Americanism and Fordism.” In his analysis of the effect of Taylorism and Fordism, 
Gramsci noted that the American capitalist’s creation of a “rational demographic 
composition” of social forces with an “essential” productive function whose role in 
society was determined by the centrality of the factory and extended into society through 
“professional political and ideological intermediaries” (2000, 277-9). The development of 
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industry in the form of factory production along Fordist lines, Gramsci intuited, would 
“result in the imminent necessity of achieving a programmatic organization of the 
economy” (quoted in Palano 1998, 6). Gramsci analyzed this rudimentary outline of the 
social nature of industrial capitalism, primarily, in terms of the moral and psychological 
effect of Fordism—points that were almost completely lost on QR. That is, despite 
Panzieri’s early call (pre-QR) for studies in psychology as part of a renewed workers’ 
movement, within Quaderni Rossi this was virtually absent, at least outside of the direct 
production process, even if some of the intellectuals who frequented their conventions 
were themselves intimately interested in phenomenology and psychoanalysis (Rozzi 
2001; Daghini 2000). Instead, as we saw in Panzieri, QR discussed the “social factory” in 
the materialist view of the reproduction of surplus-value and the sociological effect of 
command over labor, rather than from the Gramscian tradition of historic and philosophic 
idealism. The Gramscian idea of a  “rational demographic composition” of the productive 
forces was interpreted in Quaderni Rossi out of a concern with workers’ political 
subjectivity that emerged from the practice of workers’ inquiry, also known as “class 
composition.” However, the rational logic of capital, and its affect on the composition of 
the working class derived, for the workerists, more closely from Lukacs’ formulation of 
society-factory relations, a theoretical position that had a “self-evident influence” on 
Quaderni Rossi’s configuration of the “social factory” (Palano 1998, 5). 
 In the Lukacsian depiction of capitalist organization, Quaderni Rossi highlighted 
the view that established the relations within the factory as the logic of the entire society. 
Lukacs expressed this in terms of the factory as a microcosm of the entire society where 
commodity production and the capitalist’s “rational mechanized production” became the 
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“principle” that “must embrace every aspect of life” (1971, 90-1).  The logic of capital, 
for Lukacs, was centered on the factory as the “concentrated form” of society’s structure 
that becomes the general condition of society as the commodity relation extends over the 
entire social order. When the commodity form becomes universal, Lukacs wrote, “the 
fate of the worker becomes the fate of society as a whole.” Or to formulate the problem in 
a slightly different manner: “Only when the whole life of society is thus fragmented into 
the isolated acts of commodity exchange can the ‘free’ worker come into being; at the 
same time his fate becomes the typical fate of the whole society” (Ibid, italics mine).  
Two important, and slightly divergent, themes emerged in QR from this analysis. 
First, as we have already seen in Panzieri’s discussion of the extension of capitalist 
concentration and its affect on society in terms of control and planning; second, the 
acceptance within QR of a rational logic inherent in capitalist development. Panzieri had 
only discussed this in terms of the capacity for the extraction of surplus-value and he did 
not capture the moments of the increasing proletarian character of capitalist society as a 
central feature of this development. Instead, Mario Tronti developed this thematic of the 
“social factory” as the expansion of the commodity form to the entire society, where the 
salaried worker became the central political subject in capitalist social relations. This 
formulation was fundamental to the continued development of operaismo and 
Autonomist Marxism, and remains elementary for any understanding of a political theory 
that locates its critique of capitalist political economy within the ambit of a “social 
factory” relation.  
 The second issue of Quaderni Rossi opened with Mario Tronti’s “La fabbrica e la 
società” (The factory and the society), which attempted to determine the “specific 
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character of capitalist social relations” within neo-capitalism (1962). Like Panzieri, 
Tronti was concerned with the circulation of capital and, how, in the process of capitalist 
social relations, relative surplus value became generalized in the form of “social capital.” 
Tronti’s argument derived, substantially, from Marx’s 1857 “Introduction” to the 
Grundrisse, where the circulation of capital was discussed in terms of the moments 
between the sphere of production and the sphere of circulation (Marx 1973). Tronti’s 
analysis set in opposition the labor process (production) from the process of valorization 
(1962). For methodological purposes, Tronti put under the general heading “circulation” 
the moments of distribution, exchange, and consumption. By doing this, he was able to 
put in opposition two general conditions, production and circulation. Following Marx, 
Tronti analyzed these two processes as “distinct in their unity, up to the point of counter-
posing them the one to the other” (1962, 2; Marx 1973, 99). In separating these two 
processes, Tronti highlighted the work process as the central node that produced value 
through the creation of surplus-value and the value of labor-power. Tronti understood the 
sphere of circulation as a realm without any determinant class conflict where isolated 
individuals purchased commodities with money. Only in the direct production process 
was antagonism possible; the key to producing a rupture in neo-capitalist relations was 
located in salaried work, where the “price of the worker” was nothing more than the 
capitalist’s “subjective choice to hide the substance of the real relations” (Ibid, 4). In the 
1857 “Introduction” to his Grundrisse, Marx argued that production dominated the other 
moments in the circulation of capital as the determinant function of the relationship 
(1973, 99). Likewise, Tronti privileged the direct labor process and the mystification of 
value in the workers’ salary as the key to understanding the capitalist production of 
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surplus-value. The understanding of value was seen as the point in which the distinction 
between necessary work and surplus work was hidden. The key was to establish the 
analysis where “living labor [the worker] is present only as variable capital (1962, 5).” At 
this point, Tronti concluded, began the true and proper development of capitalist 
exploitation and domination of labor power. 
 Beyond demonstrating the determinant relationships of capitalist domination, 
Tronti constructed a historical analysis of capitalist exploitation through the salary, 
because, in the salary, one could “follow the entire development of capitalist production” 
(Ibid). Throughout the history of capitalist development class struggle played the 
important role of conditioning the form of capitalist domination by forcing, through 
resistance, capital to alter its form of productive social relations. Importantly, the means 
of production did not develop along the lines of objective scientific progress; as Panzieri 
had concluded in his discussion on the capitalist use of technology, the means of 
production were determined and shaped by class conflict, by determinant social relations 
of production. Moreover, throughout its history, capital had learned how to “deepen and 
extend its dominion” on labor. Tronti demonstrated this historical process by analyzing 
the Factory Acts in England in the 19th century:  
With the results of the various commissions of inquiry, with the violent intervention of 
the State, the collective capitalist first tries to convince and then begins to constrain the 
single capitalist to align itself to the general needs of capitalist social production…. It is 
only on this base that it becomes possible, at a certain point, a process of generalization 
of capitalist production and its development to a higher level (Ibid, 15).  
 
The social nature of capital, in its planning function, was not constituted by an objective 
process, but was understood through this analysis as determined by class conflict within 
the productive process, from a simple cooperation model with the extraction of absolute 
surplus value (i.e., lengthening of the work day) to the arrival at the development of 
	   113	  
processes for the expansion of extracting relative surplus value (i.e., intensification of 
work via technical implements, reduction of wages, et cetera). In this process the social 
character of capital emerged as the dominating force in society, compelling individual 
capital to follow suit. This process of capitalist development created the ability of social 
capital to augment relative surplus value. Tronti, differing from Panzieri’s analysis, 
located capital’s increasing function as the subsumption of society by and through 
transformations of capitalist development, to the point where the entire society existed as 
means for the ends of capitalist production. Thus, Tronti wrote,  
 [w]hen the factory possesses the entire society—the entire social production becomes 
industrial production—the specific traces of the factory are lost within the generic traces 
of the society. When all of the society becomes reduced to a factory, the factory—as 
such—seems to disappear…. The higher degree of development of capitalist production 
signals the more profound mystification of all bourgeois social relations. The real 
increasing process of proletarianizzazione is present as a formal process of 
terziarizzazione (Ibid, 21 italics in original).41  
 
The “social factory” reflected, for Tronti, the expansion of salaried work as the basis of 
increasing the proletarian and tertiary characteristics of productive relations. When he 
was using the term “factory,” Tronti, like Panzieri and the rest of the Autonomists, was 
not envisioning that the actual, or empirical, view that implied a particular factory (i.e., 
Fiat’s Mirafiori production plant) was going to control and dominate social relations. 
Rather, Tronti followed Lenin’s “scientific concept” of the factory, which, as Lenin had 
argued in The Development of Capitalism in Russia, was conceptually useful only insofar 
as it expressed the “highest degree” of capitalist development. Tronti utilized this 
understanding of the factory in order to identify the logical development of capitalism 
and to highlight the tendency of this development to turn all of society into a moment, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 I have left proletarianizzazione and terziarizzazione in Italian here. Elsewhere I have 
translated these terms as “proletarian character” and “tertiary character.”  
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a particular aspect, of the universal form of industrial production. The empirical content 
of Tronti’s “social factory” found its particular hypothesis in the claim that capitalist 
development and dominion over society demonstrated the political aspect of control over 
the categories of labor and labor-power as determinant components of capital; that is, for 
capital, labor and labor-power only existed as particular subjects within capital. In this 
process capital sought to obfuscate the worker’s individual relation to the collective 
worker by denying, ideologically, the categories of labor and labor-power as autonomous 
subjects. Thus, the historical process of capitalist development, in denying the workers’ 
existence outside of its commodity form, Tronti believed, demonstrated capital’s 
“expanding dependency on labor-power,” and compelled it to “plan, on a long period, the 
capital-labor relationship as an index of stability of the social system” (Ibid, 27).  
 Parallel to this ideological form of workers’ “integration” in capital, Tronti 
cautioned those in the left who took the “old maximalist”42 position that viewed labor as 
entirely outside of capital. Rather than approach capitalist social relations through this 
conceptual duality, Tronti’s method required an investigation of each category through 
their particularity within an otherwise unitary relationship. Following this, labor had to be 
investigated as a part of capital, as it existed within capitalist production. Like Panzieri, 
this methodological point was not a matter for lauding labor’s domination by capital, but 
of pointing to the possibilities for breaking this domination within the concrete, or 
historically determinant, material reality. The working class, Tronti wrote, “needs to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The epithet of being labeled a “maximalist” derived from the “revolutionary” wing of 
the Socialist Party in the 1910’s who were against any “reformism” or parliamentary activity. The 
actual term was utilized to describe those who pushed for the party’s maximum program, for the 
most revolutionary consequences of the party’s theoretical elaboration. Tronti’s appeal here was 
intended to be a friendly critique and a warning that the “old maximalists” viewed class struggle 
through a lens of “economic catastrophe” with the working class existing as completely separated 
from capital.  
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recognize itself as a particular of capital, if it wants to present itself as its general 
antagonist.” Further, the working class’ antagonism would emerge when “the collective 
worker counterposes itself not only to the machine as constant capital, but to labor-
power, as variable capital. Labor needs to see labor-power, as a commodity, as its proper 
nemesis” (Ibid, 25-6 emphasis added).  
This identification of worker antagonism between the concepts labor and labor-
power pushed Tronti’s formulation of working class strategy beyond the possibility of 
workers’ control. In order to overcome capitalist social relations, Tronti’s analysis relied 
on the “subversive praxis” of the working class as an antagonistic subject that would 
assert a “political response” against capital’s attempt at the “economic integration” of 
labor and labor-power. The more capital was able to reproduce labor-power, the more it 
was also capable of reproducing itself. The workers’ movement, for its part, was seen as 
completely integrated into capital’s plan. That is, insofar as the workers’ movement 
concentrated on contractual struggles (i.e., economic struggles) alone, the union became a 
“typical democratic institute of capitalist planning” (1963, 61 emphasis in the original). 
In this sense, Tronti highlighted how the “ideology of neo-capitalism correspond[ed] to a 
capitalist organization of the workers’ movement” (Ibid, 64-5). Thus, the working class 
stood naked in its relationship with social capital, its struggle was now deprived of the 
proper possibility of mediation. From this rejection of mediation, Tronti declared his 
disagreement with the possibility of workers’ control. Instead of trying to get control over 
the work process, “the single worker needs to become indifferent to his work, so that the 
working class can come to hate it” (Ibid, 68 italics in original). This hatred of work was 
viewed as the “irrational” aspect of capital’s rational plan. The only anarchy that existed 
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for Tronti was the workers’ hatred for work, as the only element that capital could not 
socially organize. The strategic consequences of this position seem clear: there was a 
need to organize a workers’ movement capable of giving a political expression to the 
“refusal of labor” (Ibid, 70). But more immediately, this position portended the eventual 
rupture in Quaderni Rossi. Tronti now rejected the methods of social science, as they 
“only would serve to register the workers’ movement, in a better way, within the 
development of capital” (Ibid, 73).  
Within these two depictions of the “social factory”—the Panzierian and the 
Trontian—emerged a divergence of understanding on the proper strategic goals to be 
followed by revolutionaries. We saw above that Panzieri’s analysis was concerned with 
capitalist concentration and the effect this had on the social relations of production in 
terms of control and development of the working class. From his analysis, Panzieri 
remained wedded to the idea of workers’ control as the appropriate strategy for 
overcoming capitalism. Tronti, however, viewed the “social factory” and capitalist 
development in terms of its increasing transformation of society as a particular moment 
of industrial production where the wage relation, and thus the proletarian character of 
society, became the dominant fact of social relations. In order to overcome this state of 
things, he argued for the political expression of antagonism by the working class as a 
refusal of labor to become labor-power; that is, Tronti posited the rejection of 
commodification and salaried labor as the proper strategy of revolutionary activity. As 
we will see in subsequent chapters, this divergent understanding would influence the 
wave of upheavals around the issue of class antagonism and working class power during 
the “hot autumn” of the late 1960s and beyond. In anticipation of a later discussion, it is 
	   117	  
worth noting that, on the one hand, Tronti’s formulation of working class strategy as a 
rupture and antagonism by labor against labor-power rejected institutional mediations 
(i.e., workers’ contractual struggles or positive claims to be made by workers, as labor-
power, in particular factory struggles), whereas Panzieri’s formulation required the 
rejection by the working class of the particular capitalist form of their relationships that, 
by themselves, did not reject, but in fact relied upon, workers taking over their 
workplaces and constructing sources of “workers’ power” within the society’s productive 
relations. To put this another way, Tronti’s analysis, as we will see more fully in chapter 
four, was essentially a rejection of productivism as a strategy for revolution, whereas 
Panzieri relied upon the idea of working class production and development, albeit to a 
lesser degree than the “objectivists,” as the basis for socialist revolution. This 
contradiction contributed to a fundamental rupture within Quaderni Rossi in 1963 (see 
below), as each, following the particular hypotheses that followed from their 
understanding of the “social factory,” generated a different understanding of the 
collective worker and its potentiality for political opposition to neo-capitalism. We turn 
now to what some consider the key to Autonomist Marxism, their theorization of class 
composition and investigations into working class behavior and attitudes within the high 
point of capitalist development (Wright 2002). It was here that, methodologically, 
Quaderni Rossi sought to verify their theoretical hypotheses generated from their analysis 
of neo-capitalism as a “social factory.” 
The renewal of the workers’ struggles and Quaderni Rossi’s interpretation of the 
“new forces” 
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The theoretical genesis of Quaderni Rossi coincided with a renewal in workers’ struggles 
and a new sense of collective protest that developed in the rise of the “New Resistance” 
with an antifascist and antiauthoritarian discourse that found similar tendencies in the 
workerist’s emphasis on working class autonomy as a strategy for political struggle. 
Directly appropriating the language of the partisan Resistance, this new movement did 
not, however, limit its understanding of fascism to Mussolini’s totalitarian regime.43 
Rather, there was widespread sentiment that understood fascism to be a “constant 
tendency of the bourgeois system” and, that, in the current phase of neo-capitalist social 
relations, it was the boss (il padrone) who was identified with fascism (Bermani 1997, 
149, 192).  This “New Resistance” came out of a younger generation whose political 
development differed fundamentally from the older militants. For example, in the early 
1950s there existed within the workers’ movement, and in the parties of the left, a sense 
of doom, a genuine feeling that the worst was yet to come. But the generation that 
became politically socialized in the latter half of the 1950s confronted a radically 
different world. In no small measure had the “economic miracle” of 1958-1963 changed 
the Italian landscape and basic mode of living. There was an attitudinal shift in the young 
that reflected the societal revolution that began with the introduction of mass consumer 
goods, television and music, cinema, refrigeration, and mass ownership of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 While initially used by opponents of Mussolini, the fascist regime began using the term 
“totalitarian” to describe itself in the mid-1920s. Despite the Cold War connotations that the term 
assumed in Western societies, the Italians used the term during the 1960s to broadly express the 
political, social, and economic system—neo-capitalism—as Panzieri, appropriating the Frankfurt 
schools usage of the phrase, had introduced the term during the late 1950s. Christofferson’s work 
on “anti-totalitarianism” as a tool for critiquing the left misses the Italian example. He wrote that 
the “extreme Left attacked the PCI for its supposed…betrayal of revolution” (2004, 15). This is 
accurate, but since he frames the discussion in terms of the legacy of the Resistance, he misses 
the Marxist left’s critique of reformism and how the PCI, following the lead of the PSI, sought to 
enter into the government, which, as we will see in the discussion of Classe Operaia’s analysis of 
the State, was a central component of the “social factory.” 
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automobile; in short, modernization entailed the conviction that all could be changed, it 
was the opening of new horizons full of boundless possibilities that shattered the defeated 
mentality of the 1950s (Crainz 2005, 87-147).  
Not only had the attitude of the young shifted as a result of domestic changes, but 
the role of Italy, internationally, became much more prominent as its national economic 
indicators placed the Italian economy as an economic leader, even earning monetary 
praise from the influential business weekly, The Economist. The left had consistently 
been international in its political and ideological positions, but this first generation of 
postwar youth found new sources of international solidarity. While the Soviet Union’s 
action in Hungary and Poland had shown the repressive side of “existing socialism,” the 
Cuban and Algerian Revolutions sparked the imagination of the young (Balestrini and 
Moroni 1988, 25-30). Moreover, there was an awareness among the more politicized 
youth about international currents that gave a fresh breath of air to the possibilities for 
resistance: the Japanese protest against Eisenhower’s planned visit, which was cancelled 
as a result of opposition and workers’ strikes and events in South Korea and Turkey 
against regimes perceived to be conservative or reactionary. While this sentiment was 
widely felt at a more general level in the Cold War’s thawing of tension under the 
Kennedy-Khrushchev doctrine of “peaceful coexistence,” its development took different 
turns within the left. Reflecting two divergent trajectories that would define the left’s 
history in the 1960s and 1970s: one sector viewed this situation as an opening to 
parliamentary politics and the achievement of State power; the other elements saw in this 
rapport a “global plan” that exhibited strikingly similar relationships within the capital-
class nexus.    
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This sense of international and domestic affairs centered on a general feeling 
among the young of an attitude that put itself in opposition to all systems of power. This 
rather loose understanding of anti-authoritarianism produced forms of political and social 
struggle that had all but disappeared from Italian society during the period of postwar 
reconstruction. As we saw in the first chapter, the party system, in the immediate postwar 
years, had mobilized popular forces into a system of electoral and parliamentary politics. 
During the course of the 1950s, this system was seen as disconnected from the popular 
masses, by Catholics, Socialists, and Communists alike (Negri 2007, 19-27; Crainz 2005, 
152-62). When combined with the social changes that were apace in the late 1950s, this 
distance from party politics emerged in full force as students and workers began 
protesting the “new Italy,” the Italy of the so-called “affluent society”44 of private 
consumption and mass production.  
The postwar renewal of mass social movements began with the protests of July 
1960. On March 25th, the ruling Christian Democrats formed a new government with a 
hard-line conservative, Fernando Tambroni, as the head of government. For the first time 
in the postwar period the DC had to rely upon the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement 
(MSI) to form a government. Tambroni evinced himself and his government as 
authoritarian by banning any protest of his government and violently suppressing any 
popular manifestations that denounced his regime. More provocatively, however, was the 
government’s decision to allow the MSI to hold its annual convention in Genoa, a city 
with strong roots in workers’ history and a stronghold of the Northern Resistance. Much 
like 1948 when workers took over the city after an attempted assassination of PCI leader 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 John Kenneth Gailbraith, The Affluent Society (1958). In 1959 Federico Fellini’s La 
Dolce Vita was released, displaying the decadence and moral degeneration of the new bourgeois 
order based on affluence and private consumption.  
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Palmiro Togliatti, students and workers quickly organized protests that sought to prevent 
the convention and demonstrated stern opposition to any return of fascists to position of 
power. For many, the battle cry was “do as they did in Tokyo,”—a reference to the 
popular protests that prevented US President Dwight Eisenhower from making an 
unpopular visit to Japan. It is important to note that the Genoese youth were the children 
of laid-off workers, and, despite the propaganda that highlighted the economic success of 
the Italian economy, these same youth had witnessed the relative decline of Genoa’s 
economy (Bermani 1997, 169). From this declining situation the Genoese youth gave 
birth to the cultural icon of le magliette a strisce (torn t-shirts) as a symbol of antifascism 
and resistance (Crainz 2005, 180-88). The torn t-shirt became the symbol of the working 
class situation in the new Italy, as an exploited class without means for acquiring decent 
clothing, and as a self-identifying code for letting your peers know where you stood in, 
what would quickly become referred to as, “the struggle.”  
The Genoese workers announced a general strike in Genoa and Savona for June 
30th to protest and prevent the MSI convention scheduled for July 2nd.  With the general 
strike proclaimed, an estimated hundred thousand workers, and sons of workers, marched 
through the city and established barricades, blocked roads in preparation for battle with 
the police.  The situation quickly became a battlefield with police reinforcements arriving 
the next day and the Tambroni government permitting the police to shoot, if necessary.  
On the eve of the proposed convention the situation on the streets of Genoa had become 
“pre-insurrectionary”: old partisan formations were armed; people were busy preparing 
Molotov bombs; hundreds of thousands of workers were prepared to battle the neo-
fascists and “forces of order,” as the lines separating the two began to blur. The 
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government, keen on avoiding more difficulties, revoked the MSI’s permission to hold its 
convention in Genoa, on the condition that the left parties and unions would “guarantee 
the maintenance of order” (Bermani 1997, 178). But the experience of Genoa had spread, 
spontaneously, throughout Italy. Protests against the Tambroni government occurred in 
Licata, Sicily (July 4), in Reggio Emilia (July 7), and Rome at Porta San Paolo (July 6), 
culminating in a national general strike called by the GCIL for the 8th of July. In each 
case the government responded with violent repression, murdering and injuring 
protesters. The Tambroni government fell on July 19th, but the lessons for the “new Italy” 
were quite important: the young workers and students reintroduced mass struggles as an 
essential component of political engagement; it demonstrated a conflict between electoral 
politics and mass action, confirming the distance of the parties from the determinant 
problems of the working class; it was the first taste that “revolution was possible” for a 
new generation; and it reaffirmed the need, felt within some parts of the CGIL since 
1955, for an understanding of the workers’ situation and for new ways to construct a new 
workers’ politics.  
The three years from 1960-62 were a period of a postwar renewal in the labor 
struggle, and to a limited extent, in the general class struggle. Beginning from the more 
advanced sectors of economy, particularly the electrical, metal, and mechanical 
industries, workers’ struggles became a potent force for the first time in the new 
Republic.  The first signs of this workers’ renewal was during April 1960 in Milan at 
Alfa Romeo with a 16-day strike against work rhythms. This initial appearance 
culminated, a little later, in a three-month strike with workers marching through the city 
squares that led to a Christmas Day manifestation in Piazza Duomo in the center of 
	   123	  
Milan. Bermani captured the importance of this event: “You could not distinguish 
between the electrical and mechanical workers, the students, and the intellectuals. The 
uniformity of the economic miracle had abolished each element of them and restored a 
more clear expression of the societal class contradictions … This connection [was] new” 
(1997, 239). This same year, 1960, witnessed the national contractual struggle of the 
metal mechanics. Backed by union support, the final agreement had important pay raises 
and reduction of work hours. More importantly, the new contract was an “integrative 
contract” that allowed for local negotiations to modify the national contract to meet the 
needs of workers in particular sectors and companies (Barkan 1984, 56; Foa 1975, 125-
7). For the CGIL, this was part of a strategy for state intervention as a democratic force 
against the monopolies.45 However, as we will see below, the unions failed to account for 
two factors, the State-capital relationship and the new composition of the working class 
and its attitudes and behaviors.  
The emphasis on sector and company level struggles opened the way to new 
possibilities for worker protest. Throughout 1961 and 1962 there was a wave of local 
struggles (ranging in diverse industries and sectors) that culminated in the renewal of 
workers’ struggles at Fiat in the summer of 1962, marking a dramatic turning point in 
working class politics.46 The key to these actions for Quaderni Rossi was the nature of 
the claims addressed and the new forms of workers’ communication that developed by 
the more “advanced” workers. The general claims went beyond the “political” claims of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 For analysis of the union’s position in the V Congress of the CGIL, see Vittorio Rieser, 
“Definizione del settore in una prospettiva politica,” Quaderni Rossi, no. 1, 1961: 73-90.  
 
46 For an outline that captures the extent of these affairs in Turin and highlights the role of 
the workers’ assemblies, see Giovanni Alasia, “Alcuni dati sulle lotte sindacali a torino 1960-1. 
Osservazioni preliminare,” Quaderni Rossi, no. 1, 1961: 149-86.  
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the left-wing parties and targeted the structure of power as the key to exploitation. These 
demands did not derive from “tactical” considerations, but from what QR identified as a 
general “antagonism” to the bosses power. There were, in short, “new forces” at play 
within the working class that were appearing for the first time, as political subjects, in 
this wave of struggles.  
In this general background, Quaderni Rossi emerged as a potent force for 
“discovering” the new working class within the large factories of Turin. As Mario Tronti 
later recounted the importance of QR in the early 1960s, “the experience of Italian 
operaismo was fundamentally the meeting of a new Marxism and this new working 
class” (2001, 2-3). The earlier and more important interventions into factory working life 
were conducted by a group around Romano Alquati (Piero Gasparotto and Romolo 
Gobbi), whose political experience derived from the work of Danilo Montaldi and the 
“sociology from the base” that came out of the political circle in Cremona. Alquati’s 
singular contribution to Quaderni Rossi was in the field of producing an understanding of 
working class subjectivity as the expression of attitudes, behaviors, and the composition 
of, what Tronti identified as, the “collective worker.” Beginning from an understanding 
of “workers’ inquiry,” Alquati sought to develop the consciousness of the individual 
worker’s social relation in production as a phase of “preliminary consciousness” in 
preparation for a “second phase” which would be the point at which the “collective 
worker” would be the result of  “a ‘workers’ research’ as self-research by the individual 
workers’ together” (1975, 13). For Alquati, the proper understanding of workers’ inquiry 
and co-research were preparatory sociological tools for workers to use in order to develop 
their own collective consciousness of themselves as a class.  
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Alquati’s contribution to Quaderni Rossi, in the form of three published articles in 
the review, must be conditioned by his understanding of the review as a “traditional 
review” with limited potential. His works were submitted as pieces designed simply as a 
form of communication. The details of his investigations at Fiat were not subjected to 
large discussions within QR, despite their relevance for “proving” their theoretical 
hypotheses (Alquati 1975, 24; Alquati 2000, II, 9). Alquati viewed the journal as a 
traditional theoretical review characterized by “a self-enclosed elaboration.” A bit 
skeptical about the review, he “used the Quaderni … as much as possible as an 
instrument of intervention” (Ibid, 23). Thus, what we find in his contributions remained 
limited and somewhat rudimentary, with a more complete picturing emerging later in his 
experience with Classe Operaia. However, his work was essential to one of the key 
conceptual and theoretical contributions of the group, the early formulation of what 
became known as “class composition,” a conceptual tool for understanding the process 
whereby the working class is composed, decomposed, and recomposed. This dynamic 
understanding of the working class contributed to the theorization of the “mass worker” 
as the identity of the “collective worker” brought into being by technological and 
organizational changes (e.g., Taylorism and Fordism). While this understanding of 
working class political subjectivity did not take full shape until the journal Classe 
Operaia was formed, Alquati began his research in QR by examining these trends that 
had been introduced in the postwar period, and built, primarily, on the massive migration 
of Southerners to Italy’s “industrial triangle.”  
Alquati’s first articles, Documenti sulla lotta di classe alla Fiat (Documents on 
the class struggle at Fiat) and Relazione sulle “forze nuove” (Report on the “new 
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forces”), were part of a contribution to a PSI Convention at Turin in January 1961. His 
key points, derived from discussions with members of the Internal Commission, with 
young employees, and some casual discussions, concerned the nature of work at Fiat and 
the characteristic of the new, mainly young immigrant workers, and their relationship 
with work and the union (1961, 198-215; 1961a, 215-240). Alquati focused on the new 
workers, who were predominantly young, and performed compartmentalized work with 
the introduction of automation and consequent deskilling of the older workforce. This 
new labor force, he found, were “deprived of every ideological or interpretive scheme or 
of any tied reference to the historic experience of the workers’ movement” (Ibid, 234). 
Moreover, and somewhat similar to Luchino Visconti’s depiction of the Southern 
experience in the North in Rocco and his brothers, timely released in 1960, they were 
uprooted from a peasant culture, with a bitter memory of the postwar defeats of the 
landless movements, and viewed work as tiresome, rather than as a means to their 
emancipation (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 26; Partridge 1996, 85). Albeit abstractly 
expressed in these early years, this perspective on the role of work and the ends of life 
was akin to the young students and “sons of workers” who were wont to find the end of 
man encapsulated in history, a connection that here is only anticipatory and does not 
develop until the worker-student politics around the “hot autumn” (see chapters 5 and 6).  
In his encounters, Alquati found that the younger workers were attracted by the 
“Fiat paradise” and the life it promised them. Once the reality of factory life demystified 
this “paradise,” they quickly developed attitudes that “criticized the logic of the factory 
entirely” (1961a, 235). Alquati interpreted the basic problems in terms of political 
consciousness and the relationship between the older workers and the new workers. The 
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former were largely tied to the union movement, while the younger workers “refused 
union work,” as they perceived the unions to be disinterested in work conditions and 
relations in the factory. Moreover, the new workers’ basic sentiment, as Alquati 
characterized it, revealed the crucial point that “the only way to guarantee the union 
conquest was to cut the power of the boss in the factory” as a “problem of political 
power, of the workers’ management of all society” (Ibid). This was far removed from the 
left-wing union’s cry for the “dignity of work” and “rights” of the workplace that had 
become a staple of the left’s push for entry into the government. Alquati, based off these 
preliminary observations, found that the general workers’ attitude provided ample 
evidence that the neo-capitalist ideological view of worker “integration,” a key polemical 
point in QR’s elaboration, was wrong. Thus, the preliminary findings of Alquati pointed 
to a new working class that understood the political nature of contestation and 
antagonism as the ends of class struggle in the factory, as part of a general rejection of the 
workplace. Following the deskilling of labor, these younger workers viewed the system 
of work qualification as more-or-less arbitrary, derived from the political rationality of 
the boss. While his discussions took place with a small portion of the workforce, and 
perhaps, represented a new “vanguard,” he identified within them a “revolutionary 
potential” that, he believed, was capable of being generalized to other large industrial 
factories.   
In order for the renewal of the workers’ struggles to have a more consistent and 
revolutionary development, Alquati set out to sketch the outlines of a class movement, 
with its new composition of workers, by cultivating within them a certain level of 
political consciousness of themselves as a class, and the need for self-organization (1962, 
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64). This idea of developing the “embryo of an alternative consciousness” derived from 
Lenin’s analysis of spontaneous workers’ action in What Is To Be Done? For Lenin, it 
was the responsibility of the vanguard party, as an element external to the production 
process in the factory, to develop this spontaneity in a political direction. For Alquati and 
Quaderni Rossi, however, the problem was not that of developing external “guides,” but 
of aiding the workers in constructing organizations that they controlled. Rather than 
working from outside, Alquati, through the intervention of co-research, sought to 
“stabilize a continuous relationship to create stable ties on the problems that emerge in 
order to create a political organization of workers in the factory” (1962, 75). Thus, the 
key problems were matters of political consciousness and organization, intimately 
connected to the workers’ struggles that could be developed through communication and, 
potentially, the workers’ own investigation of their collective understanding of 
productive relations and development of an alternative arrangement (Ibid, 69).  
In conducting his analysis, Alquati read a theoretical Marxism of the factory that 
drew heavily on Panzieri’s analysis of technology and capitalist despotism. In marked 
contrast to his writing on Fiat, Alquati interpreted the effect of technology on the work 
process in such a manner that pushed the question of organization away from the 
“workers’ control” thesis as a problem of  “the workers’ management of all society,” 
including the liquidation of the “parasitic” classes, toward the political organization of 
workers’ antagonism that emerged from Tronti’s factory-society analysis. The problem 
for Alquati centered on the relationship between the worker and the machine as a 
particular facet of social relations at a certain point of technological development. While 
Marx had studied the effects of mechanization on the work process, it was the “true and 
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proper capitalist revolution (or counterrevolution),” developed and executed by Frederick 
Taylor, that marked capital’s “grand political victory; from this point on, capital 
developed its command through the machines themselves” as a “predetermination of 
living labor.” Moreover, this “revolution” was considered to be, much like the 
interpretation of fascism by the “New Resistance,” a permanent feature of capitalism; 
“Taylorism does not appear to us as a historic contingency, but as a tendency that 
reproduces itself in new forms in each phase of the creation and capitalist appropriation 
of relative surplus-value”  (Ibid, 129, 160). This “predetermination” of the worker, by 
capital, could only be met by the working class’s political antagonism.  
The introduction of mechanization and automation altered the nature of workplace 
hierarchy and command, as well as the jobs and functions of the workers. The new basis 
of organization and job tasks were determined by information and political control to 
determine the ends to which information was used. The hierarchy functioned in terms of 
managing the extraction of surplus-value. Technology was used to control this process by 
creating “new forms of atomization and reification of the working class” (Ibid, 120). 
Alquati examined these new formations in the division between time-management of the 
workforce, the “trainers” of labor, and the workers. In this process, the goal of 
management to integrate the new workforce to the productive process and the machine 
was demonstrated as a bureaucratic technique that included the ability to control the 
“micro-movements” of the workers. While time-management functioned as a direct tool 
of capital, the trainers of labor, in this relationship, came from within the union. Alquati 
described this phenomenon as “ruffiani,” as workers fending for themselves, which he 
viewed as the “result of the historic contrast of political atomization and socialization of 
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the worker composed dialectically” (Ibid). That is, the phenomenon of ruffiani was the 
direct consequence of an atomized workforce that had accepted its integration into 
capital.  
The new tasks introduced by automation rendered the worker to a fragmentary 
existence where the assembly line, the machines, and the bosses that controlled the 
rhythm and structure of work, mediated the bonds of work. No longer was the worker the 
“executor” of a productive task, but, rather, his role, as an appendage to the machine, was 
to “fulfill” the productive plan set forth by management and thus “produce surplus value 
for capital” (Ibid, 123). In this new stage of capitalist development, production by the 
worker lost all meaning outside of its role in valorizing capital. The work process itself 
no longer held any positive value for the workers. The result of this was two-fold: 
management had to attempt to restore a sense of “value” to the work process, and the idea 
of workers’ control as “self-management” was superseded by the need for workers to 
resist the command of capital. Drawing on analogies to the Center-Left consensus for 
“democratic planning,” Alquati foresaw the capacity of more astute managers to 
introduce “free citizens” in the factory, an idea that captured the integration of the 
workforce in decision-making, albeit subordinated to the top leadership in a situation 
comparable to the integrative role performed by the worker-management councils in the 
immediate postwar years. In any case, the “boss would have to develop as much as 
possible the creative potential of the worker” in order to give some value to work, since it 
had been eviscerated in the direct process of production.  
The new forces of the working class resisted this process of integration, and took 
a stance against the basic structure of power in the factory, including “the immediate 
	   131	  
infrastructure” of work. The new working class, as it expressed its actions spontaneously 
and outside the framework of the trade unions and left political parties, no longer 
concerned itself with “controlling” the productive process, but, following Tronti’s 
argument for political antagonism against capital’s economic integration, needed to 
develop itself through a “process of revolutionary rupture of the planned capitalist 
system” (Ibid, 157 italics mine). Since the bureaucratic apparatus determined the 
machines and the “infrastructure” of work, and this, in turn, was a response to the needs 
of the collective capitalist, workers’ control over production could not be foreseen as a 
possibility for establishing, what Panzieri called, a “dualism of power.” For Alquati, 
workers’ control as a possibility for socialist revolution first had to rely upon, at a 
minimum, the working class’s rupture with capital’s control of information, embodied in 
technology as well as in the leading function of management. For Alquati, this was not 
possible within the existing institutions of capitalism, even if these came under the 
control of the factory workers. If for no other reason, workers would still have to build a 
new power based off capitalist technology. Panzieri had only approximated the 
discussion by talking about “capitalist use,” the problem, Alquati believed, was more 
profound: technology embodied a level of information that assumed the subordination 
and control of the work force.  
The last important point in Alquati’s article was its emphasis on the global plan of 
capital as a means of introducing an international class perspective, in the system of the 
Soviet Union as well as that in the United States and capitalist West. Olivetti, the 
particular “case-study” of his article, produced machines and implements for other 
industries, and was a particularly useful example for demonstrating how smaller firms 
	   132	  
were integrated into the global plan of capital. Alquati outlined a general schema for an 
understanding of an international division of work and the national expression of this, 
divided into particular geographic regions. In this global plan, there existed dominant 
factories, which were the “propulsive points” of the economy, from which one could then 
speak of divisions and sections. The function of workers, in this system, remained that of 
“fulfilling” the plan administered and determined by an array of bureaucratic and 
hierarchic functions. Importantly, this situation was not particular to the Western 
capitalist bloc, but could equally be found in the Soviet Union’s national planning and the 
role of workers in this plan (Ibid, 157). The particular feature of this relationship was 
evidenced in the manner in which the boss used the machine in order to hide the 
bureaucracy, by “eliminating it physically from the workers and transmitting the 
functions to the machine,” through the control of “single decisions of each worker” in 
fulfilling their tasks in the production process (Ibid, 157; 1962, 94). This connection with 
an international division of labor anticipated a much more developed analysis of the 
Soviet Union as a State-capitalist society along with an internationalist dimension of 
working class composition that would be more fully developed in successive years.   
Piazza Statuto and ruptures within Quaderni Rossi 
The central elements that emerged from Alquati’s analysis, along with Tronti’s 
discussion of the social factory, pointed to the need for organization of the working 
class’s “political antagonism” against capital. If the workers’ renewal of 1960-62, along 
with QR’s co-research in the factories, had demonstrated a revolutionary “potentiality” in 
the working class, the events of Piazza Statuto appeared to elevate the level of this 
worker antagonism. The revolt of Piazza Statuto had multiple effects, including, as the 
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secretary general of the Union of Italian Labor (UIL), Giorgio Benvenuto, recalled a 
decade later, a reunification of the unions away from the ideological division that pitted 
capitalist “democratic” unions against the “social-communist” unions (Foa 1975, 130). 
From the perspective of those in Quaderni Rossi, Piazza Statuto proved to be the 
“immediate catalyst” for the splintering of QR into a series of seemingly insuperable 
divisions (Wright 2002, 58).  
1962 marked the definitive arrival of the class struggle in the postwar years, 
breaking a decade of worker defeats and trepidation. In the previous year the public 
sector engineering and mechanical workers had won impressive gains in contractual 
terms, and in 1962, beginning with workers at Lancia (auto) and Michelin (rubber/tires), 
this momentum spread through the private sector finally reaching Fiat, an island of 
capitalist-imposed quiescence that stood as an exemplary workplace in the neo-capitalist 
propaganda of the economic boom. The immediate events of the Piazza Statuto revolt 
occurred in early July (7-9) as part of a metal-mechanics strike at Fiat. The UIL, the more 
conservative of the three main unions, brokered a deal with Fiat and signed a separate 
contract without approval or support of its own workers, and against the strike in general. 
Upon hearing the news, picketing workers and students marched and assembled in Piazza 
Statuto in front of the UIL headquarters to protest what they perceived to be the unions’ 
betrayal. The scene quickly became a battleground as workers’ anger mounted and police 
arrived in a show of force. For over twenty-four hours clashes occurred between the 
protesters and the police, with stone throwing and other projectiles coming from one side 
that was met with reinforcements, teargas, detentions, and arrests by the forces of order. 
In Turin, the unique factory-city, dominated by the presence of Fiat, the conflicts that 
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began in 1960 at Genoa and Milan manifested in a collective action by a new generation 
of young workers, workers with new attitudes and behaviors that were outside the 
understanding of the union apparatus and political parties.  
Not surprisingly, a movement that takes shape outside the framework of the 
existing norms and preferences of a particular social order draws the condemnation of the 
established leadership. Much like their contemporaries in Genoa and Milan, who the 
magistrate had characterized as a “mob, untouchables, without family, no school, perhaps 
no religion, without name or civil existence,” the “mob” at Piazza Statuto was berated by 
the labor press as fascists, or paid provocateurs in the service of Fiat (Bermani 1997, 224; 
Cronache 1962, 57-61). The liberal spectrum of the media, for its part, played the Cold 
War card by trying to place blame on the PCI and thus isolate the communists from the 
PSI and the push for a Center-Left government. Quaderni Rossi identified a different 
phenomenon in this upheaval, albeit with very little agreement about how to interpret, 
strategically, the importance of Piazza Statuto. While the media focused on the rioting 
and the clashes between the police and protesters, QR was quick to separate itself from 
identifying with the “squalid degeneration” of the manifestation (Ibid 1962). Panzieri 
offered the more grim assessment, describing the whole affair as a “grave blow to the 
worker left”; the inability of the workers to control the strike was evidence, for Panzieri, 
that the workers were relatively immature and left themselves open to provocation and 
repression (1973, 302). Despite this lack of organization, the group still found in the 
revolt the “first appearance” of the new working class as a political force in general 
antagonism to the capitalist organization of life (Daghini 2000, 4).  As for the rioting and 
“degeneration,” QR attributed this to the general conditions of urban work life that was 
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isolating and deprived the workers from feeling “themselves as participants of a more 
vast class-consciousness” (Cronache 1962, 60).  
Despite their attempt to distance themselves from the affair’s more desultory 
aspects, QR’s participation in the workers’ strike, and its interpretation of the role of the 
unions, marked the end of the their collaboration with the local CGIL. The first divisions 
within QR were between the members of the group who were affiliated with the CGIL 
and the Turin Camera di Lavoro, who left the review after its first number as the result of 
a pamphlet circulated by Pierluigi Gasparotto and Romolo Gobbi. This pamphlet, 
circulated during a strike by maintenance workers in the transportation sector in the 
summer of 1961, called on the workers to organize themselves outside the union: “the 
class knows how to organize itself, without the need of the party and without the need of 
the syndicate” (Gobbi 2000, 4). The union element within QR, particularly Vittorio Foa, 
who was essential to the first volume and QR’s ties to the workers’ movement, stopped 
contributing to the group, but left their contacts open. The group intervened in the 
workers’ struggle at Fiat with the circulation of a pamphlet, “Agli operai della Fiat” (To 
the workers of Fiat), that was distributed throughout all the sections of Fiat on July 6-7 
(Cronache 1962a, 89-92). While the pamphlet was similar in content to the previous one, 
there was, reflecting the push in QR by Tronti and Alquati, markedly more emphasis on 
workers’ “taking their destiny in their own hands” by constructing their own 
organizations within Fiat to continue their resistance (Ibid). This last pamphlet provoked 
the final rupture between the Turin socialists (Vittorio Foa, Giuseppe Muraro, Giovanni 
Alasia, and Sergio Garavini) and Quaderni Rossi. Panzieri’s fears of being reduced to a 
“sect” were realized. From this moment on, workers’ history and politics in Italy became 
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a study of two phenomenon, the actual workers’ movement, from the base, autonomously 
organized against capital, and the institutional unions and parties of the “historic left,” 
who, following these events, Quaderni Rossi viewed as “completely bureaucratized” and 
were not adequate “instruments” to use in building a generalized workers’ struggle (Negri 
2007, 51; Panzieri 1987, 359).  
The question of relations between QR and the union movement was a permanent 
feature of the review’s work. But as the workers’ renewal developed in the early 1960s it 
proved to be a prelude to a much bigger dispute about the role of organization. Following 
Merli, we can identify three different positions that had been developing in the review 
that came to a bitter confrontation during Piazza Statuto: the line of the “Wildcat strike,” 
the workers’ control position, and the political line (1987, xlii). The “workers’ journal” 
Gatto Selvaggi (Wildcat strike) was published by Romolo Gobbi to put forth the example 
of sabotage as the organizational expression of workers’ power during the strikes at Fiat 
and Lancia (1963). The role of these struggles, Gobbi wrote, was in the importance 
attributed to the use of sabotage against capital. But the workers’ needed to continue this 
sabotage as the basis for “realizing more advanced forms of struggle” (1963, 1).  
Similarly, Potere Operaio di Veneto began a “workers’ journal” that called for the 
workers’ need to “bring together and generalize” the “spontaneous acts of worker 
insubordination” (1963, 1; 1963a).  The importance of these journals resided in their 
exaltation of sabotage as the precondition, or base, from which to develop workers’ 
struggle from the base, without the use of inquiry or development of political 
consciousness through external groups.  
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Against this type of “anarcho-syndicalism,” Panzieri argued that sabotage was an 
impoverished foundation from which to build socialism. Given the “anarchic” nature of 
the struggle over the previous two years, Panzieri argued that there did not exist the level 
of organization within the workers’ movement that could begin to construct its own 
leadership of the struggle, capable of “elaborating a politics” and evaluating the 
significance of a particular struggle (1973, 296).  Reflecting his general pessimism that 
followed from the rupture with the CGIL, Panzieri believed that the “immediate future” 
did not augur well for the “prospects of large successes.” That is, despite the display of 
working class autonomous struggle, Panzieri foresaw a long period of educational work 
to be conducted by the working class in terms of cultivating and forming a mass 
vanguard formation. Against the example of sabotage and the “wildcat strike,” he 
expressed a general warning about such over-zealous appreciations of the recent class 
struggles, noting that in organizing a revolutionary working class movement, “there are a 
series of stages, and if you do not see them you end in mystifying the defeats and 
successes, and, at least, you end up exchanging a form of vanguard political struggle [for 
sabotage], which for the last ten years the working class conducted in diverse situations, 
in diverse moments, and which is the permanent expression of its political defeat” (1973, 
304).  The basic problem for the working class, strategically, was that of  
knowing how to identify, beginning from the factory, the entire process; of knowing how 
to foresee the successive stages, in a way that the workers struggle will not be the 
“response” (at times defensive) to the capitalist’s move, but it will anticipate that move, 
and lead on the point where the crucial problems of capitalist development arise, and 
impede that complex combination of “technocratic rationality” and of “democracy” 
developed in the assurance and stability of capitalist dominion (Ibid, 296, italics in 
original). 
Consistent with his earlier theoretical elaboration of workers’ control, Panzieri, took a 
more conservative approach that appreciated the need to build, over the long-term, 
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workers’ institutions. But if Panzieri was distressed by the exaltation of sabotage, he was 
equally concerned with the more serious fissures that emerged from Tronti’s theoretical 
and strategic position.  
  Romano Alquati and Mario Tronti, to use the more prominent members of this 
position, viewed the recent renewal of class struggle in more positive terms, posing the 
question of intervention at a more direct relationship with the working class. Romano 
Alquati articulated this through his understanding of the “self-research” where workers’ 
came to understand themselves as the “collective worker” or as a unitary political subject 
in a dialectical process between struggle and continuous investigation of their own 
condition in the class struggle. The problem of organization, in this interpretation, was 
put to the immediate context of the workers’ struggle. In short, for Alquati, workers’ had 
already expressed a general antagonism to capital that could be directed in terms of self-
organization and expression of the class struggle without the need for elaboration or 
theoretical interpretation of the movement’s significance. As Toni Negri commented 
years later, after Piazza Statuto the only theoretical question left was that of organization 
(2007, 72). For this group, which included Asor Rosa, Alquati, Gasparotto, Negri, and 
Tronti, the immediate problem was that of direct political action towards the construction 
of a revolutionary working class party, autonomously organized (ie, organized from the 
base), to put itself as a general antagonism to the capitalist class.   
 Mario Tronti’s elaboration of the “refusal of labor” had already tapped into the 
connection between sabotage and “refusal” as a general revolt against that particular 
commodity, labor-power. For Tronti, the problem became that of constructing direct 
contacts with the workers’ base to build a revolutionary organization of the class. We saw 
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above the theoretical distinction between Tronti’s “refusal” and Panzieri’s workers’ 
control. “After Piazza Statuto,” Merli wrote, there was “certainly a convergence…against 
Panzieri, by the “Wildcat” group [and the workers’ self-organization of Potere Operaio 
di Veneto] with the Roman “political” group” (1987, xliv). This alignment was put in 
open debate in the summer of 1963, as Quaderni Rossi published its Cronache Operaie 
(Workers’ Chronicle), with the Venetian group controlling the editorial body, as an 
attempt to give space to the diverging positions within the group.  
 The Workers’ Chronicle only published one issue, but represented the diverse 
paths that had been developing in QR over the previous two years. In his contribution to 
the internal problems of their work, Panzieri reiterated the need for developing a worker 
cadre capable of generalizing the class struggle. The spontaneity of the recent workers’ 
struggle, again, only represented that “embryo of consciousness” and lacked an 
understanding of the “fundamental objective, material elements external to the working 
class” (1973, 294). Those who wanted to exalt this spontaneous action, Panzieri wrote, 
“mystified” the actual process underway by focusing solely on the working class. And, 
for those who thought that they could construct a party out of this workers’ spontaneity, 
without developing workers’ understanding of the material conditions of capitalism, and 
without developing workers’ organizations that went beyond particular factory struggles, 
the result could only end in an imposition of a party-form based on “blind voluntarism” 
or “consolatory prophecies” (Ibid, 294-300).  
 The renewal of the workers’ struggle had forced QR to confront the relationship 
between their theoretical elaboration and organizational strategies. By the summer of 
1963, it had become apparent that the review contained at least two diverse research 
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projects that translated into political lines. The basis for the diverging research programs 
stemmed from their evaluation of the workers’ struggles. Vittorio Rieser represented, on 
the one hand, the more conservative outlook, that “there existed, in fact, a direction of the 
struggle … on the level of the union and claims; there did not exist a political plan” 
(1962, 15). On the other hand, the position of Tronti had been elaborated that spring in an 
address to the “Lega Marxista” (Marxist League) in Milan that proposed the need for a 
working class party appropriate to the “law of development of the working class” (1964, 
1).47 Given these two different projects, Panzieri stated: “we can have two lines of 
research, that are contrasting and divergent, and make political action in this coexistence. 
If this is possible the divergences need to be open and clear: only in this way is it 
legitimate; but at this moment I do not see the advantages” (1975, 303).  More 
damningly, he continued, “there probably is not any point on which our divergences 
agree. It is not possible to make a workers’ journal in this way” (Ibid). Panzieri accused 
Tronti of going against the lessons of Della Volpe’s own formulation of Marxism by 
introducing philosophical idealism into investigations of the workers’ movement.  
Tronti’s position had represented the type of “mystification” that Panzieri had steadfastly 
opposed throughout his life, and, as if in a final plea for rationality and commitment to 
the “truth,” he cautioned those in the group against Tronti’s formulation:  
it is for me a fascinating resurrection of a complete series of errors that in this moment 
the workers’ left could commit. It is fascinating because it is very Hegelian, in the 
original sense, as a new way of reliving a philosophy of history. But it is exactly a 
philosophy of history, a philosophy of the working class (Ibid, 302).  
 
From either perspective, Panzieri was not capable of foreseeing a connection between the 
theoretical work and a genuine connection with the real movement. The situation for him 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Tronti’s address was published as the lead article in the first issue of Classe Operaia, 
entitled “Lenin in England.”  
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was too immature. At best, the recent workers’ struggle could have given way to “a new 
space at the theoretical and historic level” by the development of workers’ organizations, 
not tied to QR. But, the splits in the group proved insurmountable.  
By August of 1963 the group split, with the Panzieri-Rieser faction from Turin, 
who remained in QR, and the factions from Rome, Veneto, and Milan who went on to 
form Classe Operaia. The political project of CO, as we will see in the next chapter, 
expanded the theoretical project of operaismo into a critique of the State, recovering the 
Leninist thematic of the State and workers’ organization (i.e., Party) in ways that 
Quaderni Rossi only superficially discussed. As for the Turin group, they continued to 
focus on the workers’ condition and conduct inquiries for another three years. However, 
after the untimely death of Panzieri in October 1964, their work became more academic 
and formalistic, and increasingly separated from the revolutionary class politics that had 
been central to its founding purpose. If Panzieri had been unable to foresee the 
potentialities and actual situation of militancy in the class movement, he perceived the 
difficulties that would afflict Classe Operaia in its attempt to propel the class struggle into 
a general class revolution, based on a theoretical and idealistic assumption of the working 
class’s “refusal” and “antagonism” that could only introduce a form of party or 
organization by force.  In turning to Classe Operaia, we will see how they developed a 
theory of “workers’ refusal” as the antagonistic expression of the “collective worker” and 
sought to propel this unitary working class political subject into an organized Party-form 
to lead a revolutionary class struggle against the State and against capital.  
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CHAPTER 4 
CLASSE OPERAIA: THE PRIMACY OF WORKING CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE 
ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTION 
We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and workers second. 
This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse the polarity, and start 
again from the beginning: and the beginning is the struggle of the working class. At the level of 
socially developed capital, capitalist development becomes subordinated to working class 
struggles; it follows behind them, and they set the pace to which the political mechanisms of 
capital’s own reproduction must be tuned. –Mario Tronti, Lenin in England  
 
The political work of the class consists today essentially in keeping alive in the practice of every 
workers’ struggle the strategic proposal of the conquest of power through the revolution. The 
organization and the revolution coincide in the same strategic moment. The organization is the 
revolution. To organize signifies tying together, in the struggle, the mass organizations internal 
to the factory, at a national and international level, unifying the struggle in time and in space—
Padua Autonomia Operaia 
 
To realize an economically and politically stable society, with the active collaboration of the 
working class, is the legitimate dream of intelligent bourgeois politicians: if such a dream 
represents the highest plan of a communist party, more than a million workers strong, the conflict 
between a reformist strategy and revolutionary tactics becomes inevitable—Rita di Leo, Operai e 
Pci 
 
Introduction 
The advent of Classe Operaia (Working Class, CO) signified a movement within 
operaismo to integrate theoretical analyses and political proposals leading to the 
construction of a revolutionary workers’ organization. In important ways the experience 
of CO differed from its predecessor. First, the journal conducted more extensive 
interventions in the class struggle by trying to “make politics” with the workers (Negri 
2007, 79). This derived from a view of the journal as an “instrument of intervention,” 
rather than as a place of theoretical debate. In fact, the journal’s contents revealed an 
extensive chronicling of workers’ struggles, a feature that reflected its subtitle as a 
“political monthly of the workers in struggle.”  
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The group in Classe Operaia came together and was animated by an emphasis on 
intervention in the workers’ struggle. This decisive shift stemmed from a reading of the 
recent wave of workers’ struggles that evinced, they believed, a politically unified 
working class with decidedly antagonistic behaviors and attitudes in its confrontation 
with capitalist domination (Grandi 2003, 16-18). Moving away from the focus on 
sociology in Quaderni Rossi, CO constructed a reductive and deterministic method that 
located the working class as the central, dynamic agent of capitalist development. Their 
methodological approach centered on a materialistic conceptualization of capitalist social 
relations. Unlike the orthodox Marxism of the Italian left, which determined historical 
development through an understanding of the “objective” conditions of capitalism, Classe 
Operaia examined the development of working class political subjectivity within 
capitalist social relations that produced an understanding of “class composition” that was 
specific to a social system of production with its determinant technological and social 
relations (i.e., Taylorism). Against orthodox Marxism’s focus on the private ownership of 
the means of production, which produced a static conception of the working class, CO 
understood working class subjectivity as a dynamic and fluid social subject that was 
constantly composed, decomposed, and recomposed in the process of class struggle. 
From these methodological premises, Classe Operaia introduced the “workers’ point of 
view” as the appropriate level of analysis from which to construct new political proposals 
and to generate a political line in order to build a revolutionary class organization. 
Aside from the theoretical innovations that CO introduced, there existed 
substantive differences between the work of CO and QR. While the articles in Classe 
Operaia were largely monographic, the content and substance of the work derived from a 
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more collective approach than the intellectual production in QR. However, despite this 
collective work, Mario Tronti has been generally recognized as the dominant intellectual 
influence within the group. Lapo Berti, a CO militant who was active in the Tuscan 
region, later remarked on Tronti’s importance: “the discussions, the ideas, the orientation, 
the intellectual material on which we worked was in good part derived from Tronti’s 
writings and discourses which were commented on and discussed each time that we came 
together for collective work” (2000, 1). It followed from Tronti’s influence that CO put 
forth more unified theoretical analyses and political proposals than had QR. Indeed, 
Tronti’s intellectual prowess had a durable influence on the successive development of 
operaismo, as he possessed an “intellectual allure,” in Berti’s words, that enveloped those 
around him in the hopes of founding a new theory of workers’ revolution (Ibid).48 With 
this general uniformity of method, political proposals, and organization, Classe Operaia 
developed the analysis of the “social factory” towards the question of territory as well as 
its international scope. While Wright is quite accurate in his remarks that Classe Operaia 
was not primarily concerned with capitalist circulation or its reproduction, there was, at a 
minimum, an analysis of territory and internationalism in CO that broadened the 
discussion of social capital beyond the work of QR (2002, 80-1).   Last, CO had a much 
more national presence than QR; while the Roman branch dominated CO’s theoretical 
production (much like its position in the second and third years of QR), the group 
maintained a broader regional composition than QR, with a significant presence initially 
in Milan, Genoa, Florence, Turin, and Padua-Veneto, that expanded over time. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Tronti’s Operai e capitale (Workers and capital), a collection of his writings in 
Quaderni Rossi and Classe Operaia along with an important new contribution, was published in 
October 1966, and has been described as the “bible” of working class revolution for Potere 
Operaio and a dominant source of analysis for a generation of militants from 1968-1977 (Greppi 
2000, 8).  
	   145	  
groups from Rome and Padua-Veneto controlled the basic editorial and political tasks of 
the journal. Classe Operaia was a relatively short-lived journal, but its political culture 
shaped the trajectory of operaismo in terms of method and theoretical analyses, which 
also influenced working class revolutionary politics into the 1970s.  
 In this chapter, I analyze CO’s treatment of political organization and Tronti’s 
introduction of the party as an instrument of working class revolution. I begin with 
Tronti’s method for developing a workers’ revolution in the West, that, by locating the 
working class as the central social subject of capitalist development, focused on factory 
struggles as the basis for developing a workers’ political organization capable of breaking 
the political power of capital in order to impose a revolutionary political process within 
capitalist economic development. This discussion is located within the birth of the first 
post-war Center-Left government and the economic conjuncture of 1964-1965. Next, I 
examine Tronti’s introduction of Lenin and construction of the party as a central theme of 
operaismo. This discussion is located within the context of the debates around the PCI 
after the death of Togliatti in August 1964. Out of this debate, CO developed internal 
divisions between Tronti and the Roman group, who sought a workers’ “use” of the PCI 
and those, particularly form Padua-Veneto, who looked toward the working class as the 
proper fount of class organization and a workers’ party, a split that suggests a different 
understanding of the “workers’ point of view,” or, at a minimum, of how to discern the 
meaning of that important methodological tool. Implicitly, from this discussion, CO 
developed the early forms of its critique of the State, which, in later developments was 
formulated by Negri as the “Planner-State.” This chapter ends with the closure of CO as a 
journal, as the group followed diverse ways to continue their political work. I critically 
	   146	  
examine the experience of CO in light of its theoretical and political contributions as well 
as its limitations.  
Tronti’s “Copernican Revolution” 50 
 At the founding conference of Classe Operaia, Mario Tronti presented an 
argument for overturning generations of methodological analysis in order to establish a 
theoretical basis for workers’ revolution in the advanced capitalist West. Tronti’s so-
called “Copernican Revolution” established the foundations for CO’s theoretical 
perspective by attributing primacy of the working class as the leading, dynamic subject of 
capitalist development. In “Lenin in England,” Tronti put forth his now widely cited 
inversion of Marxism:  
We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and workers 
second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse the 
polarity, and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is the struggle of the 
working class. At the level of socially developed capital, capitalist development becomes 
subordinated to working class struggles; it follows behind them, and they set the pace to 
which the political mechanisms of capitals’ own reproduction must be tuned (1964a, 1 
emphasis added).  
 
Sweeping away the history of Western Marxism that focused on capital as the “objective” 
expression of the social order, Tronti asserted that, under conditions of social capital, 
analytical focus must be placed on the working class as the politically determinant agent 
of capitalist development. Importantly, the working class was not expressed here as a 
category of capital (i.e., labor-power); for Tronti, the problem was not that of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Tronti’s “Rivoluzione copernicana” (Copernican Revolution) was presented and 
discussed at the founding conference of Classe Operaia on October 26-7, 1963 in Florence. The 
full text, with excerpts of the debate, is now reprinted in Trotta and Milana’s L’operaismo degli 
anni Sessanta (2008, 290-301). This was the same text that Panzieri had previously criticized as 
“Hegelian” (see above, Ch. 3). The substance of this address and debate was published as the lead 
editorial in the first number of CO as “Lenin in Inghilterra” (Lenin in England) [1964a]. “Lenin 
in England” was later republished in Tronti’s Operai e capitale (1966) and translated into English 
by “Red Notes” in Working Class Autonomy and the Crisis (1979). It is now available on-line: 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/it/tronti.htm.  
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understanding workers as an economic category, as this necessarily limited theoretical 
investigation and comprehension of the working class as part of a “predetermined social 
category,” thus limiting class politics to capturing economic power and management, as 
exemplified by those who advocated “workers’ control” (Tronti 1963a, 292). Not only 
did Tronti’s thesis overturn the “objectivist’s” focus on capital, but it also sought to leave 
behind the broad traditions of anarchist communism, council communism, and 
revolutionary syndicalism. Against these “economic” approaches to the working class, 
Tronti asserted that the class must be investigated as an autonomous political and social 
subject with its own distinct characteristics and historical development. Working class 
subjectivity was more than that particular commodity of capitalism, labor-power, and it 
was the task of a revolutionary method to understand and develop a conception of the 
working class unto itself, as a political subject within historically determinant conditions.  
 If the key point of analysis resided in examining the working class as a political 
force within capitalist social relations, then, for Tronti, it followed that it was necessary 
to identify and discern the historical growth and development of the class. Against the 
focus on the “laws of capitalist development,” Tronti proposed the need to comprehend 
the “laws of development of the working class” (Ibid, 292-3). Only in this way was it 
possible to develop a revolutionary theory adequate to the historic conditions of social 
capital and its particular relations of production expressed in the “social factory.” For 
Tronti, the revolution was political, and its agent was the working class. Its concern was 
political power, the political growth and intensification of workers’ power over capitalist 
society. “The specific revolutionary movement,” Tronti wrote, “of the working class 
consists in the fact of capturing power, the revolutionary rupture, hence the expansion of 
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the working class within the economic system of capital is immediately put as political 
growth” (Ibid, 292). Thus, Tronti’s so-called “Copernican Revolution” unfolded a 
political project that methodologically prioritized the investigation of the working class 
as a political subject, analytically distinct from its economic categorization in capital as 
labor-power, with the purpose of discerning the class’s “laws of development” as the 
premises for constructing a revolutionary political organization.  
Tronti based his analysis on the recent wave of workers’ struggles as an 
expression and confirmation of a stage of the autonomous political growth of the class.51 
In identifying the political situation of the working class, the early 1960s signified 
collective attitudes and practices that, in later years, would be popularized through the 
slogan of the “refusal of work”: “planned non-cooperation, organized passivity, 
polemical expectations, a political refusal, and a permanent continuity of struggles” 
(Tronti 1964a, 18-19). Reaffirming the shared position of QR, working class “rupture” 
was the key contradiction of capitalism, and this rupture was displayed through a general 
“refusal” of capitalist social relations by the working class. Tronti laid out the potential of 
this refusal to signify the rejection of claims by workers to capital. “We can foresee,” 
Tronti wrote: 
that even at a certain point the relationship between the working class and capital will be 
overcome, in the sense that the workers will not make any more claims to capital … [the 
class] will not be limited any longer to ask for some things, but to refuse those things that 
are requested: thus it can be foreseen that a more high form of development of the class 
struggle in which the requests, the claims, will be made only by the capitalists (1963a, 
294).  
As we saw in the previous chapter, Tronti’s “strategy of refusal,” and particularly his 
view that “labor needs to see labor-power, as a commodity, as its proper nemesis,” was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For a staunch defense of Tronti’s position against claims of “idealism,” see Albert Asor 
Rosa’s review of Operai e capitale (1967).  
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now presented as the key strategic line of working class militancy that emerged out of the 
early 1960s (Tronti 1963, 25-6). In this great “refusal,” Classe Operaia initially found the 
possibility, the potentiality, for the unification of the workers’ struggle through the 
construction of a workers’ organization, giving expression beyond particular struggles 
and generalized to the whole class. The basis of this formulation for revolution in the 
West was to organize the working class’s political refusal of commodification and 
capitalist social relations, reaching a “critical moment” where the class would be capable 
of putting into crisis the “economic mechanism of capitalism” (1963a, 295-6). In short, 
workers’ political rupture of capital’s “economic mechanism” was the proper way for 
overcoming neo-capitalism.  
 If the autonomous development and political growth of the working class 
presupposed the latter’s analytical distinction from capital, what role did the latter play in 
determining the situation of the class? As a political force, capital, was responsible for 
bringing the working class together as a social subject; capital provided the material basis 
for the unification of the working class. The historically determinant position of “social 
capital” was responsible for the “technical composition” and “social composition” of the 
working class. That is, the working class was prepared by capital within a specific set of 
relations that socialized the class with certain attitudes and behaviors in the direct process 
of production, which needed to be understood and analyzed as the basis for the political 
organization and growth of the working class. The experience of QR, and the 
investigations conducted there, particularly Romano Alquati’s analysis, demonstrated a 
willingness to struggle among the working class that Tronti utilized to construct his 
understanding of the “mass worker” of Taylorist production. While, theoretically, the 
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potentiality existed for the class to reach the “critical moment” of rupture in the capitalist 
system, the actual prospects were far-off; it was necessary, in order to make this passage, 
to organize working class resistance. In the short term, with the birth of the Center-Left 
government and the onset of the economic crisis in 1963-4, the immediate strategic goal 
of the class was to organize itself in order to “provoke a certain type of capitalist 
development that [went] in the direction of revolution” (1964a, 20). That is, capitalist 
economic development was not the immediate strategic target for the working class; 
rather the concern here was with the development of workers’ political power as a 
determinant factor shaping capital’s economic development. Thus, the working class was, 
in the short-term, in favor of capitalist economic development, but it simultaneously 
refused capital’s political development, putting against the latter its own political power 
and control over the course of such development. If workers evinced certain antagonistic 
attitudes, it was the political task of Classe Operaia to identify those and to organize the 
working class around these attitudes and behaviors in such a manner to push capital into a 
revolutionary process.  
 Tronti’s thesis that the working class, under the situation of “social capital,” 
politically determined capitalism’s “political mechanisms” of development seemed to be 
verified with the inauguration of Italy’s first postwar Center-Left government. On the one 
hand, the Center-Left signified a request by capital to bring the workers’ movement into 
government as a direct consequence of the revolts of July 1960 and subsequent increase 
in militancy through 1963. In short, it was deemed necessary, by elements of the 
Democratic Christians and the leading industrialists, that the working class be integrated 
into the government in order to control their political militancy. The first proposal for 
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government planning appeared in an “Additional Note” to the “General relations on the 
economic situation of the country,” written by Ugo La Malfa, the Republican Minister of 
Budget in the Fanfani Government (1962-3).52 La Malfa’s proposal highlighted the need 
to obtain union collaboration in order to force a policy of wage restraint on the working 
class. In exchange, the government would commit itself to improving basic social 
services (i.e., transport, housing, etc…). This type of exchange had already been 
established with the PSI, as the latter agreed to support the Fanfani government, albeit 
without their direct participation, in lieu of promises of reform.53 As a result of this 
agreement, by December 1963, the PSI entered the government to form the first Center-
Left government in the postwar period, as the basis of a government that increasingly was 
shifting its role to economic and social planning, now with the direct collaboration of one 
of the working class’s historic political parties.  
 The first Center-Left government confirmed Tronti’s prediction that the PSI’s 
entry into government would polarize the Socialist Party between those who saw in the 
class a politically antagonistic force against capital, which constituted the foundation for 
a socialist program, and the reformists who sought to use state power as a democratizing 
force leading to a long-term transition to socialism. This polarity developed through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 For discussion of La Malfa, see (Crainz 2005, 218-9; Sassoon 1986, 52-3). Amintore 
Fanfani was President of the Council of Ministers from February 21, 1962 to June 21, 1963 as 
part of a tripartite government composed of the Christian Democrats, The Democratic Socialists, 
and the Republicans.  
 
53 Of the promised reforms, the only one passed was the important nationalization of the 
electricity trusts. This reform supported the PSI’s basic position of using the government to 
control investments and direct development away from the monopolies and into the democratic 
planning of the State. This basic goal of their reforms, however, was disrupted by the 
compensatory scheme for the former trusts. Upon nationalization of the trusts, the former owners 
were allowed to remain as financial service companies, and thus they maintained a critical 
function in the Italian economy (Ginsborg 1990, 268-71).  
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fall of 1964 with members of the CGIL, notably the Secretary-General Vittorio Foa, 
rejecting the call for working class sacrifice as a condition for government reforms, and, 
ultimately, produced the second post-war fracture in the PSI (in January 1964 a group of 
deputies and Senators left the PSI and formed a faction under the older party name, the 
PSIUP) [Foa 1975, 120]. The basic complaint levied against the PSI: the party was too 
ready to sacrifice working class autonomy to party politics (DiScala 1988, 146-7). For its 
part, Classe Operaia welcomed the Center-Left while attacking the politics of reform. 
With the PSI integrated into the capitalist system and rendered functional to capitalist 
reforms, the class would more readily be able to identify its friends and enemies. Left to 
itself, the class would be shown that their struggle had to be “the direct work of the 
workers organized” (Classe Operaia 1964, 1). In short, CO expected that the experience 
of the Center-Left would further demonstrate the need for workers’ organization at the 
base level.  
 A crucial fact for CO was that the Center-Left and the politics of planning 
emerged in the absence of a revolutionary workers’ organization. In this scenario, 
working class collaboration in a politics of planning could only serve to advance the 
command function of capital in tandem with its economic development; that is, to make 
capital stronger both politically and economically. It was this perspective of reformism 
that was the target of CO’s polemics, but it was not a complete rejection of capitalist 
reforms. Rather, as Tronti noted in “Lenin in England,”  
It is clear that if the working class had a revolutionary political organization, it would aim 
everywhere at making the highest developed point of capitalist reformism. The process of 
building a unification of capital at the international level can only become the material 
base for a political recomposition of the working class … if it is accompanied by a 
revolutionary growth not only of the class, but also of the class organization. If this 
element is absent, the whole process works to the advantage of capital, as a tactical 
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moment of a one-sided stabilization of the whole system, seemingly integrating the 
working class within the system (1964a, 19).  
The Center-Left arose out of capital’s political need to stabilize economic development in 
the aftermath of the workers’ struggles of the early 1960s. Without the presence of a 
revolutionary workers’ organization, this process threatened to politically subordinate the 
working class to capital. Against the prospects of a subaltern status, Tronti and CO began 
to speak of the political destabilization of the Center-Left in the sense that the class 
needed to block capital’s political stability, even while capital advanced its economic 
development and unification internationally. Thus, the working class strategy developed 
by CO remained within a determinist position of the need to develop capital at an 
international level in order to broaden the scope of the class’s “political recomposition,” 
but within the context of a revolutionary class organization.  
 The Center-Left government represented a political response to the workers’ 
struggles of the early 1960s. One of the key elements of these struggles was the ability of 
the working class to “use” the unions in order to decouple wages from productivity. That 
is, through the demand for wages (considered as a basic aspect of union struggles—
defense of the material condition of labor-power), workers were able to break the 
connection between productive output and pay and thus turn an economic claim into a 
political demand. By late 1962, wages began to outpace productivity (Barkan 1984, 60-
4).  The wage struggle was a crucial strategic feature of CO’s political line, that forged 
the later practice of demanding wages for the proletariat’s “needs” as a strategy for 
overcoming the commodity nature of capitalist society. As we saw above, this demand 
for wages was only one part of the political action practiced during the workers’ 
struggles. But it was a practice that the bosses could also directly respond to, given their 
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control over the functioning of the circulation of capital. Immediately, the bosses 
responded to these wage increases by passing costs along to consumers (industrial and 
private individuals) through inflated prices. Business further responded to the increased 
cost of labor-power by engaging in an investment strike and by directing capital to 
foreign markets. The effect of the bosses’ response was to put an end to the “economic 
miracle,” as their actions induced the Italian economy into a process of inflation, 
monetary instability, and a balance of payments crisis. By late 1963-early 1964 business 
interests were able to produce a general climate of panic over the state of the economy 
(Ginsborg 1990, 271). It seemed that, after years of consumer euphoria, the gloom and 
doom of 1948 was on the horizon, and along with it, another round of deflationary 
monetary policy.  
 Politically, the first victim of the economic downturn was the Center-Left reform 
package. Throughout 1963, the pervading sentiment within the DC was that reforms 
would have to wait until the economy was repaired; even La Malfa’s proposals were 
premised on the favorable situation of the economy stemming from the economic 
advancements made during the “economic miracle.” According to Guido Carli, General 
Director of the Bank of Italy, the necessary corrections to the economy required 
deflationary measures. From fall 1963 through winter 1964 the government responded to 
the crisis with a credit squeeze and directed economic policy toward the restoration of 
monetary stability and a rectification of the country’s balance of payments (Carli 1993, 
266-76). These deflationary measures set back any hopes of planning, and opened 
political space for a direct attack on workers and their organizations. From the 
perspective of Classe Operaia, “the objective posted by Carli is nothing other than a ‘less 
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rapid but more controlled development’: the move consists exactly in the conquest of 
control by the capitalist class on the working class” (1965, 20). The attack on the Center-
Left was complete. All reforms were put on hold. As Guido Crainz described the political 
consequences of the deflationary measures: “the Center-Left … survived only as a 
governing formula, as a modality of exercising power that contradicted its original 
project, and thus contributed to discolor it in an irremediable way” (2005, 240). As we 
see in subsequent chapters, the experience of the first Center-Left developed within 
operaismo, in the words of Franco Berardi, a “radical anti-reformist” position (1998, 57). 
The initial features of this “anti-reformism,” would not develop, however, until the 
question of organization became more fully pursued and, specifically, directed towards 
the PCI in the aftermath of Togliatti’s death in August. In any case, rather than offering a 
possibility for working class control over capitalist development, the experience of the 
first Center-Left sullied the idea of reformism as an ideological tool for working class 
integration into the capitalist system.  
From workers’ struggle to workers’ organization 
While the renewed militancy of the workers’ struggle was initially perceived by CO as 
the catalyst for developing the thematic of a workers’ organization, by the onset of the 
economic crisis and the Center-Left government, the relative position of power and 
situation of the working class altered the discourse of Classe Operaia. Throughout the 
whole period, however, the theoretical position of, and justification for, organization 
remained the necessity of giving political organization to the workers’ struggle in order to 
initiate a revolutionary process. However, whereas during the 1960-63 wave of workers’ 
struggles the class was able to “use” the union struggle in order to impose salary gains 
	   156	  
delinked from production, by 1964 this strategy had to confront the stringent pressures 
and relative weakness of the working class once the economic crisis was underway. Yet, 
the wage remained a fundamental expression of the material needs of the class; the 
understanding of the wage, as distinct from any connection to value in the production 
process was, Tronti surmised, a “political fact” (1964c, 99). Following the general 
position of the narrow and one-sided vision of the “working class point of view,” Tronti 
later wrote against the view of the labor theory of value that attributed the production of 
wealth in society to the workers. Rather than propagate this moralistic position, Tronti 
asserted that, as a political fact of the working class, “the labor theory of value means 
labor-power first, then capital … Labor is the measure of value because the working 
class is the condition of capital (1966, 224-5, emphasis in original; Wright 2002, 83-5).54  
In view of the economic crisis and the recent workers’ struggles, CO, building off the 
class’s wage demands, advocated as its strategic line the need for an “open struggle” in 
order to prevent the unions from suffocating the class’s militancy within the confines of 
the contract (Classe Operaia 1964a, 1).55 The “open struggle” signified the willingness 
and availability of the workers to express a “direct conflict with capital in a continuously 
aggressive form”—through “polemical expectations” of the wage, understood not as a 
desire of economic improvement, but as a political demand—which meant that it was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 In Operai e capitale, Tronti’s previously unpublished section, entitled “Marx, labor-
power, working class,” laid out a theoretical analysis of the wage relation in terms of power. This 
analysis will be discussed towards the end of the current chapter. The importance of this 
theoretical development will also be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 in connection with the general 
demand by the working class for wages to meet, not production or output, but proletarian 
“needs.”  
 
55 Throughout the militant practice of operaismo the polemic against the contract, and the 
union’s continued acceptance of this basic collective bargaining practice, as a “cage” constraining 
the workers’ struggle in the bosses’ interest of “maintaining social peace” imposed with the “help 
of the union organizations” (Sacchetto and Sbrogiò 2009, 18).  
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incapable of being bottlenecked by contractual negotiations and other forms of behavior 
that recognized the legitimacy of capital (Ibid). During the economic crisis, the goal of 
the “open struggle” was to block production, continue to impose the struggle on the 
union, and construct a political organization to advance the power of the workers’ 
autonomous struggle. From this general perspective of workers’ organization out of the 
“open struggle,” CO, through the course of 1964, focused on the question of organization 
as the key to workers’ revolution.  
 Classe Operaia convened at Piombino, a small town in the province of Livorno, 
from May 1-3, 1964, to discuss the question of organization. Tronti opened the 
convention with an address that outlined the shortcomings of the experience in QR and 
CO up to that point on the question of institutions and workers’ organization (1964b). 
According to Tronti, within Quaderni Rossi there was a complete lack of development on 
tactics, no clear understanding of how to attain objectives, or any discussion of 
organizational forms (Ibid, 376). Rather, their general slogan, “workers, it is you who 
needs to decide,” reflected the theoretical immaturity of the group’s understanding of 
revolution. In short, the approach lacked an understanding of how to maneuver through 
“passages” in organizing a revolutionary struggle. Tronti identified three basic 
“passages,” an analysis that remained central to subsequent workerist practice: theoretical 
elaboration, general political discourse, and the political-practical moment of intervention 
(Ibid, 377-8). At most, in QR, Romano Alquati had sketched a general outline of a 
similar set of steps in his discussion on workers’ inquiry and co-research, but his 
discussion only touched upon the second of Tronti’s passages and completely neglected 
the “political-practical moment.” It was the latter that Tronti wanted to develop within 
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CO: “the journal needs to assume as an immediate work to resolve … the formation of a 
true and proper political cadre, that … translates this [political] line at the workers’ 
level…” (Ibid, 380 emphasis in original). The origins of this new cadre were less 
important; though preferably from “immediate worker extraction,” this was not essential 
(Ibid, 383). The crucial matter concerned the development of a network of cadres ready 
to elaborate a political line at the base of the working class.  
 Following this convention, Classe Operaia dedicated the sixth number of the 
journal to the question of organization. The lead editorial, “Intervento politico nelle lotte” 
(Political intervention in the struggles), laid out a fourteen-point analysis of organization 
that roughly paralleled Tronti’s classification of passages in revolutionary practice. 
Within the context of international capital and Italy’s experiment with the Center-Left as 
a step towards politically planned economic development, CO confronted the question of 
the historic institutions of the workers’ movement and the role they played in the 
thematic of workers’ organization (1964a, 1).  Within international capital, Italy was 
characterized by the workers’ struggles, which offered a “unifying moment” for the 
international class struggle. The goal of organization, as we have seen, was to develop a 
politically strong working class that could push capitalist development in a revolutionary 
direction. In the previous wave of struggles the class had been able to “use” the unions 
and push them beyond their limited economic function of defending labor-power to give 
them a political character. But their structure, understood as the political line that 
dominated the union, remained economic in nature. The political task of the class, in 
confronting their historic institutions, was to develop a unified and autonomous workers’ 
movement capable of imposing a “new structure” in order to ensure that the CGIL and 
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the PCI would maintain a “non-reformist character” (Ibid, 20).56  This first incursion into 
the institutional question and form of organization slowly carried CO in the direction of 
the traditional organizations, to the neglect of searching for new organizations, and 
produced a fissure in the strategic approach of the group that would increase during the 
course of the next two years.  
 While the workers’ movement had been capable of using the union for its own 
end, the goal of focusing on the union as the new locus of organization was dubious to 
many.  This division centered on two diverse positions. One, expressed at the end of the 
fourteen-point analysis, warned against the development of the workers’ struggles into a 
historical minority or fringe movement, perpetually marginalized in the political battles 
of the class. On the other hand, there existed within the factory a considerable opinion 
that rejected the existing union movement as capable of providing the organization that 
the workers needed. For example, in a pamphlet circulated by CO in factories around 
Turin, entitled “Lottiamo per la nostra organizzazione” (We struggle for our 
organization), there was a clear rejection of the unions and a declaration for the need to 
construct autonomous workers’ organizations (1964b, 1). The pamphlet also rejected the 
push towards the PCI, which was viewed as irretrievably lost in its turn towards social 
democracy and strategic goal of entering the government. Rather than focus on 
regenerating the official institutions, the pamphlet emphasized the need to construct a 
new organization out of the actual workers’ struggles: “the new party of the working 
class will not be born from any of the current parties, nor will it be the result of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 In chapter 5 below, we see how this strand of working within and against existing 
institutions developed in the workers’ struggle at Milan in the experience of the Comitati unitari 
di base (United base committees) and retained some influence in the Comitati Operai (Workers’ 
Committees) in the Veneto-Padua region.  
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unification or disaggregation, but the fruit of a long experience of managing the 
struggles: in these all the organizational forms flow together developing themselves in the 
struggle” (Ibid).  
 While the group expressed differences of opinion on the proper locus of 
organization, there existed a general consensus on provoking a revolutionary process in 
the capitalist West. The passages that Tronti had laid out at Piombino were accepted, with 
the development of a political line and the need to execute this political line at the base. 
The general goal of organization, from both sides, also reflected the desire to have a 
relationship between the class and its organization that approached synthesis. That is, the 
type of intervention that was formulated in terms of organization and the party sought to 
harmonize the relationship between the construction of the political line and its 
articulation and practical execution in the workers’ organization. In this manner, the 
journal had accepted a fairly rigid form of political work that became theorized in a neo-
Leninism that accentuated the need for guiding and controlling the workers’ struggle 
through the workers’ organization. In any case, Classe Operaia had assumed for itself the 
role of constructing a “precise political line” to be executed by the class, while this line 
was “verified” in the struggle and developed through the political expression of the 
workers. As the question of organization advanced the group also began attributing to 
itself the capacity for directing the struggle at the “strategic points” of capital with the 
journal acting as the leading coordinator, both centralized and on a national scale, of 
these strategic attacks on capital (Classe Operaia 1964c, 1). While this latter position was 
at odds with those focusing on the workers in the factory as directing their own struggles, 
CO, particularly after the death of Togliatti in August, moved toward this type of  
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“external” direction of the class struggle. If the Center-Left government and the 
economic crisis of the mid-1960s had produced the need for workers’ political 
organization to stave off the social democratization and integration of the workers’ 
movement, it was resolved with, in the words of Franco Berardi, that “dangerous burden” 
of “political voluntarism” inherited as an “element of Leninism” within the history of the 
workers’ movement (1998, 68).  
Tronti’s Leninism 
Tronti’s introduction of Lenin must be understood within the changes that took place in 
the PCI after the death of Palmiro Togliatti on August 23, 1964. The political proposals 
that Tronti derived from his analysis of Lenin were intimately connected to his analysis 
of the PCI as an organization for class revolution. As early as May 1964, Tronti had 
pointed to the need to struggle within the existing organizations. In “Vecchia tattica per 
un nuova strategia” (Old tactics for a new strategy), Tronti argued that the recent worker 
struggles had “overcome” and “broken” the “capitalist use of the union” (1964c, 99). 
This organizational and strategic victory by the workers demonstrated that they were 
capable of imposing a modicum of political control over the traditional organizations. 
Within the context of the bosses’ response to the workers militancy (i.e., Center-Left and 
economic crisis), Tronti wrote: “[i]t is not enough to refuse collaboration to resolve the 
cyclical difficulties: it occurs to carry these difficulties … in the productive structures,” 
where it would be necessary “to force the struggle to high levels, breaking in these points 
the workers’ spontaneity, imposing the open character of the conflict, overcome the  cult 
of passivity in the open struggle, and pull itself behind … the old organizations” (1964c, 
100).  
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 The type of revolutionary jump that Tronti advocated pointed to the need to 
transform the “passive” struggles of the early 1960s, both against the bosses and the 
historic left, into an open struggle for a political line in order to determine the outcome of 
the economic crises. This push into the old organizations offered the best strategic 
approach for breaking the cycle of capital. As a justification of this approach, Tronti 
argued that the crisis offered the opportunity to begin an “open conflict … in which the 
chain will not be broken where capital is weakest, but where the working class is 
strongest” (1964c, 101). The working class was not necessarily “strongest” in a 
quantitative sense, but, for Tronti, the strength of the working class was identified by its 
organizational ability to impose a revolutionary process on capitalist development. Since 
any new organization seemed destined to a minority position, it was strategically 
imperative to conquer the historic institutions and impose on them a workerist political 
line. With Tronti, the early discussions on organization quickly reverted to the old 
positions of party politics, stifling the experiment with new modes and forms of base 
organizations. The slogan of CO became “from the factory to the party and to the new 
party in the factory” (Classe Operaia 1964e). Only through the party, through the 
prospect of the party-form, would it be possible to transform the working class’s behavior 
from a passive revolt to an open struggle.  
 The death of Togliatti, at the end of August 1964, opened new political space for 
diverse positions vying for direction of the PCI. For its part, the PSI was already tarried 
by its social democratization and the left-wing PSIUP split. In the PCI, Togliatti had left 
behind a mass party that promoted structural reforms as the basis of an alternative vision 
to the social democratization of the left. Within the international communist movement, 
	   163	  
this domestic program reflected the Cold War’s ideological expression of “peaceful 
coexistence” between the capitalist and communist blocks. However, within the Italian 
communist movement, 1956, the Sino-Soviet split, and the “economic miracle” 
challenged the direction of the party. 57  In the aftermath of 1956, the party had 
increasingly developed a left-wing position that was trying to push the party back into the 
factory struggles and to reconnect its political program with the base of the working class 
(Amyot 1981). This program, advanced most energetically by Pietro Ingrao, challenged 
the conservative wing of the party led by Giorgio Amendola. Over the next year and a 
half, up to the XI Congress in January 1966, CO increasingly took interest in the 
happenings of the PCI and attempted to affect these debates by pulling the general 
discourse towards its understanding of the “workers’ point of view.”  
 Debate within the PCI referred not to the actual workers’ struggles of the early 
1960s, but to the experience of the Center-Left—its failure to advance reforms and the 
onset of the economic crisis. For Ingrao, the Center-Left represented an attempt by 
capital to integrate the working class through progressive reforms; through an alliance of 
progressive forces in the political alignment of the DC, the capitalist class, and the PSI, 
the Center-Left signified the social democratization of the left. Against this alliance, 
Ingrao proposed a new “historic bloc” of social forces with the working class as the 
leading actor capable of rejuvenating the PCI towards a more class-centered orientation. 
His proposal was an attempt to establish a connection between the party’s political line 
and the workers’ struggle. In the immediate period, the PCI would use workers’ power in 
the factory to strike at the “heart of Italian capitalism” and would connect this militancy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 The pamphlet recognizing the origins of the split from those sympathetic to the 
Chinese system is “Le divergenze tra il compagno Togliatti e noi” (The differences between 
comrade Togliatti and us) [December 31, 1962]. 
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to a series of reforms that would augment workers’ power (Amyot 1981, 57). In the long-
term, Ingrao envisioned a devolution of power away from the centralized State towards 
more local and regional forms of a democratic federalism that loosely paralleled the type 
of workers’ power and direct democracy that had been the basis of Libertini’s and 
Panzieri’s “workers’ control thesis” six years earlier. As such, the Ingrao position 
sketched out a broad possibility for unification with the PSIUP and sought to enlarge the 
role of the working class within the traditional left institutions. This last point did not go 
unrecognized within some circles of CO; over all, however, Ingrao’s position was 
problematic insofar as it sought to eclipse workers’ autonomy within the party-guide and 
“use” the class for its own political line.  
 On the other hand, Amendola viewed the Center-Left as a general failure: it had 
failed to produce reforms and it did not begin to solve Italy’s myriad social and economic 
problems. The failure of the Center-Left, Amendola believed, opened the possibility for 
the PCI to capitalize, electorally, on its shortcomings and pointed the way to the PCI as 
the only party capable of constructing a new government. It followed that the direction of 
the party should focus on winning the battle for democracy, to reform the state structure, 
and create new forms of “democratic planning” in alliance with the working class and 
progressive social and political forces. Amendola’s proposals focused on increased public 
services, an improved standard of living, and increased economic security for the 
working class. But his position demonstrated little in the way of a transition to socialism. 
In the end, his vision of the PCI was state-centric and technocratic; the working class was 
viewed only through the lens of electoral politics with little to no respect for the working 
class’s autonomous political power (Ginsborg 1990, 291-4).  
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 Classe Operaia approached the historic left on the assumption that, if the workers 
could maintain a certain level of consistent crises through organized revolt, then the 
historic institutions of the workers’ movement would fall within the revolutionary 
process (Negri 1983, 88). The chief problem for the PCI was that Togliatti had “left an 
ambiguous heredity on the terrain of method,” and it was the strategic goal of CO to 
direct itself to use its methodological analysis of workers’ revolution—the “workers’ 
point of view”—to push the institutions of the left towards a correct relationship between 
the party and the class, between the institutions of the workers’ movement and the actual 
workers’ struggles (Ibid, 86). The problem was one of method: the debate internal to the 
PCI focused on methods that were best suitable for attaining state power and achieving a 
certain measure of reforms, albeit with diverse positions on the idea of development. 
Whereas Amendola’s theory on development resided in reforms that would correct the 
inequalities and imbalances between private and socially consumed goods, Ingrao’s 
theory rested on the devolution of power to more localized forms of democracy and 
workers’ control. Both positions resided within the general level of capitalist 
development, theorized by CO as “social capital,” and, as such, did not directly address 
the working class perspective within the appropriate, historically determinant situation of 
Italian (and international) capital. Perhaps it was a shortcoming of CO’s discourse (often 
criticized as “fabbrichisti,” or too factory centered), but they consciously refused to 
construct a perspective of development outside of the political development of the 
working class. (Not until the student movement’s appropriation of the workerist discourse 
would operaismo begin to address the question of development in terms of proletarian 
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“needs” as the basis for directing the material value of labor-power in a program of 
socially productive relations.)  
 Classe Operaia’s focus on the historic institutions of the left marked the beginning 
of an attempt to impose the methodological position of the “workers’ point of view” on 
the entire left. Their position, with respect to the PCI, was not to engage the party 
internally, but to work on overcoming the fragmentation of the workers’ local struggles in 
order to juxtapose two conceptions of political organization: reformist and workers’ (Ibid, 
87). As we saw above, the workers’ plan was that of blocking production at strategic 
points and organizing the class as a political force, at the factory level, in order to control 
capitalist development, pushing it in a revolutionary direction. On the other hand, the 
reformist plan was identified as an attempt to integrate the working class into a “modern, 
pluralist, and contractual capitalist structure” (Paci 1964). From CO’s perspective, the 
debate within the PCI was viewed precisely in these terms: the real struggle was between 
the attempt by social capital to pull the PCI towards a social democratic orientation and 
the real existence, at the workers’ base, of the idea of communism (Negri 1983, 86).  As 
Rita Di Leo wrote in Operai e PCI (Workers and PCI):  To	   realize	   an	   economically	   and	   politically	   stable	   society,	   with	   the	   active	  collaboration	   of	   the	  working	   class	   is	   the	   legitimate	   dream	  of	   intelligent	   bourgeois	  politicians:	   if	   such	  dream	  represents	   the	  highest	  plan	  of	   a	   communist	  party,	  more	  than	   a	   million	   workers	   strong,	   the	   conflict	   between	   a	   reformist	   strategy	   and	  revolutionary	  tactics	  becomes	  inevitable	  (1965,	  28).	  	  
 
In short, the organizational question could not be overcome unless the workerist left was 
able to solve the problem of workers’ unity that existed between the communist cadres in 
the factory and the “new forces” that Alquati had previously identified in his work with 
QR. Only through the organizational unity of these workers could the militants of CO 
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begin to push the factory into the party and begin to impose the working class point of 
view as the methodological basis for the direction of the PCI.  
 Tronti’s 1905 in Italia (1905 in Italy) focused on the need for this “leap” to form 
workers’ organizations as the answer to the political power of the class (1964d). This 
article represented an attempt to bring Lenin into the West and directed the political task 
of workers’ revolution toward what Lenin had called the “weak link” in the chain of 
international capital. The reference to 1905, of course, was to the formation of the soviets 
in Russia that Lenin had theorized as fundamentally important in developing a 
relationship between the workers and the Bolshevik Party. The upshot of Tronti’s 
introduction of this historic point was that “without 1905 there is no October 1917” (Ibid, 
109). The analogy served the point of bringing the “party in the factory” as the urgent 
necessity of workers’ organization. While his analysis touched on many themes that were 
already circulating within CO (i.e., the PSI was dead as a class party, and the Lombardian 
reformists were the gravest threat since they sought to integrate the working class), Tronti 
emphasized the need to overcome the “ambiguous relationship” between the workers’ 
movement and the working class (Ibid, 107). The novel point for those in CO was that, 
now, Tronti was highlighting the role of the PCI as having a “real relationship with the 
working class” (Ibid). The immediate effect of this discourse was to alienate those who 
had been attracted to CO because of its appreciation, and support for so-called 
“spontaneous” class struggle. Tronti took direct aim at these elements within the group:  
[t]he cult of spontaneity always tends to overcome itself in a fetishism of organization. It 
is the destiny of being in the minority. It needs to be refuted. The just Bolshevik majority 
attains, again, a complete victory. The dilemma is not between spontaneity and 
organization, but between two possible ways to arrive at the new organization (Ibid).  
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And the new organization, against the position that CO had expressed in its pamphlet that 
had been circulated to workers in Turin during the summer, could hardly come from 
anew:  
[a]n alternative organization, on the general political level, in this moment in Italy, is not 
seen by anyone. Here, the circle is closed. To break it does not mean to abandon the 
research on this alternative, but to plant it in the heart of the workers’ struggle, at the 
head of this struggle, as a material guide and as the principal objective (Ibid).  
 
While Tronti exalted the need for political work to alter the course of the PCI and to 
establish a new organization, the point was to rejuvenate the PCI, to alter the course of 
the existing organization in order to set it anew. This was possible, Tronti maintained, not 
by searching to reproduce an organizational form, but to go to work “in the factory, in 
production, among the workers, the few organized as well as the masses of unorganized” 
and direct their political power into the PCI (Ibid, 108). From this point forward, the 
work of CO was firmly directed towards the internal struggle of the PCI with the hope of 
developing the “workers’ point of view” as the dominant method of the party.  
 This focus on the PCI provoked early waves of discontent within CO. The small 
section from Como (immediately north of Milan) expressed disagreement with the 
tactical and strategic position of Tronti’s 1905 article. In an internal letter, the Como 
group stated: “it is a clear confirmation that the way from the factory and production … 
was now patently substituted by the way of tactics and a monkish withdrawal in order to 
recover party cadres and the union” (reproduced in Trotta and Milana 2008, 437-8). As 
an alternative, the Como group pointed to the “14 points” that came out of the Piombino 
conference the previous May, which, in their interpretation, “identified the forms of 
struggle and intervention as beginning a diverse workers’ organization as an alternative 
moment to all the old and new discourses on worker reformism” (Ibid, 438). Another 
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consequence of Tronti’s position, and one that he had expressed as early as May, was that 
the class struggle had to take on an immediate national context rather than the 
internationalism that part of the group had prioritized.  
 While the second issue of Classe Operaia had been dedicated to the question of 
workers’ struggle in Europe, the increasing focus on organization, and ultimate, 
introduction of the discourse on the party, had pushed Tronti and others to reject the 
international struggle as secondary to the Italian situation.  At Piombino, Tronti remarked 
that an international perspective was not feasible at this moment because “the 
international discourse … can never be captured as a practical moment of the concrete 
articulation of a political line” (1964b, 382). Operaismo became trapped within a nation-
state framework, and increasingly within the traditional structures of the state with the 
acceptance of the party-form as the appropriate organizational instrument for workers’ 
struggle. Internationalism was replaced by an identification of Italy as the “weak link in 
the chain of capitalism,” and the assertion made by Tronti that only a national revolution 
could unleash an international revolution. The Italian workers, rather than forge political 
and material relations with the working class in Germany, France, and elsewhere, were 
now perceived to possess symbolic value for the international class struggle. The 
dominance of this turn within operaismo was upheld by the editorial body of CO: 
“workers’ internationalism is not a useful frame: it is a structural component of the class” 
(1964d, 4). Despite the general push towards the traditional nation-state and party 
structures, internationalism did not disappear, but remained alive in smaller sections of 
the group.58 I return to the question of internationalism in the next section. What matters 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 In bringing workers’ internationalism back within the state system framework, Tronti 
utilized Lenin against various Marxist thinkers of the post-Bolshevik Revolution, interwar period 
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here was that Tronti’s position on the PCI and discussion of the party became fully 
developed in the last issue of 1964.  
 The last number of the journal in 1964 was dedicated to the question of the party. 
Tronti’s article, Classe e partito (Class and party), was the lead theoretical article whose 
significance pointed to the political work that would dominate CO throughout 1965.  
Here we find Tronti’s mature expression and formulation of the party as the revolutionary 
organization of the working class. While the formulation was not without its 
contradictions and difficulties, it represented the culmination of his theoretical 
contribution to operaismo, with the party identified as the “instrument” of the working 
class. In this analysis there are several difficulties with regards to the application of a 
“party-form” into the realm of workerist theory and with the attempt to merge this 
external force with the question of an autonomous workers’ organization. While Tronti’s 
discourse seemingly closed the circle within CO on the question of organization, his 
introduction of the party remained a problem for subsequent theoretical developments.  
 Tronti posed the question of the party in terms of the development of the 
“subjective consciousness” of the class. Given the conception of class composition, the 
party was viewed as an essential component in generalizing the workers’ struggle at the 
national level. As such, the party was the working class’s “collective brain that has within 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in Europe, thus bringing the workers’ struggle back within the traditional institutions of the state 
system. The consequences of this move generated fractures, particularly later on in the student 
movement as it searched for new forms of organization that looked all too familiar to the 
Luxemburg-Lenin debates. The general problem of carrying the class struggle within the nation-
state is aptly captured by the “systems theory” of Arrighi et al: “State encapsulation of the 
projected development of the proletariat,” they write, “contradicted the uniting of the workers of 
the world. It deflected the formative revolutionary tendencies into national and international 
organs, that is into organs that work through, and so reinforce and depend upon, one of the 
fundamental structures and planes of operation of the capitalist economy, namely, the relational 
network we call the interstate system” (1989, 68). 
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itself the reality of the facts of the class, of its movements, of its development, of its 
objectives” (1964e, 113). In its role as the class’s “revolutionary will,” the party had to 
possess the intellectual qualities of “foresight and anticipation,” combined with the ability 
to “measure, control, manage, and thus organize the political growth of the working 
class” (Ibid, 112). For its part the working class was capable of “spontaneous struggles,” 
strategy at the level of the base, but deemed incapable of making the necessary passage to 
unify these local struggles into a broader movement. Tronti was explicit on this point, 
albeit bifurcated between the categories of tactics and strategy:  
The party … is not only the scientific carrier of strategy, but the practical organ of its 
tactical application. The working class possesses a spontaneous strategy of the 
movements and of its development: and it is the party that detects, expresses, and 
organizes them (Ibid, 113).  
 
In order to comprehend the recent expression of class struggle, Tronti argued that a 
correct relationship between the class and the party had to be premised on the 
overcoming of the distinction between economic and political struggles—the working 
class had already given political content to their economic demands (i.e., the wage as a 
political demand). The correct relationship, then, saw the working class as a theoretical 
and political subject with the party serving as the embodiment of the consciousness of 
this subject on the political terrain. It is arguable to what extent this party would assume 
the form of an “external” vanguard; that is, what role the “subjective consciousness” of 
the party would have in relation to the working class. Consistent with the basic sentiment 
of operaismo to locate theory directly in the workers’ struggles, Tronti noted that the 
“correct relation” between the class and the party could be measured in terms of how 
“organic” the party was in relation to the factory. Hence the slogan adopted by CO: “the 
party in the factory and the factory in the party.” However, this does more to obfuscate, 
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than clarify, the problem.  In order to understand what Tronti intended, it is useful to 
examine his discussion of this “correct relationship” in connection with his understanding 
of the left’s historic institutions.  
 Within the official workers’ movement the distinction between economic and 
political struggles was sustained by an understanding of the purpose and role of the union 
and the party, respectively. The unions functioned as instruments to “defend, conserve, 
and develop the material valor of social labor-power” and the party signified a political 
arm of the “workers’ political interests” to attack capital. Thus, the organizational relation 
was seen as developing from the political expansion of the class, through the 
politicization of economic demands (the union function) and the revolutionary tactics of 
the party (Ibid, 115-6). For Tronti, the original idea of CO—“making politics with the 
class”—evolved on the axis of an intertwined relationship between the expression of 
struggle by the class and its theoretical expression, generated and organized by the party. 
In this manner, 1905 in Italy provided the analogy for a preparatory phase in organization 
that, through the use of the PCI, would serve to commence a revolutionary process in 
Italy.  
 As a life-long member of the PCI, Tronti argued for the application of this 
strategy into a full-blown defense of the PCI in order to preserve its status as the last class 
party in Italy. The political objective of the class struggle was identified as the need to 
capture the workers’ movement in order to organize the political force of the class. 
Within the climate of the economic crisis, Tronti argued, the working class was not 
strong enough, organizationally or politically, to prevent capital from reaching a more 
mature level of development. The only option, he believed, was to develop the working 
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class’s political maturity to impede the “political stabilization of the capitalist class”; that 
is, to prevent the social democratization of the PCI. “The immediate objective,” Tronti 
wrote, “is to have a politically strong working class in the presence of the economic 
maturity of capital” (Ibid, 117). This was captured and propagated by CO in the general 
slogan: “maturity without stabilization, economic development without political 
stability.” For much of CO their political work was directed to the defense of the 
Communist Party, not at the upper echelons of party, but towards the communist workers 
in the factory.  
 This turn towards the institutionalization of the class struggle provoked resistance 
within the group. In December 1964, comrades from Genoa left CO. While the internal 
matters of the dispute are not well known, Tronti’s position with regards to the PCI and 
his conception of the workers’ party were likely to have been the central points of 
dissent.59 In no small manner Tronti had brought the autonomous workers’ movement 
into the official workers’ movement, at least as a strategic goal. His assumption that they 
would be able to take over these forces resided solely on the ability to impose a political 
line that was generated from the methodological analysis of the “workers’ point of view.” 
Years later, Toni Negri critiqued CO’s lack of institutional analysis of the official 
workers’ movement (1983). However, a more severe judgment of Tronti’s theory of the 
party emerged later from a former communist militant in the journal La Classe (Sbardella 
1980).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 The only indication in the archival material, according to Trotta and Milana’s research 
in Archivio Romano di “classe operaia” (Roman archive of Classe Operaia), appeared in a note 
by Pozzi [in carte Tronti, autografa su 4 cc]: “At Genoa … Classe Operaia is not present, 
because of the lack of the Genoese group. First, they are not in agreement on our discourse on the 
PCI …, they have refuted the hypothesis of conflict. Their present situation is of a total worker 
passivity, and these are appraised in a populist manner” (cited in Trotta and Milana 2008, 437).  
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 While Tronti’s analysis had the merit of developing a theoretical solution to the 
organization of the class in a party-form, the content of the discourse revealed a rather 
limited understanding of the actual problems at hand, and thus was woefully short on the 
solutions to the problem. Rafaelle Sbardella, in his La NEP di “Classe Operaia”, took aim 
at the revolutionary nature of Tronti’s theory of the party. Taking issue with Tronti’s 
identification of the actual problem of the historic institution’s lack of a correct line, 
Sbardella noted that, for Tronti, “political institutions [were] rediscovered for the class, 
not on the premises of alienation—which Raniero Panzieri was concerned with—but as 
instruments that the class manages to conquer, control, and utilize” (1980, 240). Tronti’s 
critique of the PCI was limited to an understanding of its “structure” that was equated 
with its political line and method for generating that line, but had nothing to say about its 
representative nature and its internal authoritarianism. Tronti’s instrumentalist conception 
of the party ensured that the “presence of the workers in the party” could not be a 
“transforming phenomena” (Ibid, 249). Sbardella identified as the basis of Tronti’s 
theoretical errors a more general problem in his attribution of the party as the 
embodiment of the working class, or, in his words, as the “incarnation of the Subjectivity 
of the class”; that is, for Tronti, the idea of autonomy was redirected towards the party 
(Ibid, 241). All that was necessary for Tronti was to conquer the party in terms of 
method, and this would ensure workers’ autonomy even if it ossified the working class as 
a fundamentally external and passive element with regards to the actual affairs of the 
party. In this vision, the class remained subjected to the happenings of its party; the party 
as a function of the class satisfied Tronti’s view of the “correct relationship” between 
class and party.  
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 From a perspective that shared many of the concerns raised by Sbardella, Franco 
Berardi (Bifo) critiqued Tronti’s theoretical analysis for its fundamental confusion: his 
thought, Berardi noted, “oscillates between an exaltation of workers’ political spontaneity 
and a stress on the subjectivist-voluntarist function of the vanguard party” (1998, 65). 
Within these two positions, Berardi found the fundamental flaw of Classe Operaia to be 
nothing short of introducing an out-dated ideology (Leninism) into a new situation of 
class politics. For Berardi, the need for a political will external to the class was 
fundamentally at odds with the method of “class composition” and autonomous workers’ 
struggle. Tronti’s theory of the party seemed far off from operaismo’s original 
intervention in factory life and workers’ struggles. Indeed, as Tronti’s position became 
increasingly focused on the PCI and the institutionalization of the autonomous workers’ 
movement, the group from Padua-Veneto registered a vociferous dissent that, within a 
year, laid out an alternative for workers’ organization.  
Porto Marghera: a dissent 
In the early 1960s some dissident PSI members from Padua and Veneto came into contact 
with the work of Quaderni Rossi and, specifically, Panzieri’s development of Morandian 
themes on workers’ autonomy (Isnenghi 1980, 222). Among those impressed with the 
ideas of operaismo were Guido Bianchini, Antonio Negri, Luciano Ferrari Bravo, and 
Francesco Tolin, who inaugurated political work in petrochemical factories through the 
distribution of Potere Operaio di Veneto Emiliano, which came out as an insert in 
Progresso Veneto (Potere Operaio 1963).60 The Veneto region was dominated by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Bianchini was a powerful organizer in the workerist circles in Veneto. As one of the 
older participants, he was in the Resistance at an early age and played an important part as orator 
and militant in arguing against the centralization that gripped operaismo in favor of and respect 
for the capacity of workers to share information and forge their own instruments of struggle 
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petroleum and chemical industries controlled by large companies such as Breda, Sirma, 
Italsider, Edison, and Vetrocoke. After the affairs of Piazza Statuto, and throughout 1963, 
workers in the Porto Marghera zone began forming assemblies to demand salary 
increases, income parity, and the elimination of worker categories. These workers’ 
assemblies rejected the union struggle after past experiences of betrayal and duplicity and 
began forming autonomous struggles with the inclusion and support of local student 
groups and university professors (mainly from the University of Padua, from which 
derived Toni Negri, Alisa Del Re, Luciano Ferrari Bravo and others). By 1963 Il Potere 
Operaio dei lavoratori di Porto Marghera began circulation within the local section of 
Classe Operaia, with contents that focused on the regional struggles but also carried CO’s 
critique of the Center-Left and the government’s attempts to introduce the planning of 
capitalist development. These initial assemblies quickly developed into frequent meetings 
that focused on the development of a workers’ vanguard organization to organize the 
class’s “autonomous needs” in Porto Marghera (Sacchetto and Sbrogiò 2009, 18-23). The 
Veneto region, with its mixture of internal peasant migration and budding industries, 
produced one of the more dynamic and powerful autonomous workers’ movement tied to 
operaismo that rejected the state-centric and party-dominated centralization advocated by 
Tronti.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(Zagato 2001). Toni Negri came into operaismo from a radical Catholic youth organization, then 
into the PSI, when he began, with Bianchini and others, to publish Progresso Veneto and, later, 
Classe Operaia and Potere Operaio (Negri 1983). His theoretical contributions will be the central 
focus of later chapters. Luciano Ferrari Bravo grew up in Veneto and was an assistant to Toni 
Negri at the University of Padua (Negri 2003).  Francesco Tolin, brother-in-law of Bianchini, was 
the responsible director for the publication of Progresso Veneto, Classe Operaia, and Potere 
Operaio (Wright 2010). The journal Progresso Veneto began publication in 1959 and initiated the 
political development of workers’ autonomy as a distinct political tradition in the Veneto region 
(Isnenghi 1980).  
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 Toni Negri registered the region’s dissent with the general line of CO in his 
contribution to the first number of Classe Operaia in 1965, “Lenin e i soviet nella 
rivoluzione” (Lenin and the soviets in the revolution) [1965]. Negri’s article, 
diplomatically executed, was preceded by a more direct opposition of the Paduan group 
to Tronti’s political proposals that detailed the extent of their disagreement. The Paduan 
group of workers’ autonomy, much like the previous experience in QR, argued that not 
only was the PCI “past redemption,” but the proper starting point for the question of 
organization was to recognize the “integration of the entire workers’ movement, with its 
factory cadres, into bourgeois society and its precise anti-worker function” (Padua 
Autonomia Operaia 1965, 439). Tronti’s discourse neglected these “preliminary facts” 
which derived from the workers’ direct experience of the previous five years. In doing 
such, Tronti had put the problem backwards; instead of placing the party as the 
“preliminary condition” of the workers’ struggle, the Paduan group argued that the 
political work of organization could only arise as the “mature expression” of the class 
struggle (Ibid, 440). If Tronti had begun to shift his analysis towards the political will of 
revolutionaries in the party, then the group from Padua signified what Berardi identified 
as the “compositionist” conception of the revolutionary organization. Consistent with his 
critique of Tronti’s Leninism, Berardi identified the particular contribution of operaismo 
in its understanding of class composition as the determinant factor: “the compositionist 
method departs from the twentieth century Marxist tradition: the force of historic 
transformation is not the subjective political will, nor the necessity of dialectical law, but 
the cultural action that determines the process of social recomposition” (1998, 58). As 
this conception is of fundamental importance, as a complementary concept to the analysis 
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of the circulation and reproduction of capital in the “social factory” analysis, it is worth 
quoting the position of the Paduan group on this point:  
The political work of the class consists essentially today in making live, practically in 
every workers’ struggle, the strategic proposal of the conquest of power through the 
revolution. The organization and the revolution coincide in the same strategic moment. 
The organization is the revolution. To organize signifies tying together, in the struggle, 
the mass organizations internal to the factory, at a national and international level, 
unifying the struggle in time and in space (Padua Autonomia Operaia 1965, 442, 
emphasis added).  
 
Here we find not only a reaffirmation of the internationalism that had been an early focus 
of CO, but also an argument that located the conquest of power directly in the workers’ 
organisms as the proper bodies of revolution. While the argument was not sustained by 
the critique of the party as an alienating feature of the workers’ practical struggle, we can 
infer this position from the understanding that organization and not the party is the direct 
expression of workers’ power, that there could be no other organizational center than the 
workers’ themselves. Moreover, only this type of bottom-up conception of organization 
could allow for the workers’ own creative expression in the class struggle, an essential 
component in ensuring the democratic nature of working class revolution.61  
 Negri’s Lenin and the soviets in the Revolution developed this dissenting opinion 
through an analysis of the relationship between the party and the soviets in Lenin’s 
political thought from 1905 to the October Revolution. For Negri, Tronti’s discourse on 
the class-party question seemed to parallel Lenin’s discussion of the relationship between 
the soviets and the party: in Lenin’s thought the soviets began as revolutionary class 
organizations only to slowly evolve into the formation of a new provisional revolutionary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 While this document does not contain an author, the argument set forth is consistent 
with the theoretical position of Bianchini, who vociferously argued for a “directly working class 
generalization of the struggles” against all efforts at centralization (quoted in Wright 2010).  
Similarly, Luciano Ferrari Bravo argued that a materialist understanding of the working class was 
precisely this “creative force” of the working class exercised in their struggle against the capitalist 
system (Negri 2003, 69).  
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government. Likewise, Tronti had theorized the class organization as a leading governing 
structure of the proletariat. That is, the distinction between the soviets as organs of the 
workers’ movement and as forms of a governing apparatus revealed an ambiguity over 
the role of workers’ autonomous organizations. Tronti, by delimiting the scope of 
strategy and tactics to the party at the national level, dragged workers’ autonomy and the 
new forms of workers’ organizations into an institutional mold. Negri regarded the 
conception of the party in this scheme as an external imposition of the party on the class. 
As had happened in 1917, and as Panzieri had warned upon the rupture in QR, the 
expression of a political line that emerged outside of the class struggle, at the level of the 
workers’ base, could only result in an authoritarian imposition on the workers, with the 
party, as the “subjective organization,” as the primary entity of class struggle. According 
to Negri, this was precisely Lenin’s idea of the  “correct relationship” between the party 
and the workers’ movement, that resulted in the soviets being reduced to a mere 
“organization of consensus” determined by the party-guide (1965, 32).  
 It is noteworthy that Negri’s disagreement with Tronti was based not on the 
question of a vanguard but on the location of the vanguard. For Negri, the vanguard was 
internal to the working class and its struggle. Tronti, on the other hand, was seen as 
advocating a view of the working class as a political, or strategic, instrument of the party 
functioning as an external vanguard. (This argument points to a further development (and 
recovery) later in operaismo of a discourse on the structural features of the class 
organization in terms of its internal democracy and worker’s control over their own 
organizations.) Negri alluded to the fact that the earlier soviets had as the “center of the 
organization” a delegate structure with strict responsibilities and the possibility for 
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workers’ to revoke delegates (Ibid, 27). It was this democratic function of the soviets, as 
mass organisms comprised of a workers’ delegate structure that, in the context of the 
Italian movement, found expression in the autonomy of Morandi and was developed 
within the PSI by Panzieri and others in the post-1956 era. This tendency had a palpable 
influence within the Veneto group as Bianchini was deeply committed to workers’ direct 
democracy, a position that attracted him to aspects of the PSIUP in 1964, as well as 
others who drew their direct experience from the factory struggles in Porto Marghera 
(Zagato 2001).62 Negri’s critique of the discourse on the party, in this sense, embodied an 
understanding of workers’ autonomy as an analytical distinction and gave primacy to the 
workers’ struggles as the basis of class composition, not necessarily out of any particular 
consideration of workers’ consciousness and political direction, but rather as a materialist 
view that rooted the revolutionary class struggle directly within the factory struggles and 
the direct experience of the workers in these processes.  
 The position emanating from Padua-Veneto was decidedly a minority position of 
dissent as CO focused its attention on the slogan “party in the factory” and similar themes 
that reflected the predominance of the PCI within the class struggle. In fact, only one year 
after its formation, Classe Operaia seemed to have lost much of its theoretical dynamism 
as it turned to the question of organization in terms of the party. One of the results of this 
tendency was a general closure within the factory as the space of the class struggle. 
Tronti had already committed himself, in part, to this tendency by formulating the “social 
factory” as characterized by the increasing proletarianization of advanced capitalist 
society with the waged worker as the defining feature of the class. Also, the focus on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 The rise of workers’ delegates as a leading form of workers’ organization emerged in 
1969, particularly at Fiat in Turin. See chapters 5 and 6.  
	   181	  
“class composition” was considered secondary since the idea of the “social factory” was 
locked into that “particular commodity” of capitalism—labor-power—resulting in the 
ossification of experiments with new organizational forms and opportunities to generalize 
the class struggle. Since the factory became the center for the political organization of the 
class, and CO focused on the “high points” of capitalist development as the proper 
strategy to confront capitalist development, the conceptual apparatus that had served as a 
dynamic turn in Italian Marxism seemed to increasingly close itself within the factory 
gates and the idea of organizing the workers’ party. While I return to the discussion of the 
“social factory” and “class composition” in the next section, I finish the discussion of 
CO’s developments on the organizational question by examining their emphasis on the 
workers’ use of the PCI and the attempt to stave off the process of social democratization 
within the communist movement, the group’s dominant priority in 1965.  
From the “party in the factory” to the “class party” 
At the beginning of 1965 Classe Operaia entered a small crisis. Financial difficulties had 
forced the journal to be published bi-monthly, rather than monthly. The journal also 
began producing, with each issue, a leaflet for intervention at the factory gates. This latter 
development was in stride with their new program of political work that took shape after 
the convention at Como in December, which targeted the communist cadres in the 
factory. Significantly, this change in publication and the commitment to focus on the 
communist cadres reflected the general strategy of preventing the social democratization 
of the PCI and, in the long run, attempting to impose the “workers’ point of view” on the 
party. Their immediate hope was that they would be able to provoke a move toward the 
left within the party by cultivating this cadre at the base in direct antagonism to the 
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reformist leadership. As 1965 began CO focused its work almost exclusively on the PCI 
and influencing its political developments through the factory.  
 The timing proved fortuitous for CO, even if they were ultimately unsuccessful in 
developing the PCI left. The general international climate of “peaceful coexistence” that 
marked the early 1960s depiction of the Cold War relations appeared to be over with the 
United States’ bombing of Vietnam and the general tide of national liberation struggles in 
the so-called Third World.63 The idea of “peaceful coexistence” had its domestic parallel 
in Togliatti’s postwar Italian Way to Socialism and the party’s focus on winning the 
battle of democracy as a precondition for socialism. Domestically, the economic 
conjuncture was nearing its end, with economic recovery based almost primarily on the 
bosses’ political power in the factory—new investments in plant and technologies were 
virtually nonexistent; owners overcame the economic crisis by extracting more 
production from a leaner workforce, further rationalizing the production process, 
changing job structures, and imposing new work procedures. In short, according to CO, 
the end of the economic crisis demonstrated the political attack by capital against the 
working class. Both the international climate and the national climate were conducive to 
the type of political line that CO was propagating. As such, it prepared to combat the PCI 
by taking the struggle, for the life of the party, into the factory.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 During this period, CO began a small collaboration with the Franz Fanon Center, 
which was established on January 1963 by leftists in Milan as a result of the Algerian war, and as 
a center of inquiry for the “political prospects of the third world”(Trotta and Milana 2008, 493).  
Classe Operaia had a fairly limited perspective on national liberation struggles as they retained 
the position that capitalism would be struck in the “weak link” of its international chain—Italy. 
Maintaining an essentially American-European centered worldview, CO claimed that the “true 
contest is made here among us, in Europe and in the USA: in the factory, not in the jungle” 
(Classe Operaia 1965b, 487). 
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 In 1965 the Italian communist movement prepared for two important conventions 
that determined the political program of the PCI: the Conference of Communist Workers, 
held in May at the historic port of Genoa, and the XI Congress of the PCI, the first post-
Togliatti conference, held in January 1966. As its slogans the PCI adopted the “party in 
the factory” and the “partito unico” (the only party), positions that represented, 
respectively, the Ingrao and Amendola factions. CO, as noted above, sought to put these 
two positions in opposition, utilizing the first for its own formulation while directing its 
polemics against the latter.  
 The “partito unico” was criticized from within the historical development of the 
PCI beginning from the immediate postwar period, Togliatti’s “new party,” to its 
formulation with respect to the Center-Left. The analogy that CO worked with found that 
the situation at the end of the war—destruction from war and fascism—was virtually 
unrecognizable from the post-economic miracle situation (a point the youth movement 
refuted in practice and theory). Instead of accepting abstract calls for winning 
“democracy,” CO focused on the common denominator of the two periods: the political 
needs of capital as the basis for the reformist line within the party. Amendola’s position 
focused on the distortions of modernization and development produced by the economic 
miracle and, more generally, neo-capitalism. His position reflected that of corrective 
reforms which sought to rectify the structural inequalities in the national economy. This 
limited approach, in fact, did not contain any of Togliatti’s arguments about a gradual 
transition to socialism. Rather, as Albert Asor Rosa wrote in the lead editorial of CO, the 
problem was that Amendola’s “democratic planning” represented an attempt to “subtract 
from the capitalist system its fundamental contradictions … substituting this with the 
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myth of a modern and rational evolution of certain economic factors, abstractly 
considered” (1965, 24). Moreover, Amendola was proposing the use of the profit as a 
tool for redistributing capital (i.e., the politics of income), virtually ignoring the class’s 
autonomous demands on the wage as a political phenomenon, and not simply a call for 
better economic conditions within the capitalist system. From this analysis of both capital 
and the working class, CO rejected Amendola’s position as nothing short of an attempt to 
rationalize capitalism. This position exemplified the attempt at integration of the working 
class within advanced capitalism, both politically and economically, that CO sought to 
defeat (Ibid, 26).  
 In its return to the factory and focus on the communist cadres, CO sought to 
overcome the contradiction within the PCI between what they identified as the “real force 
of organization”—the working class—and the reformist politics of the leading group with 
its desire of collaboration with capital (Ibid, 23). Approaching the factory, the short-term 
goal was a two-fold approach: attack the bosses while simultaneously removing the 
reformists from the party. Tronti laid out this position during a conference at Gobetti 
Theater in Turin, leading up to the PCI’s workers’ conference in May. In this address, 
Tronti began with the political passage out of the economic crisis as a point of 
stabilization between capital and the State. Economically, the system was stabilized by 
the response of the bosses against the factory workers, but politically the approach 
towards equilibrium witnessed the first coherent attempt at planning that finally became a 
bill in the Parliament by 1967. The Pieraccini Plan,64 Tronti wrote, demonstrated the fact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Early attempts at planning began with the Saraceno Commission that met throughout 
1963 with participation from experts, industrialists, and trade unionists. The final product became 
called the Giolitti Plan after the Budget Minister. This plan was not approved because of a change 
in government, with the final product put forth in 1966 by the new Budget Minister, Giovanni 
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that the conjuncture established the  “basis of the structural, economic, political, control 
on the movement of the working class, which renders possible for the first time a 
planning on the long period of Italy” (1965, 463). The immediate result of the economic 
crises was that the Italian State now had a controlling function over capitalist 
development. Whereas Italian industry was able to return to its “particular function,” the 
State now became an explicit partner of private industry in controlling the “entire 
society” in a division of labor that left to the industrialists the “production of profit” with 
the State holding the reigns of “control over the distribution of income” (Ibid). For Classe 
Operaia this push to the “planner-State,” as it was later coined in Potere Operaio, and the 
conjuncture were inseparable affairs, both tied directly to the bosses’ counter-attack on 
the working class as an attempt to control the class and integrate it within a long-term 
stabilization of capitalist development.   
 This “objective” situation of Italian capital had already been the dominant 
position within CO on the crisis. Their concern was not so much with the new unity 
between industry and the State, but the deepening divisions between the PCI, with its 
push towards social democracy, and the working class. The uptake of the economic crisis 
was a new situation where there existed more unity in the capitalist bloc, in the sense that 
there existed a governing unity, along with a more divided working class that witnessed 
the increasing separation between the party and the class (Classe Operaia 1965c, 1). The 
only way to overcome this separation for CO was to put the party inside the workers’ 
movement. Only this approach could offer the real basis for understanding the workers’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pieraccini, ultimately being approved by Parliament in July 1967 (Sassoon 1986, 51-2; Ginsborg 
1990, 273-80). A consequence of this plan, as we will see in the next chapter, was its proposals 
for reforming the school system, which was one of the important elements in the formation of a 
mass student movement.  
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struggle and reveal the necessity of a political response from the working class (Tronti 
1965, 466). The entire purpose of the “party in the factory,” Tronti stated in his address to 
the Conference of the Communists in the factory, was “nothing more than the problem of 
the existence of the organization in determinant moments of the passage of capitalist 
development, and the existence of a political organization … tied directly to the place of 
production” (Ibid, 468). Again, the need to develop a politically strong working class 
within capitalist development pointed to the need for organization, not in order to 
produce a general crisis of capitalism, or for taking over state power, but for expanding 
and generalizing the class’s political power.  
 As Tronti’s discourse increasingly focused on the recovery of the PCI as the 
workers’ organization, it became clear that the role of CO and other groups was being 
called into question.  Was CO simply an appendage of PCI politics? Or did it have a 
different purpose? Towards the end of his discourse at the communist workers’ 
conference, Tronti concluded that the work of CO and other minority groups had outlived 
their usefulness. Against the recent passage of capitalism, Tronti noted,  
the obligatory passage is that which reestablishes in real, concrete terms, the problem of 
the new revolutionary organization. Before this passage, each attempt of constituting 
itself in a new revolutionary organization repeats the exact historical errors of minority 
factions of the workers’ movement, which are foreign by nature, in principle and fact, to 
all the experience that we have made up to now (1965, 476).  
 
Given the overall pessimistic evaluation of this passage, Tronti’s comments were omitted 
from CO’s supplement to the conference, but it is important as it concluded Tronti’s 
elaboration of the problem. The focal point of activity for workerism was now the PCI. 
Over the course of a year or so, the need to experiment with new models of organization, 
which was the founding argument of CO in their rupture with QR, became reduced to the 
historic institutions that workers’ autonomy had sought to overcome in its initial 
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theoretical analysis. However, a caveat remained: the political work of CO was to bring 
the party into the factory, into the material and political existence of the class movement 
as expressed from the direct point of production. A two-fold objective was established: 
convince the working class of the need to revitalize and conquer the PCI as its 
organization and battle the reformists within the PCI as the primary enemy and obstacle 
of the working class’s revolutionary organization.  
 Approaching the XI Congress, Aris Accornero, a member of the PCI who had a 
particularly close relationship with Classe Operaia, published a criticism of the group’s 
assessment of the situation in the communist periodical Rinascita (1965). He confronted, 
among other things, CO’s strategy of conducting a two-front battle, against capital and 
towards the party. Accusing the group of narrow sectarianism, he took aim at their 
unilateral and narrow understanding of the party’s politics, limiting their critique to 
“reformists” in the PCI, because, the latter did not follow CO’s “absurd street” (Ibid, 
513). Accornero charged CO with an unwarranted reductionist approach to capitalist 
society that confined historical determinations to the affairs of two competing classes 
who were attributed with virtually uniform characteristics, despite the empirical evidence. 
In particular, Accornero took aim at the discussion of the politicization of the class, 
claiming that CO was advocating worker spontaneity: “[h]ow can it be directly political if 
it does not pass through the class organization? And it is enough that a salary struggle 
was organized by the workers because it became political?” Rather than remain trapped 
behind the factory gates, confounding questions of politicization of the union, or 
unionization of the party, Accornero suggested that CO learn to walk with two legs, one 
in the factory the other in society. Against Tronti’s previous claim that society could 
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never be revolutionary, as the site of the circulation of money, Accornero’s criticism, at 
least, exposed the narrowness of CO’s discourse. Even if his critique was unjust (i.e., 
Turin is not Italy), it pointed to the lack of a critical discourse on the circulation and 
reproduction of capital, which had been theorized in QR, but was lacking in CO (Wright 
2002, 80-1).  
 Advancing the most developed theoretical analysis of the communist workers, 
Romano Alquati came the closest in CO to developing an understanding of “class 
composition” within the social relations of production of advanced capitalism. Given, 
Alquati’s understanding of the “social factory” as the expansion of the proletariat through 
tertiary industry (shared by Tronti, but phenomenologically different from Panzieri), it 
was not unforeseeable that his analysis represented the high point of this otherwise 
narrow discourse. Beginning in 1965, Classe Operaia dedicated a column to investigating 
“class composition” alongside the question of the party. Alquati brought to the discussion 
the need to develop the “social fabric of class recomposition;” that is, an examination of 
the social life of the worker and how capital has penetrated that life.  
 Remaining within the context of productive labor and the workers’ struggles, 
Alquati pressed the need to understand the “connective tissue” between various portions 
of workers’ struggle in order to have a practical organizational form in the “party-
factory” nexus. In particular the search for working class unity necessitated inquiry in 
order to  
find new connections with regard to the preceding moments, modifications in the 
connective tissue, new uses of the diffuse territorial net, or of certain categories that 
reproduce or develop for the first time a generalizing function, because they … have 
acquired a determinant mode of relations of force, shifting all the terms in a phase of 
struggle (1975, 226).  
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Through this investigation CO could begin to understand the type of organization 
necessary to produce a continuous struggle, but also locate better forms of organization 
pertinent to the expression of working class unity that the struggles themselves 
demonstrated. Within this moment, it was necessary for Alquati to produce research on 
the “new structure of the working class.”  
   For Alquati, it was not sufficient to restrict analysis of the working class to the 
immediate point of production. Turin, for example, was identified with all the 
characteristics of a “factory-city,” where the was no discernible distinction between the 
“plants where surplus-value is created, the residential zones where labor-power is 
reproduced, and the centers of administration of the movements of variable capital, of 
commodities, products and semi-worked raw materials and auxiliary materials” (1965, 9; 
1975, 230). Thus, the idea of “class composition” that emerged out of Turin presented the 
type of situation where the logic of the factory was reproduced throughout the entire 
social order; the production, reproduction, and circulation of capital were all present as 
the dominant force of social relations. However, reflecting the general paucity of analysis 
conducted by CO on the processes of reproduction and circulation of capital, Alquati’s 
article ended with a discussion of direct production and the role of the party in relation to 
this process. For example, the discussion was situated within the direct process of 
production, albeit within “social relations” that connect the cycle of capitalist 
accumulation: 
the problem of the Communist Party in the factory is always confronted at the level of 
social relations of production, and assumes the more precise form of relations between 
the “boite,” the middle industries, and the auxiliary functions in which are prevalently 
concentrated the communist cadres of the factory, and the workers’ social mass of the 
large factories—in particular the motor sector—which execute a role of “mass vanguard” 
in the working class struggle on a social scale (1965, 10; 1975, 232).  
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It might be the case that operaismo’s focus on the high point of capitalist development 
prejudiced their view of capitalist social relations towards the large factories and the 
more concentrated forms of the working class. It is also reasonable to conjecture that this 
was a holdover from the focus on monopolies in the postwar discourse of the left-wing 
parties. However, a better explanation focuses on their research and intervention which 
was directed against the structure of neo-capitalist social relations, that were premised on 
the dynamism of the large monopoly structure and the resulting transformations of Italian 
society to the production and consumption of consumer durables. Accornero’s accusation 
that CO focused only on Turin neglected to point out the city’s role, especially Fiat, in 
determining Italy’s economic development. That aside, in examining the more advanced 
parts of Alquati’s discourse the discussion of the “social fabric of class recomposition” 
was still concerned only with the effects of production. This point appeared in another 
pertinent component of neo-capitalism: the working class and the rural question.  
 Alquati’s discussion of the “green factory” focused on the question of agriculture 
in relation to industry. Again, the focus was on the PCI, and criticism was centered on 
their position. While the PCI had recognized that salaried workers in agriculture were 
“workers like the others,” they deemed agriculture an “autonomous sector,” separated by 
its particular “mode of production” (1975, 255). Against this position, Alquati pointed to 
the cycle of capitalist accumulation and noted that agricultural production was 
“objectively integrated into the monopolies” (Ibid, 256). Investigating the “Padana 
Irrigua” (the agriculture zones that surround the Po River), he argued it was no longer 
useful to operate in terms of the old “town-country” dichotomy, but rather the distinction 
that needed to be made was that between the city-region. The idea of the city-region was 
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expressed as the “decentralization of industrial production in the rural zone around poles 
of capitalist productive development” with the consequent decentralization of residential 
surroundings and productive activity (Ibid, 260). From this analysis (which bore enough 
similarities to Panzieri’s position on the territoriality of the monopolies as “islands”), it 
was the PCI who remained stuck within an idea of industrial production, trapped in the 
“Industrial Triangle,” unaware of the new class composition and, much like in the 1950s, 
out of touch with the changing social relations of production. Alquati, introducing the 
discussion of territory and capitalist production, wrote:  
[w]hoever looks at the old “Triangle” as it was transformed in the new ellipses, Turin, 
Genoa, Milan, Marghera, and the transformation of the vertexes of the “Triangle” in the 
“city region,” can observe as the movements of struggle of the working class have 
already begun to impose also in Italy that type of rupture of the “city-country” relation 
that Marx had put as a claim of the communist program (Ibid, 260-1).  
 
Anticipating the decentralization of production that became the dominant tendency of 
capital in the early 1970s, Alquati’s analysis criticized the PCI for failing to see the 
possibilities of political struggle within this new framework. Thus, the attack on the 
monopolies, executed by the PCI, neglected any serious organization of the workers in 
these areas. While the PCI had accepted that the agriculture workers were part of the 
working class, they were incapable of seeing the unity that existed within the workers’ 
struggles.65 This fluid conception of “class composition,” tied to the analysis of the 
“social factory,” was the key to understanding not only the changes taking place within 
the social relations of production, but also to developing the so-called “workers’ point of 
view” within those relations. Alquati concluded his investigation of the “green factory” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 The theme of the working class in relation to the “backward” sectors of the economy 
had already been treated by Negri in the third number of 1964, in his Operai senza alleati 
(Workers without allies), as part of a rejection of the PCI’s and the historic left’s strategy of inter-
class alliances (1964). The rejection of alliances was restated in CO’s intervention at the XI 
Congress of the PCI (below).  
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by pointing to the problem that CO was trying to impose on the PCI: “the problem is that 
of the political direction of a unity of movements that already exist” (Ibid, 273). 
Movements that stemmed directly from the place of production, that is. Despite the brief 
allusion to moments of reproduction of labor-power and control over other commodities, 
Alquati’s discussion of these aspects of the “social factory” never materialized within 
CO. It would take some years for this analysis to develop, and a new impetus from other 
sectors in society, before the “social factory” would be used to demystify capitalist social 
relations beyond the immediate point of production.  
 In anticipation of the XI Congress, CO published, in early December, its 
pamphlet, Nascita di una forza nuova (Birth of a new force), which represented its 
contribution to the Congress’s debate (Classe Operaia 1965d). Despite the theoretical 
explorations of Alquati on the need for expanding the discussion of the social 
composition of the class, CO focused its attention on radicalizing the PCI in view of the 
metal-mechanics contractual deadline in 1966. The pamphlet was not only a contribution 
to the PCI Congress, but was also circulated in the factories in order to lay out CO’s 
proposals to the communist workers in anticipation of a renewal of the types of attacks 
that had already been circulated in the communist press (i.e., Accornero’s critique, above) 
[Gasparotto 1965, 518-21]. It is appropriate to read this document as a	  summarization	  of	  the	   work	   that	   CO	   had	   executed	   up	   to	   that	   point,	   and,	   as	   such,	   it	   represented	   its	  mature	  expression	  for	  organizing	  working	  class	  revolution.	  	  	   Focusing	  their	  criticism	  on	  the	  line	  of	  the	  reformists	  in	  the	  PCI	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  official	  workers’	  movement	   in	   the	   latest	  wave	  of	   struggles,	   CO	  highlighted	   the	  role	  of	  the	  working	  class	  in	  preventing	  the	  social	  democratization	  and	  integration	  of	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the	   workers’	   movement	   into	   capitalist	   planning.	   The	   problem	   with	   the	   PCI’s	  leadership	  was	  that	  it	  acted	  more	  like	  “shadow	  ministers”	  proposing	  economic	  plans	  in	  hopes	  of	  being	  called	  into	  government	  (1965d,	  5).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  official	  line,	  CO	   proposed	   a	   “minimal	   program,”	   centered	   on	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   workers’	  revolutionary	   political	   organization.66	  The	   goal	   of	   organization	   was	   to	   develop	   a	  counter-­‐plan67	  to	   strike	   against	   the	   reformists	   and	   government	   planning,	   both	   of	  which	  were	   identified	   for	   their	   functional	   role	   in	   regulating	   capital	   accumulation.	  The	   factory	  was	   justified	  as	   the	  central	   focus	  of	   this	  anti-­‐capitalist	  attack,	  because	  “only	  in	  the	  factory”	  did	  there	  exist	  the	  working	  class	  “mole	  that	  corrodes	  it	  and	  the	  gravedigger	   that	  wants	   to	   bury	   it”	   (Ibid,	   9).	   The	  worker,	   as	   a	   subterranean	   force	  within	   the	   heart	   of	   capitalist	   social	   relations	   of	   production,	   symbolically	   captured	  the	   intent	   of	   CO’s	   minimal	   program:	   the	   purpose	   of	   a	   revolutionary	   organization	  was	   to	  understand	   the	  dynamic	  class	   composition	   that	  occurred	   through	   the	  class	  struggle,	   to	   organize	   the	   moments	   of	   resistance	   expressed	   by	   the	   class,	   pushing	  these	  movements	   into	  a	  direction	  that	  worked	  to	  enlarge	  the	  movement	  and	  force	  capital	   into	   a	   revolutionary	   direction.	   The	   key	   here	   was	   that	   revolution	   was	  understood	  as	  a	  process.	  The	  reformists	  and	   those	  centered	  on	   the	  state,	  CO	  held,	  had	   lost	   focus	   of	   this	   process	   because	   they	   lacked	   the	   proper	   method	   for	  understanding	   working	   class	   behavior	   and	   attitudes.	   The	   result	   of	   this	   flawed	  method	   of	   analysis	   was	   that	   the	   historic	   left,	   the	   official	   parties	   and	   unions,	   had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 The idea of a “minimal program” also played a central role in the extra-parliamentary 
group Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power) [see chapter 6].  
 
67 Massimo Cacciari, Toni Negri, and Asor Rosa began publishing a short-lived review 
under the name Contropiano after the dissolution of Classe Operaia.  
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focused	  on	   inter-­‐class	   alliances	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	   state	  power	  and	  direct	   change	  from	  above.	  Classe	  Operaia,	  like	  the	  previous	  experience	  in	  QR,	  held	  that	  this	  was	  a	  flawed	  approach.	  Building	  off	  of	  Alquati’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  agricultural	  worker,	  and	  the	  general	  thesis	  of	  the	  “mass	  worker,”	  the	  position	  of	  CO	  was	  that	  there	  existed	  a	  	  social	  mass	  of	  10	  million	  producers…;	  4	  million	  industrial	  workers	  …	  in	  movement	  in	  the	  same	  direction.	  Thus,	  structure	  and	  articulation	  of	  the	  movement	  begins	  from	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  generic	  mass	  of	  social	  labor-­‐power	  …	  that	  gravitates	  around	  the	  working	  class	  of	  the	  factory,	  as	  its	  permanent	  and	  mature	  vanguard	  (Ibid,	  12).	  	  	  Continuing	  with	  the	  reduction	  of	  the	  class	  struggle	  to	  the	  factory	  and	  the	  industrial	  vanguard,	  they	  concluded:	  	  [t]o	  see	  …	  4	  million	  industrial	  workers	  as	  a	  social	  majority	  already	  made,	  in	  their	  dislocation,	  composition,	  and	  internal	  relations,	  in	  the	  logic	  of	  their	  anti-­‐capitalist	  movement	  that	  unites	  one	  nucleus	  to	  another,	  one	  struggle	  to	  another:	  here	  is	  the	  sufficient	  force	  and	  indispensible	  army	  that	  is	  enough	  for	  a	  class	  party	  to	  provoke	  –through	  a	  series	  of	  conflicts—the	  crises	  and	  rupture	  of	  the	  system	  (Ibid,	  15).	  	  	  It	  was	  this	  “social	  majority,”	  as	  a	  uniform	  mass	  of	  social	   labor-­‐power,	  that,	  despite	  the	  uneven	  composition	  between	  workers	  in	  the	  North	  and	  the	  South,	  demonstrated	  a	  “class	  structure”	  that	  was	  both	  “solid	  and	  mature”	  (Ibid,	  13).	  	  Again,	  at	  the	  general	  political	  level	  of	  class	  relations,	  the	  working	  class	  structure	  revealed	  a	  unified	  social	  subject	   with	   significant	   anti-­‐capitalist	   attitudes	   and	   behaviors	   that	   moved	   in	   a	  historically	   conceived	   linear	   direction	   (i.e.,	   expanding	   with	   time	   in	   militancy	   and	  numerically),	  attentively	  waiting	  its	  organization.	  	  	   At	  the	  XI	  Congress	  the	  left-­‐wing	  Ingrao	  faction	  suffered	  a	  fairly	  heavy	  defeat.	  Their	   conception	   of	   reforms	   was	   rejected	   in	   favor	   of	   “structural	   reforms”	   that	  sought,	   as	   a	   priority,	   to	   increase	   the	   voting	   base	   of	   the	   PCI	   through	   expanding	  alliances,	  and	  then	  to	  alter	  the	  relations	  of	  force	  in	  society.	  The	  general	  position	  of	  connecting	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  struggles	  with	  a	  broader	  program	  of	  reform	  was	  also	  rejected	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in	  the	  name	  of	  focusing	  on	  a	  long-­‐term,	  abstract,	  conception	  of	  controlling	  the	  state	  and	  using	   it	  as	  an	   instrument	  to	  turn	  capitalist	  profit	   into	  social	  use.	  The	  defeat	  of	  the	  Ingrao	  faction	  continued	  a	  process	  of	  removing	  the	   left-­‐wing	  from	  positions	  of	  importance	  within	   the	   PCI.	   It	   did	   not,	   however,	   resolve	   any	   of	   the	   contradictions	  that	  existed	  between	  the	  party	  leadership	  and	  the	  working	  class	  base	  (Amyot	  1981,	  70-­‐2).	  This	  push	  towards	  eliminating	  the	  Ingrao	  faction	  and	  the	  inability	  to	  resolve	  the	  distance	  of	  the	  leadership	  and	  its	  political	  line	  from	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  struggles	  led	  to	  the	  break	  away	  of	  the	  Manifesto	  group	  in	  1969	  (see	  chapter	  6,	  below).	  	  Within	   Classe	   Operaia,	   Albert	   Asor	   Rosa	   concluded	   that	   the	   “pre-­‐congressional	  and	  congressional	  debate	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  create	  a	  true	  left”	  inside	  the	  PCI	  (1966,	  21).	  The	  strategy	  of	  confronting	  the	  PCI	  was	  a	  “mistaken	  battle,”	  only	  resulting	  in	  demonstrating	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  the	  approach.	  The	  PCI	  would	  never	  be	  anything	  more,	  he	  concluded,	   than	  a	  party	  “for	  the	  defense	  of	  backwards	  social	  interests”	  (Ibid,	  22).	  Toni	  Negri,	  and	  the	  group	  from	  Padua-­‐Veneto,	  also	  shared	  this	  assessment.	  Notably,	  the	  workers’	  base	  in	  the	  Padua-­‐Veneto	  region	  had	  registered	  a	  series	   of	   victories	   and	   expansion	   of	   the	   struggle	   with	   contributions	   coming	  primarily	   from	  socialist	   circles	   in	   the	  PSIUP.	   In	   light	  of	   these	  developments,	  Negri	  wanted	   CO	   to	   allow	   for	   a	  modified	   version	   of	   the	   national	   pamphlets	   in	   order	   to	  eliminate	  the	  line	  on	  the	  PCI	  as	  an	  “absurd	  closure	  of	  the	  discourse”	  that	  precluded	  alternatives	   to	   organization	   (Trotta	   and	   Milana	   2008,	   530).	   By	   July	   1966	   this	  initiative	  began	  to	  take	  place	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  Potere	  Operaio	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	   Classe	   Operaia,	   edited	   by	   Massimo	   Cacciari.	   This	   new	   publication	   signified	   an	  attempt	  to	  construct	  an	  “alternative	  organization	  of	  the	  class	  vanguard,”	  against	  the	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PCI	  and	  the	  unions,	   indicating	  one	  direction	  that	  the	  militants	   in	  CO	  would	  take	   in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  failed	  strategy	  of	  trying	  to	  salvage	  the	  PCI	  from	  its	  turn	  towards	  social	  democracy.	  	  This	   position	   was	   further	   buttressed	   by	   Asor	   Rosa’s	   interpretation	   of	   the	  post-­‐XI	  Congress	   failure	  of	   the	   left.	  With	   the	  onset	  of	  purges	   from	  the	  PCI	  and	   the	  newly	  formed	  PSIUP,	  Asor	  Rosa	  argued	  that	  the	  new	  work	  of	  Classe	  Operaia	  should	  target	   those	   militants	   disillusioned	   with	   the	   historic	   parties	   and	   work	   towards	   a	  political	   reunification	   of	   the	   revolutionary	   left	   (Di	   Leo	   1966,	   539).	   The	   positions	  stemming	  from	  the	  Padua-­‐Veneto	  group	  and	  from	  Asor	  Rosa,	  a	   former	  Communist	  Party	   member	   alienated	   by	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   left,	   created	   fractures	   within	   the	  group’s	   tactical	   and	   organizational	   choices.	   These	   conclusions	   drew	   particular	  frustration	  from	  Rita	  Di	  Leo	  who	  defended	  the	  “workers’	  use	  of	  the	  party”	  (Ibid).	  If	  nothing	  else,	  Di	  Leo	  argued,	   the	  position	  of	   Ingrao	  had	  the	  merit	  of	  demonstrating	  that	  the	  PCI	  “is	  not	  a	  fossil	  …	  but	  an	  instrument	  of	  power	  in	  which,	  with	  patience,	  the	  conquest	   is	   organized”	   (Ibid,	   540).	  These	  positions	  have	   lent	   credence	   to	   the	   idea	  that	   the	   eventual	   dissolution	   of	   Classe	   Operaia	   centered	   on	   the	   question	   of	  organization	   and	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   workers’	   party	   (Negri	   2007).	   Indeed,	   by	   the	  summer	  of	  1966	   there	  had	  emerged	  clear	  divisions	  over	   the	   future	  of	   the	   journal:	  the	  group	   from	  Rome	  and	  Turin	  posited	  against	   the	  Venetians	  and	  Asor	  Rosa;	   the	  groups	   from	  Lombardy	   and	  Tuscany	  were	  neutral	   (Trotta	   and	  Milana	  2008,	   524).	  While	   this	   might	   merit	   some	   consideration,	   insofar	   as	   there	   were	   quite	   real	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disagreements	   with	   the	   direction	   of	   work	   emanating	   from	   Padua-­‐Veneto,68	  there	  was,	  still,	   the	  consideration	  of	  Mario	  Tronti,	   the	  founder	  and	  principal	  animator	  of	  the	  journal.	  	  As	   early	   as	   the	   workers’	   conference	   the	   previous	   May,	   Tronti	   had	   begun	  expressing	  his	  opinion	  that	  the	  work	  of	  the	  group	  was	  exhausted	  (1965a,	  476).	  This	  position	  was	   further	  enhanced	  by	  his	   interpretation	  of	   the	  metal-­‐mechanics	  strike	  that	  began	  in	  January	  1966,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Pierracini	  Plan,	  the	  unification	  of	  the	   PSI	   and	   PSDI	   in	   a	   social	   democratic	   position,	   and	   the	   possibility	   that	   this	  unification	  held	  for	  bringing	  the	  PSIUP	  and	  PCI	  into	  a	  revolutionary	  position.	  If	  1966	  was	   the	   first	   year	   of	   state	   planning,	   then	   the	   metal-­‐mechanics	   strike	   of	   1966,	  according	  to	  CO,	  demonstrated	  a	  clear	  rejection	  of	  this	  position.	  With	  the	  adherence	  of	   workers	   from	   Fiat	   after	   one	   month,	   the	   strike	   began	   to	   take	   on	   strategically	  important	  nodes	  of	  Italian	  capital,	  developing	  into	  a	  national	  strike	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  March.	   In	   the	   lead	   editorial	   of	   the	   first	   issue	   of	   1966,	   published	   in	   May,	   Tronti	  opened	   the	  discussion	  by	  noting	   that	   there	  was	   a	   “jump”	   in	   the	  movement:	   “[t]he	  isolated	   vanguard	   does	   not	   exist	   anymore,	   they	   do	   not	   have	   reason	   to	   exist.	   A	  process	  of	  massification	  of	  the	  struggle	  is	  in	  act”	  (1966a,	  1).	  But	  the	  struggle	  did	  not	  point	   in	   the	  direction	  of	   organization.	  Rather,	   it	  was	   settled	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   union	  unity,	  with	  rather	  modest	  gains	  that	  fit	  within	  the	  reformist	  schemes	  of	  capital	  (the	  so-­‐called	   “gabbia	   contrattuale”	   (contractual	   cage).	   If	   union	   unity	   centered	   on	  economic	   concerns,	   then	   there	   was	   space	   for	   the	   political	   organization	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 In a letter from Romano Solbiati to Tronti, dated August 8, 1966 it was written that, we 
“need to clarify the position of the group from Padua, provoke a discussion with them to avoid a 
rupture, and to soften their presence in the group” (Trotta and Milana 2008, 546-548).   
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workers.	   Against	   the	   alignment	   of	   social	   democratic	   forces,	   Tronti	   pushed	   not	  towards	   the	   organizational	   problem,	   but	   for	   a	   united	   front	   of	   the	   mass	   struggle	  against	   the	  social	  democratization	  of	   the	   left.	   In	   this	  battle,	   there	  was	  no	  room	  for	  minority	  groups:	  “we	  have	  been	  thinking	  that	  in	  large	  part	  the	  reasons	  for	  our	  direct	  political	   presence	   have	   been	   exhausted….	   [t]he	   practical	   work	   needs	   to	   involve	  more	  men,	  more	  movements,	  more	  experience”	  (Ibid,	  32).	  The	  problem	  of	  political	  organization,	  for	  Tronti,	  became	  secondary	  to	  the	  need	  for	  staving	  off	  and	  defeating	  the	   social	   democratization	  of	   the	   left.	   The	   “united	   front	   against	   social	   democracy”	  became	  the	  order	  of	  the	  day.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  summer	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  work	  of	  CO	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end.	  No	  longer	  advocating	  a	  clear	  mission	  for	  the	  revolutionary	  organization	  of	  the	  working	   class,	   the	   journal,	   in	   its	   last	   three	   numbers,	   focused	   on	   clarifying	   the	  prospects	   of	   the	  workers’	   struggles	   and	   the	   usage	   of	   certain	   conceptual	   tools	   and	  methods	   for	   approaching	   the	   process	   of	   revolution.	   	   On	   this	   problem	   some	   clear	  divisions	  can	  be	  identified	  that	  ultimately	  led	  to	  a	  flowering	  of	  projects	  as	  CO	  slowly	  disappeared.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	   there	   was	   the	   pressure	   to	   end	   the	   direct	   political	  presence	  of	  the	  journal,	  transforming	  it	  towards	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  expression	  that	  could	  be	  a	  force	  for	  change	  in	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  historic	  left	  and	  guide	  workers’	  culture	  at	  the	  base	  level.	  To	  this	  end,	  a	  group	  from	  Florence	  established	  a	  center	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Giovanni	  Francovich,	  one	  of	  the	  militants	  of	  the	  Florence	  section	  of	  CO,	  who	  had	  died	  in	  a	  car	  accident	  at	  age	  25	  in	  January	  1966.	  The	  “Centro	  Francovich”	  was	   established	   in	  March	   as	   a	   place	   for	   seminars,	   research,	   courses,	   conferences,	  and	   publications	   directed	   towards	   the	   class	   struggle	   (a	   similar	   center—“Il	   Centro	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Cultural	  Monzese”	  (the	  Monzese	  Cultural	  Center)—was	  established	  in	  Milan)	  [Classe	  Operaia	  1966,	  30;	  Trotta	  and	  Milana	  2008,	  550-­‐2,	  555].	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  position	  that	  maintained	  the	  need	  of	  a	  newspaper	  or	  journal	  while	  continuing	  to	  work	  on	  agitation	  at	  the	  base	  in	  order	  to	   form	   the	  nucleus	   of	   an	   autonomous	  workers’	   organization.	   The	   introduction	   of	  Potere	  Operaia	  between	  March	  and	  May	  of	  1967	  represented	  the	  response	  from	  the	  Veneto	   group,	   while	   Asor	   Rosa	   established	   a	   short-­‐lived	   journal,	   Classe	   e	   partito	  (Class	   and	   party).	   The	   experience	   of	   Potere	   Operaio	   had	   a	   particularly	   important	  role	  in	  this	  development	  since	  the	  struggles	  there	  in	  1966	  were	  expanding	  and,	  with	  the	   launching	  of	   the	  chemical	  workers’	  strike	   in	   July,	  demonstrated	  a	  real	  capacity	  for	   a	   worker	   vanguard	   to	   lead	   the	   process	   of	   building	   an	   autonomous	   workers’	  organization.69	  However,	  it	  is	  noteworthy	  that	  in	  this	  last	  phase	  of	  work,	  this	  latter	  group,	  while	  differing	  from	  Tronti’s	  assessment,	  did	  not	  abandon	  the	  question	  of	  the	  party.	   In	   fact,	  while	  Asor	  Rosa	   had	  previously	   noted	   that	   the	   PCI	  was	   destined	   to	  remain	  backward	   looking,	  he	  still	  maintained,	  “only	  the	  party	  can	  have	  an	   integral	  
vision	   of	   the	   class	   conflict,	   regulate	   the	   consequences,	   and	   above	   all	   sustain	   the	  worker	   offensive”	   (in	   Trotta	   and	  Milana	   2008,	   562	   emphasis	   added).	   However,	   it	  was	  up	  to	  the	  workers	  to	  “straighten	  the	  line	  of	  the	  party”	  as	  a	  basic	  prerequisite	  for	  any	   attempt	   to	   carry	   the	  party	   in	   the	   factory	   (Ibid).	   Similarly,	   the	   first	   number	   of	  Potere	  Operaio	  pointed	  out	   the	  need	   to	  accentuate	   the	  contradiction	  of	   the	  PCI	  as	  having	   a	   “vast	   influence	   at	   the	   class	   level”	   while	   carrying	   forward	   a	   reformist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 As we will see in chapter 6, the journal Potere Operaio di Veneto-Emilano would be 
short-lived, morphing over time into Contropiano (Counterplan), then to La Classe [May – July 
1969], before returning as a national organization of Potere Operaio in September 1969.   
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discourse	   by	   using	   this	   contradiction	   for	   the	   “expansion	   of	   the	   revolutionary	  movement”	  (POv-­‐e	  1967,	  1-­‐2).	  	  For	  his	  part,	  Tronti,	  in	  one	  of	  the	  last	  meetings	  of	  Classe	  Operaia,	  offered	  his	  understanding	   of	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   workers’	   struggle	   over	   the	   past	   several	  years,	   and	   directed	   his	   comments	   toward	   the	   prospects	   of	   political	   struggle.	   His	  analysis	  centered	  on	  the	  Keynesian	  revolution	  as	  a	  “revolution	  of	   income”	  that	  put	  in	  motion	  two	  forms	  of	  income—workers	  and	  capital;	  salary	  and	  profit	  (Trotta	  and	  Milana	  2008,	  570-­‐1).	  The	  workers’	  “choice	  of	  the	  salary”	  as	  the	  “terrain	  for	  struggle”	  was	   met	   with	   this	   “revolution	   of	   income”	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   the	   attempt,	   by	  capital,	   to	   conquer	   society.	   From	   this	   analysis,	   the	  workers’	   struggle,	   through	   the	  salary	  struggle,	  put	  capitalism	  in	  crisis.	  Thus,	  for	  Tronti,	  the	  point	  of	  arrival	  for	  the	  workers’	  movement	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  was	  to	  continue	  the	  salary	  struggle	  as	  a	  fight	  against	   capitalist	   planning	   which	   was	   based	   on	   “a	   politics	   of	   income”	   and	   the	  “control	   of	   the	   salary	   variable”	   (Ibid,	   575-­‐6).	   However,	   when	   he	   turned	   to	   the	  question	  of	   the	   international	  dimension	  of	  Keynesian	  political	   economy,	  he	  noted:	  “the	  system	  of	  capitalist	  production	  was	  somewhat	  very	  young”	  (Ibid,	  578).	  Tronti	  utilized	   this	   important	   point	   to	   drive	   home	   his	   central	   objective:	   “The	   working	  class,”	   he	   concluded,	   “needs	   to	   be	   within	   and	   against	   capital	   for	   each	   general	  struggle;	   within	   the	   party	   and	   against	   the	   state”	   (Ibid,	   580). 70 	  Given	   the	  international	  perspective	  of	  capitalist	  planning,	  Tronti	  asserted	  the	  need	  to	  abandon	  the	  work	  of	  CO	   in	   favor	  of	   trying	   to	  ascend	   to	   the	   “vertexes	  of	  power”	   in	  order	   to	  manage	  capitalism	  in	   the	  direction	  of	   its	  overthrow.	   In	   line	  with	   the	   functionalism	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Luciano Ferrari Bravo subsequently developed this theme within operaismo in a much 
more theoretically sophisticated manner that Tronti’s treatment.  
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and	   instrumentalism	   that	   characterized	   his	   understanding	   of	   the	   party,	   Tronti	  wrote:	   “capital	   can	   be	   consciously	   managed	   in	   some	   national	   points	   …	   until	   its	  existence	   becomes	   superfluous	   to	   the	   working	   class,	   and	   thus	   the	   international	  conditions	   for	   its	   overthrow	  will	   be	   mature”	   (Ibid,	   579).	   For	   Tronti,	   the	   struggle	  amounted	  to	  a	  battle	  of	  power—“only	  force	  is	  decisive”—with	  the	  need	  to	  play	  the	  fox,	  working	   inside	   the	   institutions	   in	   a	   conscious	   attempt	   to	   direct	   them	   to	   their	  ruin.	   For	   Tronti,	   the	   work	   of	   CO	   was	   over;	   the	   only	   thing	   left	   for	   the	   workers’	  movement	  was	  “mass	  entry”	  into	  the	  PCI	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  win	  government	  power.	  In	  a	  strange	  twist	  of	  affairs,	  Tronti	  had	  directed	  autonomist	  Marxism	  back	  into	  the	  very	  institutions	  that	  it	  sought	  to	  negate,	  with	  an	  analysis	  focused	  on	  capital	  and	  income,	  outside	  of	  any	  sociological	  understanding	  of	  working	  class	  subjectivity.	  	  	  	   The	  end	  of	  Classe	  Operaia	  was	  less	  the	  consequence	  of	  differing	  approaches	  to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   PCI	   within	   the	   workers’	   struggles	   and	   more	   the	   result	   of	  disagreement	  on	  how	   to	  develop	   the	  workers’	   revolt.	   Tronti’s	   development	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  workers’	  movement	  and	  institutions	  led	  him	  to	  a	  position	  that	  increasingly	  pointed	  towards	  altering	  the	  political	  line	  of	  power,	  in-­‐line	  with	  his	  functionalist	  approach.	  For	  Negri,	  Asor	  Rosa	  and	  others,	   the	   “mass	  entry”	  position	  was	   doubly	  mistaken	   in	   its	   negative	   assessment	   of	   the	  workers’	   capacity	   for	   self-­‐management	  of	  the	  struggles	  and	  for	  neglecting	  to	  confront	  the	  “repressive	  reality”	  of	   the	  official	  workers’	  movement	   (Negri	   2007,	   83-­‐4).	   Commenting	  on	   the	  Roman	  group	  years	  later,	  Negri	  charged	  them	  with	  a	  certain	  incapability	  and	  incompetence	  in	  “making	  politics”	  with	  the	  class:	  “[the	  Romans]	  were	  completely	  incapable	  of	  any	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intervention	   in	   front	  of	   the	   factory—they	  were	   comrades	  who	  were	  never	  able	   to	  speak	  with	  the	  workers	  and	  never	  managed	  to”	  (2007,	  79).	  	  
Conclusion 
Classe Operaia signified an important turn within operaismo that was reflected in its 
strict emphasis on the mass worker as the expression of the working class’s political 
subjectivity within neo-capitalism. Based on this unified working class subjectivity, CO 
introduced the question of organization leading to analysis on the use of institutions 
within a revolutionary process. Their logic was consciously one-sided, representing the 
so-called “workers’ point of view” as the dominant and determinant explanation for 
capitalist development. While the narrowness of this approach has been criticized as 
“factoryist,” CO was able to bring its discussion of the factory relation to the culminating 
point of political organization and direct intervention in the workers’ struggle, providing 
an understanding of material life in the factory that up to this point had alluded the left. 
By establishing the factory as the locus of political organization, CO established one of 
the key features of worker revolt in the wave of struggles from 1968-73. In terms of the 
“social factory,” CO introduced territory as a central theme of capitalist circulation and 
reproduction. The effects of the decentralization of industrial production and the 
emergence of territory as a factor in anti-capitalist resistance will be discussed in the last 
chapter. In the next chapter we see how the student movement appropriated parts of the 
workerist analysis by critiquing the school system as part of the reproduction of capital 
through the training of a new labor force. With the locus of anti-capitalist resistance 
spreading to the school system, there emerged an increasing ferment of worker-student 
politicization and unity that propelled the wave of struggles from 1968-1973. Further, CO 
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began to rethink the international question; even if Tronti’s use of Lenin recycled 
outdated conceptions of the “weak link” in the capitalist chain, parts of CO (particularly 
Sergio Bologna, Antonio Negri, and Francesco Tolin) began searching for a new 
understanding of international social capital and for proletarian unity within these 
processes. Included in this discourse was an analysis of the workers’ condition in 
“existing socialism.” Their preliminary discussion of this topic noted that the 
“mechanisms” for “managing power” over the working class in the USSR were “similar” 
to the capitalist countries. In fact, the actual relations of production, from the “workers’ 
point of view” were strikingly similar (Di Leo 1966). This early critique of “existing 
socialism” further developed after the events of Prague in 1968. This initial discourse on 
internationalism was carried over in the student movement and emerged in the analysis 
laid out by the extra-parliamentary groups Lotta Continua (Continuous Struggle) and 
Potere Operaio (see below, Chapter 6-7). Last, the fundamental contribution of CO 
remained the methodological development of the “workers’ point of view” as the proper 
analytical tool for explaining and guiding the class struggle within Autonomist Marxism.  
 In the last issue of the journal (March 1967), they emphasized the need to 
continue the salary struggles by the class, since the salary-profit nexus was considered to 
be quite stringent. The journal editorialized that the future struggles would be more 
effective and more powerful on this terrain. What they did not foresee, however, was the 
generalization of this demand by other social subjects, who, in turn, would assert 
themselves in the class movement as an attempt to break the reproduction of capital and 
thwart the cycle of the circulation of capital (the student and community movements; 
importantly, the women’s movement). We turn now to examine how this “workers’ point 
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of view” came to be understood and applied to the school system by a radicalized student 
body that saw the role of the university as a conduit for the reproduction of capital. In 
doing such, the student movement developed the “social factory” analysis beyond the 
factory gates to the processes of the reproduction of capital.  
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CHAPTER 5  
 
STUDENTS AND REVOLUTIONARY CLASS POLITICS: CAPITALIST 
  
PLANNING, THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM, AND STUDENT REVOLT.  
 
The university functions as an instrument of ideological and political manipulation intended to 
instill in them [the students] a spirit of subordination to power (whatever form it is) and to cancel, 
in the psychic and mental structure of each of us, the collective dimension of personal existence 
and the capacity of having relationships with each other that are not purely of a competitive 
character. –Guido Viale, Contro l’Università   
 
The social system of advanced capitalism increasingly takes the form of a network of totalitarian 
institutions aimed at the total control and domination of the persons subject to it … 
Authoritarianism in a neo-capitalist world is not a hangover from feudalism; it is the fundamental 
form of class domination, to which all social institutions are subordinated—Luigi Bobbio and 
Guido Viale, La strategia del movimento  
 
The school is … a place for the production of qualified labor-power and re-enters as social cost in 
the broader cycle of reproduction of capital.  
The student is defined as labor-power in his process of qualification and thus as a 
subordinate social figure, not only in relation to his future salary position in the productive 
process, but in his university activity in which the capitalist division of intellectual work 
immediately defines him in terms of an executor of mental processes and of predetermined and 
fragmented experiences.—Tesi della Sapienza 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I examine the student movement’s contribution to operaismo. I am 
particularly interested in demonstrating how the student movement discussed the “social 
factory” as a means to enlarge the conception of working class composition to include the 
student as part of the working class. The term “student movement” is intended here as a 
descriptive term that reflects diverse university and high school protest movements. It is 
not intended as depicting a homogeneous movement.71 In short, for lack of a better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 As we have seen in previous chapters, it would be equally incorrect to speak of a 
singular operaismo (Borio et al 2002). Fabrizio Billi correctly notes that the theoretical and 
strategic differences between Quaderni Rossi and Class Operaia constitute a fundamental 
diversity in the tradition of operaismo to the extent that it is more correct to speak of the plural 
operaismi. This is a rather obvious point: operaismo was not a homogenous theoretical 
movement. For Billi, the history of operaismo unfolded in the movements of ’68 with a “direct 
evolution” towards Potere Operaio, as “one of the constitutive principles” of Lotta Continua, and 
smaller influence elsewhere (1999, 163-6).  
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expression, “student movement” is used; it is little more than an inexact term that is 
utilized to generalize about a far more heterogeneous phenomenon that, for reasons of 
space and purpose, prevents me from exploring its significance in greater detail. 
Importantly, the student movement was not so much a theoretical movement as it was a 
social movement, with practice informing its politics to a greater extent than theoretical 
formulations.72 But as the movement matured and searched for answers to the social 
problems it was confronting, the work of operaismo, particularly from the positions of 
Panzieri and Rieser in QR, but also with affinities to the Venetian and Florentine 
positions in CO, offered a conceptual framework to investigate and understand a 
revolutionary class politics. In particular, the student’s appropriation of sociological 
inquiry (“sociology of the base”), class composition, the social factory, and aspects of 
revolutionary theory (i.e., organizational questions such as the critique of centralized 
authority, the need for revolutionary party to emerge from the movement and live in the 
movement, and the rejection of external vanguards) provide a framework for examining 
the trajectory of operaismo as it found space in the student movement.   
 Before arriving at how the student movement began appropriating the language 
and theory of operaismo there are several background factors that must be introduced. 
The first section describes the generational features that mark the particular nature of the 
student movement with respect to their parent’s generation. Emphasis is placed on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
72 The student movement did not emerge out of the need to construct new theoretical 
tools. Rather, theory followed from the practical need of confronting reform of the educational 
system. The trajectory of the rise of the student movement, its relationship with the official 
organizations of student representation, its position with respect to the three main political parties, 
its understanding of itself, and its demands, verify that theory was virtually always a reflection 
upon practice. This is certainly the case with the majority of documents produced in the 
movement. For the best discussion of this point see Rossana Rossanda’s L’Anno degli studenti 
(The year of the students) [1968, 55].  
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psychological and cultural effects of the “economic miracle,” as marking a rupture in the 
mode of living and attitudinal behaviors of the new generation. A second factor is the 
emergence of an “existential ambiguity” that permeated the youth. New means of 
communication—film, phonographs, and television—signified the birth of a truly global 
culture. Last, their reading preferences demonstrate the intellectual hue of the youth 
movement—an admixture of existentialism, psychoanalysis, humanist Marxism, and 
operaismo.  
 The second section of this chapter discusses the relationship between the student 
movement and the ideas of operaismo. While I do not want to overstate the connection 
between the development of operaismo and the rise of the so-called “New Left” of the 
student movement, there were direct connections (Santarelli 1996, 143-6; Massari 1998, 
41-63; Urso 1999). At the same time, I do not want to undervalue the influences of 
previous movements, as one prominent scholar does in his characterization of the student 
movement as an “event,” particular to the schools (Revelli 2001).73 Rather, in agreement 
with Urso and others, the student movement must be understood as part of a broader 
social process, with its own particular configurations that were characterized by their 
experience as students (Hellman 1976). While Urso highlights the idea of “rupture” as a 
connecting point between the student movement and Autonomist Marxism, I put 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Revelli argues that the student movement constituted an “event” (as opposed to a 
“process”) that was marked by the explosion of student protest inside the university. This rather 
narrow assessment misses not only previous theoretical and cultural influences, but also 
minimizes the connective tissue between the youth in general and the student movement, 
connections that were evident in protests in the piazza and other manifestations (for example, the 
December 1968 protests in Milan during the opening night of the theater season at the famous 
Teatro alla Scala, followed by a similar protest on New Year’s Eve at the resort of Bussola on the 
coast near Pisa. Both protests were “social” in nature, and the composition of the protesters was 
predominantly young, but by no means limited to the student movement.)  
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emphasis in the second section on the idea of the “social factory,” the idea of 
“autonomy,” and forms of knowledge production. This section highlights the common 
ground between two distinct but congenial tendencies that emerged within the student 
movement.74 The central point of this section is to understand the means by which the 
student movement began to formulate its questions in terms of the “social factory,” 
understood in both the Trontian and Panzierian versions discussed above.  
 This is demonstrated by analyzing the more prominent theoretical documents that 
emerged from the student movement in universities at Pisa, Trento, and Turin. From this 
analysis, the student’s conception of the “social factory” emerged as a totalizing system 
based on despotism and control—the core power features of social capital. Within this 
configuration, the role of the university, the role of the student, and the political 
obligation or commitment for revolutionary struggle developed. The student’s 
appropriated the conception of the “social factory” in order to critique the university 
within a particular phase of neo-capitalism and to situate their struggle within a class 
analysis. Their significant contribution to the conception of “class composition” derived 
from their emphasis on the social division of labor and their role as the subjects of what 
they identified as the political and technical-social functions of social labor. 75  A 
consequence of this sociological focus was that Tronti’s logical-deductive method of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Careful attention must be placed on the word “within” as the positions of Classe 
Operaia, and to a much lesser extent, Quaderni Rossi, were particularly lacking with regard to the 
question of educational system and the role of the student as a subject within neo-capitalist social 
relations (Wright 2002, 96-7).  
 
75 This criteria for a definition of the working class was addressed in the Tesi della 
Sapienza: “A definition of class” must be seen in terms of “the capitalist division of labor internal 
to the cycle of social production, that is, from the distinction between the fragmented executive-
social functions and social functions that are repressive management-administration-control” 
(1967, 174).  
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discerning revolutionary practice under conditions of social capital was dismissed in 
favor of examining the phenomenological effects of social capital on the reproduction of 
labor-power.  
 The third section of the chapter concludes by focusing on the limits of the student 
movement as autonomous actors in revolutionary theory. The problem derived from the 
uncertainty and flaws in their analysis of the university in its relation to capital and the 
state. This became evident by at least the spring of 1968 as the focus of “student power” 
increasingly sought ties with those advocating “workers’ power.” The slogan that 
captured the general sentiment of this period, “students, workers united in the struggle,” 
reflected the expansion of revolutionary struggle beyond both the university and the 
factory into the broader contours of capitalist production and reproduction. The 
uncertainty over political space76 for revolutionary politics and its organizational form 
dominated the student movement as it gained momentum moving into the tumultuous 
“Hot Autumn” of 1969. The generalization of working class struggles, involving 
neighborhoods, rent strikes, consumer action, street protests, workers’ occupations and 
strikes, the student’s revolt, and the formation of local assemblies and committees, 
seemed to offer the premonition that a revolutionary struggle was underway.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 One of the key features of both the beginning of operaismo and the student movement 
was an emphasis on autonomy as an organizational and institutional separation from the 
traditional political parties, trade unions, and organizations of student representation. They each 
also shared a critique of these as bureaucratic and centralized, resulting in a failure to recognize 
the demands of the base, and imposing a political line on the respective members. For Panzieri, 
autonomy was a central theme for establishing a revolutionary workers’ culture. The student 
movement soon neglected its emphasis on autonomy as it confronted the workers’ movement and 
problems beyond the university. Their response was a step-backwards organizationally that only 
began to be rectified in 1973 when Potere Operaio dissolved itself as an organization and various 
small cells of Autonomia emerged in a loosely federated network of struggles. Thus, the idea of a 
political space for the movement proved quite problematic, despite varied experiments in this 
regard (see Ch. 6).  
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Configurations of a new generation 
The youth of the “economic miracle” politically emerged in the revolts of July 1960. 
They embodied a different outlook, a reflection of more confident times: their spirit was 
emboldened by the genuine feeling that, through activism, they could take control of the 
social forces at play in society and reconstruct a new world; their sensibility was imbued 
with irreverence towards the previous generation’s values and mores expressed in the 
“holy trinity” of M’s: macchina, moglie, mestiere (car, wife, and professional job). The 
basis of the “economic miracle,” with its vision of social organization and progress was 
directly challenged. But the economic miracle had broader connotations for the Italian 
psyche. Fundamentally, it signified the possibility of a better world, it provided better 
material conditions, and it turned Italy into a world economic power. According to 
Piccone Stella, the youth confronted the “economic miracle” with considerable 
“ambiguity”: the “new ambitions of the boom, combined with the attraction towards a 
mutable and indecipherable remixing of values” inaugurated, a “subterranean process” 
that redefined the culture (1993, 12-13; Crainz 2005, 79, 142-3; Balestrini and Moroni 
1998, 197). Initially expressed through anti-conformist attitudes and behaviors, their 
culture, socialization, and ideational framework produced a lively dissent from 
established views and mores.  
New needs and new consumption 
The social transformation of Italian society during the “economic miracle” was a 
determining force in shaping the objective conditions of the new generation. As 
previously noted, its major characteristics were the development of mass consumer 
markets through large-scale production along Taylorist-Fordist lines. One of the effects 
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of this opening was that for the first time on a large scale capitalism targeted the family 
structure through mass consumer products that affected their daily happenings: 
refrigeration fundamentally altered both the quality and quantity of foodstuffs that 
Italians consumed, television challenged the family nucleus by opening new horizons in 
the cultural imagination of the youth, and the automobile became not only a status 
symbol, but also a means for expressing the rapidly changing social understanding of 
time and force: the young interpreted the automobile as an “exaltation of a vital energy” 
of self-expression (Piccone Stella 1993, 250).77  
The expansion of consumer markets entailed the construction of new needs in the 
youth. However, capitalist culture could not contain the interpretation that the youth gave 
to these new needs. This dichotomy reflected a basic feature of the cultural effect of neo-
capitalism: the introduction of mass consumerism unleashed in the new generation the 
feeling of instant gratification in order to satisfy their immediate needs.78 In order to 
understand the dynamic of neo-capitalism through the psychological and cultural effects 
of new consumer markets along with the construction of new needs and how the young 
generation understood itself in front of these transformations, it is useful to examine the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 For this type of depiction of the youth’s imagination and the “economic miracle,” see 
Pier Paolo Pasolini’s film Mamma Roma (1962).  
 
78 Elvio Fachinelli used the psychological and cultural connection between “needs” and 
“desires” as central to the existential revolt of the youth in what he termed “dissident desires.” 
Fachnielli wrote, “…the group has put in motion the dialectic of desire.” Continuing later, “to a 
society that offers the satisfaction of needs, they perennially oppose it as NOT ENOUGH” (1968, 
88-9). As a more general observation, we might consider Daniel Bell’s description of this shift in 
capitalist culture. In his The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Bell wrote: “the cultural 
realm is one of self-expression and self-gratification. It is anti-institutional and antinomian in that 
the individual is taken to be the measure of satisfaction….” He continues: “In this 
democratization of culture, every individual, understandably, seeks to realize his full “potential,” 
and so the individual “self” comes increasingly into conflict with the role requirements of the 
technical-economic order (1978, xvii). It would take another shift in the capitalist organization of 
production to incorporate this idea of “potential” within the productive framework of Italian 
capitalism (see Ch. 7).  
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broader international conditions of this generation, first from a cultural perspective and 
then from a more distinctly political and economic framework.  
 In terms of cultural expression, television’s affect on the youth’s global 
imagination paled in comparison to film and music. In both realms, certain features 
captured not only the Italian youth but also an entire generation of youth across the 
spectrum of advanced industrial capitalist countries. This bourgeoning global culture 
confronted the preceding generation’s moral order, sharply criticizing its existential 
emptiness and fundamental decay (Lumley 1990, 73). In Italy, perhaps more than any 
other film, Fellini’s La Dolce Vita (The Sweet Life, 1960) depicted the decadence of a 
new bourgeois intent on realizing the potentiality of individuality through the immediate 
gratification of needs and desires. While the mainstream reaction, particularly, but by no 
means unique, from the Catholic sector, deplored the film’s immoral displays of sexuality 
and other suggestive moral transgressions, others saw in the film a recognition that 
Italians no longer lived in the postwar condition of “delayed gratification” and repression, 
justified in the name of reconstruction, but lived in a “decadent” society, with all sorts of 
excesses and existential conflict (Crainz 2005, 157-9).  
The central theme of Fellini’s film was not to point out the moral decadence of 
the social order, but to highlight, in his words, the “terrible existential emptiness” of neo-
capitalist culture (quoted in Crainz 2005, 162). While critics were outraged by such 
scenes as Nadia Gray’s strip show during a house party, and the free display of casual 
sexual relations, the message that Fellini sought to drive home climaxed in the film’s 
final scene. With the main character, Marcello, sitting on the beach, away from his group 
of fellow partiers, he notices a young, beautiful girl in the distance who is trying to 
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communicate with him. Separated by an inlet of water, they are incapable of physical 
contact; the girl’s voice is drowned out by the sound of the ocean. In his failed attempt to 
listen to the girl, Marcello expresses futility—he is incapable of developing his own 
thoughts of what it might be that the girl wants; she, in turn, prays him to understand as 
he turns around to leave, accentuating the tragedy that the innocence of love is seemingly 
lost in a world of existential emptiness, or drowned out in the constant “noise” that 
marked neo-capitalist culture. Fellini’s understanding of the moral crisis that confronted a 
new consumer world with rapidly changing moral codes was also reflected in a new wave 
of Italian film that sought to explain the social transformations of the economic boom.79 
Importantly, this existential void was captured in a broad array of film that focused on the 
individual who was heroic and rebellious, violent, and full of ethical ambiguity. 
 International films caught on in Italy with the importation of the Western from the 
United States – the “Spaghetti Western” – as well as films from a new generation of 
independent filmmakers that focused on the theme of the individual as rugged, self-
reliant, rebellious, and, oftentimes, violent. The “man with no name” (played by Clint 
Eastwood) in “A Fistful of Dollars” (1964), later, the role of Peter Fonda in “Easy 
Rider”80 (1969), and earlier James Dean in a “Rebel without a Cause” (1955, Italian 
release 1956) were films that stressed the outsider, those cast aside by not only society 
but also by history. The “man with no name” resonated with the same protagonists in 
Pasolini’s films Accattone (The Scrounger) [1961] and Mamma Roma (1962). The former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Adagio highlights three films as marking a decisive turn in film’s capacity to shed light 
on the social changes underway during the economic boom: Luchino Visconti’s Rocco e i suoi 
fratelli (Rocco and his brothers), Federico Fellini’s La Dolce Vita (The Sweet Life), and 
Michaelangelo Antonioni’s L’Avventura (The Adventure) [1999, 236-7].  
 
80 Adriano Sofri of Potere operaio pisano characterized Peter Fonda’s role in “Easy 
Rider” as a “perfect Italian variant of the protagonists of 1968” (quoted in Cazzullo 2006, 10).  
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depicted the criminal lifestyle of an unemployed rascal who cheats and robs, trying to get 
buy in a life suffocated by dreadful existence of the underclass. The latter featured the life 
of an aging prostitute trying hopelessly to change her life and to offer her son, Ettore, a 
more healthy and sane world. These forms of anti-heroes that came from the margins of 
society reflected the angst and ambiguity of the role of the individual in the age of the 
economic miracle. The introduction of the underclass into history, as a living subject, 
with the display of bourgeois decadence and alienation as the dominant mode of 
existence in the economic boom produced a sharp break with the norms of neo-capitalist 
culture.  
The consumer culture of the early 1960s produced a general leveling effect in 
Italian society that cut against previous social roles. Modes of dress, particularly, became 
more homogenous among the youth. The July 1960 protest that produced the cultural 
icon of the ripped t-shirt and jeans was both a consequence and a partial rejection that 
demonstrated the class nature of the protest. On the one hand, jeans were the universal 
class leveler, but the image of the ripped t-shirt demonstrated the general poverty of the 
working class (Lumley 1990, 70-2). Connected to the trend of dress was another: the rise 
of rock-n-roll and the global culture of music.  
The expansion of music as a consumer item was the result of an increase in 
production of records and record players. Crainz writes: “[t]he evolution and successes of 
the record market contribute in a decisive manner to the self-definition of a youth 
universe and has more general implications” (2005, 149). With the advent of records and 
phonographic players an international market was established in youth circles with a 
vibrant diversity of sounds and messages: the Rolling Stones, Pink Floyd, the 
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Temptations, Jimi Hendrix, the Grateful Dead, Bob Dylan, and the Beatles. A sector of 
the new music was connected to the beat culture as well as the emerging culture of 
experimentation in mind-altering substances (particularly marijuana and LSD). Thus, the 
Italian movement contained elements within it that were influenced by the poetry of 
Allen Ginsberg, the advocacy of The Psychedelic Experience of Tim Leary (which in its 
own right influenced large portions of the new music), and the Yippie movement 
associated with Jerry Rubin. Music fed part of a void within the existential condition of 
the youth by transgressing the limits of the real, searching for new ways to connect as 
individuals with others in the belief that an infinity of possible worlds remained to be 
explored, and that their generation had the capacity to overcome what appeared to be an 
absurd social system.  In this sense the “existential ambiguity” of the boom generation 
highlighted a rapidly changing world in which the individual had the possibility of 
forging new norms and modes of living.  
 While the new forms of communication began to draw the world closer together, 
particularly the sensibilities of the youth, within Italy this cultural shift was augmented by 
an expanding publishing market that, for the first time, began to reach broader audiences 
along with their nascent consumer demands. Throughout the 1950s it was standard that 
the publishing houses produced for the upper-middle class. Einaudi, in Turin (where 
Panzieri had briefly worked), was one of the few exceptions.81 The young students were 
consuming literature that was outside of the dominant intellectual circles. In fact, their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  Libreria Feltrinelli (Feltrinelli Bookstore) and L’Istituto Feltrinelli (Feltrinelli 
Institute) became central reference points in the successive years, not only for the production of 
literature for the movement, but also as a place of discussion and meeting. Giangiacomo 
Feltrinelli’s role in left culture was particularly important for not only gathering information on 
the European working class, but for Feltrinelli’s own personal affinity for the Third World 
liberation struggles with emphasis on Cuba (Feltrinelli 2001).  
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literature reflected the ambiguity with which they found themselves that was premised on 
a rejection of the previous generation’s values. In a series of topics that reflected ethical 
shifts and diverse intellectual tendencies, the youth read a host of new literature: on the 
question of sexual behavior they read Wilhelm Reich’s The Sexual Revolution; for a 
critique of the family as a repressive and ultimately conformist entity they went to RD 
Laing’s essays; philosophically they were interested in the Frankfurt School, the young 
Marx of the Manuscripts, Sartre, Camus, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche (Crainz 2005, 160-
1; Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 197-200). The dominant themes that they derived from 
these works were alienation, totality, critical rationality, and the importance of individual 
choice or decision-making (see below). These shifts in literature began to deepen and 
focus their theoretical and philosophic questions. Importantly, this background sheds 
light on the formation of new needs derived from the introduction of mass consumer 
markets. Below, I demonstrate more concretely how this “subterranean process” 
impacted the politics of the student movement. Before turning to that important point, it 
remains to understand the ideational and social configuration of the youth generation.  
Ideational and social configurations  
As the younger generation was defining itself culturally, a broader protest culture was 
emerging that focused on international political events. The United States’ war in 
Vietnam, while the most prominent theme of early protest, often led and organized by the 
official left and their civic associations, was part of a broader international outlook that 
was fundamentally shaped by anti-imperialism. The youth’s rejection of imperialist 
politics stemmed from an increasing identification with the “wretched of the earth” 
(Fanon), especially those who fought in the periphery or margins of the capitalist system, 
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domestically and internationally. Indeed, after the initial movements over school reform, 
anti-imperialism quickly became the leading focus with 1967 known as “the year of 
Vietnam.” (As we will see below, the politicization of the struggle also reflected a deeper 
political commitment within the student movement.) The critique of imperialism was 
based on the relationship between legitimacy and power. Its normative aspect was part of 
the broader climate of the Nuremberg trials and universal human rights in the postwar 
era. Hence their outrage was not only against perceived aggression and criminality of the 
United States in Vietnam, but also against authoritarian regimes in Greece and Spain.  
 The idea of “peaceful coexistence”—the trope of Khrushchev-Kennedy Cold War 
relations—was regarded as a fiction, rendered as propaganda in face of the Third World 
liberation struggles and the response those drew from the dominant world powers. Latin 
America exercised considerable influence, particularly the Cuban Revolution and Che 
Guevara’s definition of a “revolutionary.” Elsewhere, Maoism emerged from within the 
communist left as a result of the Sino-Soviet split as the perceived egalitarianism of Mao 
was seen as a welcome renewal against the gray bureaucracy of the Soviet model. In the 
student movement, these two influences were popularized in the slogans: “make one, 
two, three Vietnams,” and Mao’s decree to “shoot at the headquarters” (Balestrini and 
Moroni 1988, Scalzone 1988, 30). This international perspective and particularly the 
expression of “peaceful coexistence” had domestic implications. Oreste Scalzone, a 
student at Rome during this period, later wrote: “In our attitude there was a criticism of 
peaceful coexistence that translated in a criticism of social coexistence … the focus on 
parliament, the participation of unity of the constitutional arch, the constriction and 
regulatory management of the struggles by the union” (Ibid). Peaceful coexistence neither 
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existed internationally nor nationally: the workers’ struggles in Italy, the planning of 
education and structure of academic authority, the family, these and more were the 
domestic counterparts of a broader contestation of authority that spread throughout the 
Italian ideological spectrum.  
 Shifts in both the Catholic and Communist movements opened new space and 
possibilities for more liberal or democratic orientations. In the Catholic world, Pope John 
XXIII turned attention to social justice and ethics, culminating in his final encyclical 
Pacem in Terris. As Ginsborg writes: “the encyclical stressed the need for the increased 
economic and social development of the working classes, the entry of women into public 
life and the justice of anti-colonial struggles in the Third World” (1990, 261). While 
officials in the Vatican were awkwardly confronted with the appeal to “all men of 
goodwill,” at the local level there were sympathies for Latin America’s “Marxist priests” 
(i.e., Camillo Torres). The focus on ethics and social justice resonated with leftist 
portrayal of the workers as an exploited class. Shifts in the Communist movement, 
particularly the current of operaismo, pushed the focus on exploitation away from 
economic terms towards the broader power dynamics of capitalist social relations, 
speaking in terms of “despotism,” “domination,” and “control.” In these two dominant 
political cultures, there was a greater opportunity and proclivity to include the working 
masses within their orbit. One of the basic contradictions that pervaded the period, 
however, was that within these cultures the base, or membership, often found itself at 
odds with the political line of the leadership.  In this regard, the student movement and 
the working class experienced similar phenomena in their relations with the political 
institutions and party structures.  
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The basic questions that students were asking stemmed from the tradition of 
Western Marxism and were framed around themes of alienation, totality, and critical 
rationality. Their approaches varied between philosophy, psychology, sociology, and 
urban studies. They were the first generation to seriously consider the writings of the 
young Marx in the Manuscripts. Here they discovered psychological, sociological, and 
methodological criteria that were not consistent with the PCI’s focus on development and 
production. Rather, they found a critique of capitalist social relations that highlighted 
man’s four-fold alienation and continued impoverishment through capitalist 
development. Not only did the wage system increase workers’ political dependency on 
capital, but it also constructed new needs through its social and technical power. For 
young students, Marx’s claims that highlighted the workers’ loss of control over 
production, the decimation of the individual’s creativity and interests that prevented 
social relations to be based on genuine human need resonated strongly.82 Thus, the young 
generation encountered a Marxism that was closer to the dissident left of the post-
Stalinist era (even if many workerists disdained the humanist tendency within Marxism), 
particularly in the shift of focus towards the subjective component of capitalist social 
relations (i.e., worker’s inquiry) away from more traditional “economic” questions (i.e., 
production, development, property relations).  
Capitalism as a system of control had been introduced to students in the North 
(particularly Pisa and Turin) through Panzieri’s interpretation of Marx’s “Fragment on 
Machinery” in the Grundrisse. Here they came into contact with theoretical positions that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 This is particularly true of the various Architecture Departments that were among the 
first to criticize the influence and control of capital over their professional training and 
intellectual work. For an excellent discussion of the experience at Veneto during the late 1960s 
and 1970s, see Gail Day “Strategies in the metropolitan Merz” (2005).   
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demonstrated how knowledge production, determined by the needs of capital, imposed a 
form of technological rationality on society. (Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man was 
published in 1967 and sold 150,000 copies in its first year) [Lumley 1990, 121]. To 
confront this problematic the student movement turned to the use of inquiry in Quaderni 
Rossi as a foundation for new forms of knowledge production to combat the social power 
of capital. The linkage of these two themes—capitalist despotism through its use of 
technology and workers’ inquiry as a democratic mode of knowledge production—served 
the movement in their critique of the university system as part of a broader logic that 
connected the university with the power of capital and the role of the state in university 
reform.  
In trying to understand the totalizing nature of capitalism, the student movement 
also accepted Sartre’s critique of dialectical materialism and his consequent formulation 
of freedom and truth. In his Search for a Method, Sartre critiqued the Hegelian position 
of freedom that locates truth in history (1963). Against this totality of history as the 
determination of freedom, Sartre posed the concept of “totalization” as a character in 
history that is not determined dialectically but is present in history through the fact of 
individual choice. Sartre argued that the liberty of choosing was the positive content that 
allowed individuals to negate both internally and externally given conditions.83 The 
ambiguity that this generation felt towards the boom was addressed through the problem 
of control and power exercised through the execution of individual choice. For Sartre, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 In a slightly different formulation, but as an important influence, Camus advanced the 
proposition that “with rebellion, awareness is born.” The basis of this for Camus was 
individualistic: The rebel “confronts an order of things which oppresses him with the insistence 
on a kind of right not to be oppressed beyond the limit that he can tolerate” (1991, 15, 12). On the 
role of negative thought, Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution was an important influence as well 
(1960).  
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“man” not only “makes himself,” but this claim recognizes as a precondition that 
individuals have the ability to imagine that the world is something other than it is, and to 
also imagine themselves differently. The fundamental determination of human affairs is 
choice and how this is exercised in the basic circumstances in which people are living.  
The student movement rejected economically deterministic explanations of social 
theory. This rejection derived from the influences of Panzieri’s interpretation and use of 
the Frankfurt School as well as existentialist arguments associated with Sartre and 
Camus. Within the parameters of these influences the movement was able to forge a 
loose international class analysis that targeted neo-capitalism at home and imperialism at 
the international level. At the international level, the movement found cultural icons in 
the figures of Che and Mao.84 These figures were certainly appealing for their symbolic 
messages of what it meant to be a revolutionary and for an egalitarian and anti-
bureaucratic form of communism. However, politically, the student movement existed in 
a direct struggle against capitalist reforms in their own universities and cities.  
The students confronted a university system that was outdated and faced with 
legislative proposals for reform, one of the main pillars of the Center-Left government. 
Their ideational and social background evinced a dynamic “existential ambiguity” that 
began taking shape during the student’s confrontation with university reform. That is, 
without the question of university reform, or without the need (partially imposed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Balestrini and Moroni note that Che was particularly influential, especially after his 
address to the United Nations General Assembly (December 11, 1964). His definition of a 
guerilla in La Guerra di Guerriglia (Gorilla War) [Feltrinelli 1967] set out basic characteristics 
that resonated with sectors of the youth movement: discipline (and this is connected to Sartre’s 
emphasis on “being with others” as essential to revolutionary engagement), an acceptance of 
violence, the culture of small groups tied to the oppressed (“foco”), connecting the small 
struggles to a total attack against imperialism (1988, 177-8).  
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changes in the system of production, but also by the democratic ideals of the Republic’s 
Constitution85) for expanding university education, there would not have been a student 
movement. However, it is equally true that the determinant elements were not solely the 
dissatisfaction with regard to the universities, but with the “system” as a whole, and with 
the condition of the youth in the social system of neo-capitalism. And while the 
ideational background was somewhat diffuse, the student movement became more 
closely aligned with the analysis of operaismo through its struggles and, especially, from 
the Pisan students, who, after 1967, attained a large deal of theoretical influence over the 
national movement.  
The student movement and themes of operaismo 
From the outset, class was a central theme in discussions of the educational system. The 
entrance of the socialists in the first Center-Left government was premised, in part, on 
education reform. Its singular achievement was the scuola media unificata, or unified 
middle school, which eliminated schools of professional and commercial training and 
pointed the way towards equal education for all, opening the prospects for the sons and 
daughters of working and peasant classes to receive higher education. The workerists, for 
their part, saw in this a reflexive attempt by capitalist planners to implement the Fordist-
Taylorist model of production within the schools. In fact, the exponents of operaismo had 
paid virtually no attention to the problem of education, with the partial exception of 
Panzieri. Their conception of class composition precluded the need to focus on training 
and qualification; with no need for the professional skilled worker of the past, education 
was seen as preparing labor for the assembly line and in managing these affairs (only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Article 34 of the Constitution forms the basis for the “Right to Study.” It stipulates that 
those who are “capable and deserving, also if deprived of means, have the right to attain the 
highest level of study.”  
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later would they focus on intellectual labor, a consequence of the student movement). As 
we will see later, the student movement exposed the shortcomings of this approach as 
they confronted the role of intellectual production within a system based on the deskilling 
of certain forms of labor while increasing specialization and qualification of other forms 
of labor.86 What, if any, were the new set of skills required by the productive system of 
international capital and the role of Italy in that schema? The student movement 
responded to this question by focusing on the capitalist system in terms of the division of 
labor.  
 During the early debates on education reform, the position of the traditional left 
focused on the “right to education” as a social goal of the postwar Republic. For them, 
the expansion of education, the democratization of knowledge to all social classes, was 
intrinsic to the democratic spirit of the Constitution. In support of the educational reforms 
the slogan of the “right to education” served as a normative basis by which students 
judged the actual situation in the schools. As Lumley notes, the reality of class society 
marred student’s school experience: “educational reforms, by improving the chances of 
young working class people going to university, drew attention to the fact that very few 
did. Students went to university with great expectations and found a tawdry reality” 
(1990, 58). The early student movement latched on to this disconnect between the 
unification of the middle school with the reality that the system continued to serve the 
privileged classes. The first document addressing this class aspect within the student 
movement came from a Catholic priest, Don Lorenzo Milani, along with his students at 
the Barbiana School. The Lettera a una professoressa (Letter to a teacher) sold over a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Steve Wright attributes the focus on technicians and specialized labor to the influence 
of Andre Gorz’s Strategy for Labor and Serge Mallet’s The New Working Class. For the role of 
technicians and “class composition” in operaismo, see Wright’s Storming Heaven (2002, 101-6). 
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million copies within five years, becoming a classic of the movement (Scuola di Barbiana 
1967). At its core, it was a denunciation of the class character of the educational system, 
with a cultural and social rejection of the idea of privilege, and particularly the boss’s 
own formation of class privilege.  
The Lettera derived from the Catholic left which had turned its focus to the poor 
and downtrodden that lived on the margins of society. It represented a sample of writings 
from students of peasant and worker origins and highlighted the school’s neglect of the 
cultural and social problems facing Italy. In his review of the Lettera, Elvio Fachinelli, 
wrote in Quaderni Piacentini, that this “is the first Chinese text of our country” 
(Fachinelli, Fortini, and Giudici 1967, 66). The reference to “Chinese,” widely used in 
the mainstream press as an epithet against the students and New Left in general, was a 
polemical term used against those within the left who sympathized and supported the 
Chinese model of communism against the Soviet system. The Lettera, for Fachinelli, 
sought to evoke sympathy for the plight of those who were “forgotten,” who “pass 
through time without leaving a trace,” and that “nobody will miss” (Ibid, 69). The 
student’s letters brought attention to their subordinate and marginal position, not as an 
individual matter, but as a cultural and social problem of the Republic. What is 
interesting here is that the letters introduce class as the key for understanding why and 
how these groups have been denied identity and with it a sense of place and existence 
within the dominant culture. The limitation of the book, as Franco Fortini pointed out, 
was that it was pre-political; ultimately, it was a statement of faith (Ibid, 76). Against a 
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school that divided students according to wealth and riches, the students’ letters attacked 
the bourgeois and their privilege as the central obstacle to social equality.87  
Class was viewed through the prism of social privilege and its affect on morality. 
There was no consequent discussion of pedagogy, content, or other questions of learning, 
or of the structural features of educational institutions. Rather, the class system was 
denounced to the extent that it had a negative moral effect. The neglect of social 
problems turned moral questions into individualistic concerns. For the students this meant 
the denial and, ultimately, neglect of other individuals. Against this individualistic and 
atomistic focus, the students’ letters pointed to a “fraternal collectivity” where the 
privilege of the boss’s culture was a contaminant that needed to be extirpated (Ibid, 77, 
79). This negative appraisal of bourgeois culture was summarized in a key passage from 
the Lettera:  
Pierino, you are lucky because you know how to speak and disagreeable because you 
speak too much.  
 He that does not have anything important to say. He that only repeats things read 
in written books from others like him…. Poor Pierino, you almost give me compassion. 
For privilege you have paid dear. Deformed by specialization, by books, by contact with 
all the same type of men. Why don’t you leave? Leave the university, the burdens, the 
parties…. Quit reading; disappear. It is the last mission of your class (quoted in Balestrini 
and Moroni 1988, 183). 
 
The class privilege of the bourgeois was seen as the central obstacle to universal moral 
harmony. Currents within the Catholic left began focusing on the moral consequences of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Language, for example, was treated as an important factor in identifying class bias and 
privilege. Through the teaching of an official language, with control over linguistic practice, the 
children of peasants and workers were instructed to leave behind their local dialects and slangs in 
order to adopt proper usage. As an expression of their superiority, language was one way in 
which the pierino (sons of the bosses) exercised privilege in education (Balestrini and Moroni 
1988, 181-2). Language would become a widely treated topic in the thought of the New Left, 
along with the introduction of automation and computerization. For an extreme example of a 
critique or protest against linguistic practice that recognizes social/usage rules, see Balestrini’s 
account of the 1977 student movement in his The unseen (1989). The text is written without use 
of capitalization, punctuation, and other literary conventions.  
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the class system, highlighting the failure of the unified middle school system to realize 
the hope of democracy’s egalitarian norms, as it did not address the social and cultural 
class system.  
If the Lettera attacked the deformations on moral development that stemmed from 
class privilege in education, this remained a literary phenomenon that had not reached the 
level of national politics. A few months prior to the publication of the Lettera, students at 
the Liceo Parini in Milan set off a national scandal with their appraisal of the youth’s 
condition in Italian society. In February 1966 students produced an article that addressed 
the question of “what the young think of today.” While focused on questions of religion, 
sexual relations, family, and marriage, the students’ responses demonstrated their 
rejection of the moral customs of Italian society. Exemplary in this regard was a young 
woman’s response that if she were only offered a life dedicated to marriage, home and 
children, death would be an agreeable solution (in Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 185-7). 
The upshot of the national debate over the “Zanzara case” (literally translated as the 
“Mosquito” or “Gnat”) was that a new generation pointed out the shortcomings of 
democratic institutions, and the need for modernizing such institutions. However, the 
response from the political, economic, and educational powers evinced their clear 
rejection of the students’ concerns, as those students responsible for the article were 
expelled or politely asked to transfer to another school. The case highlighted not only the 
generational gap separating the youth from their elders, but also that the educational 
system was part of society, it replicated its norms and models of behavior that the young 
needed to adopt as part of their education. Thus, in the “Zanzara case” the students began 
deconstructing the understanding of the school as an autonomous institution responsible 
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for preparing citizens by locating the educational institutions within the spectrum of 
society, as a part of society (Lumley 1990, 94-6).  
 The Lettera and the “Zanzara case” demonstrate two things that remained with the 
student movement throughout the cycle of struggles between 1968-1973: a rejection of 
the class nature of the educational institutions and a form of existential suffering in the 
face of academic authority. In the early development of the student movement these were 
addressed primarily in terms of the democratic liberty of the student against the 
entrenched powers of the academic, political, and economic system. Their existential 
angst produced a lively rejection of external control that began to take shape in early 
1966, but did not quite bear fruit until developments of the successive two years refined 
the students’ analysis of the educational system in capitalist society. By 1966, however, 
the classical veneration of education was shattered; educational institutions were viewed 
as integral to society, and the principle feature that reflected this was the class system.  
The university in the “social factory” 
Urso highlights the idea of “rupture” as one of the uniting features of the early culture of 
operaismo and the student movement. As this dissertation has argued, operaismo was in 
part the product of the post-1956 political rupture with the official left. Urso identifies a 
similar political rupture with the student movement during the years 1967-8, as students 
rejected the traditional form and content of politics. The connective linkage between the 
two is that like the post-1956 rupture, the student movement signified the arrival of “new 
subjects” that filled “space left vacant by [traditional] politics” (1999, 13). The idea of 
rupture is a useful heuristic for unfolding other, more linear connections that unite the 
ideas of operaismo and the student movement. I do not think it is useful to determine the 
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causes of “rupture” for each case in order to demonstrate theoretical connection. Rather, 
it is more appropriate to discuss how the student movement utilized ideas expounded by 
variants within operaismo. The benefit of this approach is that it does not limit inquiry to 
cases that demonstrate a direct connection (i.e., Pisa). Rather, it allows for an 
examination of cases that have less direct connection with the workerists.  
 I want to now examine the connection between operaismo and the student 
movement by focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on the universities of Trento, 
Turin, and Pisa. The central theme of each is their development of an overall viewpoint 
with regards to the “social factory.” This is discerned by a loose understanding of the 
“social factory” to include such terms as “the Plan,” “despotism,” “social capital,” et 
cetera. Differences or variations in usage will be explained in terms of the university 
movement’s respective focus and theoretical expression.  
Trento 
The example from the University of Trento is anomalous to the Italian student movement, 
but more closely connected with other European university movements. As part of an 
initiative begun by progressive members of the Democratic Christian Party, the 
University of Trento established the first Institute of Social Science in Italy (Istituto 
superiore di scienze sociali). The intent of the policymakers was to form a professional 
school that would train a new cadre of social managers suited to the economic and 
political needs of neo-capitalism. A unique feature of Trento was that its student body 
overwhelmingly came from outside of the province; it was, in this sense, the first truly 
national university. Also, the working class background of the student population 
increased throughout the decade forming the vast majority by 1968 (Silj 1976). As a 
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product of the Center-Left politics of planning, the University of Trento signified the first 
attempt to construct a class of “social engineers.” Its novelty at a time when sociology 
was given scant attention88 was suggestive of the social transformations brought about in 
the “economic miracle” and the deeper economic-social formations of neo-capitalism.  
The two years preceding 1966 were marked at Trento by participation in the 
national protest against the GUI Plan or Bill number 2314 that were organized by the 
traditional student representative organizations and coordinated around the themes of the 
democratic university and educational reform. 89 The protests were largely directed 
towards the interests of the dominant political parties, as the traditional student 
organizations reflected the type of submission to party politics that the unions 
experienced during the 1950s. In the top-down conception of the “party-guide” that 
Panzieri had heavily criticized, the student protests in this period were frustrated by their 
subordination to electoral and party politics (Boato 1979, 118). By 1966 students at 
Trento proved willing to demonstrate their commitment to more participatory democratic 
methods as a more effective way to have their power levied in discussions over university 
matters. Thus, the initial phase of the movement at Trento was within the traditional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 While sociology had been introduced, as we saw above, on the fringes of the left in 
Montaldi, Alquati, and others, within the dominant intellectual culture sociology in Italy did not 
have much diffusion. And where it did, “[f]igures of thinkers and sociologists such as Weber and 
Mannheim, grand schools of theory like that of Frankfurt (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, etc.) 
for the most part they remained excluded from the Italian cultural horizon” (Balestrini and 
Moroni 1988, 205).  
 
89 Bill number 2314, or “Plan Gui,” which derived from Luigi Gui, the Minister of Public 
Instruction, who was responsible for the plan, focused on two essential reforms: the formation of 
training departments through specific lesson plans and the institution of three rankings of 
graduation, from one year diplomas to doctoral degrees.  
 
	   230	  
structures and organized according to the hierarchy and division of labor that existed 
between political parties, their cultural associations, and the electorate. 
 Following Urso, the year 1966 marked the beginning of the student’s rupture with 
the traditional form of politics and its contents. This rupture was initially expressed as a 
rejection of the student associations and parliamentary politics. In January the students 
occupied the school, opening a cycle of occupations and protests that lasted until 
November. The initial protest was against an attempt to divide the academic degree into 
political science and social science, but the implications of the protest soon went beyond 
the surface of this initial position. First, the protest began over the qualification of the 
student—against the division between political science and social science. At root, the 
students argued that this concerned the fundamentals of knowledge production and the 
role of sociology. Second, the occupation, as a tactic, went well beyond the protest 
methods of the traditional organizations and demonstrated the students’ proper force. The 
key aspect of the second occupation in November 1966 was the recognition by the 
student body that their political autonomy was essential to their struggle.  Third, the 
students developed a connection between the function of the university and the needs of 
the overall system. The isolated university did not exist; just as sociology was a “species 
of public intelligence,” the university was seen as intimately connected to society (in 
Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 209). In consequence, the students argued that the only way 
to change the university was to through society.  
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In their “Bilancio della seconda occupazione” [Assessment of the second 
occupation]90, the students indicated an early formulation of the connection between the 
university and society: “The Department of Sociology of Trento … is a fact that invests 
by itself, objectively, all of Italian civil society, and within this, the cultural, political, and 
union forces that are directly involved in the problem of socio-economic development of 
the country and in the existence of reform and requalification of the university structures” 
(Movimento studentesco1968, 37). The students understood the discipline of sociology as 
a “social operation” with “human and social obligation” central to its endeavor. The idea 
that the Sociology Department would produce social technicians and managers was 
contested by the students in terms of the limits of sociology as a technical function. In a 
similar spirit to Panzieri’s critique of the capitalist use of technology, the students at 
Trento began formulating a similar critique to the capitalist use of sociology and, by 
extension, to knowledge production and the role of the university in general.  
 Initially the idea of “scientific autonomy” was considered inseparable from the 
theme of university democracy. However, as the student movement began directing its 
contestation towards the social system, the focus on both autonomous knowledge 
production and university democracy became secondary factors to an examination of the 
role of the student and the university as situated within the capitalist system. The 
movement from Trento developed a critique of capitalism in terms of the commodity 
form as a systemic feature of capitalist relations. They did not believe that a socialist 
university was possible without a socialist society; the struggle had to confront the total 
system. They quaintly expressed the point in polemics with “reformists” that constructing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Originally published as La battaglia dei sociologi di Trento, Questitalia, IX, no. 102-
104 (settembre-novembre 1966): 138-44. Now in Movimento studentesco, Documenti della 
Rivolta Universitaria (Bari, 1968): 24-39.  
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a new university would only amount to the erection of a “ghetto of gold in a world of 
shit” (Rostagno 1968, 8).  
 We find the more developed theoretical expression from Trento in two 
documents, Appunti sulla Struttura Scolastica (Notes on the Scholastic Structure) and 
L’Uuniversità como Istituto Produttivo (The University as a Productive Institution) 
[Movimento studentesco 1968, 45-51; 51-61]. The documents are the result of the third 
occupation of the department, which was decided upon during a student assembly on 
January 31, 1968. The importance of this occupation was its emphasis on direct 
democracy and upholding the general assembly as the proper decision-making body 
through which the students organized seminars on topics of interest. The Appunti and 
L’Università were two of the more significant theoretical pieces that emerged from the 
student seminars.  
These essays critiqued the university and its function of commodity production in 
terms that paralleled the insights of early analysis in Quaderni Rossi. Usage of 
terminology such as “social capital,” introduced by Tronti and Panzieri, was already 
present in the student’s analysis. For them, the Center-Left was its political face and their 
university was an experiment in producing commodities well suited to the needs of social 
capital. Within the overall system, the university was considered to be a “nodal” but “not 
decisive” productive institution. Its function was subordinated to “more decisive centers 
of power,” rendering it as part of the “material structures of capital” but in a manner that 
had not yet been formulated (Ibid 60; see Ch. 2). In pointing beyond the university to 
those “decisive centers of power” the students expressed themselves in terms of power; 
“student power” was used to signify a “permanent contestation of the university structure 
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and of academic power, as an instrument of rupture of academic authoritarianism” (Ibid, 
60-1).91  
 The university, they found, fundamentally operated within the constraints of the 
“social factory.” Students expressed their “professional preparation” as a “social capital,” 
suited to the needs of a “bureaucratic business organization” (Ibid, 60). The university as 
a productive institution performed the function of cultivating labor-power both in the 
technical terms of its “qualification” and normatively through the transmission of goals 
and values. Of the leading values, schools imputed their students with the value of 
obedience, learning how to obey and how to take orders. The university, the classroom, 
the polity, family life, and the factory were all united in generating a certain form of 
passive obedience and readiness to execute others’ orders and commands. For capital, the 
need for a more highly educated labor-force was set against the need to ensure a specific 
type of training. The student’s expressed this contradiction in terms of mystification or 
ideology: “Capital needs to impede … the full critical comprehension of the … 
productive process and development of society” (Ibid, 49). In this understanding 
education was intimately subordinated to the productive process; education was viewed 
as contributing to the “valorization of labor-power,” with the qualification signifying an 
achievement towards those ends. However, educational training and application of such 
skills was controlled by the “authoritarian necessity of capital” that, “from a disposition 
of factors of production and of a division of labor subordinate to productive efficiency, 
that is to the logic of profit” (Ibid).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 During this period Boato notes the influence of German SDS and the “Black Power” 
movement in the United States, and others within the movement at Trento (1979, 24). 
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 The students identified the productive process as the key controlling factor that 
linked the university to society, and thus to the factory. In their more pointed 
investigation of the university, students at Trento examined in what ways the university 
could be considered a “productive institution.” The analysis situated the university within 
a broader system linking the goals of capital with the structure of power in society. Based 
on the assumption of the unification of international capital along with state intervention 
in terms of planning, they viewed the structure of power in society as being pulled to help 
Italian capital attain a quicker rate of accumulation and a competitive edge vis-à-vis its 
international competitors. The university, as part of this structure of power, was held 
responsible for producing commodities, qualified labor-power. They wrote: “[t]he scope 
of the productive institution (the university) is to position such commodity (student-
graduated) on the labor market until it will be sold, and insert it in the overall cycle of 
social reproduction until it will be consumed” (Ibid, 51). The educational process internal 
to the university was reduced to that of producing commodities. Research, classroom 
lessons, and examinations were all discussed in reductive terms, limiting the character of 
such to their utility for commodity production. For example, knowledge production was 
critiqued for its passive transmission as a point of teaching obedience; the examination 
procedure as a similar subjective process for discrimination on ideological or class 
grounds (things not consistent with the values of a useful commodity).92 Thus, the 
university became centered in the productive process for its role in a commodity system. 
Characterizing the university in neo-capitalist society they wrote: “its love is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Guido Viale, in his important article Contro l’università (Against the university), 
wrote: “the exams are the phenomenal form by which the university is present to the student-
worker: a police officer called, for this occasion, a teacher, who in 5-10 minutes liquidates the 
accused with a series of questions” (1968, 92).  
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commodity, the quality and quantity of the object (labor-power) to be a commodity, to 
function eternally as such” (Ibid, 56).  
 The university functioned to create qualified labor-power for the economic 
structure. Its role was subordinated to the “decisive centers of power,” but was also 
fundamentally a power structure within itself. The student body was the immediate 
subject of this power structure. What they characterized as “academic authoritarianism” 
reflected their marginal role in the institution; deprived of power, of voice, of inclusion in 
effective decision-making roles, they increasingly viewed the university as a repressive 
and controlling institute. Over the course of occupations and protests a more radical wing 
of the movement went beyond the “democratic, co-management, and reformist illusions” 
of the “democratic university.” In fact, in their rupture with the traditional student 
organizations was also a rupture with the institutions of capitalist society. However, 
consistent with the Panzieri’s distance from the Frankfurt School’s analysis, the students 
were not fatalistically depicting an objective situation defined by total control. Their 
political practice had taught them that they existed as a politically autonomous subject 
and were capable of producing a rupture with the capitalist system. Like the workers, the 
students as labor-power in formation, were capable of resistance and generating a degree 
of revolutionary force. 
 The claim “student power” (potere studentesco) served to organize students’ 
sentiment against academic authoritarianism. Its initial claim was an expression of the 
desire for a “permanent contestation of the university structure and academic power.” 
This “permanent contestation” was closely akin to both Panzieri’s usage of “permanent 
revolution” and to Tronti’s “revolutionary process,” albeit less theoretically developed. 
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Like Panzieri, the students understood revolution to be a permanent affair within a 
cultural contestation that centered on power relations within the capitalist system. This 
culture was evident in Panzieri’s depiction of a workers’ culture and connected more 
intimately to the role of worker’s inquiry as the origins of a process of constructing new 
worker’s cultural and organizational bodies. Both an autonomous culture of knowledge 
production and the role of inquiry were distinctive features of the movement at Trento.93 
(Tronti’s analysis was much more developed than the student’s own configuration and 
would only be developed later in Potere Operaio.) By 1968, the student movement at 
Trento began appraising the lack of political organization of the student struggle. The 
assembly with its practice of direct democracy (often expressed as “speaking in the first 
person”) was the basis of this approach, but autonomy now shifted away from the 
university and toward the political autonomy of the student movement. Thus, “student 
power” was formulated as the expression of the students as a politically autonomous 
subject that needed to be organized “based on the hypothesis of breaking actual structures 
(scholastic, economic, political) of the capitalist social system” (Ibid, 75). In this manner, 
the movement arrived as a political force that transcended the limits of the university to 
confront the total “system.”  
The overall position of Trento derived from understanding the power relations of 
economic planning, situating their own role within that planning, and establishing the 
theoretical and practical bases for contesting that planning. In doing such, their treatment 
of neo-capitalism, in terms of power relations, brought them into that part of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 As part of an attempt to enlarge their struggles and to forge deeper connections with 
“worker-students,” the movement at Trento utilized the technique of “Inquiry” practiced by QR. 
See “Inchiesta sugli studenti iscritti all’Istituto superiore di Scienze sociali di Trento” (“Inquiry 
on the students enrolled at the Superior Institute of Social Sciences at Trento”) [in Movimento 
studentesco 1968, 79-88].  
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workerist culture that focused on knowledge production from the base (workers inquiry), 
on capitalist use and control over labor-power, on the role of rupture, and on the basic 
identification of revolution as a process, as the product of a culture that permanently 
contests the capitalist system.  I now turn to a brief discussion of similar themes that were 
found in Turin.  
Turin 
The university movement at Turin paralleled Trento in significant ways. Here I want to 
focus on their understanding of the university and their connection with the working 
class. Turin, that peculiar “city-factory” that was the hallmark of neo-capitalist culture, 
represented a litmus test for the level of working class militancy in Italy. The city itself 
contained a significant working class culture, with Quaderni Rossi serving as one of the 
main actors outside of the official party and union organs. As such, Turin represented one 
of the more prominent examples where the original theoretical configuration of 
operaismo came into direct contact with the student movement.94 Its importance also 
derived from the fact that the leaders of the Turin movement were prominent militants in 
successive years. Luigi Bobbio, son of philosopher Noberto Bobbio (one of the drafters 
of the Constitution), was among the founders of Lotta Continua (Continuous Struggle, 
LC) in November 1969. Marco Revelli, son of an oral historian, had participated in class 
struggles since the events of July 1960. He, too, was a founder of Lotta Continua, as well 
as later contributing to the workerist journal Primo Maggio (May 1st) as a historian of the 
“other workers’ movement.” Beyond these two “sons of the bourgeois” who retained 
considerable importance in the extra-parliamentary left, there was Guido Viale, “the more 
original leader of the Italian 1968” (Cazzullo 2006, 22). Viale wrote one of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Pisa and Venice constituted similar cases (see below).  
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fundamental texts of the movement, Contro l’Università (Against the University). The 
movement at Turin was important for its emphasis on matters inside the university during 
the initial phase of its protest and for articulating the “detonator thesis” as the 
understanding of the role that students should play in a revolutionary class struggle.  
 The movement at Turin was born out of failures that stemmed from the attempt at 
having student participation within the college. Between 1963 and 1967 students had 
fought for representation on a permanent commission to deal with curriculum and general 
changes in the university as it adjusted to new social realities. The students won a 
consultative seat on the commission, but had no effective decision-making role. In 
February 1967, along with 11 other universities, the students occupied the college giving 
birth to the assembly as the only valid expression of student power. Like at Trento, the 
occupation marked the beginning of a series of occupations that culminated in the 
occupation of the Department of Letters in Palazzo Campana on November 27, 1967. 
This occupation set the tone for others throughout Italy. On the basis of Viale’s emphasis 
for the need to give content to these protests, the Turin students established a 
coordinating committee. The committee affirmed the sovereignty of the assembly as the 
constitutional basis for students’ power and founded subcommittees that introduced 
counter-courses as an alternative to what they considered the “repressive didactic” of the 
professors.95 Counter-courses demonstrated in practice that the movement had “overcome 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 The counter-courses were fundamental in affirming the principle that the university 
was the “university of the students.” It not only grounded their intellectual concerns but gave 
content to their power within the university. The counter-courses were based on collective 
readings of pertinent material and were structured democratically with discussion leaders 
operating on a rotational basis. Where technical expertise was involved the individual was solely 
appreciated for such knowledge and not given other accolades or titles. The difficulty that 
remained unresolved was how to coordinate the different commissions that were conducting the 
counter-courses (Movimento studentesco 1968, 227-30).  Typical of other experiences with 
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the abstract political line” of their early protest and began to construct possible 
alternatives (Movimento studentesco 1968, 227). Thus, the occupation marked a two-fold 
purpose: to reject the “academic authoritarianism” of the university and to establish an 
alternative.96  
 The basis of this alternative resided in the establishment of “structural spaces” 
within the university. Anticipating the practice of social centers and “liberated spaces” 
that developed in the mid-1970s, students found in this theme the key to beginning a 
“complete restructuring of the university” (Bobbio 1967, 224).  The need for “space” in 
the university expressed the strategic need to actualize the demand for student power, as 
the basis for combating their “social subordination” as students: the seminars and 
counter-courses provided an initial example of the potential in changing pedagogy 
towards a more self-determined research program; they provided the space for 
investigating new forms of the university; and they allowed for students to construct a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
student seminars, they formed groups to investigate international politics and imperialism in Latin 
America and Vietnam:  “the function and work of philosophy (on Marcuse); School and society; 
the pedagogy of dissent; Cinema and society; The youth and protest; Minority groups; capitalist 
development in Italy after 1960; the division of labor; the contents and methods of Humanities 
Departments; the right to study; Science Department commission; and Psychoanalysis and social 
repression” (Ibid, 229).  
 
96 Regarding the important theme of “academic authoritarianism” it is important to note 
that they were referring not only to didactic, but also to the roots of such authoritarian relations.  
Deriving their argument from the “social factory” thesis, Luigi Bobbio and Guido Viale wrote: 
“[t]he social system of advanced capitalism increasingly takes the form of a network of 
totalitarian institutions aimed at the total control and domination of the persons subject to it … 
Authoritarianism in a neo-capitalist world is not a hangover from feudalism; it is the fundamental 
form of class domination, to which all social institutions are subordinated” (1968, 222). The 
Turin movement was significant in its emphasis that these relations were based on consent: “The 
roots of academic authoritarianism, as all forms of authoritarian power, do not reside only from a 
series of institutional and structural relations, but reside above all in the consent of those who are 
subjected to such power. The university is organized in a way to create and conserve this 
consensus; that is, in a way of maintaining the students in a state of passivity and division. It is 
this that we intend to say when we affirm that the authoritarian didactic is a form of violence 
exercised on the students” (“Didattica e repressione,” Documento diffuso dal comitato 
d’agitazione, in Movimento studentesco 1968, 261-271).  
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platform of claims that went towards the formation of objectives for a mass movement 
(Ibid). Thus, the initial upshot of the idea of “structural spaces” was, on the one hand, a 
strategic move designed to provide the spaces for organizing contestation against the 
university structure and the general apparatus of “social subordination.” On the other 
hand, it offered the real possibility of changing the professional preparation and 
pedagogy of particular disciplines.  
These proposals were set forth in the seminar dedicated the restructuring of the 
Humanities Department, Carta Rivendicativa per la ristrutturazione delle Facoltà 
Umanistiche (Demands for the restructuring of the Humanities Department) [Movimento 
studentesco 1968, 253-260]. Here the students demonstrate their rejection of the college’s 
“professional predetermination” by insisting, “the university should, and can, furnish to 
those who attend it both an adequate professional preparation and critical instruments 
regarding the professional role” (Ibid, 253). At the same time the students needed to 
establish the means by which they could become a governing body, to organize 
themselves on “autonomous bases … entirely independent from the post assigned them” 
in the university and the social structure (Ibid, 255). Practice, however, overcame these 
strategic proposals. On December 28th police entered Palazzo Campana, dispersing 
students. Two weeks later students reoccupied the Palazzo only to be violently broken up 
by police on January 23. However, the implications were profound: after the 28th students 
lost sight of their need for “structural spaces” as the counter-courses collapsed and they 
assumed a more direct confrontation with the professor’s power (now considered a “class 
enemy”). Like the experience at Trento, the Turin students invented the sciopero bianco 
(the white strike): students invaded classrooms and disrupted professors’ lectures 
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demanding that they address the concerns of the students. This was only one aspect of a 
deeper politicization of the movement that increasingly focused its attack on established 
authority.  
After the experience of police violence their conception of authoritarianism turned 
towards the state apparatus and the overall “system.”97 The university became a center for 
a broader “class conflict,” with the occupation serving the general political interests of 
the students in blocking the functioning of the system. The counter-courses were lost, the 
autonomy of the movement rendered ineffective in the face of political isolation vis-à-vis 
the working class, and the student movement was stuck between the need to conserve 
itself while expanding its political understanding. The issues grappled with during the 
struggles of 1967 culminated in the most important document to emerge from the Turin 
movement, Guido Viale’s Contro l’università (1968).98  
Against the university offered a concise summarization of a phase of struggle at 
Turin. For the movement at Turin, the university was viewed in terms of power, which 
also provided the connective tissue between the university and society. The power 
apparatus of the university reflected “other repressive apparatus in society,” including the 
police, the media, the family, and the “economic blackmail” exercised by the capitalist 
function of profit (Ibid, 97-8). Ideologically, the university was charged with performing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97  Carlo Donolo’s interpretation of the student movement, “La politica ridefinita,” 
appeared in Quaderni Piacentini in the July 1968 edition. He summarized the changing contents 
of the movement’s use and understanding of the term “authoritarianism” as such: “it is the term 
that denounces the logic of society completely mediated by the dominant interests and that 
utilizes to its advantage the repressive functions of pre-capitalist, bourgeois, and technocratic 
institutions. It allows for a political interpretation of internalized repression, from the subliminal 
institutional violence as well as that which is explicit and material” (1968, 124).  
 
98  Twenty thousand copies of Contro l’università were printed and distributed to 
universities throughout Italy. Initially published in Quaderni Piacentini in February 1968, it has 
been reprinted in two anthologies (Università 1968; Fofi and Giacopini 1998; 2008).  
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the social function of “political manipulation” as a mechanism of cooptation in service of 
the dominant class. Particular to the analysis that derived from Turin, the student’s 
“social capital”—their professional preparation—was considered as a mechanism of 
control in so far as it was nothing more than “psychological conditioning” (Ibid, 85). For 
Viale and the Turin movement, the university  
tends to instill in them [the students] a spirit of subordination to power and cancels, in the 
psychic and mental structures of each of them the collective dimension of personal 
existence and the capacity of having relations with those near them that are not of a 
purely competitive character (Ibid, 85-6).  
 
This psychological dimension of university repression was evident in the traditional view 
of the “ivory tower” isolated from worldly affairs, combined with a ritualistic practice of 
learning that considered research to be conducted on ancestors worthy of veneration as 
santi prottetori (holy protectors). For them, in a world that had become more unified 
through the general planning function of neo-capitalist society, it was inconceivable that 
academic culture and knowledge production should be separate from the world they were 
confronting. In this manner, they critiqued the reformist elements that wanted to 
democratize the university within the current institutional arrangements. Against this they 
claimed the importance of constructing “structural space” in order to determine their own 
educational pursuits. But this conception of autonomy was tenuous as long as it lacked 
any connection with other sources of power in Italian society. The question of the student 
movement’s relation to other potentially antagonistic or revolutionary forces remained 
unclear until the renewal of the workers’ struggle at Fiat’s Mirafiori plant in 1968-9.  
The essay concluded with important self-criticisms and premonitions for the 
difficulties facing the movement. The occupation was seen as the result of assembly 
decisions that very few students actually participated in and this separation increased as 
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the movement became more political. The result was an excessive reliance on “leaders”99 
of the movement who considered themselves as asserting the more advanced expression 
of struggle. As we will see below, this generated a cleavage between those deemed 
“revolutionary” and those deemed “reformist.” The hierarchical culture of “leaders” lent 
no small hand in generating factional polemics. 
The movement at Turin was subject to external criticism on the very basis that it 
lived in the center of neo-capitalist culture. The Turin movement understood the role of 
the student in a general schema of revolutionary politics as providing a “detonator” to the 
actual revolutionary class, the workers. To the chagrin of workerist currents in the Pisa 
movement and around Negri’s group in Veneto, they insisted on a university-centered 
focus (Cazzullo 2006, 23-4). The student as a “detonator” assumed that the “university 
can put a mechanism in motion that can put the system in crisis, marking the beginnings 
of a revolutionary process (Boato 1979, 179).100 Within Quaderni Rossi at Turin, Vittorio 
Rieser noted that the student movement should operate as a “political stimulus” to the 
working class “as an example of long and open struggle that is considered necessary also 
at the workers’ level” (quoted in Rossanda 1968, 126). While I discuss in the next section 
the question of student-worker relations in revolutionary struggle and unpack the slogan 
of “student-worker unity” that dominated the successive wave of struggle, it is important 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 “The most negative aspect” of leaders in the student movement, Boato, remarked a 
decade later, was that “from this collective enterprise, from a mass movement, the overwhelming 
majority of comrades remained “in the background,” they were expropriated from their product 
and from their collective experience. From this “background” emerged the “representative 
figure,” with a mechanism that functioned like the same expropriation and alienation of the 
masses from their own history (1979, 24-5).  
 
100 Within the Italian movement, the idea of the student movement as the “detonator” of a 
revolutionary class politics took on added importance after the French May (Wright 2002, 100; 
Bologna and Daghini 1968).  
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here to note that by early 1968 the student movement had generated a critique of the 
university that led them increasingly beyond from the immediate problems internal to 
university towards social structures of repression and domination, particularly the factory 
and the working class. While the student movement was in a period of uncertain change, 
the fundamental need to maintain its continuity along with its theoretical analyses led the 
movement towards society and the working class. Before turning to that important 
question, I first examine the case of the Pisan student movement as the most direct 
expression of workerist theory within the university struggles.  
Pisa 
The student movement at Pisa exemplified the most direct incorporation of workerist 
theory to explaining the student condition and the role of the university in capitalist 
planning. Part of the reason for this connection was the significant presence around Pisa 
of political parties and groups; old Morandian elements in the Psiup, left-wing influences 
in the PCI associated with Lucio Colletti, and direct experiences and connections with 
Quaderni Rossi all circulated in the political culture at Pisa—decisive factors in 
subsequent years with the rise of the extra-parliamentary left. A second explanation for 
the influence of workerist thought stems from the industrialization of the region and the 
particular historical memory of the workers’ culture in that process. Situated along the 
coast of the Mediterranean Sea, Pisa is couched between La Spezia and Livorno. While 
the latter had its own significance as the sight of the founding Congress of the 
Communist Party in 1921, the region was industrially centered in Massa and Carra, just 
north of Pisa. The worker’s culture contained strong anarchist, socialist, and communist 
elements with a vibrant memory of the Resistance, a period when factories were turned 
	   245	  
into arms depots and subsequently destroyed by the fleeing Germans. “At Massa,” 
Luciano Della Mea writes, there was “a profound tie between a Resistance substantially 
“betrayed” in its values, in its hopes, in its early conquests soon overturned, and the new 
worker insurgency sustained by the youth of a new generation” (1998, 9-10). 
 This aspect of Pisan worker’s culture made its way into the broader culture of the 
dissident left after a young man confronted the elder Togliatti at Pisa’s elite school, the 
Scuola Normale Superiore. In March 1964, PCI leader Palmiro Togliatti addressed the 
problem of Italian political parties, and the democratic legitimacy of the Communist 
Party, to the student body. At the end of the discussion, a young student, Adriano Sofri, 
confronted the aging communist leader: Sofri demanded, “Why have you not tried to 
make the revolution?” Taken aback by the young “arrogant kid with a nasally voice,” 
Togliatti shouted back: “You try and make the revolution!”101 This small event was 
unsurprising. As a student, Sofri worked on a thesis on Gramsci and circulated within the 
currents of dissident socialist and communist politics. At Pisa, Sofri organized 
conferences that brought Lelio Basso, a left-wing member of the PSI and later Psiup, 
Raniero Panzieri, and others to the university. Morevoer, Sofri, along with GianMario 
Cazzaniga and Luciano Della Mea (both students and members of the Psiup), had, during 
the winter of 1963-4, frequented reunions of Quaderni Rossi in Turin. Sofri also had 
contacts with Classe Operaia, attending the founding reunion at Florence (December 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 The best discussion of this event is in Rina Gagliardi, “L’Impossibilità di essere 
Normale: Sofri e l’occupazione di Pisa,” Il Manifesto n. 22, January 1988, supplement “1968 
January.” Now reprinted in Adriano Sofri: il ’68 e il Potere operaio pisano, pp. 237-243. The 
depiction of Sofri is from Aldo Cazzullo, I Ragazzi che volevano fare la rivoluzione, p. 7.  
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1963) and subsequent meeting of CO at Piombino (May 1964).102 It was also during this 
period that Sofri began personal, direct contact with Panzieri. The latter was central to 
Sofri’s political development and understanding of himself as a radical (Tarrow 1989, 
244). Panzieri’s allure for the Pisan students went beyond his politics: Cazzullo writes 
that “[t]hey were much more impressed … with his personal story, his distanced position 
(posizione appartata), his moralism … [of] the necessity to make correspond proclaimed 
principles and practical behaviors” (2006, 9). Beyond this, Panzieri’s ideas found a 
receptive audience. He introduced them to the writings of Pollock, Adorno, and Marx’s 
Grundrisse. From these writings, Panzieri left his imprint on the young Pisan students as 
they embraced some of the central themes of operaismo: the “social factory” of neo-
capitalism, the critique of technology, capitalist planning, and revolutionary politics as 
essentially an affair of the most developed countries (Michelucci 1998, 43). These themes 
remained alive in Pisa through the construction of Potere operaio pisano (Pisan Workers’ 
Power), a small organization founded by Sofri that should not be confused with the 
similarly named group in Veneto-Emilia (POv-e). By the time the student movement 
matured as a serious force both in the schools and in society, Sofri’s group played a 
hegemonic role in Pisa.  
 Like other universities throughout Italy, Pisa’s student movement came into being 
as part of the national campaign against the proposed university reform (GUI). In the 
winter of 1966 various student movement leaders planned to organize an occupation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Although Sofri’s name appears on the third issue of Classe Operaia in 1964, his article 
was not published in the journal and he appears never to have had any serious political ties to the 
review, despite Vettori’s assertion to the contrary (1973, 23). Michelucci, basing his argument 
from Cazzaniga’s claims, noted that “Sofri and the group from Pisa (Cazzaniga and Della Mea) 
were never politically tied to Tronti’s magazine and they continued to maintain ties with the 
editors of Quaderni Rossi” (1998, 43).  
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the Sapienza at Pisa. The Sapienza was the sight of the Department of Jurisprudence and 
the school’s library. Built during the Renaissance, it was a symbol of ancient veneration 
that pointed to the construction of new leaders in an atmosphere of disinterested 
knowledge. Like the purpose of prominent universities such as the Scuola Normale 
Superiore, the Cattolica at Milan, and the Institute for Social Sciences at Trento, the 
Sapienza operated on the assumption of training the future leaders in order to control the 
“long period of democratic evolution” (Movimento studentesco pisano 1998, 252). The 
occupation of Pisa’s Sapienza from February 7-11, 1967 quickly became a point of 
reference to the national student movement for three reasons: its theoretical elaboration, 
its declaration of an official rupture with the official student movement, and its political 
contents.  
Towards the end of the occupation a group of students began drafting a document 
in order to give a formal position to the occupation. The resulting Tesi della Sapienza 
(Sapienza Theses) laid out the most formidable application of workerist theory within the 
student movement.103 The document itself should be read as part of a debate within the 
left wing of the UGI (Unione Goliardica Italiano). The latter had already recognized, in 
its Congress at Naples in 1966, the role of the student within the university as “labor-
power in qualification” (Tesi del Congresso Ugi di Rimini 1966). The importance of the 
Pisan Theses was to make the connection between education as the qualification and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The original title of the document was “Progetto di Tesi del sindacato studentesco,” 
and while it was a collective project, the authorship has been principally attributed to GianMario 
Cazzaniga, Vittorio Campione, and Umberto Carpi (Massari 1998, 216). Later it became better 
known as the Tesi della Sapienza, and was first published in “Riforma o rivoluzione 
universitaria,” Il Mulino, 16: 369-91, and later in “Cronache e documenti del movimento 
studentesco,” Nuovo Impegno, 8: 19-37; Massari Adriano Sofri: il ’68 e il Potere operaio pisano, 
pp. 216-236; and Università: l’ipotesi rivoluzionaria, 165-185 (citations refer to the latter 
reprint).  
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training labor-power to the capitalist mechanism operative within the university. That is, 
the particular phase of capitalist society necessitated the university to enact a particular 
form of production of future labor-power. In this process the student’s role was directly 
placed within the cycle of capitalist reproduction. The movement from Naples objected to 
this position on the grounds that this argument demonstrated no connection between the 
student movement and the actual, direct valorization of capital. The position from Naples 
derived from their reading of Marx’s “theory of surplus-value.” The Napoli movement 
argued that role of students in capitalist society did not lend itself to the production of 
surplus-value, as the students did not exchange with capital, and any money given to 
them for study was considered as a “form of income.” As such, the “student condition 
does not present the fundamental characteristic of the working class, economic alienation, 
and thus the student is not identifiable as a social figure internal to the working class” 
(Sinistra Universitaria 1968, 153-4). Conversely, it was precisely this expansion of class-
capital relations that the Tesi confronted and sought to overcome by demonstrating how 
capitalist society determined and controlled the formation of the student as labor-power 
in formation.  
The Tesi went beyond the reductionist logic that identified the working class 
within the immediate and direct process of the valorization of capital; they extended the 
so-called “fundamental characteristics” of capitalism to include the cycle of capital’s 
reproduction. This position derived from the workerist approach to the “organic 
composition of capital” as well as drawing the consequences of this analysis to the role of 
the student and the university within an international division of labor under an 
imperialist system. Utilizing the “social factory” thesis of Panzieri and Tronti, the Tesi 
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began its analysis by identifying the shifts in the organic composition of capital that 
increased the power of “constant capital” vis-à-vis “variable capital.” These changes to 
the structure of capital “have determined … an expanding centralization of capital … that 
implies an expanding control and more centralized world market” (1967, 169). As a 
result of the increases in power and control of capital, the labor market and the 
international division of labor evinced the “first form of [capitalist] planning”: “a 
stabilization of the international labor market in terms of a growing authoritarian 
centralization; that is, of despotic control on the availability of labor-power in the area of 
organized capitalism and the rape of underdeveloped areas” (Ibid, 170). These shifts in 
the organic composition of capital led the Pisan movement to reject the reductionist 
equation that limited the composition of the working class to the direct production of 
surplus value. Instead, they shifted the terrain of working class towards a focus on the 
international division of labor and capital’s “despotic control” and “planning” of work.  
Two points are notable in the Pisa theses: the role of the university and the student 
within the international division of labor and the role of the university and the student 
with respect to the social mechanism of capital. We have seen in previous university 
movements a focus on the latter via the qualification of labor. However, the 
distinctiveness of the Pisa Theses was that it located the university and student within the 
reproduction of capital by analyzing these features through the division of labor. Against 
the position from Naples, the Pisa group argued that an understanding of capitalist 
production must view the university as a long-term social productive cost: “the school is 
configured at this level [capitalist planning] as the place of production of qualified labor-
power and comes back into play as a social cost in the expanded cycle of the 
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reproduction of capital” (Ibid, 176 emphasis added). Here “social capital” confronted the 
problem that in order to control the availability of labor-power (i.e., the labor market), its 
power must extend to the “entire arch of development of labor-power,” from the 
university (i.e., formation, training, and qualification) to the final phase of capitalist use 
of labor-power (Ibid, 171-2). In this manner, the “social factory” thesis pointed the way 
to an understanding of “class composition” that went beyond the immediate point of 
production and direct process of the working class valorization of capital.  
In order to highlight the social mechanism of capital in the university, the Pisa 
Theses argued for the inclusion of the capitalist division of work as essential to 
understanding class composition. The student was defined as internal to the working 
class, however, not based on a future positioning within the division of labor, but based 
on their current or actual role of intellectual work. This particular and technical feature of 
labor, which was notably missing in the workerist focus on the “mass worker,” was 
viewed as the subject of the capitalist mechanism of control inside the university: “in his 
university activity, in which the capitalist division of intellectual work is defined 
immediately in terms of the mental execution of processes and of predetermined and 
fragmented experiences,” the student is part of the working class (Ibid, 177). Thus, the 
student condition was understood in terms of their role as intellectual labor subjected to 
capitalist despotism. Moreover, within society the student was viewed as a “socially 
subordinated figure,” which operated on the “margins of the process of valorization” 
(Ibid). As Wright correctly notes, the Pisa movement, with its innovative use of the 
“social factory” analysis, remained divided between the findings of this approach and the 
more traditional focus on the direct point of production (2002, 95).  
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The theoretical elaboration of the Tesi connected the movement’s concerns over 
their role in the university and the contestation of academic authoritarianism to the 
capitalist mechanism of control. Through the latter, they connected their subordinate role 
inside the university with a more general political struggle directed against the capitalist 
use of labor-power. Previous analyses of the university within the capitalist system (see 
Trento and Turin above) tended to generically identify the university as a place of 
capitalist control simply by the fact that the institution existed within capitalist society. 
The Pisa Theses, however, applied an analysis of the role of the university within the 
actual historic situation and phase of capitalist development—its role in the international 
division of labor, the function of intellectual labor, and the view of the school within 
social capital’s planning function as a form of social investment. In doing such, the Tesi, 
while advancing a narrow functionalist argument of the university to the exigencies of the 
labor market, connected the university to capitalist planning in such a manner as to locate 
the student condition within the working class. Thus, they viewed the class relation not 
merely as a relation between the worker and capitalist exploiter, but more fundamentally 
against the entire social organization of capitalist production and reproduction. This 
analysis theoretically established the basis for a more advanced prospect of revolutionary 
struggle within the “social factory” thesis. However, to the extent that they did not move 
beyond the position of productive labor as the core feature of class composition, they 
faltered in articulating a theory of revolutionary class politics that would incorporate not 
only the production of capital, but also the broader cycle of capitalist reproduction.  
 As an initial theme for constructing a revolutionary politics, the Tesi advocated 
the formation of a student union to replace the traditional bodies of student 
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representation. The basis for such a union resided in the student participation in the 
assemblies, cementing these organisms as the effective bodies of student’s political 
claims. The overarching goal of the union was put as guaranteeing the “contracts for all 
aspects of student life,” and laid the organizational basis for connecting student struggles 
with the workers’ struggles. The connection between workers and students was 
established on the grounds of social capital with the latter entering into the working class 
as the “first moment of the capitalist use of labor-power” (Tesi della Sapienza1976, 184). 
But at his point students were politically isolated. Their view of the “historic left” 
reflected the position within operaismo that the unions were “backwards” and operated 
along “nationalistic lines” that fought for contractual gains within the workings of social 
capital (Ibid, 170). The political parties, particularly the PCI, were considered social-
democratic and judged as historically moving away from a Marxist analysis towards an 
attempt to legitimize themselves within the system of representative democracy. As a 
result of this political isolation, and also a product of their inability put a satisfactory end 
to the question of productive labor, the movement at Pisa proposed the “generalized 
salary” (salario generlizzata) as a student demand. As a step away from the broader 
configuration of the “social factory,” this demand connected the students to the working 
class by means of defining university study as salaried work.  
This demand was part of a broader affinity that had been developing in Pisa 
during the winter of 1966-67 as students began agitating with workers in factories 
throughout the region. The role of Potere operaio pisano (Worker’s Power of Pisa), and 
particularly that of Adriano Sofri, was important in forming bridges between the two 
sectors. In February 1967, Sofri along with students from Pisa, a smaller group of 
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workers and activists from Piombino and Cecina, and workers from Massa, formed the 
journal Il Potere Operaio di Pisa. Sofri was responsible for including the workers, as he 
was directly involved in the factories at Massa where, after 1964, he held a university 
position.104 Within the group at Pisa these connections with the workers’ struggles put 
forth the need to clarify the basis upon which the students were considered to be part of 
the working class. In this sense the “generalized salary” offered the answer to those who 
still maintained that the production of surplus value was the fundamental signifier for 
inclusion in the working class.  
As a strategic maneuver, the demand for a student’s salary was meant to enlarge 
their configuration within working class politics while also addressing the concern over 
the “right to study.” Thus, on the one hand, the students would be connected to the 
production of surplus value insofar as they would receive a salary and that would be 
universally applicable. On the other hand, it touched upon a central theme of student 
protest, the classist nature of the school system. As early protests focused on the material 
obstacles for working class students to university study, the idea of a generalized salary 
established a basis by which the movement could confront the classist element of the 
university. However, the overriding goal of this strategy was to enlarge the movement’s 
appeal. In no small part the proposal of a generalized salary sought to mobilize workers 
and student-workers, dependent workers with school-age children, and young workers 
excluded from the possibility of school (Il Potere Operaio 1968, 10). In short, the demand 
for the generalized salary served the two-fold purpose of seeking actual material 
improvements for students’ lives and as a rallying point by which to generalize the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 For an excellent discussion of this period and the formation of Potere Operaio di Pisa, 
see Michellucci (1998, 55-63) and Betrozzi (1980, 167-77).  
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student struggle beyond the university, while also maintaining a modicum of themes 
pertinent to the university condition. Its advancement, like that of the general position of 
the Pisa movement, pointed to a more serious problem within the student movement: its 
political isolation and, particularly, its ambiguous relationship with the working class. As 
Vittorio Rieser pointed out in his criticism of the generalized salary, the focus on 
immediate objectives that required an overthrow of the system pointed to a belief in the 
movement that the “masses” were “not politically mature enough for a revolutionary 
struggle in the long term without immediate conquests” (in Boato 1973, 192). At best the 
“concrete objective,” Rieser claimed, would produce a struggle that claims to be 
revolutionary but “sans la savoir” (Ibid, 192). In fact, the example form Pisa 
demonstrated what other student struggles in Italy were soon to learn: the students 
overwhelming reliance on social actors external to the university. We turn now to the 
important question of student-worker unity, which was the dominant theme of the student 
movement leading up to the explosion of the “hot autumn” in the fall of 1969.  
Student-worker unity 
Student-worker unity derived from the expansion and politicization of the student 
movement. It found roots in the theoretical elaboration that tied the university within 
power relations of the social system. In terms of the “social factory,” the line that most 
fully adhered to a workerist approach came out of Pisa. But this analysis oscillated 
between its understanding of the student in the process of capitalist reproduction—
professional formation, qualification—and its identification with the direct process of 
production—waged labor—as the primary subject of working class revolution. The 
positions at Trento and Turin also evinced the same generalization: the totalizing nature 
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of neo-capitalism was the central premise of the student movement’s development from 
the more localized struggles in the university to the more general social struggle. In this 
manner, the “existential ambiguity” of the youth became resolved, in part, by their 
struggle against the social system. The positive content of this revolt occurred in the act 
of protest; occupations, counter-courses, “white strikes,” and assemblies were self-
determined acts that constituted a new understanding of the “self.”105 The more mature 
expression of this appeared in the slogan “student power.”   
By the winter of 1967-1968 “student power” signified the need for a mass 
movement to contest the power dynamic of neo-capitalist social relations and the politics 
of planning. The student movement was notable for its rejection of bureaucratic top-down 
authority, which resulted in the movement rejecting any form of institutional mediation—
refusing such approaches as “co-management” and representative forms of 
“participation” (Boato 1979, 206-7). Like the “movement of the base” that came to 
fruition in early operaismo and radical sociology, the student movement preferred, for the 
most part, to take the struggle directly to the workers. At best, the students viewed their 
role in a revolutionary class politics as a “partial force in absence of other organized 
forces” (Rostagno 1968, 171). This commitment to revolutionary mass struggle that 
defined their political obligation, tied to their acceptance of a dissident left’s emphasis on 
the workers as a revolutionary force, opened the way to establish ties between the 
workers and the students.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Mauro Rostagno characterized the assembly at Trento as such: “The logic of the 
assemblies is that of “becoming what you are” (1968, 14). The act of defining oneself in direct 
social interaction and participation reflects the existential current that runs through the youth of 
this period. Such claims of authenticity in revolutionary praxis did not materialize in subsequent 
years. As the next chapter illustrates, the existential critique became a marginalized position once 
the “hot autumn” pressed forward with the rise of the extra-parliamentary groups.   
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This process was not without its contradictions or antiquated baggage. Below, I 
focus on the attempt by the student movement to forge a method of social struggle, based 
on forms of organization and struggle that the students had developed in the preceding 
years. The importance of this student-worker unity is in the generalization of working 
class struggle to include areas of capitalist production and reproduction. The basic 
contradiction that the Pisans were unable to resolve—the connection between labor at the 
direct process of production (as giving value to capital) and labor-power in 
qualification—permeated the struggles that followed. Importantly, however, this 
expansive identification of “class composition” was reflected in the more diffuse nature 
of anti-capitalist social struggle.106 Thus, the slogan of student-worker unity reflected a 
greater understanding of working class struggle that enveloped not only the factory, but 
also found its place in neighborhoods, hospitals, consumer acts, educational systems, and, 
ultimately, in political organization. The essential component of this working class 
analysis began from the workerist premise that only from the base, at the mass level, 
could a revolutionary class politics occur. In this manner, the initial approach towards the 
workers derived from the students’ own experience of direct democracy, in the form of 
assemblies that defined, for them, the constitutive power of their social subjectivity. The 
student movement hoped that the same affirmation of their existence could serve as the 
basis for workers’ radicalization.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Negri is perhaps the more prominent figure that later interpreted this class phenomena 
through the concept of the “diffuse factory” with its central social subject defined as the “social 
worker.” It is interesting to note that Negri’s interpretation was an attempt to impose his 
understanding of the social factory and class politics on the student movement that, in 
fundamental ways, was responsible for generalizing theoretical analyses that stemmed from the 
workerist tendency in the Italian left (see discussion of Veneto-Emilia below and chapter 6).  
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In this last section of the chapter, I discuss the phenomena of student-worker unity 
in the birth of the factory committees at Trento; the origins student-worker relations at 
Pisa, the novel Comitati Unitario di Base at Pirelli in Milan, the workers militancy during 
the summer of 1968 at Montedison in Porto Marghera, and the renewal of labor conflict 
at Fiat in Turin. These activities established the groundwork for the expansion of working 
class revolt in subsequent years. Often termed as their strisciante maggio (creeping 
May)107, the attempts at forging bridges between the worker and student movements was 
more like a process of long, patient work that reflected the culmination of a decade of 
dissident communist and socialist theory and practice combined with the political 
commitment of a new generation of revolutionaries.  
The first experiment of this kind emerged at Trento with the establishment of 
factory committees through the intervention of the local student movement. During the 
winter of 1967-68, students from Trento began intervening in factories in order to forge 
linkages between the two struggles leading to the generalization of a method for political 
struggle. The initial phase of work consisted in student intervention at the factory level 
that dealt with the daily struggles of the workers inside the factory. At factories such as 
Serica and Nastrificio of Rovereto these initial contacts soon moved forward to 
emphasizing the nature of working class autonomy. Reflecting the workerist position, the 
students put forward propaganda that pointed to the necessity of workers adopting a “type 
of logic” that understood a commitment to struggle premised on the rejection of “being 
objects” with respect to the organizations of class and capital and to “assume the role of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 107  The phrase “creeping May” was coined by Emilio Reyneri in his “Il ‘Maggio 
Strisciante’: L’inizio della mobilitazione operaia” (1978). The “creeping May” was intended to 
“counterpose the Italian situation to the French … giving the image of a gradual process deprived 
of the most violent exploding moments which destroyed the old system of industrial relations and 
profoundly changed the social and political system” (Ibid, 54).  
	   258	  
subjects” (Università 1968, 72). One manner in which this was implemented took place 
in the practice of only speaking in the first person during department assemblies. This 
facilitated the establishment of workers’ committees—at the department and factory 
level—by those more “aware and political” (Ibid, 74). Within two months student 
intervention had been successful in establishing organizational expressions of workers’ 
autonomy through the erection of factory committees. From these early forms of 
autonomous organization, the workers then made political advancements by moving from 
an initial focus on the individual factory condition and the class struggle inside of it to the 
national plan of capital and then to a consideration of the European class struggle (Ibid, 
75).  
These advancements were complimented by to a solidification of workers’ direct 
power inside of the factory. Workers were increasingly demonstrating their unity in the 
face of bureaucratic management—in both the union and the company. The experience of 
self-managed struggle was the first step in establishing a deeper awareness of their 
potential for power and control. As part of their intervention in the factories, the students 
at Trento introduced a dialogue around the need to contest the entire logic of the system. 
The basis for this was completely within the framework of autonomous organization as 
an expression of power from the bottom: “…This choice of deliberately contesting the 
system, outside of the traditional channels of manifesting disagreement which are 
allowed by the bourgeois state, that puts the movement and all its articulations in a 
subversive position, outside the possibility of integration” (Movimento studentesco 
trentino 1968, 76). Like the critique that had developed during the university struggles, 
the Trento students ultimately sought to instill the workers’ struggle with that “effective 
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tie” between the two movements, the “condition of the worker as a commodity” (Ibid, 
77). Through practice and propaganda workers had begun viewing the student-worker 
relations through the commodity nature of the class-capital relationship. As such, the 
students introduced a discourse on “social capital” that highlighted the “fundamentally 
totalitarian nature of the capitalist social system” which required that workers begin a 
“conscious refusal … to be a productive machine in the boss’s hands” (Ibid).  
This first phase of student-worker unity witnessed the student movement bringing 
their political struggle to the working class. The key innovation resided in the impulse for 
direct democracy, the rejection of productivist norms, the organization of workers’ 
committees at the departmental level and at the factory level, the role of rupture in 
revolutionary class politics, and the connection between students and workers around the 
commodity nature of capitalist social relations. The students described their work as part 
of a long “patient work” of revolutionary organization and struggle. But with factory 
struggles coming to an end in July 1968, the movement at Trento underwent substantial 
modification. However, its initial work in facilitating the creation of and organizing 
factory commissions set the tone for developments elsewhere.  
At Pisa initial student intervention in workers’ struggles began during the March 
1966 metal-mechanics’ contractual affairs at Massa where they focused on propaganda 
by distributing bulletins to the workers advocating claims beyond the union demands to 
include a reduction of the work day from 48 to 40 hours with a minimum salary increase 
of ten thousand lire a month for all (Bertozzi 1980, 285). From the position of future core 
of Il Potere Operiaio, this claim was the unique and immediate manner in which the 
workers’ could begin to attain better living conditions. The struggle ended with the 
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unions signing an unsatisfactory agreement. At this point the intervention of students and 
militants in Potere operaio extended their propaganda beyond the division between the 
base and union bureaucracy to include an analysis of technological progress and capitalist 
planning. The metal-mechanics workers at such companies as Riv, Dalmive, and Olivetti 
continued the strike and began the process of self-organization that allowed for continued 
contacts with the students activists. This intervention also demonstrated that the workers 
were willing to strike and act outside of the contractual struggle.  
The demand “less work and more pay” (meno lavoro e più soldi)  was the basis on 
which the students sought to forge linkages with the workers through lending support to 
their struggles while also attempting to radicalize the workers’ demands. The following 
year interventions in the Olivetti factory in Ivrea produced some successes in expanding 
working class consciousness. The significance of this intervention was that it went 
beyond student support and distribution of pamphlets to the establishment of the journal 
Il Potere Operaio, which came out on February 20, 1967 as a supplement to “Lotta di 
Classe” (Class Struggle), a worker’s journal from Olivetti of Ivrea. In his encyclopedic 
history of “subaltern classes in Italy,” Renzo Del Carria notes that many who were 
involved in the factory interventions around Pisa were militants formed by their 
experience in the Tuscan branch of Classe Operaia (1977, 67). But here again the 
workers were relatively weak in the face of an “intransigent” response from the bosses. 
Despite the failure of the struggle, the important lesson from this intervention remained 
that the workers began producing their own journal with students and activists. For the 
student movement at Pisa, this directed their work towards generalizing the workers’ 
political struggle, much like at Trento, to include an anti-imperialist worldview connected 
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to an international class struggle that was based on immediate claims designed to solidify 
the political position of the working class through their autonomous organization. With 
the relative shortcomings of the contractual struggles, the students began organizing in 
working class neighborhoods.  
Part of the push for students to intervene outside of the university was the result 
of police repression and academic reprisals. Importantly, the reaction to the students’ 
occupations and protests by the forces of order provided the basis for identifying a shared 
enemy: the state’s use of force to quell worker, peasant, and student struggles.108 From 
this shared subordinate position vis-à-vis the constituted power of the state, combined 
with the aforementioned weaknesses in the factory struggles, arose the first actions in the 
neighborhoods. After many students were given suspensions for their role in the Sapienza 
occupation, they went to the public. In a small booklet published by the Pisa student 
movement they described their intervention outside of the university: “For all of the 
months that followed [the end of the occupation] more than a hundred students, divided 
into groups of four or five, went around to the popular quarters of Pisa distributing 
pamphlets, discussing problems of school and of the neighborhoods with its inhabitants” 
(Movimento studentesco pisano 1998, 258). This intervention reflected their depiction of 
the “social factory” as a “bourgeois system” that “exploits and dominates men, not only 
in places of work, in factory or in the country-side, but in each moment of their life” (Il 
Potere Operaio 1969, 291 emphasis in original). The struggle against capitalism was not 
limited to a particular aspect of capitalist power “but to extend it to all the gears of this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Of the many killed and injured by police violence against protesters, the police 
violence at Avola (December 2, 1968), where workers and peasants were openly shot at for 
demanding a small pay raise and the murder of a student activist, Paolo Rossi at Rome by neo-
fascists (April 27, 1966) were widely publicized within the student movement.  
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[capitalist] mechanism” (Ibid).109 Thus, the student movement conducted interventions 
that sought to take the struggle to the workers, the university, neighborhoods, hospitals, 
department stores, and housing.  
These interventions outside of the factory took on added importance a year later 
with the renewal of workers’ struggles at Marzotto and Saint-Gobain. In the first case, 
which occurred against the proposed closing of the factory, students intervened in the 
workers’ struggle by distributing propaganda, collecting strike funds, organizing reunions 
and assemblies with the workers, and participating in marches and protests (Movimento 
studentesco pisano 1998, 259; Moreno 1968). Their method of intervention was 
identified as being “direct management of the struggles by the masses” and of acting 
“autonomously in each sector of social life” (Ibid, 260).  The second case centered on 
worker protest against restructuring. In the course of the struggle, wide sectors of the city 
came together. Luciano Della Mea described the struggle at Saint-Gobain as a battle that 
“acquired a social dimension” between the “workers of Saint-Gobain, the students, the 
laid-off from Marzotto, and young workers from all over the city” (1973, 68). Both 
struggles demonstrated the possibility for new relations with the city, not simply with the 
workers in the factory. That is, even though these interventions were taking place on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 This depiction of the “social factory” demonstrated a couple of important points: 1) 
they had not acquired the analysis executed by Alquati on the need to overcome the division 
between city and country that “social capital” had already done in areas such as the Po Valley 
(see Ch. 4); 2) by including in their definition “each aspect of individual life” they reaffirmed the 
core of the social factory thesis that the reproduction and production of capital were both 
necessary components of anti-capitalist struggle. Thus, the “gears” of the capitalist mechanism 
were diffused throughout the entire social order; the analysis of capitalism as a “social factory” 
brought into light the “despotic” nature of capitalist control over not only the “use” of labor-
power, but also the formation of labor. In line with the Trento analysis this position affirmed the 
connection between the student and the worker in terms of capitalist control over their individual 
lives through the use of institutions such as the factory and the school. The logical consequences 
of introducing the reproduction of capital as a factor in anti-capitalist struggle was generalized in 
the following years to include housework, housing strikes, and an array of consumer acts (see 
Chs. 6-7).  
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concerns stemming from the workplace, they assumed a social dimension that brought 
workers and students into the same assembly in order to address pertinent themes of the 
class struggle.  
 Importantly at Pisa, the student movement and Potere operaio pisano maintained 
that the factory was not the primary or only location of class conflict. Rather than focus 
on the relations of production, they, as noted above, emphasized that the real target was 
the social organization of consensus (Il Potere Operaio 1968, 5). They criticized those 
who solely focused on the relations of production, and particularly the direct valorization 
of capital, as an approach that viewed the role of the student as assuming a “general 
political cadre” and assuming a “directly political struggle without worrying themselves 
with the problems of the schools” (Ibid, 7). Moreover, their interventions in working 
class neighborhoods seemed to confirm their assumption that in the “social factory” of 
neo-capitalism “violent class conflict occurs at the material and ideological level” in 
every facet of social life (Ibid, 9).  
At Pisa, the renewal of the workers’ movement gave new breadth and purpose to 
the student movement and the large presence of Potere operaio pisano. In the aftermath 
of their interventions in the workers’ struggles the group examined their shortcomings 
and relative successes. In the middle of these considerations perceived need for greater 
organization began to take on serious consideration. Their interventions in the workers’ 
struggles had compelled the PCI to expel from the party those of its members who 
worked with PO. Moreover, the French May was interpreted as a clear lesson for the need 
for organization. Their assessment of the student-worker revolts in France was that the 
“absence of an organization and of a revolutionary political direction … blocked the 
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expansion of the movement … and had permitted De Gaulle to take control of the 
situation” (in Bertozzi 1980, 303). The question of organization was the focus of 
extensive debate during that September.  
The pertinent aspect of this debate was not so much on the emphasis for 
“discipline” that was expressed by Luciano Della Mea, and ultimately led him to leave 
the group, but to the emphasis by Sofri’s argument on the basis of legitimacy for a new 
revolutionary party. Sofri maintained the need for revolutionary direction that was 
ultimately founded on a correct conception of a vanguard. He began by rejecting the idea 
of a party as being legitimate because of its “historic continuity,” from its “relations with 
the mass,” that its “revolutionary direction is generated ‘spontaneously’ by the masses,” 
or from a theorization of the “identification of mass-vanguard” (Sofri 1968). Rather, the 
only legitimate basis of a vanguard is that which recognizes as valid the working class as 
the only basis of political revolutionary leadership. In this manner, the role of the 
vanguard was to put themselves in “the service of autonomous mass organizations” 
(Ibid). In any case, Sofri argued, the formation of such organizations was necessary in the 
process of forging a revolutionary politics.  
In the midst of debate over organization, the Pisa movement demonstrated its 
most publicized act of protest at the end of 1968 by organizing a New Year’s Eve protest 
at the resort of Bussola in Versilia. Organization for the protest stemmed from student 
and Potere Operaio pisano support for a general strike of department store employees. At 
Pisa, the movement offered their support to striking Upim workers who had timed the 
strike to coincide with Christmas shopping—December 21st and 22nd—as a protest not 
only against the bosses, but against the culture of conspicuous consumption. The students 
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intervention urged others to join them to protest the boss’s New Year’s festivities at 
Bussola. The protest was portrayed in pamphlets and posters as carnivalesque. For 
example, one pamphlet reads: “To the fat bosses and to their furred women, we want this 
year to personally extend our greetings. It will only be a small, symbolic homage of fruit 
and vegetables in order to prepare you for a 1969 loaded with other emotions!” (in 
Balesrtini and Morono 1998, 266-7). Bussola’s importance was not only its symbolic jest 
at the bourgeois, but that it was a prelude of things to come. The manifestation, which 
contained a few hundred students and youth, was met with police violence. In short, 
police opened fire on the protesters turning a symbolic protest into what was judged as a 
“preordained” and systematic use of violence by caribinieri and police (Balestrini and 
Moroni 1998, 268; Potere Operaio di Pisa 1969). The lesson was clear: the “sensibility of 
the workers, students, of the men of the popular quarters” was not welcome and would 
not be tolerated.  
From the analysis of Il Potere Operaio this small affair demonstrated the dynamic 
that repeatedly occurred in 1969: the instrumental use of law enforcement, the conscious 
falsification in the boss’s large newspapers110 (claiming that the police had not fired first, 
even though the protesters had no weapons and had publicly declared their intentions), 
the suspicion that there existed unknown groups tied to conservative state actors, and the 
necessity of organization in the movement (Balestrini and Moroni 1998, 271; Il Potere 
Operai 1969, 290-4). Thus, the experience of student-worker unity at Pisa went beyond 
forging connections within the factory, but enveloped a broader territory of class politics. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 In the first half of January 1969, Potere operaio pisano conducted an extensive 
program of counter-information based on collected testimonies that denounced the role of the 
state and the blatant lies in the mainstream press. The tactic of counter-information was widely 
used after this occasion, with perhaps its most well known development of the period in “Radio 
Alice.”  
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One of the key lessons from this approach was that once the movement went beyond the 
factory or the university and towards the city, their lack of organization and political 
power left them exposed to violent repression. The question of organization confronted 
the movement as a whole over the course of 1969—particularly after the revolt at Corso 
Traiano in Turin during July 1969. This initial experience in the Pisa movement pointed 
to the purpose of developing small base committees that focused on “all gears of the 
capitalist mechanism.” And while the group splintered in early 1969, with some joining 
other movements, and others like Sofri going to Turin to take part in the “student-worker 
assemblies” at Fiat, the importance of Pisa derived from their diffuse understanding of 
the social factory and its reach into the corners of daily life, combined with their 
interventions beyond the factory.  
Milan and the Comitati unitari di base (United Base Committees) 
Little mention has been made of the student movement at Milan during this period. Its 
significant components were in the Architecture Faculty at the Politecnico di Milano and 
at the prestigious Università Cattolica. What interests us here is the connection between 
the student movement and the workers in the city, particularly the struggles at he Pirelli 
factory. The connection between the workers and students did not arrive out of any 
particular theoretical analysis, but rather stemmed from acts of solidarity that derived 
from shared affinities of direct democracy, autonomous organization, and solidarity in the 
face of state repression. For the workers’ part, the formation of United Base Committees 
in early 1968 signified the emergence of autonomous workers’ organizations that marked 
a focus on the importance of workers’ voice and control. The students, on the other hand, 
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followed the other university movements in their rejection of the traditional 
organizations, giving place to student assemblies, counter-courses, and occupations.  
At the Cattolica, the turning point came in late March when thousands of students 
conducted a “sit-in” in front of the university. The event ended with police firing on the 
students injuring numerous people, arresting dozens, and filing complaints against many 
more. The day passed in the memory of the student movement as the “massacre of largo 
Gemelli,” adding to the continued list of police and state repression of the student 
movement. What is notable about this violent affair was that it brought some workers 
from Pirelli to the Cattolica in solidarity with the students. These initial contacts began a 
process of collaboration between workers and students around the central themes of 
direct democracy and autonomous organization against a generically expressed capitalist 
system (Mosca 1988, 34).   
The impetus for this collaboration came from the development of grassroots 
militancy and organization by workers at Pirelli. In important ways, the latter began the 
first example of worker antagonism after the defeats of the 1966 contractual affairs, 
setting the stage for subsequent radicalization in factories throughout Italy. Two 
particular innovations merit attention: the formation of the Comitati unitario di base 
(United Base Committees, CUB) and the innovative practice of autoriduzione di 
rendimento (self-reduction of output).  The immediate context for the renewal of worker 
militancy at Pirelli occurred during contractual negotiations for the rubber workers.  On 
February 13, 1968 the three main unions, in accordance with their unitary platform 
agreed upon the previous December, signed a contract with Pirelli.111 The immediate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 For chronological accounts of the workers’ struggles at Pirelli during 1968, see 
(Pietropaolo 1970; Lumley 1990, Ch. 12; Righi 1988). 
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response from the workers was a call for democratic relations between the workers and 
the unions, and that contractual platforms, claims, and other decision-making procedures 
needed to be conducted through an “open assembly of all the workers” (Pietropaolo 1970, 
71).  
This general lack of union democracy and subsequent marginalization of workers’ 
voice were the determining factors behind the establishment of the first CUBs. The initial 
sign of dissension came in a pamphlet signed by  “a group of Pirelli workers (operai), 
adherents to the CGIL and CISL” that denounced the relative “yielding” of the unions 
with Pirelli management (Ibid, 70-1). Over the next couple of months, workers continued 
discussions among themselves leading to the formal establishment of the CUB by the 
beginning of June. Their founding document, Riprendiamo la lotta (Resume the 
struggle), laid out their political approach, which reaffirmed a core theme of early 
operaismo—workers’ autonomy as the uncontrollable variable in capitalist planning. The 
Cub were defined as “autonomous mass organisms of the working class” that served as 
“an instrument of politics and of struggle, born from the existence of the workers that 
want to renew the struggle as they are aware of their condition of exploitation in the 
factory and outside the factory: it is the workers’ self-management of the struggle” 
(Avanguardia Operaia 1972, 19; Pietropaolo 1970, 74). Thus, the formation of the 
workers into the CUB began from the principle enunciated by Quaderni Rossi: 
revolutionary class politics is only possible when it starts from the grassroots, or when it 
“begins from the real existence of the workers” (Avanguardia Operaia 1972, 20). 
Importantly, the birth of the Cub, against the common experience of worker retreat and 
atomization after a contractual defeat, pointed to a unity of the workers that was the basis 
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for new struggles, outside of the contractual deadlines. Self-management of the workers’ 
struggles immediately targeted the practice of the unions and their status as representative 
bodies of the working class. The Cub polemically attacked the unions as “managers of 
contracts,” who sought to direct worker militancy solely towards those claims and issues 
that the unions determined (Ibid, 74).  
Aside from this manipulative role of the unions, Riprendiamo la lotta revealed 
significant aspects of anti-capitalist politics. If the unions were attacked for managing 
contracts, the contract itself was viewed as part of the “line of economic planning,” and 
thus an integral part of neo-capitalist development (in Foa 1975, 167). Their goal 
however, was not to replace unions, but to revive them from below; they harbored no 
illusions about becoming an “alternative to the unions” (Avanguardia Operaia 1972, 19). 
Rather, they sought to continue the struggle, outside of the contract, by beginning a 
process of constructing workers’ unity through discussions and struggles “among all the 
workers, among the sections (reparti), in all of Pirelli” (in Foa 1975, 167). Thus, beyond 
their initial focus on rejuvenating the workers’ “use” of the union, to borrow Tronti’s 
expression, the CUB, in the course of discussions and struggles, became radicalized 
against what they identified as management despotism; rather quickly, workers’ 
discussions pointed to dissatisfaction among such features of the Pirelli factory as 
hazardous conditions, elimination of classification or category structures, equality of pay, 
and towards direct control over the production process and determination over its 
organization. The latter was premised on the assumption that workers’ needs, as defined 
by workers, should be the determining factor in organizing work. In this manner, during 
the course of 1968 and into 1969, workers at Pirelli asserted their opposition to the 
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capitalist organization of work, setting an important example for subsequent working 
class struggles.  
 Members of the student movement began frequenting the Cub at Pirelli in late 
June of 1968. The student intervention went beyond the workers’ instrumental use of the 
students that occurred elsewhere. While they did perform service roles and other forms of 
solidarity, CUB documents claimed “students no longer have a subordinate role, but 
participate in the first person in the workers’ political activity” (Comitato di Base Pirelli 
1968, 2).  Moreover, the student-worker connections stimulated student research, which 
was based off of workers’ knowledge of the factory situation that focused on mutually 
determined problems to address.  
It is important to add here that the students from the Cattolica who were 
participating in the CUB caused a scandal of sorts in Milan’s society. The Cattolica 
educated leaders, not managers or technocrats such as at Trento, but the future political 
and business leaders. Thus, they were prejudiced by a view that considered the students 
to possess a contemptuous view of the workers and the poor. Such was not the case: in 
the student-worker assemblies they were equals; they marched down Monte Napoleone 
with workers smashing milk cans and flapping empty lunch pails; they attacked the state 
media, Rai, for its smear campaign against the workers; they suffered police attacks after 
a protest at the famous Pirelli skyscraper; and they enacted a militant manifestation 
against the conservative newspaper il Corriere della Sera, blockading entire arteries of 
streets, preventing the paper from being distributed—also known as the “battle of Viale 
Solferino.” In short, the student practice in the CUB was part of a broader 
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acknowledgement among the workers that the “consciousness of their own interests and 
rights in the workplace … leads to general struggle in society, and vice-versa” (Ibid).  
The establishment of CUB’s at Milan led to a flowering of similar experiences 
over the next year. We now turn to the example of Porto Marghera and the establishment 
there of workers’ committees and the role of student movement along with Potere 
operaio veneto-emiliano during the long summer of 1968.  
The “long summer” of 1968 at Porto Marghera 
Student-worker politics in the Veneto region was heavily shaped by the presence of 
Potere Operaio di veneto-emiliano (POv-e) and its organizational presence in the 
workers’ struggles in the factories. While I have not discussed the student movement at 
Veneto in any depth in this chapter, the example from this region serves the purpose of 
demonstrating how the existing organizational framework that derived its political 
experience within QR and CO came to confront, or better yet, avoided the question of the 
student movement. In fact, from its initial publication in March 1967 up to May 1968, 
POv-e made no attempt to theoretically explain or understand the significance of the 
student movement. This was not for a lack of student radicalism and militancy in the 
region; student protest extended beyond the school to support for workers’ struggle as 
early as the 1965 workers’ struggle at the Sirma factory. The outlook of the bourgeoning 
student movement was summarized in an inter-university Assembly at Ca Foscari where 
the students put forth a “national strike against the Gui plan” combined with the need to 
respond with a “general and global struggle” of the workers and students together 
(Chinello 1988, 183). Two years later (April 1967) the student movement began 
launching occupations of various faculty based on the need to assert “student power” 
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through the general assembly and to organize for a “permanent contestation” against the 
system—two themes that assumed a central role in the region’s student-worker politics 
(Ibid, 188-9; Sacchetto and Sbrogiò 2009, 25-26). Simultaneously, students rallied in 
solidarity with striking workers at the Edison electrical plant, picketing in front of the 
factory gates under the slogan: “workers and students united in the struggle against the 
bosses.” With this last affair began formidable contacts between the workers and students 
with the latter introducing the assembly as an organ for decision-making at the base, 
which the workers’ movement would later adopt. This experience culminated in the long 
summer of 1968 with the workers’ struggle at Montedison112 that definitively marked the 
arrival of student-worker politics at Porto Marghera.  
 The focus of activists in Potere Operaio followed from their experience in the 
journal Classe Operaia; the journal was concerned with workers’ problems in the factory, 
the struggle against the plan, workers’ autonomy expressed in the struggle, and, above 
all, political organization. The group distributed the journal at various factories beginning 
in 1967, utilizing the available organizational channels (i.e., internal committees, unions 
(the Cgil in particular) and the existing party apparatus in the factory) in order to build 
Comitati Operai (Workers’ Committees) as the organizational form, constituted by 
worker cadres, of the political expression of workers’ autonomy. The neglect of the 
student movement, despite the participation of students within the group’s own political 
work, stemmed from their understanding of class composition and the “social factory” as 
relating solely to the waged condition of labor; that is, wage labor was the necessary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112  On July 7, 1966 the Edison Company (electric) merged with the Montecatini 
Company (chemicals) to form Montedison. The subsequent workers’ struggles were interpreted 
by POv-e as a contestation against the attempt to homogenize conditions of exploitation of the 
two groups, electrical and chemical workers.  
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condition inclusion in the “working class” and an understanding of the “social factory” as 
the increasing tertiary character of capitalist production. In short, for POv-e, the student 
did not exist as a “social figure” but could take part in the class struggle as a “militant and 
political cadre” (Sacchetto and Sbrogiò 2009, 26; Chinello 1988, 190).  
Negri and others in Potere Operaio later sought to explain their neglect of the 
student question in terms of the latter’s relative minority status in the group. “The 
composition of Potere Operaio veneto-emiliano,” Negri wrote, “was an overwhelming 
majority of workers, so that the students’ problems … were always mediated through a 
most difficult debate” (2007, 89). There are two problems with this explanation: for POv-
e the students were not part of the working class and thus their questions were not given 
priority, and Negri’s simultaneous claim that these struggles began demonstrating the 
“diffuse factory” of the “territorial working class” that sought to “take over the city” is 
problematic with regards to the nature of their definition of the working class (Ibid, 86-7). 
The students took on a proper class perspective for PO only to the extent that there 
existed a wage relation, and to this end PO adapted the demand for a “generalized salary” 
to reflect the nature of working class production and reproduction. Here it is worth noting 
that their conceptualization of the “social factory” was determined by the wage as the key 
focal point of capitalist control as well as the key factor for understanding working class 
composition. The upshot of this with regard to Negri’s justification was that the student 
question had no autonomous recognition within POv-e and was only useful insofar as 
they renounced their self-understanding as students and committed themselves to the 
workers’ struggle. (Not until 1970 would the national group Potere Operaio give 
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consideration to the student movement and the question of the university and teaching 
within the “social factory.”)  
Thus, despite the student movement’s presence in the workers’ struggle from an 
early stage, and their theoretical position of the university struggle as a “permanent 
contestation” against the system, POv-e did not discuss the student movement until May 
1968. In his treatment of student-worker unity at Veneto, Steve Wright uncritically 
accepts the claim of POv-e that it was the students’ “turn to the class” that prompted the 
journal to pay attention to the students (2002, 97).113 This claim needs to be qualified. It 
was clear that the students had begun forging ties with workers in various different 
regional and local areas, but at Veneto, the approach of POv-e reflected a recognition of 
the students’ presence in anti-capitalist struggle that signified the need for Potere 
Operaio to direct them into the class struggle, centered in the factory. This entailed a 
complete abandonment by the part of the Veneto student movement of matters dealing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 The interpretation of the student movement executed by Potere Operaio was paltry in 
comparison to the rich and diverse experience of the movement. Their analysis oversimplified the 
students’ own understanding of student-worker relations, polemically attacked the movement as 
mostly “sons of the bourgeois” who needed to first “negate their class origin” and then, and this is 
presumably how the students perform their “negation,” recognize that “the fundamental relations 
of exploitation exist in the factory” (POv-e 1968, 1). The expression “turn to the class” is rich 
with implications for understanding the narrowness of POv-e’s discourse: its configuration of the 
student movement as worthy of interest because it participated in working class struggles 
combined with this view of “negation” of their bourgeois upbringing was simply a fancy way of 
appreciating the fact that so-called “bourgeois” students had renounced their own political 
autonomy and dedicated their struggles to the cause of the workers. In short, the desire of the 
students expressed in the Lettera a una professoressa, that the bourgeois disappear (their last 
historic “mission”), combined with the Sartre’s invocation of “being for others,” harmoniously 
emerged in PO’s assessment of the student movement and its importance. The only thing left for 
the student was to renounce their own struggles and line up behind the workers’ struggle within a 
movement dominated by Potere Operaio (The approach of the students and the attempt of POv-e 
to control it by subsuming it within their framework and political line provides an early example 
of how PO would confront other extra-parliamentary organizations in subsequent years. In no 
small manner these smaller, factional struggles for domination proved detrimental to the project 
of workers’ autonomy) [see discussion of relations between the group Il Manifesto and Potere 
Operaio in Chapter 6.] 
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with the university, a position they were too ready to fulfill. Thus, if in January of 1968 
the students intervened in the workers’ struggle at Montedison around the slogan, “no to 
the harmonization of the university and no to the harmonization of Montedison,” by the 
time of the Venice “student-worker” conference (June 8-9, 1968) we find students in the 
Architecture Department distributing a pamphlet based on the centrality of the factory 
worker in the class struggle: “There is nothing we can teach the working class: it is the 
working class that needs to teach the students many things” (quoted in Chinello 1988, 
212). And it was not until after the Venice conference that Potere Operaio recognized the 
student presence in the workers’ struggles. At a minimum then, it was not the students 
“turn to the class” that prompted POv-e to pay attention to the student movement, but the 
recognition of the availability to struggle among a mass sector that they could utilize as a 
force within the workers’ struggles in the factory.  
The first article recognizing the role of the student movement came out in the 
ninth number of the journal on May 10, 1968 entitled “Fiat Edison Marzotto Università: 
una sola lotta contro un solo padrone” (Fiat Edison Marzotto Univeristy: one struggle 
against one boss) [POv-e 1968]. Their assessment of the student movement praised the 
“general political level” of its contestation. But this contestation they believed had no 
realistic basis for autonomy.114 On the one hand, the example of Rome115 demonstrated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 The article includes the following warning to the student movement: The “student 
movement needs to find in the workers’ struggle those continuous and organic ties with the class 
without which it appears condemned to a slow political death” (POv-e 1968, 4).  
 
115 On February 28, 1968 students at the University of Rome (Architecture and Physics 
Departments) conduct an occupation in order to control the examination process. The university’s 
rector refused to conduct exams under the occupation and called the State’s police forces to 
disperse the student body. The unique feature of this event is that the students repelled the police 
attack, which caused them to confront the question of defining themselves as a political 
movement. The Roman example gained national recognition, generated its own cultural folklore 
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that the students were capable of confronting the forces of order, but not in an organized 
manner. Moreover, the student’s approach was deemed as being too anti-institutional. If 
the high point of their consciousness was in the reflection that they needed to forge ties 
with the workers’ movement, then they needed to go further and lose their anti-
institutional tendencies: “The Student Movement cannot renounce the channels that such 
parties [and unions] offer for the internal expansion of the student movement and above 
all for the birth of an organic political-organizational contact with the working class” 
(Ibid, 4).116 For POv-e, The establishment of student-worker ties went through the 
institutionalization of contacts between the student movement, the union, and the 
workers’ movement. As a stopgap measure, Potere Operaio advocated the “generalized 
salary” for the student movement as a means to “open the doors of the university to the 
sons of the exploited classes” (Ibid). In this manner they sought to integrate the student 
movement within their political and organizational priorities. (The program of a 
“generalized salary” was the forerunner to Potere Operaio’s demand for a “political 
wage”117 that developed in subsequent years [see Ch. 6].)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with the hymn of Valle Giulia, and marked the beginning of a dangerous process of countering 
state violence with “revolutionary violence” (Scalzone 1988, Ch. 2; Balestrini and Moroni 239-
41; Rossanda 1968, 49-53). Two important actors at the University of Rome later formed part of 
the leadership of the national organization Potere Operaio, Oreste Scalzone and Franco Piperno.  
 
116 At Rome, and though not yet a workerist in theoretical outlook, Oreste Scalzone 
warned about the dangers that the students’ anti-institutional critique also could entail a rejection 
of the “revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat.” His assessment of student-worker relations was 
premised on the assumption that only the working class was a revolutionary class, but he 
understood that diverse cultures interact in a revolutionary struggle, and that it was “necessary to 
define the political limits of a contestation at the university level, and to identify the connections 
between this battle and the hypothesis of a revolutionary work at the general political level” (in 
Boato 1979, 179-80 emphasis added).  
 
117 During the National Convention of Workers and Students at Venice, Guido Bianchini 
introduced the idea of demanding 120,000 lire as a minimum salary for all, which PO 
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 In late June 1968 the workers’ struggles at Montedison’s Petro-chemical plant in 
Porto Marghera developed on the themes of the renewal of production bonuses and equal 
salary increases for all workers. The role of student-worker assemblies and the 
intervention of Potere Operaio were central in galvanizing what the latter called an 
“articulated struggle” that the workers could use as a platform for demands to impose on 
the unions and the factory bosses. For POv-e, the articulated struggle served the purpose 
of not only organizing workers, but it also provided the basis through which the workers 
could generate demands, based on their immediate needs, that would destabilize the 
boss’s power in the factory. The relative success of this platform among the workers 
forced the unions to accede to the demands on bonuses and equal increases in pay (based 
on fixed levels, not as a percentage of salary). By the end of May the unions submitted 
the platform to the bosses, with July 1st as the official deadline to settle the contract. In 
the course of the struggle, however, the workers’ movement at the base level came into 
direct conflict with the unions over determining how to conduct the struggle; this struggle 
marked the rejection of any institutional integration of the student movement in the 
official left and led to the formation of workers’ committees as organizational expression 
of workers’ autonomy in the factory. The importance of this struggle in the long term was 
that it demonstrated that only through unity at the base with autonomous management of 
their struggles was it possible for the workers to confront and destabilize the bosses’ 
system of power. A cursory treatment of the affair suffices to demonstrate this point.  
During the course of the workers’ struggles the unions confronted the affair on the 
basis of maintaining union unity (Uil, Cgil, Cisl) as the overarching goal of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
subsequently developed into a campaign for the “political wage” (Sacchetto and Sbrogiò 2009, 
28).  
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contractual negotiations. In their view, they had already conceded an important point 
from the base—the platform of claims. Aside from this, the unions demonstrated a 
paternalistic attitude with respect not only to the students, but also to with the workers. 
First, from the beginning of the strike (June 21, 1968) students were present outside the 
factory gates and inside the workers’ assemblies. The unions and the political parties 
viewed the student participation with hostility; unions viewed themselves to be the sole 
proprietors of the workers’ struggle. The student movement was demonized as 
introducing the filocinese (i.e., supporters of Mao) who only sought to utilize the 
workers’ struggle for political ends to the detriment of union unity (Lotta alla Montedison 
1968). During debate in the assembly, however, workers expressed their support and 
desire for the students’ participation. After two strikes that witnessed at least 90 percent 
worker participation, the workers’ assembly called for successive strikes on alternate 
days (scioperi a giorni alternati) beginning on the second of July. The unions expressed 
their complete opposition to what they claimed was an “illegal” form of strike; they 
vowed to return to offer new, permissible forms of struggle. At this moment the workers 
and students understood that they controlled the direction of the struggle and dismissed 
the union leadership as “sell-outs” and “swindlers” (venduti e imbroglioni). After the 
success of implementing the alternate day strike, the union leadership began expelling 
workers who were deemed responsible for deciding this form of struggle. With strikes 
continuing apace, a march of workers and students defied attempts by the union to direct 
it and headed to the local bosses’ newspaper, Il Gazzettino. The strike climaxed on the 
25th of July with a massive presence of workers and students blocking all the entrances to 
the plant in order to prevent work replacements and “indispensables” from entering the 
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shop; the pickets lasted into the following week. As the militancy of the pickets 
increased, the plant management demanded entrance for those workers deemed 
“indispensable” for the maintenance of a normal manner of production. The assembly, 
however, refused to let anyone enter the factory. The strike ended with the unions signing 
an agreement with factory management; the unions did not consult the workers and they 
abandoned the initial contractual platform settling for a five thousand lire pay increase in 
three parts, with the white-collar workers (impiegati) receiving increases of seven 
thousand lire. Despite their effective management of the strike, the autonomous workers’ 
organization (i.e., the assembly) was insufficient to overcome the union-boss 
agreement.118  
Despite the overall failure of the workers to organize themselves in an effective 
manner, a few lessons were drawn. Key themes from the student movement were 
introduced for the first time within the workers’ struggles: the need for worker unity that 
was not bureaucratically performed; the emphasis on democracy in the assembly; the 
construction of a platform that focused on equality; and the need for a permanent 
contestation as the proper manner for destabilizing the bosses’ power. The struggle also 
pointed to shortcomings that needed to be overcome in future struggles: organizationally, 
the workers needed to construct “assemblies in the factory” (the following spring (March-
April) workers’ committees were established); they failed to generalize the struggle 
beyond their particular factory, meaning that the goal of generalizing the struggle 
remained at the level of intentionality without any practical efforts to the effect of 
realizing a generalized struggle (POv-e 1968b).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 The description of this affair draws primarily from (Saccheto and Sbrogiò 2009, 25-
34; Chinello 1988, 212-4; POv-e 1968a; Lotta alla Montedison 1968).  
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Potere Operaio assessed the situation in the need to focus on political 
organization at the base level and the need to prepare the working class for the upcoming 
contractual affairs of the metal-mechanics, chemical, textile, and construction sectors 
based on claims of equal pay raises without respect to region, job category, or sector, a 
reduction of hours, equal health care119 for all workers, and a minimum income of 
120,000 lire for all (echoing a similar claim that surfaced during the French May). PO 
further pointed to the need to establish workers’ committees with decision-making 
assemblies as their governing form. These demands set the basis for continued 
intervention throughout Veneto and Emilia aimed at the establishment of workers’ 
committees and a political organization of the working class in anticipation of upcoming 
contractual struggles. In any regard, the question of student-worker unity was answered 
by utilizing the students as instruments for the workers’ struggles; they intervened 
throughout the region but within an overall project set forth by Potere Operaio. For the 
latter, their lack of theoretical insight and reflection on the student condition was met 
with energy and commitment to organization that eclipsed the students’ own concerns, 
and led to the formation of political cadres. Overall, the project of PO met with 
considerable success in developing organizational linkages and generalizing themes of 
workers’ struggle. However, by spring of 1969 focus turned to Turin and Fiat, as 
workers’ struggles there had intensified beginning in the spring of 1968 with increasing 
militancy and scope. By spring 1969 Turin had become a tourist attraction for student 
activists and working class militants throughout Italy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 As we saw at Milan, the question of work conditions and work hazards increasingly 
became a focal point of workers’ demands. In November 1968 Potere Operaio distributed a 
pamphlet addressing the question of hazardous working conditions in factories throughout the 
region. The key in both of these situations was that the workers refused pay as a substitute for 
hazardous conditions, posing the abolition of them as an unconditional claim (POv-e 1968c). 
	   281	  
Student-worker unity in Turin 
The student movement at Turin began its approach towards the working class following 
the occupation of Palazzo Campana that ended in late January 1968. Their understanding 
of the university-society relationship was premised on a generic “social factory” analysis 
that located complete power in capitalist domination over society, and emphasized the 
need for “structural space” and autonomy within the existing institutions as necessary to 
their political demands. This connection remained at an abstract level until events 
reinforced their commitment to revolutionary struggle. By the spring of 1968, the renewal 
of worker protest in March and May (particularly at Fiat), the slowing down of student 
protest in the university, and the imagination of the French May flowed together to 
produce a moment where the student movement could realize a continuation of class 
struggle by approaching the working class of Turin (Balestrini and Moroni 1998, 299-
300). Reflecting on the period, Sergio Bologna wrote: “the French May was a watershed 
in the collective imagination. But concretely it did not capture the example of student-
worker relations…. It gave rise to the ‘worker question’ in the university and in the base 
structure of the movement but nothing more” (in Balestrini and Moroni 1998, 300). The 
lack of a theoretical conception of student-worker relations in the Turin student 
movement was quickly overcome by external influences within the broader left that 
centered on the renewal of the worker struggles at Fiat as the key to the Italian class 
struggles. Thus, while the Turin student-worker relations began in March 1968, the 
perceived symbolic and material importance of the Turin working class generated a 
response from all actors in the revolutionary left that produced the organizational 
expansion of left-wing groups dedicated to revolutionary struggle without recourse to 
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parliamentary channels, hence the phenomenon of the so-called “extra-parliamentary 
left.”  
The relative immaturity of the student movement in relation to the workers’ 
struggle was immediately evident. Beginning with a general strike over pensions in 
March and then a Fiat strike for a reduction of hours and claims over piecemeal work in 
May, the students’ approach revealed a general confusion about the working class. 
Ciafaloni, writing that July, commented: “the students did not know exactly what to say 
[to the workers],” continuing, “the large majority of the students hardly knew that 
national contracts exist at the category level and they did not have the slightest idea how 
to make a strike” (1968, 67).  Student intervention, despite their general inexperience and 
their lack of theoretical development, was based on the democratic and egalitarian ideals 
that constituted their practice of “student power.” Their initial approach reflected these 
ideals insofar as the students rejected the role of the “vanguard” as well as the role of 
“intellectuals” guiding the mass of workers. Rather, they settled for the generic and 
elusive claim of being “at the service of the workers in struggle” (Ibid). That is, despite 
their inexperience they intervened in the workers’ struggle as subordinates, offering a 
general service role to the workers. To this end, on the morrow of the spring strikes, 
students and workers established their relations in the “Lega studenti-operai” (Workers-
students League) as the incipient organizational form of student-worker unity.  
For the student movement, the relation with the working class was premised on 
the theoretical understanding of the students’ role in the class struggle as a “detonator” 
for the broader rupture that was working class resistance. This understanding was 
buttressed by the student-worker revolt in the French May. Within the Italian movement, 
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Sergio Bologna and Giario Daghini gave credence to this example of the French students’ 
role in anti-capitalist struggle, noting the importance of student-worker politics as a 
“trampoline” for the organization of working class revolution: “The [factory] occupation 
is a trampoline for launching decisions of a practical-political type that must then be 
translated into the organization of the social circuit of struggle” (1968, 53). For Bologna 
and Daghini, they insisted that the students needed to “entirely reconstruct” their theory 
in order to “anticipate the spontaneity” of the workers, and organize it (Ibid, 55). 
Importantly, this organization needed to involve the entire “social circuit” of class 
politics, linking factory struggles to the question of schooling, rent, the cost of living, et 
cetera.  
The “Lega studenti-operai” (Student-workers league) was established after the 
spring struggles in order to establish more solid ties between the workers and the students 
in a struggle against capital in the factory, school, and social life. Included in the group 
were roughly one hundred workers (operai) from a few different plants, some white-
collar workers and technicians, and approximately fifty students. Their work was divided 
into teams responsible for a particular factory where they would stand at the gates 
distributing pamphlets, collecting information from workers, and trying to begin 
discussions of a political nature of the factory and the capitalist system (Punto Rosso 
2009, 48-9). The Lega was one of the principle bodies outside of the factory that 
conducted regular interventions and maintained a continuous presence among the 
workers as their struggles intensified throughout the fall of 1968 and the spring of 1969. 
They considered themselves as “an autonomous and independent organization 
from the parties and the unions” that reflected the needs of the class for a more grassroots 
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and general class conflict. The factory, again, served as a “trampoline,” or the central 
starting point, for a more generalized class conflict; the factory was the central point of 
working class struggle that could detonate a broader more extensive class struggle 
throughout the contours of the “social factory.” In a small booklet the Lega wrote:  
[t]he renewal of the struggle at Fiat assumed the characteristics of a general conflict that 
invested not only the despotic regime within the factory, but collected the ties between 
the factory regime and ‘external society’ … [understood as] the rules of life and values 
that determine social relations between individuals, that condition their affective choices, 
their enjoyment and use of consumer goods (in Punto Rosso 2009, 48).  
 
Given this understanding of anti-capitalist struggle they viewed the unions as 
“constitutionally incapable” of mobilizing and organizing this revolt. Despite this, their 
interventions utilized the union as a channel for the working class, but they also began 
constructing new class organisms, within the factory and in working class neighborhoods. 
Notably, the organization of the Lega was understood as cultivating a long-term struggle, 
focusing on mobilization and preparation for the Fall 1969 contractual struggles.  
 The workers’ availability to mobilization in a general class struggle against the 
boss at Fiat was surprisingly alive and well. After the May strike, the unions conducted 
an inquiry to gauge the workers’ understanding of the conduct of the strike and the 
workers’ view of the factory. The results revealed widespread support for the 
continuation and intensification of the struggle based on an existential hatred of the 
factory regime. Hence, an understanding of the power relations within the factory system 
and its organization of work that resulted in crippling and stultifying their very humanity 
motivated workers. In the inquiry workers wrote: we strike because we want to work “as 
men and not as beasts” (in Ciafaloni 1968, 64). And, as in the times of slaves “men carry 
chains that also pull them, but now the whip is missing.” Against this system that treats 
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them like slaves, they wanted “to fold [piegare] the capitalist Fiat after seventy years of 
bosses’ slavery” and with victory put an end to the “dictatorship in the factory” (Ibid).  
This readiness to strike at a system deemed odious to human existence was 
dramatized in early December with the murder of two peasants in Avola, Sicily during 
the violent repression of a peasant protest by the police. Workers at Fiat, particularly the 
younger migrants from the South, conducted, for the first time at Fiat, an internal strike. 
“The strike today,” the workers wrote in a pamphlet, “is a day for our battle, it is the 
continuation of the spring strike and the pension strike: it needs to be the beginning of a 
new phase of struggle that is made within the factory that needs to end the truce at Fiat” 
(in Dina 1969, 135-6). The internal strike signified a direct challenge to the hierarchy in 
the factory, putting into conflict the relation between the workers and the foreman, 
management, and the leadership. The workers’ demands pointed to the need for control 
over the conditions of work and work rhythms as the departure for a more general class 
struggle. These struggles renewed with intensity in April, but in the meantime militants 
and activists from around Italy had descended on Turin in hopes of finding there the core 
of an unitary anti-capitalist movement.  
The influx of militants from around the country overwhelmed the local student 
movement in its approach to the workers. Of particular importance was the presence of 
workerists from Potere operaio di pisa, Potere operaio Veneto-emiliano, along with 
militants from Rome, Milan, Florence, and Bologna (Berardi 1998, 103; Cazzullo 2006, 
62). The upshot of this influx was to focus energies on the question of organization, with 
interventions directed towards the construction of workers’ committees. In April 1969, 
after police violence against a workers’ demonstration against the closure of a tobacco 
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factory in Battipaglia (just south of Naples) resulted in the death of two men and injured 
scores of others, workers’ protest renewed a process of internal affairs that witnessed the 
birth of an autonomous workers’ movement inside Fiat. Like elsewhere, the assembly 
emerged as the first form of organization linking students, workers, and militants. The 
assembly served the purpose of formulating claims and organizing work stoppages and 
slowdowns of production. Simultaneously, workplace delegates arose in departments and 
on the production lines. By May, this autonomous organization led struggles that pushed 
the workers’ movement along lines based on a general “refusal of labor” and the slogan 
of “less work more money.”   
This intensification of the workers’ struggle prompted the influx of workerists to 
begin producing La Classe, a journal of the “workers and students united in the struggle.” 
With the struggles in May, the group around La Classe gave theoretical import to the 
general positions and slogans that emerged out of the student-worker assemblies by 
focusing on the need for autonomous organization centered on egalitarian salary claims. 
Their emphasis on material needs resonated with the demands of the workers for more 
control over the entire production process and grounded the understanding of this 
struggle not in ideological terms, but in the workers’ own definition of their material 
needs (Wright 2002, 122). For example, the slogan “less work more money” offered a 
position around which organization of the struggle could take place, but concretely it was 
informed by the workers’ own content: less work reflected the workers’ decision making 
power over the work process and rejection of work rhythms; more money was an 
egalitarian call for equal pay raises for all and an end to merit raises. But it was the 
strictly workerist discourse that La Classe introduced that marked their presence and 
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importance within the workers’ struggles; it also highlighted their inability to fully 
comprehend the nature of the class struggle.  
A hallmark of workerist intervention initiated during the formation of La Classe, 
but dating back to the Piazza Statuto affair, was the need to theoretically push for the 
intensification and radicalization of the workers’ struggle. In May and June at Turin, the 
journal introduced the question of technology and a guaranteed minimum social salary as 
the basis for extending the struggle as a general “refusal of labor.” Based off of Panzieri’s 
discussion of “Surplus value and planning,” they introduced the question of technology, 
and particularly the introduction of automation, to demonstrate how the bosses’ 
“progress” resulted in a higher level of exploitation by creating unemployment and 
reshaping job structures to create a hierarchy of labor, reflected in pay scales based on job 
categories (La Classe 1969, 7). It followed from this critique of technology that the 
“liberation of labor,” they argued, “can only mean the concrete, material possibility of 
liberation of living work from the entire organized, productive apparatus of dead labor” 
(La Classe 1969c, 34). From this position it was sufficient that workers’ initial claims 
targeted a reduction of work hours as the basis for equating technology with less work. 
The latter served as a basis from which La Classe sought to develop their political line 
within the class struggle by focusing their energies on “organizing the organization” 
(1969b, 2). 
 The rise of workers’ autonomous organization in base committees, assemblies, 
and workshop delegates throughout numerous divisions demonstrated the extent to which 
workers were in control over their own struggles. The goal of La Classe was to extend 
this organizational form leading to an internal vanguard of workers who could become 
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the nucleus of the workers’ political organization (1969a, 6-10). Their approach to 
organization rejected institutional mediation, locating the workers’ base organizations as 
reflecting the revolutionary needs of the class. So, with the intervention of La Classe 
arose a sharp polemic against the unions, which up to that point had been kept at a critical 
distance, but not openly rejected.  By May workers had successfully pushed their struggle 
beyond the unions, which opened the door for organization from the base (Lotta Continua 
1969). On the one hand, delegates from the more professional Auxiliary departments 
pushed the need for “workers’ control” in order to transform the union while controlling 
the conditions of work (Ibid). Against this attempt to utilize the union, La Classe argued 
for the rejection of all institutional mediation as an integrating function within capitalist 
planning. Thus, while institutions were considered completely integrated, the autonomous 
class struggle, so the argument ran, needed to surpass and discard the unions in favor of 
the workers’ direct political organization. In its lead editorial at the end of June, La 
Classe argued that by “eliminating the union—institutions that are only worker in 
appearance, capitalist in reality—it has … destroyed the organizational articulation most 
functional to capitalist development and opened the process of conquest by the workers at 
the level of political organization” (1969d, 1-2).120 For their part, the unions had lost 
control over the workers’ struggles, and in Turin this was evident by the affairs of Corso 
Traiano in July, which marked the arrival of autonomous working class antagonism in the 
“social factory” as a reality of Italian class struggle. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Commenting on this period of labor relations, Dina remarks: “This phase of struggle 
has furnished a confirmation of the vulnerability of the modern organization of capitalist work in 
the face of a decisive workers’ refusal. It has confirmed the necessity of a workers’ base 
organization, capable of deciding autonomously, which does not end completely in the union but 
carries the class conflict beyond the moment of contracts … as a mass political movement” 
(1969, 149-50).   
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The “Battle of Turin” began as a general strike proclaimed by the unions over rent 
in worker’s districts, which was accompanied by student-worker manifestation in the 
afternoon leading to popular uprisings in the neighborhoods. In the student-worker 
assembly they prepared to take the previous months’ lessons of struggles and 
organizational advancements from the factory to the society; that is, the autonomous 
workers’ organizations utilized this opportunity to extend the struggle and with it to 
enlarge their demands in order to “make the struggle in the factory a moment of 
expansion of a discourse and of a general strategy of attack against capital” (quote in Foa 
1975, 185). As the students and workers set off to begin their manifestation, the police, 
who sought to prevent the march, promptly met them with tear gas and clubs. By three 
o’clock in the afternoon, the march was able to find its way out of one of the streets 
connected to Fiat spilling over into Corso Traiano and the forces of order. The terrain 
turned into a “violent urban guerilla” war: workers converged from other Fiat factories 
(Lingotto and Rivalta); men in the neighborhoods around Fiat joined in as did the youth, 
and women (La Classe 1969e). Throughout the night barricades were erected on 
numerous streets surrounding the Fiat Mirafiori factory. The placards at each point read: 
Che cosa vogliamo? Tutto! (What do we want? Everything!). However, by midnight and 
with extensive use of tear gas and manpower, the police were able to gain control over 
the working class neighborhoods.  
In their assessment of the revolt, the workers’ assembly at Fiat insisted on the 
continuity of their struggles and the revolt at Corso Traiano. They viewed the call of a 
general strike over rent to be an attempt by the unions to regain control in the factory. But 
the workers showed their ability to take control of the situation. Against the unions’ 
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“symbolic strike” they emphasized the importance of the strike as a means to expand the 
struggle and unite the working class. For the workers’ assembly they argued: “Today in 
Italy an open revolutionary process is in motion that goes beyond the large significance 
of the French May. It is not an improvised movement, but a long struggle that tightly 
unites workers (operai), students, laborers and technicians, in a struggle that continuously 
upsets the capitalist’s projects” (La Classe 1969f, 1). The immediate consequence of the 
“Battle of Turin” was to begin the unification of the autonomous workers’ movement in 
Italy and to put forth objectives for a new phase of struggle.  
Conclusion 
 With the “Battle of Turin,” the movement in Italy shifted from student-worker 
unity towards the establishment of a multitude of “extra-parliamentary” groups. At the 
end of July 1969, workers’ vanguard organization held their one and only conference. As 
a result of the conference, but also reflecting broader tendencies that came out of the 
experience of the student movement as it approached the working class, two 
organizations emerged on a national scale: Potere Operaio (born in September) and Lotta 
Continua (established in November). While these tendencies are discussed in the next 
chapters, it is important to note that the argument has demonstrated a loose connection 
between the rise of operaismo, its impact and appropriation within the student movement, 
leading to the development of autonomous forms of organization. The core aspects that 
bind this history are a confluence of the ideas of “autonomy,” the “social factory,” and 
self-generated forms of knowledge. In this chapter, I argued that the “social factory” 
served as a conceptual tool linking the university to the capitalist cycle of production and 
reproduction, a position most clearly established in the student movement at Pisa. The 
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introduction of this concept into the student movement was determined by broader 
generational configurations that emerged from culture of the “economic miracle” in both 
its global and existential processes. In part, the critique of the “system” as a “social 
factory” helped them understand their “existential ambiguity,” as a factor of capitalist 
planning, control, and other signifiers of authority and power. As part of the broader left 
culture that had developed from Morandi through the 1956 crisis, the student movement, 
both in its own practice and in its intervention in the factory, maintained the principle of 
autonomous class organizations, with their forms of decision-making and deliberation in 
the first person, as essential to a democratically organized class revolution. Third, the 
student movement had a lasting influence in the next stage of workerist thought by not 
only focusing on the process of capitalist reproduction, but by also raising specialized 
intellectual work, a theme that operaismo, as a theory, failed to take into account. Last, 
while the student movement introduced the “social factory” to include the student as part 
of the working class, there remained the problem of the wage relation as a determinant of 
class composition. The theme of the wage was central in workerist theory, and 
contributed its own problematic to the conceptualization of the social factory. In the next 
chapter, we turn to the wage as the principal claim of workers’ “material needs” during 
this cycle of struggle that began in the spring of 1969 and continues through 1972.  	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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE “SOCIAL FACTORY” AND WORKER’S LIBERATION FROM WORK: THE  
 
“HOT AUTUMN” AND WORKING CLASS REVOLUTION 
 
If the working class was up to this point mute, it is no longer the case. For this, to take the floor, 
not to manage their survival, but for self-examination and to put in discussion their proper 
existence, is an initial, but decisive moment of a radical transformation of life—Guido Viale, 
Lotta continua 
 
The refusal of work is the discovery of the possibility of the construction of a society in which the 
free worker collectivity will produce that which is useful for living, to satisfy the fundamental 
needs, outside of the absurd rules of productivity, and against the rules of productivity. The 
refusal of work is the refusal of both capitalism and socialism as forms of production that are 
based on the social extraction of profit. Refusal of work is both against the State and against 
work—Franco Piperno, Potere Operaio 
 
“War for liberation from work”—Slogan, Potere Operaio 
 
“Democracy is a pistol in the back of the workers”—Slogan, Potere Operaio 
 
Introduction 
 
The revolt at Corso Traiano demonstrated the arrival of an autonomous working class 
movement as a social and political force that contested not only the power relations of 
Turin’s “social factory” but of capitalist command in general. The workers’ militancy 
during the spring set the stage for an offensive strategy striking the heart of Italy’s 
approach to postwar political and economic development. The importance of Fiat has 
been noted in earlier chapters. The workers’ actions of 1969, aside from the strategic and 
symbolic importance of Fiat, were noteworthy for their magnitude as well as the 
possibility they offered for a political unification of the class struggle. Not only did the 
workers’ movement strike at the heart of Italian capital, but they were now, at Fiat’s 
Mirafiori, also engaged in an offensive attack against the largest automotive factory in 
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Europe.121 The “hot autumn,”122 as the fall struggles were coined, began in earnest in 
June and July, and lasted until, at least, 1973. It was during this period that Italian 
operaismo brought to fruition its decade-long political work.  
In this chapter, I focus on the role of intellectual work primarily inside the group 
Potere Operaio, giving particular focus to the writing of Antonio Negri. His contributions 
to operaismo are many, but emphasis here is given on theory of the State as a “Planner-
State,” his formulation of the Marxian concept of “crisis,” and his insistence on the 
connections between production and domination as the premise of a political praxis of 
working class revolution (Negri 2005, xlviii-xlix). Central to Negri’s writing was the 
tension that emerged between the workerist’s conceptualization of the “social factory” 
and “class composition.” That is, even as they saw the rise of the “mass worker” as an 
antagonistic force in the “hot autumn,” the struggles developed into the sphere of 
capitalist reproduction, ultimately, forced workerist theorists to confront their 
understanding of working class subjectivity. In short, during this cycle of struggle a 
social transformation demanded the reconsideration of the “mass worker” in lieu of the 
changing power dynamics of the class-capital relation in the post-hot autumn “social 
factory.” This chapter explains the historical trajectory of operaismo in terms of how 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 Aldo Cazzullo aptly depicts the magnitude of Fiat’s Mirafiori plant: “In the Spring of 
1969 Mirafiori is the largest European factory, bigger than Volkswagen of Wolfsburg. Thirty-
seven open doors along the perimeter of ten kilometers, three million meters squared, half 
covered: forty kilometers of assembly line, 223 air ducts, and thirteen underground galleries. A 
city in a city, protected by insurmountable walls against those who do not live there, but besieged 
during the hours of shift changes—five in the morning, one in the afternoon, ten at night—by 
young people distributing bundles of pamphlets, with police intended to watch them, and 
journalists to write about them. Behind the guarded doors each day fifty-five thousand people 
work, eighty-five percent of whom are blue-collar (operai)” (2006, 51). 
 
122 The phrase “l’autunno caldo” (hot autumn) was first used in the business paper, 24 
ore, in its August 21, 1969 issue as a general warning of workers’ insubordination against the 
“principle of authority” as the basis for postwar Italian capitalism as laid out by Angelo Costa, the 
head of the industrial group Confindustria, in the immediate postwar years.  
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their critique of political economy began to entail both the production and reproduction 
of capital. The culmination of this social transformation resulted, as is discussed in the 
next chapter, in the displacement of “worker centrality” towards a broader configuration 
of working class subjectivity. 
I begin this chapter with the fragmentation of the Turin student-worker assembly 
that gave way to the rise of the so-called “extra-parliamentary left.” Next, I turn to 
Antonio Negri’s formulation of the “planner-State,” his formulation of “crisis,” and his 
argument for a political organization of the autonomous working class. The last part of 
the chapter highlights the importance of Negri’s contribution to operaismo as the 
culmination of Tronti’s “strategy of refusal” in the construction of what Negri called the 
“workers’ party against work.” Negri’s central importance in this period resided in his 
formulation of the “social factory” as capitalist command over “social labor.”  
The demise of the student-worker assembly  
 
The prospects of an increasingly militant and autonomously organized working class 
grew throughout the summer of 1969. Sergio Garavini, who contributed to the first 
number of Quaderni Rossi and served in the Turin CGIL, later remarked: in the summer 
of 1969 “we did not control the strikes, Lotta continua did” (quoted in Punto Rosso 2009, 
62). [Lotta continua (continuous struggle) was the moniker stamped on the pamphlets 
coming out of the assembly and should not be confused with the soon-to-be-formed 
extra-parliamentary group.] Workers’ autonomy had confronted the hierarchical 
organization of the industrial relations system, not only in the factories with the formation 
of “united base committees” and assemblies, but also with the parliamentary-oriented 
trade unions and political parties. Moreover, theirs was a “continuous struggle” that went 
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beyond the formally established and regulated contractual battles and, for the time being, 
had broke with the accepted mode of industrial relations (Grandi 2003, 67).  
In late July, national leaders of the autonomous workers’ movement came 
together for the first time under the auspices of the “National Convention of the 
Autonomous Vanguard” at the Palazzo dello sport in Turin. The immediate purpose of 
the convention was to come to terms with their recent experience as a basis for forging a 
united front as they prepared for the fall contractual struggles. Importantly, the workers 
held the order of the meeting and they alone had the opportunity to speak; the “external” 
forces, the student movement and other political organizations, occupied a background 
role. Overall, the convention was a display of opposition to the entire political and 
economic order. However, when it came time to discern a way forward there were 
palpable ideological and strategic differences that permeated the convention. On the one 
hand, there was the future nucleus of the national organization Workers’ Power (Potere 
Operaio) as reflected in the group that made up the journal La Classe [The Classe] 
(Oreste Scalzone and Franco Piperno from Rome, Antonio Negri from Padua-Veneto, 
and Sergio Bologna and Giairo Daghini from Milan).123 On the other hand, there was the 
Turin student movement, which had allied itself with Potere Operaio of Pisa that 
included personalities such as Adriano Sofri, Guido Viale, and Luigi Bobbio. During the 
convention these diverse personalities remained within the broader archipelago of the 
Turin student-worker assembly. The group from Turin and Pisa had understood the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 For a history of the formation of La Classe as one of the two journals, Contropiano 
(literally “Against the plan,” or “Counterplan”) was the other, that linked together the theory and 
practice of operaismo between the demise of Classe Operaia and the birth of Potere Operaio, see 
Aldo Grandi’s La generazione degli anni perduti and Franco Berardi’s La nefasta utopia (2003, 
47-58; 1998, 76-82). 
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convention to be centered on the continued work of the assembly as the proper locus of 
workers’ autonomy. However, the group from La Classe utilized the occasion to make a 
push for greater organization by emphasizing the necessity of systematically putting the 
workers’ struggles and objectives into a concrete form of planning.  
Aside from these differences, the conference was successful in developing a 
united political platform for the autumn contractual struggles. The central claims focused 
on pay, hours, and equality: the abolition of work categories, a reduction of the work 
week from 48 to 40 hours, flat salary increases, and parity of pay between blue-collar and 
white-collar workers. The question of organization, and the tactical direction of the 
struggles, was left unresolved. The convention ended with the intention to meet again at 
the end of August, after the summer vacation. This never occurred. The unification of the 
autonomous struggles, while bearing potent possibilities, was torn asunder by the all-too-
familiar factional disputes and sectarian politics that, historically, have bedeviled 
attempts at the political organization of the working class.  
 Before discussing these differences more fully, it is worthwhile to point out that 
despite the emerging fissures, the convention operated under the shared understanding of 
a common nemesis, lumped under the general rubric of the “bosses,” a category that 
included those in the centers of power within the economy and the State, and those who 
had the power to make decisions on the overall arrangements and purpose of the political 
and economic institutions. While this certainly did not reflect a coherent and clearly 
defined theoretical position, it did reflect a general anti-capitalist attitude that understood 
the struggles to be concerned with the interconnections between the factory, the state, 
city, and communal bodies, housing, schooling, and services. There was also a shared 
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understanding of “worker centrality.” This concept, which is the focus of the next 
chapter, signified that the actual factory worker was the relevant subject of working class 
political practice. That is, the paid worker, the figure of labor-power, was widely agreed 
upon as the central figure of working class revolution. Moreover, the nature of working 
class subjectivity was also located in the common worker, or the “mass worker” 124 of 
Fordist production. Connected to this assumption was the centrality of the factory, the 
point of production, as the “Archimedean point” (Panzieri) of the broader “social 
factory.” Last, they widely accepted the salary as the central theme of the workers’ 
struggle, albeit with diverse justifications.  
It is important to point out that these shared assumptions were maintained for the 
most part even after the dissolution of the Turin student-worker assembly. Moreover, 
despite their differences, the two leading groups that emerged from the student-worker 
assembly at Turin—Workers’ Power and Continuous Struggle—shared enough in 
common so that they occupied similar political terrain, they often worked together, in 
general their members maintained amicable relations, and they were part of the same 
alignment of forces within the working class movement. However, often lumped together 
as the “extra-parliamentary left,” 125  the divisions between these two groups were 
substantial, both in theory and in practice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Roberto Zamarin created the figure of Gasparazzo in vignettes for the journal Lotta 
Continua as a symbol with two meanings: one as the mass worker, the other as an expression of 
cultural estrangement and oppression. This cartoon character continues to have significance in the 
Italian Left around worker and immigrant politics. Zamarin died on December 20, 1972 in an 
auto accident on his way to the North to deliver the journal for circulation (Zamarin 1972). 
 
125 The phrase “extra-parliamentary left” identified those groups of the “left” that were 
outside of the official political parties and, in general, rejected the political system of 
parliamentary democracy. It would be more correct to maintain, as Lotta Continua did, that they 
were not “extra-parliamentary,” but “anti-parliamentary” (quoted in Cazzullo 2006, 113). The key 
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We can examine the divergence and its effect along two lines of contention: 
organization and the contents of working class struggle. At the National Convention, the 
future group of Lotta Continua favored the continued use of the student-worker 
assembly. They gave priority to the act of struggle, in both the communicative and 
physical sense of action, and not to any specificity of claims. In general, this group 
privileged the role of action and its effect on raising the level of consciousness, not only 
of the workers, but also of a broader “proletarian” class. Following the positions of Viale, 
Bobbio, and Sofri, this group focused on those mechanisms designed for the 
“organization of consensus” and legitimacy within the social system (i.e., the family, 
schools, media, and such). Fundamentally, their position resided in the potential for 
individuals to remake themselves, to invent a new world by struggling against, and, 
ultimately, destroying the old.  
Against this so-called “ideological” and Third World “solidarity” position, the 
group centered around the very short-lived journal, La Classe, which would go on to form 
Potere Operaio, argued that an organizational direction to the struggles was needed, and 
that this should take place around the workers’ “material needs” as expressed by the role 
of salary within state-capital planning. For those in La Classe, the facts of July marked a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
groups that made up the constellation of the “extra-parliamentary left” were: Avanguardia 
Operaia (Workers’ Vanguard) [1968-1977]; Lotta Continua (Continuous struggle) [1969-1976]; 
Il Manifesto (The Manifesto) [1969- current]; Movimenti Lavoratori per il Socialismo (Workers’ 
Movement for Socialism) [1972-1976]; Potere Operaio (Workers’ Power) [1966/68-1973]; and 
the Unione Comunisti Italiani (Union of Italian Communists) [1969-1972]. There was, as well, an 
“extraparliamentary right,” with groups such as Ordine Nuovo (New Order); Avanguardia 
Nazionale (National Vanguard); and Fronte Nazionale (National Front) [Negrello 2004, 186]. 
Fervently anti-communist and neo-fascist, the “extra-parliamentary right” enters the story here in 
terms of their participation in State-led domestic counterinsurgency against the “left” (i.e., the 
overall working class) as part of the well-known “strategy of tension” that incorporated the 
military apparatus of NATO’s “stay-behind” program within the framework of “Operation 
Gladio” (Ganser 2005, 3-14, 63-83).  
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“qualitative jump” that “opened a new phase” of political work (Potere Operaio 1969, 1). 
In its most dramatic depiction, echoing Tronti’s rehabilitation of the party-form within 
operaismo, Franco Piperno wrote: “it is vain to insist on themes of workers’ autonomy…. 
[This is] by now a patrimony of the movement.” Rather, what was needed was the 
understanding of a “Leninism of tactics on the strategy” (1969).126 Piperno, like his 
comrades in PO, invoked Lenin to put emphasis on the need for the domination of a party 
(or organization) over the control and direction of the movement’s “cycle of social 
struggles.” The problem of organization focused on the need for a permanent body to 
communicate and coordinate political action. The culminating feature of this turn to 
organization was meant to impose a workers’ “counter-plan” against the bosses that 
entailed the “planning of the continuity of the struggle on the social terrain under the 
hegemony and guide of the workers’ vanguard” (Potere Operaio 1969, 2). The basis for 
this was evinced in the July events, which had demonstrated a working class revolt 
against the “social factory” led by the “mass worker.” It began from the factory as a sight 
of organization and enveloped the workers’ quarters around Fiat Mirafiori. Thus, the 
workers’ political organization should have begun with this working class subject and be 
organized on the basis of the leading slogan, “più soldi, meno lavoro” (more money, less 
work). In his analysis of the Keynesian State, a year before, Antonio Negri had set forth 
the theoretical basis for this claim. Before turning to that important article, I want to 
develop the differences between PO and LC more fully with respect to their theoretical 
character.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Oreste Scalzone, a Roman member of Workers’ Power, criticized the position of Lotta 
Continua in the following manner: “they touched on themes that made us laugh because they 
treated such themes as consciousness and populism, which are sentimental and less rigorously 
Marxian and workerist; they conquered the hearts of the children of the student movement” 
(Grandi 2003, 93-4).  
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The salary question 
  
For the activists in the Turin and Pisa movements, the proper locus of organization 
remained the student-worker assembly. In this body, they argued, it was most possible to 
cultivate what they considered to be the “subjective initiative” of the working class (Viale 
1973, 58). The assembly served in no small manner as a communicative body, a place for 
deliberation and decision-making that remained centered in the “spontaneity” of workers’ 
actions. At stake for this faction was the ability to maintain an existential dimension to 
the workers’ struggle in hopes of a rejection of capitalist social relations that focused on 
the cultivation of human connections. Guido Viale viewed the assembly as offering 
precisely this alternative: “the struggle, the assembly, and life in common, offers the 
possibility of having friends, of knowing them and making oneself known, of love. And 
this is without doubt the strongest foundation of organization as well as of the struggle” 
(1978, 171). For those who founded Lotta Continua, the transformative power of 
language, of the worker’s own expression, was central. Through the practice of speaking 
in the first person during assemblies and on the shop floor, workers were accounted for 
by their speech, rather than just by their physical actions, and this also established their 
individuality as human beings and not simply commodities understood collectively, and 
abstractly, as labor-power. Thus, language was a central bond that embodied the capacity 
for individual transformation beyond the objective categorization of political economy as 
part of the overall goal of achieving a “radical transformation of life” (Ibid; Bobbio 1979, 
37).  
 The assembly served as the organizational structure best suited for the 
development of a revolutionary consciousness, which, in itself, provided an indicator for 
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the contents of class struggle. The latter could not be introduced from outside, but could 
only emerge from the participant’s own understanding. On the importance of the 
workers’ voice as key to the cycle of struggle, Viale noted:  
If the working class was up to this point mute, it is no longer the case. For this, to take the 
floor, not to manage their survival, but for self-examination and to put in discussion their 
proper existence, is an initial, but decisive moment of a radical transformation of life 
(1978, 172).  
 
The struggles that began in the spring of 1969 had destroyed the stifling silence of 
workers’ existence in the system of neo-capitalism. The facts of July launched a struggle 
over the very contents of the “social factory,” against the fundamental parameters of 
capital’s control over people’s daily existence. Within the awareness of such affairs, 
Luigi Bobbio pointed out the disjunctive potential of this rupture with neo-capitalism’s 
“organization of consensus” and “social control.” Importantly this position claimed to 
reject an “ideological” dimension to revolution that favored an open approach to the 
content of working class struggle.  
For Lotta Continua, the class struggle hinged on the construction of a “common 
language.” To this end, the pamphlet served as an instrument that provided the “decisive 
means of communication” that was part of a “revolution in language,” away from the 
bureaucratic, party- and union-formulated slogans, toward a more common vernacular 
that included the use of dialect (Grandi 2003, 74). The struggles in the factory were only 
one component of this broader approach. The formation of tenement committees, the 
beginnings of a discourse on housework, and struggles centered on consumer practices 
(i.e., self-reduction of services) developed simultaneously with the workers’ organization 
taking place inside of the factories. For Lotta Continua, the need was to extend the 
experiences from Fiat in the spring to a broader organization of the working class within 
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the reproduction of capital. However, this could only occur through discussion and 
dialogue among and between those in the struggle. Their emphasis on communication 
within the class struggle was the basis for understanding the overall class position in the 
“social factory” of neo-capitalism; only through dialogue in the struggle could the class 
forge the necessary “modifications of consciousness” that was necessary to negate 
capitalist control (Ibid, 90).127 Thus, while they accepted the factory and the factory-
worker as the central feature of the cycle of struggles in 1968-9, this was by no means 
established a priori. Rather, the need was to continue the “overall expansion of workers’ 
autonomy with respect to all those aspects of despotism and control by capital” (Bobbio 
1979, 37 emphasis added).  
The importance of the struggles at Fiat were understood in terms of their capacity 
to serve as the foundation for a socialization of class struggle based on a “general 
consciousness” that had emerged during the struggles over such things as work 
conditions, salary, housing, transport, immigration, education, and the overall social 
division of labor. Within these parameters, the focus on the salary question served to 
highlight the “incentive character” of the institutions in a society founded on salaried 
work (Viale 1978, 176). In this regard, the salary was understood in terms of its ability to 
force people to work, to shape their life choices around the need for money to live, and, 
ultimately, as a despotic control over their individual lives by forcing them to sell their 
labor. (It should be pointed out that the with respect to the question of consumption and 
its connection to the reproduction of capital, the extra-parliamentary left remained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 It derived from LC’s interpretation that the national convention was based on the 
understanding that the central indication coming out of the struggles at Mirafiori was the 
“abolition of each barrier between the factory struggle, between the struggle for the salary and the 
struggle against the carovita (cost of living)” [Grandi 2003, 91-2].  
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virtually silent, in terms of theory, until the journal Rosso [Red] introduced it in 1976). 
Thus, the salary question was important as an instrument of struggle in which the 
workers’ negated themselves as labor-power, opening the way to the cultivation of their 
“human needs” outside the restrictive boundaries of their objective condition as workers, 
which could only be formulated by a “radical transformation” or “modification of 
consciousness” which only the workers themselves could effect.  
 If the analysis from Lotta Continua suffered from being overly “sentimental” and 
“less rigorously Marxian,” as Oreste Scalzone pithily concluded, it had the benefit of 
opening the way to a socialization of the struggle that derived from an understanding of 
the transformative capacity of dialogue and decision-making from the bottom-up; they 
entrusted to the movement a self-capacity for generating the political content of its own 
struggles. Moreover, their respect for the actual happenings of the struggles allowed them 
to point out the diverse political implications of these affairs.128 On this point, their 
critique of the group from La Classe was poignant. The latter made their organizational 
push on the basis of the workers’ salary claim, understood as the political expression of 
the workers’ “material needs.” Lotta Continua criticized this approach as “economistic” 
and deprived of an actual transformative capacity.129 According to Lotta Continua, the 
approach of La Classe reduced the pamphlet to a “list of objectives” that purported to 
focus on the “needs of workers.” Guido Viale criticized La Classe for its overly narrow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Similar sentiments were found in Raniero Panzieri’s position discussed in Chapter two 
and confirms Sofri’s widely recognized appreciation of not only Panzieri’s political analysis but 
also his moral character. This general sentiment, we can conjecture, also accounts for the fact that 
Lotta Continua did not become a centralized organization until 1973, whereas groups such as 
Workers’ Power took on a centralized party form in the aftermath of the “hot autumn” and the 
emergence of the “strategy of tension.”  
 
129 This critique was also made by others against Tronti’s introduction of the party-form 
in Chapter 4, and remains a problem for that particular strand of operaismo.  
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focus with the strong indictment that such an approach, at best, “renders them incapable 
of gathering all the political implications of a struggle of these dimension,” and, at worst, 
they only alluded to a quantification of salary claims with little to no actual 
transformation of social life or fundamental rupture with capitalist social relations (1973, 
58). In short, the Turin and Pisa movement rejected the narrow focus on salary claims as 
precluding the possibility of an existential dimension to the struggle that could be capable 
of forging a collective life outside of, and against, capital’s regime of social control. 
However, as we have seen, Lotta continua accepted the role that the salary had as a 
component of capital’s command over labor. But they equally rejected the reductionist 
demand for money as incapable of producing a revolutionary transformation of society. 
In short, the salary struggle was only one component of a much broader struggle for the 
“modification of consciousness” that alone was capable of opening the way to a 
revolutionary transformation of the social system. Against the group that formed 
Workers’ Power, Viale polemically concluded: “I have read all of the workerists, those of 
State and those of the movement, and, just like Voltaire in front of the bosses of the 
Church, I have only one comment to make: they will pay me!” (1978, 193).  
Viale’s reference to two branches of operaismo referred to the divisions that had 
occurred within the post-Classe Operaia journal Contropiano.130 As the forerunner to La 
Classe, this journal is of importance in the historical trajectory of operaismo for its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 Contropiano was formed by two divergent tendencies within operaismo: those who 
worked within the PCI, including Massimo Cacciari, Mario Tronti, and Albert Asor Rosa; and 
those who sought new forms of organization and political space such as Antonio Negri and 
Luciano Ferrari Bravo. The journal’s main importance here was in its theoretical development of 
the New Deal as an expression of the “Planner-State” and in Negri’s insistence that the “party” 
existed solely as an organ of “rupture” for workers’ power, not for mediation as Tronti held (see 
Berardi 1998, 76-82).  
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intellectual production, particularly that of Antonio Negri and his writings on the 
question of salary, the State, and a critique of Keynesian political economy. Negri’s 
discussion occurred in the context of a debate with both the reformist left and Mario 
Tronti’s discussion of the use of salary as a claim to be made within the State-party 
nexus, hence the allusion to State operaismo above. Tronti’s position, which was treated 
at the end of the fourth chapter, can be summarized accordingly: within advanced 
capitalist economies, the working class is the propulsive force of capitalist development 
whose “economic laws” can only be understood as “political forces.” Conceptually, these 
forces derived from an analysis of class relations centered on the salary-profit nexus, as 
capital and class: the former utilizes “planning” in order to maintain economic 
equilibrium; the latter must organize131 for a political rupture, based on the salary, of 
capitalist planning. In short, the point of disagreement between figures such as Negri and 
Tronti resided in the formers’ emphasis that, in order to overcome the relationship 
between salary and profit, organization had to be rooted in the movement and its 
organisms, not, as Tronti maintained, “within and against the party” and “within and 
against the state” (Tronti 1967; Tronti 1967a; Tronti 1968). 
In December 1967, the workerists of the “movement” held a seminary at Padua on 
the New Deal in the United States, capitalist state reform, and the workers’ struggle. The 
theoretical inspiration behind the discussion stemmed from Tronti’s analysis of Keynes’ 
“revolution of income” and developed this argument towards a theory of the State as the 
“planner-State” that entailed a radical rethinking of value and salary. Negri’s contribution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 The extent to which the difference over whether the class was to “organize” or “be 
organized” was reflected within operaismo and the broader left culture of autonomy. For purposes 
here, Tronti had laid out a specific “role” of the class organizing itself and its proper relationship 
with the party (see Chapter 4).  
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to the seminar was published in the first issue of Contropiano as “La teoria capitalistica 
dello stato nel’29: John M. Keynes” (The capitalist theory of the state in 1929: John M. 
Keynes) [1968]. In this article, Negri targeted the analysis of objective economic 
categories, particularly within reformist elements of the working class movement, in 
order to show how the “Planner-State” recognized working class autonomy and sought to 
control the class through the wage mechanism. Though not explicitly stated, Negri 
confronted Tronti’s claim that an autonomous working class, politically organized, could 
coexist with capitalist reformism, the “within and against” approach. The upshot of 
Negri’s article was that it set forth the argument for a political rupture based on an 
analysis of the politically determinant role of the State in economic development. In 
short, against Tronti et al, Negri argued for the possibility of a working class subjectivity 
that could be organized outside the limits imposed by capitalist development (Berardi 
1998, 77).  
Negri’s article began with the premise that capital, from 1917 through WWII, had 
been forced to recognize the working class as the only actor capable of threatening the 
system’s very existence. The rise of the working class, as a political force, pushed 
economists to go beyond theories of “natural equilibrium.” Negri wrote: “Say’s Law is no 
longer valid because the variables of economic and political equilibrium have changed: to 
them are added the autonomy of the working class” (1968, 20). A political solution was 
required, and, for Negri, Keynes was the first to grasp this reality by introducing the State 
as a productive actor as well as a guarantor of capitalist “convention” that functioned to 
maintain a politically determined equilibrium of income and profit accumulation.  
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According to Negri, the key to Keynes’ General Theory rested on his formulation 
of “effective demand.” Against classical economic theories of “natural equilibrium,” this 
concept brought into the domain of economics the “political notion” of power relations 
between the working class and capital (Ibid, 28). The problem that Keynes posed for 
economics was how to gear the “aim of politics” towards the “sublimation” of the 
working class within capitalist development. The key determinant in this model, 
following Tronti’s earlier analysis, centered on the salary, or on wage-units. Since 
“variations in the propensity to consume are essentially variations in income,” salary, and 
by extension labor-power, Negri argued, comes to be understood as the “ultimate 
independent variable” of capitalist development. The policy conclusions of Keynes’ 
attempt to come to terms with the crisis of the thirties demonstrated the actual risk 
inherent in a politically autonomous working class. Negri wrote:   
From now on the work of political economy will be that of imposing a continuous 
revolution of income to sustain the propensity to consumption, overall production, 
investments, in order to determine the only politically possible equilibrium, which will be 
effective only with the acceptance of the inherent risks and precariousness of a relation of 
open forces. To assume the conflict between classes, to resolve it each day in a way 
favorable to the development of capital: this is the spirit of the theory of effective demand 
(Ibid, 31).  
 
The State, according to Negri’s reading of Keynes was the only actor capable of 
formulating and sustaining this equilibrium. Negri argued that with Keynes we were no 
longer living in a laissez-faire state of “rights,” but now had to come to understand the 
State as a productive actor, an integral economic actor. Ultimately, Negri argued, 
“collective capital” must rely on the State’s ability to extend its tentacles into society and 
manage a political and economic equilibrium that could hedge against the inherent “risk” 
of an autonomously organized political working class.  
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This critique of Keynesian development gave rise to a new historical form of the 
capitalist State, as an equivalence of the function of the state relative to the form of 
Keynesian development. In short, economic development required a “Planner-State” 
capable of applying a “series of mechanisms of equilibrium … readjusted from time to 
time by a regulated phasing of the ‘incomes revolution’” (Ibid, 13). Taking stock of the 
working class’s “impact” on development, state intervention was considered a “technical 
necessity” for the preservation of the system, understood as “guaranteeing the certainty of 
convention” (Ibid, 25). This idea of convention was influenced by Luciano Ferrari 
Bravo’s focus on the juridical form of capital during the New Deal, that identified the 
social bases of norms and values that became identified in the “planner-state” as the 
“exclusive collective representative of productive capital”; that is, a state of social capital 
(Ferrari Bravo 1971).132 This tendency towards “social capital,” Negri argued, aimed for 
the end of the “rentier state,” so that it now becomes a “productive subject,” understood 
as “the prime mover of economic activity” (1968, 31). Importantly, social capital, 
because of the working class, had to conquer the State as a mechanism for the social 
organization of capital. The critique of “theories of equilibrium” uncovered the point that 
the need to control the inherent “risk” of the system – the politically organized working 
class—implied that, as Marx maintained, “the whole of society would be transformed 
into one gigantic factory” (Ibid, 21).  
 Capital’s response to working class political power was to destroy the “state of 
rights” in favor of the “Planner-State” as a mechanism for extending capitalist control 
over society. A function of this State was that it served as an integrating mechanism by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 For Negri’s later reflections on the importance of Ferrari Bravo, see Luciano Ferrari 
Bravo Ritratto di un Cattivo Maestro: con Alcuni Cenni Sulla Sua Epoca (Negri 2003).  
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which the working class could be incorporated into a reformist framework that would 
include some form of working class participation in defining the form of “organization 
and repression” necessary for the continued development of productive forces and 
economic development. Negri wrote:  
Capital is now obliged to move to the social organization of that despotism, to diffuse the 
organization of exploitation throughout society, in the new form of a planning-based state 
which – in the particular way in which it articulates organization and repression 
throughout society – directly reproduces the figure of the factory (Ibid, 30 emphasis in 
original).  
 
Social capital reflected the tendency whereby social relations were determined by the 
commodity-form as the proper goal and aspiration of a class politics.  
Negri’s critique went well beyond this reformist position to include a rejection of 
the workers’ council tradition, state socialism, trade unionism, and other working class 
models that limited themselves to an understanding of class relations solely in “objective” 
terms (i.e., labor-power, a neutral conception of technology, etc.…). The polemic against 
these aspects of working class politics rested ultimately, as we will see below, on the 
conceptualization of a working class that politically focused on the negation of capitalist 
social relations, on the rejection of production as inherently connected to capitalist 
domination, rather than on any positive content. Importantly, Negri made the argument of 
why the state should be included as a “productive actor” and how, strategically, it should 
be negated, and not taken over. One consequence of this critique was that not only did 
those “reformist” components of left fail to produce a rupture with capital, but he also 
implicitly offered an explanation of why state-socialist and state-communist regimes had 
reproduced capitalist social relations.   
The upshot of Keynes’ analysis, Negri maintained, was the introduction of the 
“planner-State” as a solution based on the technical management of a political and 
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economic equilibrium in order to guarantee a form of capital accumulation. Theoretically, 
Keynes’ solution, at best, reflected a situation where, as Marx described, “capital 
becomes communist”—a social order where money would reflect nothing other than a 
“general symbol of equivalence between commodities produced… [And] the law of value 
would come to govern the entirety of development” (Ibid, 32). This ideal-type of a 
communistic form of capitalism would not eradicate the endemic nature of exploitation, 
but would merely generalize this condition into a system of control over the entire 
society. Exploitation was considered essential to the power relations within the 
productive system as expressed in the law of value. The role of the State, in turn, was to 
constantly correct the equilibrium, fixing the “distortions” internal to the market-based 
system of profit. Negri, following Tronti, argued that the wage-unit was the key 
“distortion,” the central expression of working class rejection of the commodity and 
profit system. On this basis, the demand for more wages, and on an equal basis that were 
not linked to productivity, demonstrated that the wage was the “truly independent 
function within the process of capitalist accumulation” (Ibid, 33 emphasis added).  
Negri’s reading of Keynes re-affirmed the centrality of the wage as the unifying 
demand of the working class, as the key to developing the political power of the working 
class as a revolutionary force against not only the bosses of social capital, but to its true 
source of power, as expressed in the new function of the “planner-State.” Negri critiqued 
the reformist position on the State by positing a general “mystification” that existed along 
the lines expressed by Keynesian development. His criticism went beyond their glossing 
over of the State’s role as guarantor of convention through technical management to 
focus on its “increased use of violence.” As guarantor of the existing order of things, the 
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State was forced to rely on “violence” in order to impose equilibrium in a situation of 
dynamic class struggle. Negri wrote:  
In a situation where the relationship between the classes has become dynamic, any 
attempt to create a new equilibrium is bound to be insecure, and it becomes impossible to 
stabilize movement around a fixed point. The only option in such a situation is to place 
one’s faith in power, as a separate and distinct reality (Ibid, 35).133 
 
This insight into the planner-State was revealed by the end of 1969 with the onset of 
state-violence as part of the burgeoning “strategy of tension”—a military strategy 
designed to terrify the population by an exhibition of massive state power (while 
attributing the violence to the workers’ movement) that was intended to create disorder 
and assert the role of the State as the guarantor of peace and order. If Keynes had 
understood wage rigidity to be the weak point of capitalist development, then Negri 
argued that the demand for wages was the central demand capable of consolidating and 
unifying a working class subject.134 And when this demand started to become a reality, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 This passage was more acutely stated by Negri in his subsequent article, “Marx on 
Cycle and Crisis,” where he wrote: “up until this point, the State had been seen as a guarantor of 
the fundamental relationship within development, as the force promoting a dynamic readjustment 
of its repressive mechanism. But now an absolute and decisive State power seeks to establish 
itself as an immanent force and to organize the process directly” (Negri 1968a). 
 
134 The use of the term working class is meant here as a concept distinct from the term 
labor-power. The wage struggle is understood here not in economic terms, but in its political 
component. Negri’s interpretation of Keynes had demonstrated the political determination of 
development, and thus of the wage. He wrote: “The ‘ultimate independent variable’ that underlies 
his [Keynes] thinking is ‘the wage-unit as determined by the bargains reached between employers 
and employed.’ It is here, around this motife, that Keynes’ theory reveals itself for what it is: it 
recognizes and makes use of the power of the working class, in all its autonomy. The class can be 
neither put down nor removed: the only option is to understand the way it moves, and regulate its 
revolution” (1968, 29). Negri reaffirmed this in his later discussion of class composition in 
“Archaeology and Project”: “...given a certain level of capitalist development, the concept of 
labor-power … becomes dissolved. Instead of capital/labor-power there is capital/working class: 
the working class now constituted an independent polarity within capitalist development” (1982, 
206, emphasis in original).  
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the violence of the state revealed itself with dire consequences for the autonomous 
workers’ movement. 
The workers’ movement, the rise of extra-parliamentary groups, and the “hot 
autumn” 
 
When the Fiat workers returned to their factories in Turin from August vacation, they 
confronted two diverse tendencies. On the one hand, the official union movement was in 
the process of forging its unity in an attempt to recapture the initiative with the factory 
workers. On the other hand, the student-worker assembly, which exemplified an 
alternative form of decision-making, was beginning to splinter into smaller extra-
parliamentary groups. With regards to the former, the trade union approach to unification 
was based on their overall strategy to regain control over the workers’ movement. During 
the summer, unions had “lost control” over the working class’s political initiative. To 
counter this tendency, they adopted as their official strategy the need to “cavalcare la 
tigre del movimento” (“ride the tiger of the movement”). This approach was based on the 
inclusion of claims emerging out of the workers’ base (which was simply worker-
oriented and without union or party affiliation) into contractual struggles. The unions 
sought, on the one hand, to reestablish the system of representation in union organization 
and, on the other hand, to force the bosses into a new industrial relations system with 
more trade union power and recognition at the company level (Punto Rosso 2009, 66). 
This last maneuver, which found success through the “hot autumn” and beyond, was 
particularly popular in the factories; alas the workers felt as if the base had considerable 
control over the union bureaucracy and leadership, and that they could achieve some 
elementary gains—a position that was palpable in workers’ contractual affairs until the 
end of 1971 (Barkan 1984, 75-77).  
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Within this framework of the push for trade union unity and the splintering apart 
of the autonomous movement the actual workers’ movement (the base movement) found 
itself confronted by competing tendencies that quickly constrained the political space, 
and the possibilities for struggle, of the movement. (As we will see below, the revolt at 
Corso Traiano may have marked the emergence of the “social factory” as the basis for a 
new revolutionary approach to jettisoning the capitalist system. However, if so, this point 
seems either to have been a missed opportunity or the high point of a cycle of struggles 
that, in hindsight, was part of the structural demise of Fordism. If the latter was the case, 
as many workerists believed, then the Keynesian model of development, and the mass 
worker were no longer the keys to understanding working class politics.) What is 
interesting here were the errors of the groups coming out of the national vanguard 
conference and the consequences, both theoretical and practical, that their positions had 
on the subsequent trajectory of workers’ autonomy.135 In the end, the formation of extra-
parliamentary groups was a serious setback for workers’ autonomy. The tragedy, of 
course, was that the movement’s most militant and enthusiastic proponents failed to make 
good on their innovations in conducting politics and shirked back from the creative 
aspects of the movement in order to resurrect the party-form, a model of organization that 
constantly reappeared within operaismo, but only with great difficulty and in tension with 
the spirit of this body of thought. Sergio Bologna, one of the founders of Workers’ 
Power, later offered a severe critique of the decision to form the national group:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Negri, while not critiquing the push towards political organization in the party form, 
viewed the rupture as “both an inevitable fact and an undeniably damaging fact for the whole 
movement” (2007, 99). His own renunciation of the party form, in subsequent years, derived from 
what he considered to be the “social indeterminateness of the figure of the mass worker” (1982, 
212).  
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[…] we were mistaken to found Potere Operaio, we were mistaken to found an extra-
parliamentary group. We needed to continue to work in the social realm, to construct 
alternatives there, to construct workers’ centers, to construct social centers, alternative 
spaces, liberated spaces: we were mistaken, we were under the allure of the old idea, the 
old ambition of conquering power…. The history of the extra-parliamentary groups was 
in large part a history of shit, because they wanted to reproduce traditional politics, the 
party dynamic (2001, 8).  
 
The error of reproducing the party dynamic within the autonomous workers’ movement 
also included with it the same type of “political” fractions that the workers’ themselves 
had already rejected in their solidarity and cooperation in the form of assemblies and in 
their organizations within the factory. When the workers at Fiat returned from vacation, 
and by late August when the faction of Workers’ Power returned to Fiat, they were 
confused and bewildered to be receiving two competing pamphlets, one from the Turin 
and Pisa movement, the other from Workers’ Power.  
Initially this had little effect on the workers’ commitment to struggle, but it had 
more profound implications in terms of workers’ organization and the trade unions’ 
strategy for recapturing their position in the factories. For example, in early September 
the struggle at Mirafiori renewed with intensity as three thousand workers in the 32nd 
office conducted a wildcat strike. Fiat promptly responded by suspending and laying-off 
the most militant workers and those who participated in the action. General Secretary of 
the Metal-mechanics union, Bruno Trentin, asserted: “this was retribution for the strikes 
of July” (in Grandi 2003, 101). The affair marked a continuation in the cycle of struggles 
leading to the autumn contractual affairs. The unions responded by calling a general 
strike among all categories of workers. Fiat rescinded the lay-offs. The balance of power 
had changed in favor of the working class. But with competing sects forming in the 
student-worker assembly there was little in the way of an autonomous political 
organization of the workers. In its place, workers began forming more substantive 
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representative bodies in the workplace. The delegate system that had been formed in May 
began spreading throughout Italian industry giving rise to the new figure of the worker-
delegate as a representative of a relatively homogenous sector of workers in departments 
and offices within the workplace. Thus, even before the autumn contracts, workers had 
resorted back to representative forms of democracy and tied their organization to the 
factory, a strategic move that benefited the unions’ position against the more general, 
“political” aims of the movement. 
As part of their overall strategy of “riding the tiger” of the movement, the unions 
accepted the delegate structure. Unlike the existing Internal Commissions,136 which were 
based on electoral votes along party and trade union lines, the new delegate structure was 
open to all workers, displaying a unity from the base that the union officials were 
frantically trying to emulate at the vertexes of their organizations. Within the burgeoning 
extra-parliamentary left, both Lotta Continua and Potere Operaio rejected the delegate 
structure. The latter, with its focus centered on the political organization of the working 
class, rejected the delegate structure as serving the union’s demand of “more power in the 
factory” (Grandi 2003, 102). For the militants in Potere Operaio, the point of the 
September struggles was not for an increase in power within the factory; rather, the 
factory was seen as a place for political organization against capital and the launching of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 In terms of the system of representation, at its peak, the Internal Commission at 
Mirafiori consisted of 21 members that represented 56,000 workers (Partridge 1996, 89). At its 
peak in 1965, in the metallurgical industry, the Internal Commission had 1,023 members who 
represented 552,148 workers. The IC was composed along party and union lines. Voting was 
deeply politicized, as discussed in Chapter 2. By contrast, the delegates arose as a way to take 
control in the workplace against foremen, the union’s bureaucratic presence, and to force 
employers to implement contractual provisions. Delegates were elected by secret ballot. There 
was no list for nominees; each worker simply wrote down a choice for delegate. Each delegate 
was immediately recallable. The ratio of worker to delegate initially was approximately 60 to 50 
delegates per worker (Ibid, 81). 
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a “general political conflict” (1969, 4). Their objective was to “politicize all the workers,” 
to move from the phase of the “political recomposition of the working class to the 
political organization of the workers” (1969a, 2). Lotta Continua, for its part, rejected the 
delegate structure with the slogan “Siamo tutti delegati!” (We are all delegates!). In 
principle, their refusal of bureaucracy, combined with the advocacy of direct democracy 
and autonomy, exemplified in the assembly, provided the justification for their refusal of 
institutional mediation and reforms. Moreover, like those in Potere Operaio, LC saw in 
the formation of permanent delegates the union strategy to regain control over the 
workers’ base movement.  
The rejection of the workers’ delegate structure demonstrated a limitation in the 
workerist’s approach to the actual affairs of the working class. This was based primarily 
on more abstract conceptual matters, such as their interpretation of working class 
subjectivity in terms of the “mass worker,” but it also was the result of a virtually 
complete abandonment of the practice of workers’ inquiry or “co-research.” Lotta 
continua, for its part, tended to mythologize “Gasparazzo” and imbued him with such 
potency that revolution seemed inevitable. These abstract conceptions of working class 
life seemed to scarcely resonate with the workers, especially with their own opinion of 
the new delegate structure. For example, in recounting the September agitations, Dino 
Antonioni, a worker in office 32, described the importance of the affair for the workers’ 
sense of power and their ability to overcome their fear and temerity:  
Each delegate, when he was presented to the head of the office, had with him his roll of 
paper with the signatures of the workers that delegated him. This was something because 
they had all overcome their own fear: the workers, by signing for the delegate, felt 
themselves as representatives of a real movement…. we had directly managed 
everything—the strikes, the marches, and the assemblies—overcoming the union (Polo 
1989, 84-5). 
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The difficulty for the workers of this office was not necessarily in their lack of political 
organization or lack of direct democracy and rejection of bureaucracy, but in their 
capacity (or lack thereof) to generalize their office struggle to other offices; that is, they 
were unable at this point to overcome the segmentation of the workforce (i.e., division of 
labor) within the factory. In spite of the competing interests and tendencies within the 
workers’ movement, the delegate structures provided an organizational form, controlled 
by all the workers who participated, that could be used to prepare the upcoming 
contractual struggles. In fact, the workers at the base level maintained the initiative in 
designing the their demands, with the external actors (the trade unions, parties, and extra-
parliamentary groups) adjusting themselves to try and capture the workers’ initiative and 
direct it towards their own ends. The example of the metal-mechanics contractual 
struggle demonstrates this point. 
The contractual demands of the metal and mechanical unions reflected the 
participatory spirit of the rank and file, the force of the so-called “mass worker” in the 
Fordist model of production, and offered a coherent expression of the workers’ desires 
stemming from the militant actions of the past year. Their demand for participation was 
evident from the fact that leading up to the contract proposal some three hundred 
thousand workers debated the platform in 2,300 assemblies around the country (Drago et 
al 1971, 122).  Moreover, they equally expressed the desire to control their own time and 
pace of work by demanding the right to assemble and hold meetings in the factory during 
work time. Reflecting the general desire to assert more control over their lives, both 
inside and outside the factory, the contractual demands included: equal salary raises for 
all, a reduction of the work week to 40 hours for all categories, movement towards 
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normative parity between operai (blue-collar workers) and impiegati (white-collar 
workers), equalization of salary for those under twenty years old, and the right of 
assembly and meetings in the factory (Ibid; Foa 1975, 185).  
These demands struck at the core of the capitalist organization of production in 
postwar Italy. Workers had expressed a rejection of the deadening pace of work, the 
continued hazardous conditions, the arbitrarily designed category system, the division of 
labor, and the power of the foremen on the shop floor. In short, the southern migrant had 
given vitality, in the expression of the “mass worker,” which represented the core of an 
autonomously organized working class against labor in general. In particular, they 
rejected the older generation’s conception of work ethic that understood work as an 
activity done with pride and dedication. Now, with the enervating effects of the 
production line, the spiritual basis for this appraisal of labor and the work ethic no longer 
held. This “refusal of work,” as Potere Operaio theorized, was particularly evident from 
the forms of struggle that workers engaged in throughout the fall as a tactical approach to 
forcing their power in the contractual negotiations.  
 During the fall, workers’ actions within the workplace and in communities were 
limited in nature but specifically directed at capitalist control. To a much less extent did 
they engage in general strikes, which reflected the strength of their unity and power at the 
base, but also their general weakness, organizationally, at the national level (and this 
quickly became evident with regards to the South). In order to control the pace of work, 
and to continue the struggles beyond the contractual negotiations, workers conducted 
internal strikes such as the sciopero a scacchiera (checkerboard strikes), the sciopero a 
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singhiozzo (hiccup strike), and the salto della scocca (skipping pieces). 137  As a 
complement to these tactics, workers frequently engaged in internal strikes that, by 
design, gave expression to their power and control over the factory. It was during these 
actions that the use of violence became readily accepted within the movement. Often 
directed against foremen, white-collar workers, and management, internal strikes were 
occasions to force recalcitrant workers to become political, to take a stand and make a 
choice between friend and foe. Both Lotta Continua and Potere Operaio exalted this role 
of violence. A pamphlet from the former was standard. The priority was to control the 
political climate in the workplace, to disrupt the work activity and then the workers could 
move beyond the factory as a site of struggle:  
The march cannot leave the factory if it has not, after conducting a procession in the 
various offices and having thrown out all the scabs (i crumiri).  
 In the moments of struggle such as next Tuesday, we need to begin to strike 
them. In the assemblies, in the marches, when we are all united we need to spit on them 
and ridicule them. We need to identify them by first and last name, beginning with the 
dirtiest rat (carogne) and threaten to make him pay dearly (Cazzullo 2006, 69). 
 
In no small sense these actions within the factory took on the image of guerrilla warfare, 
of class struggle as low-intensity conflict, where violent actions within the factory were 
seen, as most actions were, as moments for increasing workers’ power within the factory. 
To these ends, in 1969, Fiat workers registered 20 million strike hours, production 
declined by 3.3 percent, and they destroyed 277,000 vehicles (Ibid, 75-6). But it is 
important that violence here was not viewed as having any particular role outside of its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 A checkerboard strike consisted of an internal strike whereby one group or department 
of workers stopped working for a period of time, passing throughout the factory. A hiccup strike 
signified a very brief factory-wide stoppage of work continued in successive moments during the 
workday. And skipping pieces on the line involved workers—welders, for example, skipping 
every few pieces that moved down the production line.   
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instrumental value in expanding workers’ power through the enforcement of a rigid form 
of workers’ unity.  
In the fall of 1969, Potere Operaio produced articles on the question of violence—
“Sì alla violenza operaia” [Yes to workers’ violence], “Fiat—La violenza operaia come 
strumento di lotta” [Fiat—workers’ violence as an instrument of struggle], and “1960-
1970 Dalla guerriglia di fabbrica alla lotta per il potere” [1960-1970 From the factory 
guerrilla to the struggle for power]—that emphasized its instrumental use towards 
organization and the generalization of the struggle (1969b; 1969c; 1969d). The role of 
violence was accepted as a component of the overall expansion and “radicalization of the 
struggle” (1969c). During this phase, the importance of an autonomous organization 
derived from the factory struggles that aimed at extending and radicalizing those 
struggles throughout society and against the State. With the metal and mechanics strike in 
late November, which followed a general strike two weeks earlier, the movement seemed 
to be gathering the type of unity and intensity that Potere Operaio had sought to harness 
into an organized force.  
 As the contractual deadline approached the trade unions called a nationwide 
general strike. An estimated 20 million Italians joined the strike. And, at the end of 
November, the metal and mechanical workers marched and picketed in Rome (Barkan 
1984, 76). For Potere Operaio the class conflict had reached a “mass level,” that is, the 
contract battles were seen as one part of a broader continuous struggle against capital that 
extended through housing and the refusal to pay rent, the student struggle for a 
guaranteed income, workers in the South, against price increases, et cetera. Against the 
reformists, they argued that there could be no distinction within these spheres of class 
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conflict; they were inextricably intertwined in the process of capitalist production and 
reproduction. Based on worker centrality, it was the purpose of the working class to make 
“use” of the contractual struggles as a basis to extend the class conflict to society in the 
name of the “workers’ interests” (Potere Operaio 1969e). The class war, of which 
contractual struggles served a particular role, was between two diametrically opposed 
enemies: the goal of the struggles was to ignite a working class war against capitalist 
control “in all of its articulations” (Comitato Operaio di Porto Marghera 1970). Within 
the “social factory” no institution was outside the “form” of capital. In November, Potere 
Operaio expressed the overall nature of class revolt in the social factory:  
The workers’ use of these claims consists … in making them function as an extension to 
all of society from the struggles and from the factory organization…. The refusal to pay 
rent, to pay at canteens and for transport can be identified as moments of establishing ties 
[collegamento] between factory and factory … in the mode of bringing together and 
developing the attack … on capitalist society (1969e).  
 
Thus, if the factory was the central “social terrain,” as “the place where class struggle 
converges,” the “salary relation” was the “terrain of struggle” capable of cementing a 
unified class struggle against the “overall mechanism of development of the social 
system” (Comitato Operaio di Porto Marghera 1970; Potere Operaio 1969g). The 
centrality of the factory was intended to serve as an organizational model that was 
extended to social struggles based on money through the practice of self-reduction of 
prices. Within the factory this organizational push was based on the conceptualization of 
the working class’s “refusal of work” as well as the salary question. On the basis of these 
claims, Potere Operaio sought a worker’s organization as a counter-power and negation 
of the “planner-State” (Negri 2007, 105).  
The conceptualization of the “refusal of work” embodied the force of a working 
class subjectivity that rejected capitalist despotism in the overall process of production. 
	   322	  
Within Potere Operaio, the slogan came to be understood by Franco Piperno as a direct 
rejection of the principle of productivity. “The refusal of work,” he wrote,  
is the discovery of the possibility of the construction of a society in which the free worker 
collectivity will produce that which is useful for living, to satisfy the fundamental needs, 
outside of the absurd rules of productivity, and against the rules of productivity. The 
refusal of work is the refusal of both capitalism and socialism as forms of production that 
are based on the social extraction of profit. Refusal of work is both against the State and 
against work (Potere Operaio 1969f, 3).   
 
Worker’s revolution was viewed as a negation of capitalist development, as a politically 
determined mechanism of capitalist despotism over the working class. To this extent, 
Potere Operaio was in open conflict with the historic left. Their frustration with the 
“reformists” was a recurring affair throughout the decade that now had considerable 
importance as the trade unions had undertaken a policy of unification and had recognized 
the workplace delegate structures.138 Conceptually, the unions and the parties of the 
workers movement were seen as operating within a capitalist framework: they accepted 
the worker as a variable of capital defined through the concept labor-power. At best, 
Potere Operaio believed, the union sought to transform the class’s political expression 
into a form of economic power: from the self-management of the struggles to self-
management of the relations of production, of labor. However, for those in Potere 
Operaio, worker demands made during a contractual struggle were “polemical,” in 
Tronti’s sense. They were not based on any recognition of “labor value,” which was the 
open position of the CGIL leadership,139 but on the ability of the class to take control 
over the social wealth. At a minimum, Potere Operaio argued, it was impossible to speak 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  For a discussion of trade union unity during the autumn 1969 contracts, see 
Movimento Sindacale e Contrattazione Collettiva (Drago et al. 1971, 121-131).  
 
139 The official position was presented by Luciano Lama, who became the national 
secretary of the CGIL in 1970: “the basis for retribution needs to continue to be the value of 
labor” (Potere Operaio 1969g, 3). 
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of “labor value” without accepting the already existing social hierarchy, an order based 
on the existence and domination of capital. The working class’s political expression was 
needed in order to impose a new social order, with new values around time, rules, and 
methods. In short, the political expression of the working class had to assume a rejection 
of the factory (and with it a rejection of the concepts inherited from an “objectivist” 
approach to the working class—labor power, labor value, variable capital, et cetera), a 
negation of productivity as the ruling norm, and a negation of the commodity form as the 
basis for social relations, of social organization.  
 Given their instrumental approach to the contract, and their rejection of 
institutional mediation as irretrievably bound up with capitalist despotism, it was 
expected that, when the metal and mechanical workers contract was signed in December, 
Potere Operaio decried it as the first “rip-off” (bidone) [Potere Operaio 1969h]. The 
unions, for their part, while not being able to win all of the workers’ demands, had 
achieved significant gains that included: a reduction of the work week to 40 hours within 
a three year span; equal salary increases across the board; limits on overtime; increases in 
vacation time; the right of assembly; and guarantees against disciplinary abuse (Foa 
1975, 187). The unions’ ability to organize and fight for these gains marked a turning 
point in the workers’ struggles, and in the relations between the trade unions and rank-
and-file workers. The newly formed extra-parliamentary groups, subsequently, would 
find it that much more difficult to organize general support among the workers. After all, 
for those not affiliated with a particular group there was always the workplace delegate 
structure, and the unions. And with the latter’s organizational capacity to achieve real 
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gains, the “hot autumn” turned towards a renewal of trade-unionism to the detriment of 
the wider alignment of the autonomous workers’ movement (Punto Rosso 2009, 65-8).  
The question of institutional mediation was a shortcoming for the workerist’s 
analysis of the “social factory” in terms of its functional use and as a mechanism for 
making people’s lives easier while also continuing to expand and generalize the working 
class struggle against capitalist despotism. Thus, while they correctly identified the need 
to “jealously defend” the autonomy of the assembly, they did not extend this logic to the 
defense of gains that, despite emanating from the workers’ base, had been seemingly 
tainted by the reformist unions. Thus, in spite of the fact that the contract met 90% of the 
workers’ demands, Potere Operaio lashed out against the union’s declaration of 
“victory.” They wrote: “it is in the measure in which the Union cries victory that the 
working class, another time betrayed, recognizes how the union is an institution 
functional to capitalist development and not to the workers’ existence” (Comitato 
Operaio di Porto Marghera 1970, 53). It is this position, the rigid rejection of institutional 
mediation, and their failure to recognize the delegate structures, that was partly 
responsible for the ability of the trade unions to win support from those workers who did 
not identify with the extra-parliamentary groups or with their critique of unionism along 
with the overall validity of syndicalism and libertarian left ideas. However, this does not 
mean that the metal and mechanical workers contract was a defeat for Potere Operaio or 
for Lotta Continua. But, as we see below, the implications for both groups’ political 
direction were intimately connected to this general lack of presence within the factory.  
As 1969 came to a close the register of Italian labor conflict affirmed that Italy 
was a country of class struggle. During the year over five and a half million workers went 
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on strike with a total of more than 520 million worker-hours occupied by worker 
disobedience and protest. And following on the general momentum that climaxed in July 
at Corso Traiano, the gains won during the contracts were viewed as “just the beginning” 
(Barkan 1984, 77). But the workers’ movement, and the Italian populace, was in for a 
rude awakening as occult forces in the State and in the extra-parliamentary right were 
hell-bent on preventing the rise of workers’ power. Indeed, in his epic film, Novecento, 
Bertolucci drove home the central meaning of post-Fascist Italy: the bosses remained and 
they still had power. If workers’ autonomy had correctly analyzed the “social factory” as 
the proper locus of working class revolution, and had successfully developed this strategy 
from the militancy of the mass worker of the Fordist factory, it was the reactionary forces 
that unleashed a terroristic counter-insurgency operation against the workers’ movement. 
On the morrow of the “hot autumn” the willingness of the State to resort to violence 
against its own citizens was revealed with horrifying consequences.  
Piazza Fontana and the origins of the “strategy of tension” 
The intensification and expansion of the workers’ movement, including the rise of the 
student movement and various organizational advancements in society against the 
accumulation of capital, was met by a continued escalation of tension and violence by 
forces opposed to the working class movement. In the fall of 1969 these opaque forces 
gained national attention with the bombing of December 12th at the Banca Nazionale 
della Agricoltura (National Bank of Agriculture) in Milan’s Piazza Fontana. The square, 
tucked under the towering presence of the city’s duomo, is located in the heart of Milan. 
Significantly, across the street from the bank’s entrance was the former Hotel 
Commercio, which was occupied by student-workers the year before, becoming Milan’s 
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first “social center” (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 258-61).140 The bombs were set to 
explode at 4:30 on a Friday afternoon. The timing was designed to coincide with closing 
of the bank—it was the only bank operating with such late hours, the others having 
already closed. The attack was also directed at the farmers and small proprietors in the 
peripheral area of Milan who came to the city on Fridays to conduct their transactions. 
Within minutes of the bank’s doors closing, and with the clients still inside conducting 
their affairs, a small bag on the floor exploded tearing apart the banks interior and those 
in it.141 At the same time an unexploded ordinance was found in Milan’s Piazza della 
Scala—about a kilometer diagonal from Piazza Fontana. Within an hour three bombs 
exploded in Rome, though with much less devastation. At the National Bank of 
Agriculture sixteen customers died and forty-five were injured. Overall, the December 
12th bombings produced sixteen deaths and at least one hundred and fifty persons 
injured.  
In the preceding months there had been mounting repression by the State 
apparatus in response to, as both Lotta continua and Potere Operaio believed, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 The former Hotel Commercio was occupied by “student-workers” (those who both 
went to school and worked) on November 28, 1968. The occupation was viewed as constructing 
an “urban comune” in the midst of the city’s center understood as the “control room of the 
bourgeois paradise.” The occupier’s graffitied the external walls as if they were its political 
journal. Among their writings was that they were “a fist in the heart of the capitalist city,” with a 
new “house” that “is at the service of the disadvantaged students, workers, immigrants, and 
exploited” (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 261). The occupation was destroyed by police agents in 
July 1969, incidentally the high point of militancy in Turin, and the hotel was later demolished.  
 
141 For an excellent photographic-historical account, see 1969-1972 dalla Strage alle 
Elezioni, Milan: Sapere Edizioni (Magrone and Rocchi1972). Among the vast literature on the 
Piazza Fontana affair, the most thorough and recent account is Paolo Cucchiarelli’s Il segreto di 
Piazza Fontana, Milano: Adriano Salani Editore (2009).   
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“initiative of the uncontrolled struggle” (Viale 1978, 206).142 It is sufficient to highlight a 
series of events in order to depict the political character that violence assumed as the 
State began conducting its “strategy of tension.” Of significant consequences for the 
subsequent development of the autonomous workers’ movement was that, beginning in 
the “hot autumn,” violence became a more widely practiced tactic and its significance 
moved beyond the symbolic and metaphoric, as well as instrumental purposes, to embody 
its sacrificial and deadly reality. Moreover, this marks the period when tensions between 
the movement and the State developed into an open conflict.  
While this tension had been latent and fairly restricted, events in the fall evinced 
an increasingly violent intensification of class conflict. At Pisa, on October 25th a teargas 
canister launched by police during a protest killed a militant. Two weeks later a police 
agent, Antonio Annarumma, was killed during a manifestation at Teatro Lirico in Milan. 
Lotta continua responded to the first by introducing its emblem of the closed red fist and 
to the latter by exalting “workers’ violence.” Their lead editorial after Annarumma’s 
murder called on workers’ to engage in violence “from the factory to the street” (Lotta 
Continua 1969a). For the militants in Lotta Continua, it was not a question of violence, 
but of class conflict: “In a conflict between the proletariat and the police, right is not on 
the side of he who has “died”; right always remains on the side of the workers” (Ibid).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 The autonomous, and hence “uncontrolled,” struggle may have been the impetus for 
the repression, but the right-wing forces behind the attacks had a more general and widespread 
attack against the political expression of “workers’ power.” For them this was perceived both in 
the unitary movement of the unions, the continued attempt by the PCI to be accepted into 
government, as well as the construction of extra-parliamentary groups, and workers’ base 
committees, and community organizations (Francovich 1992).  
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Lotta Continua’s tactical acceptance of violence led the PCI and other left forces 
to denounce the group as “adventurist.” From the State apparatus, the President of the 
Republic, Giuseppe Saragat, had openly accused the extra-parliamentary left for the 
murder of Annarumma. In this climate of small-scale “tit-for-tat” retaliatory political 
violence, the State began clamping down on the autonomous movement’s journals: 
Piergiorgio Bellocchio, the editor and director responsible for Lotta Continua, was first 
arrested. Two weeks later, Francesco Tolin, director of Potere Operaio, was arrested on 
the grounds of “instigating the Italian workers to revolt against the State” and that “he 
contributed in all the ways to create a pre-revolutionary climate” in Italy (Potere Operaio 
1969i, 3). As a result of these incidents, the antagonism that came to dominate the 1970s, 
between the State and the autonomist workers’ movement, increased in intensity. For its 
part, Potere Operaio retorted with the claim that they were the targets of an “ideological 
terror campaign” designed to create a climate suitable to open state repression (Ibid). In 
his defense, Tolin pointed to the role of the journal, but also of its indeterminate position 
with respect to the workers’ autonomous struggle: “Our journal has made a chronicle of 
the violence. We sustain that the working class is looking for new methods of struggle 
against the bosses. It is necessary that the working class be strong. Workers’ violence 
does not depend on me: it has its autonomous forms” (Ibid).  
The direct repression of the extra-parliamentary left was only one consequence of 
Piazza Fontana. More poignantly, the affair marked the beginning of the State’s “strategy 
of tension.” For most of 1969 there had occurred small violent actions that had been 
attributed to the extra-parliamentary left that, in actuality, had been staged by right wing, 
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neo-fascist groups.143 None of these had achieved the type of magnitude needed to 
blemish the workers movement in the public eye, at least at the national level. And they 
were, moreover, practice runs for a more serious terror campaign. The bombing of Piazza 
Fontana was intended primarily to discredit the workers’ movement, as a premise for the 
ascension of a “law and order” state that could put an end to the class struggles of 1968-
69, perhaps along the lines of the Greek example. Judge Felice Casson, the magistrate 
who led the state investigation into “Operation Gladio” in the early 1990s, described this 
strategy as aiming to “create tension within the country to promote conservative, 
reactionary social and political tendencies” (Francovich 1992). Vincenzo Vinciguerra, 
who, as a member of the right-wing group Ordine Nuovo [New Order], took part in 
various terror attacks, gave a more powerful depiction. Speaking openly for the BBC 
Documentary “Operation Gladio,” he described the use of terror with stark precision:  
You had to attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown 
people far removed from any political game. For one simple reason: they were supposed 
to force these people, the Italian public, to turn to the State, to turn to the regime and ask 
for greater security. This was the role of the right in Italy. It placed itself at the service of 
the State, which created a strategy… aptly called the “strategy of tension”…. So, people 
would willingly trade part of their freedom for the security [to go about their daily lives] 
(Ganser 2005, 7; Francovich 1992).  
 
The bombing at Piazza Fontana was the first national symbol that the “hot autumn” had 
turned deadly. It marked the acceleration of street violence that continued throughout the 
1970s. The more sensational acts followed the script of public bombings targeting the 
general population, such as the train bombing at Bologna in August 1974, and then a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 For example, Guido Viale recounts: “Before Piazza Fontana, in the middle of summer, 
the fascist cell (in reality SID [Servizio Informazione Difesa, the Italian secret service]) of 
[Franco] Freda and [Giovanni] Ventura made their general rehersal with an explosion of bombs 
simultaneously on eight trains. Still before, in the spring, a bomb in the hall at Fiat in Milan 
allowed the commissioner, Calabresi, of opening the hunt against a group of anarchists…. The 
future protagonists of the strategy of tension had learned their trade, manipulation of bombings 
combined with judicial inquiry” against the workers’ movement (1978, 220).  
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second time in August 1980. However, less publicized was the fact that neo-fascist forces 
targeted the entire working class—all cultural and organizational aspects of working class 
politics were attacked in a similar vein to Mussolini’s fascist raids of the 1920s.  
The consequences of Piazza Fontana on the extra-parliamentary left and within 
the broader workers’ movement were many. First, the militant groups interpreted the 
affair as a devastating moment, a crucial passage, and a decisive change in the course of 
the movement. In terms of its cultural significance, Luigi Manconi and Adriano Sofri, 
both leaders in Lotta continua, interpreted that the affair marked the “loss of innocence” 
(la perduta dell’innocenza), a veritable rupture of the norms and mores that bound their 
political contestation. Manconi captured it thus: “We had believed in the class struggle, a 
bitter and violent conflict. But we considered it also a battle of the piazza that was within 
certain rules of play, a sort of accepted ceremonial war between both contenders” (in 
Cazzullo 2006, 90). Commenting along similar lines, Marco Revelli noted that Piazza 
Fontana signified a loss of the creative, anti-authoritarian spirit of ’68: “In the grand 
theater of 1968 the violence was mimicked, ritualized, and virtual” (Ibid, 91). Violence 
was no longer mere spectacle; as Negri had theorized, violence was the stark reality of a 
system based on the need to sublimate workers’ autonomy within capital.  
 The second significant consequence of Piazza Fontana was that the revolutionary 
left now held the State to be, if not its direct nemesis, an open enemy of the movement. 
Lotta continua and Potere Operaio both believed that the State was responsible for the 
bombing. When Giuseppe Pinelli, an anarchist that the police had arrested for the 
bombing, fell four stories to his death from a window in the Police station, militants in 
Lotta continua launched an open campaign against the commissioner, Luigi Calabresi. 
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The culmination of their investigations resulted not only in the birth of the practice of 
counter-information (controinformazione), but also in the first comprehensive 
examination of the affair—La strage di state (the State massacre), which sold one 
hundred thousand copies in six months.144 The condemnation of the State also marked the 
definitive rupture with the parties, unions, and institutions connected to the State. Thus, 
the pretext for the entrance of the PCI into government with the “historic compromise,” 
as part of the political control over the autonomous movement, became a central concern 
in this period (yet not coming to fruition until the critical year of 1973). This antagonism 
to the State was captured by Franco Piperno’s sobering remarks: “comrades, you cannot 
pretend to make the revolution and to maintain a clean criminal record” (quoted in Grandi 
2003, 112). The revolution required “illegality” of one form or another; the State and its 
juridical form was the antithesis of the workers’ autonomous movement. For leaders of 
Lotta Continua, like Guido Viale, this was decisive: “There is nothing obscure. It is all 
clear. To confront the force of the workers’ initiative, the State descends into the field 
with instruments that are irreducibly its own: terrorism, the secret services, the agent 
provocateurs, the commissioners who are beyond suspicion, the printing of information 
with their press releases, [and] the magistrates” (1978, 218).  
 The onset of right wing terror and open State repression was only one of the 
boss’s responses to the “hot autumn.” And while this may have been the most dramatic 
response, strategically the fall struggles demonstrated the inability of the mass worker to 
make the passage from contractual, factory-centered struggles into an open political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 A militant from Lotta Continua assassinated Calabresi in May 1972. The Pinelli 
assassination proved highly successful in galvanizing militants, and became a centerpiece of the 
movement’s culture. For example, the affair was the basis for Dario Fo’s play The Accidental 
Death of an Anarchist; the anarchist movement generated the widely sung Pinelli’s Ballad [La 
Ballata del Pinelli], which was released on record in 1970 by Joe Fallisi.  
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struggle. Potere Operaio’s grim assessment of the “mass worker” led the group to reflect 
on the crisis of class composition, and to begin the process of rethinking the composition 
of working class revolt in the West. Given the need to confront the question of working 
class subjectivity, workerist theory was compelled to revisit their critique of political 
economy as the “social factory.” It was at this point that Antonio Negri’s work 
demonstrated a certain maturation of operaismo, and it is useful to consider his framing 
of the issues, which take part within the particular discussions in Workers’ Power and, 
more generally, in the broader autonomist workers’ movement. Negri’s analysis, 
following his 1968 critique of Keynesian political economy, was developed in the early 
1970s around a theory of the State, the working class subject identified as the “mass 
worker” and the crisis of this category, an analysis of capital’s response to the hot 
autumn, and the consequences for working class strategy via the slogan [parole d’ordine] 
“the refusal of work.” Through inquiry on these conceptual matters, Negri theorized the 
“social factory” in its most mature expression within operaismo, moving beyond the 
hegemony of the worker in the direct production of labor-power to include the 
reproduction of labor.145 The “social factory,” for Negri, was understood in terms of 
domination and control of the working class by capital, when the norms governing the 
factory began to dominate wage labor in its “general sociality” (Negri 2005, 4). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 In Marxian terms this is understood as the transformation whereby the society moves 
from being under a condition of formal subsumption within capital to a real subsumption. 
Michael Hardt has interpreted Negri’s use of these concepts in the following manner: “formal 
subsumption” is understood in terms of the existence of non-capitalist forms of social production 
within capitalism. That is, “certain pre-capitalist and autonomous forms of production and social 
cooperation persist external to capital and they are merely formally subsumed within the global 
framework of capitalist rule.” In contrast, “real subsumption” occurs when “labor-power and 
capitalist relations of production are extended horizontally throughout society; labor and 
production are purely social determinations and hence the ‘social factory’ is absolutely diffuse. 
Real subsumption, in short, is defined by the direct rule of capital over society” (Hardt 2005, 20).   
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Specifically, Negri theorized the “social factory” through an analysis of the role of money 
as “pure domination” with the “enterprise” as the particular form of command over the 
general sociality of work and labor. We cannot, however, separate Negri’s theoretical 
development without an understanding of the discussion that was occurring within Potere 
Operaio; his work must be understood as a contribution to a collective discussion (Hardt 
2005, 9).  
In the midst of a confused period of state repression, diminished funding for the 
journal, and the ending of the metal mechanics contract, Potere Operaio held their first 
national conference at Florence [January 9-11, 1970] in order to assess the impact of the 
“hot autumn” on the class movement. The central point of the conference focused on the 
contention that a centralized organization was necessary and that the group’s propaganda 
had to extend beyond the factory, while holding it as a central place in class analysis, to 
themes and political claims in the realm of capital’s reproduction of labor. There were 
three relations to the conference that paralleled previous discussions of organization 
within operaismo. The analysis of 1969 was read diversely as: 1) a moment of political 
unification and material conquest that was the beginning of a cultural process of class 
composition, or what was referred to in previous chapters as the “compositionist” 
understanding of organization146; 2) the hot autumn was compared to Russia in 1905, a 
direct reflection on the position set forth by Tronti’s “1905 in Italia” several years earlier 
(1964d; see chapter. 4). According to this position, a party was necessary to exercise 
foresight and increase militancy in the movement while also executing the general 
function of direction, what Potere Operaio had begun to call a “party of insurrection.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 This point was made by Sergio Bologna in his relation to the conference, “Classe e 
capital dopo l’autunno,” and is later developed in his seminal article, “La tribú delle talpe” (The 
tribe of moles), in the journal Primo Maggio (May First). 
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These two opposing viewpoints persisted in the national conference casting a shadow 
over the third relation that focused on the productive role of science and technical 
organization of work, a position that occupied a more foundational basis in operaismo 
than the concern for organization as expressed in Panzieri’s seminal article in Quaderni 
Rossi. (This latter relation to the convention occupied a mediating position insofar as the 
structural determinants of dead labor, in technology and fixed capital, had a direct 
relationship with the workers who were more available to control the tendency of social 
transformation.) The debate on organization was not settled at the convention, but was 
played out in the pages of Potere Operaio throughout the year. For those in favor of a 
form of “Leninization” of the group, there remained the necessity to construct, “at all 
costs,” a “rigid and lucid organizational will” (Potere Operaio 1969f, 3). Members from 
Rome, Padua, Florence, Milan, and from the South, in general, lent their favor to a 
disciplined and militant organizational form; opposing them were some members from 
Bologna and the Comitato Operaio di Porto Marghera (Workers’ committee from Porto 
Marghera). What is interesting is that the push for organization can be read as a general 
response not only to the state violence of the previous months, but also as a direct 
response to the shortcomings of the workerist reliance on the mass worker as the 
revolutionary agent of working class subjectivity.  
The failings of the “mass worker” as a concept for understanding working class 
subjectivity were captured by Negri’s comments that this category was incapable of 
making the “decisive pass” towards revolution. Instead, a strong and clear political 
organization with a hierarchical structure that connected to the working class through a 
vanguard structure internal to the workplace was deemed necessary. What Steve Wright 
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identified as Potere Operaio’s “crisis of class composition” in the post-hot autumn period 
became an opening to further organizational rigidity and traditional party-form system 
that workerist thought had consistently, through the concept of autonomy, distinguished 
[distanced] itself from (2002, 133). Like the earlier split in Classe Operaia, it was 
demanded that organization take over the reigns of strategy, and that class composition 
was not necessarily the central realm for its development, positions which led to divisions 
between Negri, on the one side, and, on the other, Piperno and Oreste Scalzone.  
In the midst of debating the future structure of Potere Operaio, the group came to 
forge an alliance with breakaway members of the PCI who, in the fall of 1969, had 
pushed for a more councilist position within the party only to leave the PCI and form the 
group Il Manifesto. The fruit of this alliance occurred in the formation of the comitati 
politici, the political committees as a move to ensure the group’s political power within 
the factory. For Potere Operaio, the decision to join forces with the Il Manifesto group 
bore with it the contradictions of their own trajectory as moving toward a more 
centralized and militarized form of political action; Il Manifesto, in comparison, was a 
much more moderate and traditional political group.  
The formation of the comitati politici (political committees) was based on the 
observation of a few distinct trends that persisted from the hot autumn throughout 1970. 
First, it was recognition of the potential for worker agitation and antagonism (potenziale 
di combattività) with respect to the capitalist organization of work. This was based on the 
fact that, in contractual struggles throughout the year, gains made by the metal and 
mechanical workers were extended throughout major economic sectors (Barkan 1984, 
77). Second, the committees were viewed as taking on the role of factory vanguards that 
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were necessary to fill in the perceived organizational void. This vanguard role served two 
functions: on the one hand, they were a bulwark against the rise of “new unionism” and 
concurrent legislative changes that demonstrated the success of the unions’ “riding the 
tiger” of the movement. Thus, the committees performed a vanguard function against 
what Workers’ Power perceived to be the new union strategy of integrating the workers’ 
initiative into a reformist position. Importantly, the Workers’ Statute147 of May 1970 had 
provided the legal basis for recognition of factory councils148 and other forms (i.e., 
coordinating organisms) of union presence within the factory (Art. 19).  The ability of the 
three unions to achieve legislative and contractual gains won them support among the 
workforce, as evinced by the increase in union membership in the post-hot autumn period 
(Foa 1975, 198-203).  
The role of the political committees also served a positive function as the central 
force of the movement leading to the potential formation of a new workers’ party. In this 
manner, Potere Operaio and Il Manifesto sought to maintain the offensive character of 
the workers’ movement. The committees were, in essence, an attempt to bring an 
alternative organizational presence to the working class. The lack of which was 
demonstrated in the hot autumn, but then driven home in the August struggles at Porto 
Marghera (Sacchetto and Sbrogiò 2009, 54-57). Theoretically, the debate on the political 
committees spanned the course of a year with conferences in September 1970, January 
1971, and September 1971. In the course of these debates between two quite diverse 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 “Lo statuto dei lavoratori” (Workers’ Statute), public law number 300, became law on 
May 20, 1970. The law has been reproduced on a CGIL webpage at: 
http://www.lomb.cgil.it/leggi/legge300.htm.  
 
148 In the summer of 1970 the unions began constructing councils allowing only for 
workers’ delegates to hold positions in them. Within three years, Confindustria, Italy’s central 
industrial trade group, estimated that 1/3rd of factories had such councils.  
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groups, a vision of workers’ organization was set forth. While the debates are interesting 
for a number of reasons, I want to focus here on the divergences between the two groups 
in order to emphasize how Potere Operaio’s view of the “social factory” determined their 
understanding of the committees as the nuclei of a national network that went beyond the 
factory to encompass a host of social struggles and to bring them under the rubric of class 
struggle.  
Before their alliance was forged, Potere Operaio had lamented that Il Manifesto 
group lacked a “rigorous economic and political analysis on the national and international 
situation” (Potere Operaio 1971, 4). In particular, the former’s conception of the working 
class was tied to the structure of production and to the sale of labor-power, a position that 
workerist theory had long discredited. The differences between the two were the result of 
their understanding of political economy and their conceptualization of the working class, 
with implications for the role of the committees. Potere Operaio understood the latter as 
playing a more expansive role and was broader in scope than Il Manifesto’s viewpoint. 
For Workers’ Power the committees represented “instruments of permanent organization 
of the vanguards who are present in the factory, in the quarters, in the zones, as 
instruments of bringing together [collegamento] all these situations,” which would 
ultimately lead to a common strategy and to a new revolutionary party (Ibid, 10). For its 
part, Il Manifesto was weary of a direct confrontation with the state and the endless 
conflicts that occurred in the piazza (Grandi 2003, 152-3). They preferred to deepen their 
presence within the factory at a time when Potere Operaio was seeking to turn an 
economic crisis into a revolutionary crisis—an acceleration and push towards 
organization and increased militancy, an extension of the struggles beyond the factory 
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and organized directly against the state.149 In a polemic directed at Il Manifesto this point 
was driven home: “When we decided to call ourselves “Potere Operaio” … we believed 
that grand possibilities … are open to this class on the terrain of the social factory and 
against the State—so again—and more than before—POTERE OPERAIO!” (Potere 
Operaio 1971a, 38).   
Toni Negri: the “social factory” as capitalist command 
Theoretically, this polemic was most comprehensively treated by Negri, who set 
forth his understanding of the changing composition of the working class through an 
expanded conception of the social factory that reflected the transformations underway 
within capitalist political economy. In short, for the first time in workerist theory the 
social factory went beyond production to include the realm of capitalist reproduction. In 
order to make this argument, Negri used Marx’s discussion of “crisis” and “tendency” in 
the Grundrisse and showed how these concepts could be applied to the destruction of 
“value” that was occurring in the global monetary system. Thus, Negri’s contribution to 
the third Conference of Potere Operaio, published as The Crisis of the Planner State,150 
opened new analysis within operaismo to the questions of the State, the social factory, 
class composition, and the production of value (Negri 1971; Hardt 2005, 11). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149  On acceleration of the conflict from the perspective within Potere Operaio the 
following is emblematic: “if ten years before the problem was how to determine the political 
crisis, now it is a matter of understanding how to transform the capitalist crisis into a 
revolutionary crisis” (Potere Operaio 1971, 6).   
 
150 Crisis of the Planner-State was completed on September 25, 1971 and was used as an 
opening pamphlet for the third national conference of Workers’ Power. The pamphlet was 
reproduced as a supplement to a special issue on the crisis of the monetary system in Potere 
Operaio (Negri 1971). It was published in paperback form by Feltrinelli in 1974, as well as 
reproduced in the collection of pamphlets written by Negri in the 1970s in the book I Libri del 
Rogo (Castelvecchi 1997; DerriveApprodi 2005). For purposes here I will cite the English 
translation of this latter work, Books for Burning (2005).  
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In terms of the “social factory” it is useful to recall that the two early proponents 
of the concept, Panzieri and Tronti, differed in their understanding of how capitalist 
relations occurred beyond the factory proper. In the former’s version, the relation was 
based on the planning capacity of capital around the extraction of surplus value. For 
Tronti, the social factory was a form of social organization that generalized capitalist 
production to society. It is my argument that Negri synthesized these approaches in order 
to move beyond them and thus construct a new basis for working class composition. That 
is, in examining the relationship between the production of value and the formation of 
legitimacy within the social order, Negri utilized Panzieri’s focus on the planning 
capacity of capital and its power dimensions understood as capitalist “despotism” and 
Tronti’s focus on social organization understood as the construction of regimes of 
legitimacy. In this manner, Negri defined the "social factory" as a regime of domination 
exercised by capital over the entirety of the working class.  
This understanding reflected the transformations in the class-capital relations 
following the hot autumn. In order to investigate these changes, Negri utilized Marx’s 
development of “tendency” and “crisis” in the Grundrisse. The concept of “tendency” 
was not conceived as a panacea or as an “inevitable law”’; rather it was understood as an 
“adventure of reason” that pointed the way towards a 
general schema that takes as its starting point an analysis of the elements that make up 
a given historical situation. On the basis of that analysis, it defines a method, an 
orientation, a direction for mass political action (2005, 27).151 
 
The tendency served as a means to understand the “objective recomposition” that was 
occurring in the relations of production and the consequences of that for political 
practice. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 See Marx’s Grundrisse (1973, 422-3, 442-6, 747-50). 
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In part, the “historical situation” was defined in terms of “crisis.” However, the 
concept of crisis was not understood as catastrophic or apocalyptic; it was understood in 
terms of power within specific social relations of production, “relations which are 
determinate and have an immediate prehistory” (Negri 2005, 14). The militants of Potere 
Operaio understood the crisis as initiated by capital as a direct response to the unification 
and intensity of the “mass worker’s” struggles; crisis was understood as a tactical choice 
by capital to weaken society’s productive forces. Negri wrote: 
[c]risis in Marx is seen as a necessity for capital, a means of putting the brakes on 
development, a limit to the expansion of the productive forces when these begin to 
upset a certain specificity and proportionality in the relations of force (2005, 9). 
 
Inflation, restructuring, unemployment, plant closings, political turmoil, and, importantly, 
the liberalization of money, were all seen as a tactical move by capital to end a particular 
form of development—Keynesianism—because the productive forces in that particular 
form (the working class) had begun to exercise a certain amount of control over the 
political development of capital, over its planning capacity.  
Negri focused on Marx’s “Chapter on Money” in order to examine how capital 
utilized this factor to upset Keynesian planning. This argument was central to his 
expanded conception of the social factory. His analysis sought to explain how money 
operated as a basic contradiction within the movement of the tendency: on the one hand, 
money represented a measure of equivalence in commodity exchange; on the other hand, 
it exists as a tool for capital’s domination over social production (2005, 2). For Negri, the 
end of the gold standard, and with it the Bretton Woods monetary system that had 
governed the post-WWII order, was proof that the wage struggles of the previous years 
had compelled the “abstract totality” of money to “emancipate itself” away from the 
value of labor toward control over what Marx called “external conditions” that are 
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governed by “matters of chance” (Marx 1973, 148).152 That is, within money the 
tendency pointed towards a productive role for money outside of and against the 
production of value. In short, the “tendency” that emerged out of the hot autumn 
struggles, included the role of money as a general “antagonism” to the Keynesian form of 
development, as an attack on industrial development in favor of exercising its domination 
over the “dimensions of general sociality” (Ibid). Money had abandoned the factory 
because of the intensity and militancy of the mass workers’ political struggles within the 
factory. Thus, Negri understood the “tendency” to point the way to a new form of class 
composition that reflected the needs of money in its productive role, and as an attempt to 
reconfigure the relations of power between the classes in favor of capital (Ibid, 22). Since 
the “mass worker” demonstrated an “obdurate refusal … to become the subject” of 
capitalist development, capital was forced to attack these productive forces as inimical to 
its general command function (2005, 7, 23).  Capital and class now related in direct 
antagonism, the “totality of power of capital [and] totality of a recomposed proletariat” 
(Ibid, 10). 
With money as direct antagonism to labor its command function extended 
beyond the direct production of commodities to all of social labor in order to determine 
exchange value. Negri’s analysis of money’s productive role as antagonism forced him to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 For Marx’s analysis of money’s independence in circulation, the following passage 
from Notebook 1, “The Chapter on Money,” is exemplary: “The need for exchange and for the 
transformation of the product into a pure exchange value progresses in step with the division of 
labour, i.e. with the increasingly social character of production. But as the latter grows, so grows 
the power of money, i.e. the exchange relationship establishes itself as a power external to and 
independent of the producers…. As the producers become more dependent on exchange, 
exchange appears to become more independent of them, and the gap between the product as 
product and the product as exchange value appears to widen. Money does not create the 
antitheses and contradictions; it is, rather the development of these contradictions and antitheses 
which creates the seemingly transcendental power of money” (1973, 146). 
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move beyond the “mass worker” in an attempt to understand the new class composition 
and beyond the focus on the factory in terms of the Fordist-Taylorist model towards 
something more fluid and diffuse. In this analysis the term “factory” expressed the 
enterprise as the new “form of capital’s domination over production” (2005, 24-5). For its 
part, the enterprise form contained its own “norms of command” that covered “factory 
labor” and “all social labor” (Ibid, 25). In order to determine exchange value, money had 
to exercise its domination within the overall process of social production understood as 
the “general sociality” of labor, or the processes of the reproduction of labor. The 
emancipation of capital meant that its form of domination and control had to be extended 
to include all of society; money’s productive function now resided in its ability to control 
the “external conditions” of the law of value. Negri’s “social factory” was defined by the 
domination of society by capital, as an attack by money on the producing class that was 
made possible by the autonomy of finance, which he viewed as an expression of the 
failure of Keynesianism to control the “independent variable”—the working class.  
The “social factory” for Negri was the product of the unyielding power of 
money, and its attempt to control the contradiction between the increasingly social 
character of production and the need for exchange and exchange value. Strategically, this 
critique of political economy led to the demand for a political wage as an attempt to break 
capital’s attempt to control society by denying its ability to establish exchange value. For 
the first time, workerist theory had openly moved beyond the factory as the locus of 
working class politics; the attack on value that was taking place within the tendency of 
the monetary system provided the objective criterion for moving beyond the factory 
proper. Indeed, for Potere Operaio, the factory was now understood as a “straightjacket” 
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that limited the potential for “new forms of struggle on new terrains of conflict for the 
new objective of the political salary” (1971b, 13).153 Any attempt to remain wedded to 
the factory, as exemplified by the group Il Manifesto, smacked of “fabbrichismo” 
(factoryism)—as an attempt to co-manage worker’s domination as a subject of capital 
(1971c, 21-22). The proper locus for a revolutionary working class politics transcended 
the walls of the factory and was centered on the refusal of work understood through the 
demand for a political income, a guaranteed income.  
As a continuation of the demands made during the 1960s that separated income 
from labor, the demand for a political income was intended to break the connection 
between income and work. Within the environment of restructuration and unemployment, 
the demand for a political income was not intended as a palliative for the consequences of 
capitalist crisis; poverty and unemployment were not the causes for the demand of a 
political income. For Potere Operaio, the political salary was intended as allowing the 
“capacity to create a space of struggle against the capitalist mode of production and its 
overall system of work” (Ibid, 21). That is, demand for a political salary was the basis for 
offering the material resources for worker organization in the struggle against work. 
Importantly, the slogan adopted by Potere Operaio in the fall of 1971 was “guerra di 
liberazione dal lavoro!” (war of liberation from work!) [1971d]. The expansion of 
capitalist command to the terrain of exchange value and command over social labor 
necessitated the final departure from the factory proper (and with it any attempt to 
struggle for the “liberation of work” or democratization of work), introducing the 
struggle for appropriation as the direct expression of political salary.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 This opinion also prevailed in Potere Operaio’s disagreements with Il Manifesto. 
Writing a “response” to the latter group, they noted that “in the current situation, within the crisis, 
the factory struggle is nailed shut” (Potere Operaio 1971a, 38).  
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The end of factory-centered politics, which paralleled the demise of value and 
exchange value centered on labor, had two important consequences for workerist political 
practice: the introduction of appropriation and insurrection as strategic factors. The 
transition to appropriation was part of an understanding that the demand for a “political 
salary” was qualitatively different and expressed the working class’s conscious 
understanding that they were the “producers of every social good and of not 
understanding salary as a measure of salary as purchasing power, but as an arm which 
imposes the struggle for the appropriation of produced goods” (1971e, 4). The struggle 
for appropriation reflected the rejection of money as mechanism for control and 
expression of capitalist command. However, it also expressed the rejection of value, 
circumventing the need to measure value in favor of the understanding that producers had 
made the material goods but only partly enjoyed them; appropriation of produced goods 
was intended to enjoy and consume the material richness of the world that producers had 
been denied by capitalist command. This focus on consumption of goods rather than on 
the fact that labor was a commodity, which Marxism had long pointed out, tended to 
obfuscate the commodity nature of capitalist society. By focusing on the consumptive 
needs of the proletariat, Negri focused solely on the need for enjoyment (godimento) of 
social goods; the refusal of labor as appropriation was conceived in a world without 
labor, that is, to the detriment of theoretical considerations on the role of labor in a 
communist society. Rather, as Costanzo Preve noted: Negri “makes the refusal of work 
the existential and metaphysical place of every creativity and felicity.” Echoing Lotta 
Continua’s earlier critique of the focus on money, Preve charged that Negri’s conception 
of communism was simply “capitalism without work” (1984, 72-3). Thus, part of the 
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“social factory” as capitalist command outside the factory entailed a moving beyond 
labor and production as central elements of working class theory to a focus on the 
consumptive enjoyment of the material needs of the working class. Appropriation, as 
direct action, was the expression of this theoretical turn. By itself, however, it was 
insufficient. The practice of insurrection against the State was intimately connected to the 
material practice of appropriation. 
The introduction of insurrection as a theme for working class politics followed the 
mass uprising in Reggio Calabria in late 1970. Despite lacking an overall presence in the 
South, Potere Operaio viewed the event as demonstrating the proletariat’s behavior as 
anti-institutional (Wright 2002, 137). Moreover, if appropriation was the strategic choice 
of working class politics as a replacement to the demand for wages or more traditional 
factory-centered demands (even if polemical), then the practice of insurrection was seen 
as the demand for power against the command of capital over all of social labor. Both 
appropriation and insurrection were strategically important during the crisis of the early 
1970s as factory struggles were increasingly under the control of unions, and capital’s 
restructuring moved apace. These latter factors were the cause of Potere Operaio’s 
increasing marginalization within the factory, despite its formation of the political 
committees. Understood as the crisis of class composition, the group attempted to come 
to terms with the new composition of the working class, but in doing so they relied on 
inadequate tools, having long ago abandoned the practice of workers’ inquiry and 
conricerca (co-research).  
Insurrection and appropriation were intimately connected to the militarization 
of the movement as part of the broader difficulty in determining the changing 
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composition of the working class. As we have seen, throughout the period the practice of 
self-reduction of prices (autoriduzione) was fairly widespread throughout the 
autonomous left. This appropriation of social services was accompanied by “mass 
illegality” in appropriating social goods, the self-reduction of work hours and the 
unilateral control over work life in the factory—all of which was understood as the 
management of power in daily situations by the working class for its own material needs. 
Potere Operaio sought to harness these practices into an organizational form by 
establishing “red bases”—as an extension of the political committees—that were 
considered as serving a vanguard function. The direct purpose of the latter was to 
constantly push the envelope of the struggle: “the problem is to force the movement 
beginning from the terrain of appropriation towards an insurrectional path” (Potere 
Operaio 1972a, 36). That is, the extension of the “social factory” analysis to include the 
production and reproduction of capital included with it the practical result of a 
militarization of the movement as the preeminent behavior of working class antagonism 
to capital.  
Insurrection became the identifying behavioral feature of the new working class 
composition as well as the leading tactic for organization towards what Potere Operaio 
began calling “the party of insurrection” (1971e). As part of a broader acceptance of 
violence as a political tool in the post-Piazza Fontana environment, Potere Operaio 
distinguished itself by establishing that violence was only acceptable if it was open, 
organized, and at a mass level (Ibid, 1972). In this regard, they rejected the so-called 
“third world” model as inadequate to the advanced capitalist countries as well as 
“exemplary” acts of terrorism that were emerging from clandestine groups such as the 
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Gruppi di Azione Patriotica (Patriotic Action Group, or GAP) and the Brigate Rosse 
(Red Brigades). Against the notion that the construction of small nuclei of armed 
proletarian groups was a proper strategy of insurrection, Potere Operaio put forth its 
understanding of the armed struggle as derived from the workers’ movement:  
To reconnect the proposal of the passage from the armed struggle to the class offensive as 
it is found in these years in Europe and above all in Italy is the node of the question. 
Because … [it is] only from the material movements of the class, only from the 
communist program of the refusal of work that the workers in these years have expressed 
in the capitalist metropoles can a specific process of the construction of armed struggle 
develop itself (1972, 3).  
 
The advocacy of an armed struggle was only legitimate if it was connected with the 
contents of the mass movement as a “general offensive against the capitalist system, [as] 
a communist capacity of destruction of the commodity system and salaried work” (Ibid). 
Clandestine groups had rejected the need for connecting to the mass movement; that is, 
they had rejected the theory of armed struggle that would lead to an organization of the 
struggle. Increasingly wary of a fascist coup in Italy, especially after the Pinochet coup in 
Chile, but also in conjunction with the Greek example earlier, sectors of the workers 
movement resurrected the idea of a “New Resistance” whose focus, in general, rested on 
the need to eliminate fascist elements among the leading sectors of state and private 
power. Thus, the armed struggle had its clandestine elements, which Potere Operaio 
rejected, that targeted centers of bourgeois power in order to ward off an imminent fascist 
coup.  
 The differentiation between the ideas of insurrection and armed struggle that 
Potere Operaia advocated and the clandestine armed struggle of GAP and Brigate Rosse 
was rooted in its connection to appropriation. For Potere Operaio, the two were 
intimately connected and signaled the way to new forms of organization by “social 
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labor,” a new and still uncertain form of class composition that was emerging out of the 
crisis of the early 1970s. In contrast, GAP and to a lesser extent BR focused primarily on 
armed attacks against the capitalist power. The case of Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, whose 
long-time support of workers’ movements in Europe and guerrilla movements in the 
global South, most dramatically exemplified this distinction. On the morning of March 
15, 1972 Feltrinelli’s body was found under the pylon of an electrical grid in the 
periphery of Milan. The editor and propagator of revolutionary ideas ostensibly died 
while attempting to attach explosives that would have eliminated the electrical supply to 
the city. Given his stature, Feltrinelli’s death symbolized a fragmentation of the extra-
parliamentary left between those who looked for a more traditional approach to politics 
(i.e., elections, parties, voting, referendums, etc…) and those who began to close 
themselves deeper into clandestine armed struggle. This fragmentation was the effect of 
many other factors, both internal and external to the movement. The upshot was that 
coming out of the most militant period of worker politics—the hot autumn broadly dated 
as 1969-1973—the extra-parliamentary left was increasingly marginalized within the 
actual workers’ movement. Militarization, insurrection, a focus on violence, the decline 
of the mass worker, the inability to solve the question of organization, the resurrection of 
old, staid conception of the party-form, and a constant focus on capital to the detriment of 
workers’ inquiry all were fundamental in the weakening of the extra-parliamentary left.  
 Importantly, throughout this period the conceptualization of the “social factory” 
that pointed the way to working class revolution as a political action by both those 
members of the class who directly produced and reproduced capital began to take form in 
practice. Moreover, this aspect of the movement was partially interpreted by Toni Negri 
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and others in Potere Operaio and incorporated into a richer theoretical understanding of 
capitalist political economy. The “social factory,” after a decade’s worth of theoretical 
interpretation and practice, began to come to its full fruition by moving beyond the 
factory gates to incorporate the broader working class into the orbit of a working class 
revolutionary theory. As we see in the next chapter, this was not without serious 
limitations and shortcomings. For example, the women’s movement was initially almost 
entirely understood by the men in Potere Operiao through the lens of male factory 
workers. That is, now that the critique of political economy had been emancipated from 
the factory, it would take serious theoretical reflection and debate in order to develop a 
coherent approach to working class revolution. No longer would revolution appear to be 
communities of women and children rallying to the cry of factory workers as had 
occurred during the affair of Corso Traiano, but there began to emerge the idea of parity 
between a variety of struggles. During the 1970s the Italian extra-parliamentary left 
understood this in terms of the question of worker centrality. To what extent did the 
factory worker retain a privileged, central focus within a revolutionary theory of working 
class politics?  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE SOCIAL FACTORY AND THE QUESTION OF “WORKER CENTRALITY”  
 
 
The challenge for the women’s movement is to find modes of struggle, which, while they liberate 
women from the home, at the same time avoid on the one hand a double slavery, and on the other 
prevent another degree of capitalistic control and regimentation. This ultimately is the dividing 
line between reformism and revolutionary politics within the women’s movement.—Mariarosa 
Dalla Costa, The power of women and the subversion of the community  
 
When capitalist relations of production infiltrate all the pores of society, when the interest of 
social life becomes subsumed within the process of the production of value, then the workers’ 
refusal to submit to the rhythm of work implies an immediate political potency (potenza)—
Franco (Bifo) Berardi, genesi e significato del termine “autonomia” 
  
The fundamental thesis on which all the theory of operaismo is constructed is, if you will, that of 
a successive abstraction of work that runs in parallel to its socialization”—Antonio Negri, 
Dall’eclisse dell’operaio massa alla centralità dell’operaio sociale 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The understanding of the “social factory” put forth thus far has as its basis the Panzerian 
and Trontian configurations. Uniting their conceptualizations is “worker centrality”—the 
idea that the salaried worker is the central social subject of working class revolution 
within advanced capitalist society. Against the orthodox Marxist viewpoint that locates 
this subject as the productive force leading society into a post-capitalist and communist 
future, the critique put forth by operaismo highlighted the figure of the mass worker as a 
political, rather than economic or productive force constructing a new society for itself. 
That is, rather than celebrating the productive role of labor as its emancipatory feature, 
operaismo looked toward the working class in order to discover new forms of liberation 
via the “refusal of work” and “liberation from work.” Yet, key to these “new forms” was 
an understanding of the “social factory,” to the affects of capital’s extension into the 
social realm, and how this was being negated by a politically composed working class. 
Panzieri’s conception relied on the “law of concentration” with capitalist planning 
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expanding outward, despotically, to control society from the factory proper. Hence, his 
conception remained within the factory with the worker as the privileged revolutionary 
actor. Tronti, for his part, argued that the salaried worker was the key agent of working 
class revolution and that this social subject was the central actor within the increasing 
proletarian character of advanced capitalist society. That is, to the extent that capitalist 
society took on the commodity form in its social relations, the working class, as a social 
subject, was generalized to society but still limited by the figure of the paid worker. In 
short, his depiction of the social factory neglected the sphere of reproduction. Toni 
Negri’s singular contribution to the social factory analysis resided in his extension of 
capitalist command over society. Yet, his analysis was hindered by the necessity for 
overcoming the problem of organization and a weakness in the understanding of class 
composition in times of capitalist crisis and transformation following the hot autumn. At 
times, and despite the promise of an overarching critique of political economy that would 
unite diverse social groups (i.e., the student movement and the burgeoning women’s 
movement) within a class analysis, Negri relied on the notion that the factory worker was 
the vanguard and central feature of working class politics. This was most evident in his 
analysis of the affairs of Fiat’s Mirafiori and Rivalta plants in March 1973, but then later 
rescinded in part by his development of the operaia sociale (social worker) as a new form 
of class composition [see below]. Despite the difficulties that operaismo had as a political 
project in moving beyond the factory worker as the central category of working class 
antagonism and/or revolution, by the early 1970s a considerable amount of political 
activity had pushed the social factory analysis to incorporate those aspects of working 
class life that went well beyond the direct point of production to begin, incorporating 
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those aspects that penetrated the reproduction of labor. The impact of this politics 
resulted in questioning the privileged notion of the worker as central to class politics. In 
short, worker centrality was the key theoretical debate within the Italian left of the 1970s 
and it emerged because of the critique of political economy that has been investigated 
thus far under the rubric of the “social factory.”  
It is the purpose of this chapter to demonstrate how the social factory analysis laid 
the foundations for this critique. As we have already treated the subject of students in 
chapter 5, this chapter begins with the women’s movement, the rise of a feminist critique 
of housework, of capitalist despotism in the home and, particularly, in the lives of 
housewives and in the community. The second part of this chapter elaborates on the “end 
of the parliamentary groups” and the birth of autonomia as a direct response to the 
organizational failures of the “mass worker” and worker centrality. That is, autonomia 
emerged as the organizational expression of an acceptance of the “social factory” as the 
proper critique of political economy. As will be seen, this was by no means prima facie; 
there existed a considerable amount of contradictions and limitations. The last part of the 
chapter is concerned with Negri’s conceptualization of the “social worker” as an 
expression of class composition within the “social factory” that sought to introduce 
within a class politics the theoretical and practical possibility of unity within diversity. As 
a matter of periodization, it is well accepted that the theoretical configurations introduced 
by operaismo experienced a rupture in the movement of ’77.154 This chapter does not get 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 For a discussion from the perspective of those who were integral to the development 
of operaismo, see Enda Brophy’s “Italian Operaismo Face to Face: A Report on the “Operaismo a 
Convegno” Conference 1-2 June 2002 – Rialto Occupato, Rome, Italy (2004, 277-298). The 
major text addressing the history of class composition and how to understand the “movement of 
‘77” that was most visible in university protests in February-March is Sergio Bologna’s “Tribe of 
Moles” (1978, 7-81). For the connection between Autonomia and its relationship with the culture 
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into this historical question; rather, what is of interest here is understanding the practical 
culmination of the “social factory” as a critique of political economy that was open and 
fluid, and created the theoretical possibility for the incorporation of diverse segments of 
the working class into its ambit of antagonism to capitalist command and working class 
revolution.  
Wages for housework and the rise of Italian feminism 
For much of the history of operaismo, conceptualizations of society followed Mario 
Tronti’s judgment that only those at the immediate point of production could generate 
antagonism towards capital. Women, insofar as they existed outside the workforce, and 
outside of the definition of working class, were, at best, given secondary consideration. 
This position was consistent with the history of orthodox Marxism and was embodied 
within what we have called the “historic left”—the parties, trade unions, and civic 
associations: women’s issues were relegated to “personal” issues that had little to do with 
private property and the economic structure of capitalism. In her introduction to one of 
the first collection of documents on the Italian feminist movement, Rosalba Spagnoletti 
aptly noted that the “parity of sexes” was traditionally considered in terms of economic 
development and the redefinition of gender roles: “the fundamental element that remains 
is the insertion of woman in the productive process, a strategic objective as part of an 
alliance with political, union, and party forces bearing with it implications of a general 
character” (1974, 22). In this worldview, the direct process of production was the 
privileged site of working class analysis; working class politics was wedded to the 
factory, encapsulated by the internal happenings of the factory life. The genesis of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that informs the “movement of ’77,” see the third and final volume of Gli Autonomi (eds. Bianchi 
and Caminiti 2008). For testimonials and autobiographical reconstructions of 1977 movements, 
see Millenovecentosettantasette (Manifestolibri 1997).  
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autonomist Marxism and, particularly, the culture of operaismo contained, in its roots, the 
negation of this worldview. Panzieri’s intellectual contribution, which carried into a good 
portion of Quaderni Rossi and beyond, was to bring into the class analysis the forces of 
capital within the broader framework of social relations in postwar neo-capitalism, 
against the focus on ownership of property and the formalization of working class politics 
that followed from that perspective. Thus, by the mid-1960s, Italian operaismo had 
affected a shift in the discourse within Italian Marxism by focusing on capitalism as a 
social relation and extending their critique of political economy to include the entire 
circulation of capital in determining its exploitative aspects (i.e., extraction of surplus 
value). The fundamental moment for the “new women’s movement” in Italy (and, 
parenthetically, not too different from women’s movements throughout the industrial 
world) derived from the student movement from 1967 on and worker politics in the “hot 
autumn.” The basic lesson that women drew from this experience, with regard to 
Marxism, focused on the need to work outside of the official left; that is, the need to 
make politics outside of the traditional avenues. In practice, this meant a complete 
rejection of the postwar Union of Italian Women (Unione delle Donne Italiane)155 and 
numerous critical assessments of Togliatti’s postwar “Discourse on Women” (1965; Ibid, 
20-1).  
 Much like the discussion of the student movement, the discussion here of the 
feminist movement is limited to those segments that relate to a class analysis and, more 
particularly, to operaismo and the “social factory.” The Italian movement contained 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 The PCI established the UDI in 1944 around women’s issues related to the end of the 
war: voting rights, pacifism, parity of salary, childcare centers, and pensions for housewives 
among others. The slogan of their second conference in 1947 was: “For a happy family, for 
peace, and for work” (Ginsborg 1990, 85). 
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within it what British feminist Selma James noted as a binary distinction between those 
women who focused on “caste not class” and those who focused on “class not caste”—
more than a matter of emphasis this distinction had real consequences for political 
practice and the overall movement of the late 1960s (1972, 4).156 Within the new 
women’s movement the emphasis oscillated between “caste” and “class” depending on 
the particular group’s focus.157 For purposes here, two groups are worth noting: Lotta 
Femminista (Feminist Struggle) and Rivolta Femminile (Women’s Revolt). The latter 
was formed in the summer of 1970 as a collective of autonomous groups that represented 
the first theoretical expression of the conditions—individually as well as politico-
economic, cultural, and sexual—of women’s oppression. From their initial discussions 
emerged the seminal document of Italian feminism, “Sputiamo su Hegel. La Donna 
Clitoridea e La Donna Vaginale” (We spit on Hegel: the clitoral and vaginal woman) 
[Lonzi 1974]. 158  Their central import resided in emphatically separating women’s 
liberation as subjectively distinct and different from male identity and from class politics. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Within the extra-parliamentary left the women’s movement was greeted with hostility 
and skepticism by the male-dominated leadership of groups like Lotta continua and Potere 
operaio. The former, which remained as an organization longer than Workers’ Power, and 
became more centralized and traditionally oriented as the 1970s went on, infamously attacked the 
first major public manifestation of women on December 6, 1975. Men from Lotta continua 
deemed unacceptable to the movement a “women’s only” march (Ginsborg 1990, 369; Negrello 
2004, 185). For its part, Potere Operaio dismissed the women’s movement and claims for civil 
rights and equality sardonically claiming that “[c]apital has already “equalized” women at 
Mirafiori, assigning them to the assembly lines” (n.d., 53).  
 
157 For an excellent discussion of the nuances between the two positions within the early 
development of Italian feminism in the late 1960s and early 1970s see the interview with Alisa 
Del Re in Futuro Anteriore (Borio et al 2002).  
 
158 Originally written as the “Manifesto di Rivolta Femminila,” “Sputiamo su Hegel” was 
published in 1974 by the group as part of a collection of its writings (Lonzi 1974). It has also 
been reprinted in Spagnoletti (1974, 95-124) with an abridged text in Balestrini and Moroni 
(1988, 473-477). The text is also available on the internet in Italian and English (accessed July 3, 
2013).  
	   356	  
For Rivolta Femminile, the “myth of complementarity” between the sexes was an 
ideological justification mystifying men’s power over women.159 This was fundamental. 
Women’s liberation could not be located within the class struggle alone; it was 
essentially an issue of sexual roles. For them, the history of philosophy exemplified 
men’s domination with Marxism being one part that “sold us the hypothetical revolution” 
(in Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 476). Ultimately, their rejection of being subsumed 
within the class struggle, as women, stemmed from their rejection of Hegelian 
metaphysics, which, they believed, was solely concerned with the affairs of men: “the 
class struggle, as a revolutionary theory developed by the master-slave dialectic, equally 
excludes women” (Ibid). From these considerations, Woman’s Revolt concluded that 
women’s liberation could only be an affair of women, of their capturing of consciousness 
as a separate social subject, and their expression in society. To that end, they negated the 
potentiality of analyzing women’s connection with the theoretical conception of class; 
they failed to treat the innovations that had occurred within Italian Marxism and its 
development of sociology and discussion of the social factory as a critique of power 
within the social relations of neo-capitalism. In short, they favored an analysis that 
emphasized women as a subject against the conception of women within a particular 
social order.  
 This lacuna within the feminist movement was most thoroughly treated by Lotta 
Femminista (LF, Women’s Struggle). The most prominent of the women’s groups that 
had a Marxist formation, the membership of Lotta Femminista derived from Padua and 
Ferrara, where workerist ideas had a strong and dynamic presence. The group was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 The notion of “complementarity” or parity was embedded in the postwar Constitution 
in Article 3, which begins: “All citizens have equal social diginity and are equal before the law, 
without distinction of sex….” (Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana).  
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formed at the beginning of 1971, at the same time that Potere Operaio was becoming a 
more centralized organization under the leadership of Oreste Scalzone and the group 
from Rome. In their initial platform, LF called for a reduction of the workweek to 20 
hours for all, self-management of the body, nurseries, and, importantly, a salary for 
domestic work (Negrello 2004, 185). While Potere Operaio was skeptical, if not hostile, 
of the women’s movement and what they perceived as its tendencies towards 
“separatism,” they were content to pick up on the demand of wages for housework.160 
Almost fanatically obsessed with the question of organization, class composition, and the 
functions of capital, Potere Operaio was more interested in Lotta Femminista in terms of 
strategy rather than integrating their theoretical import into a more fully developed 
conception of the social factory (Potere Operaio 1971f, 32-33). Importantly, however, 
Potere Operaio argued for the need to connect the struggle of the housewife to the 
factory worker, not merely as a secondary question that would “fall with the revolution,” 
but as “a determinant link in the chain of capitalist power on all of society” (Ibid). This 
fell short for those in Lotta Femminista who argued that Potere Operaio still operated 
within a conception of class politics that was informed solely by a “male definition” 
(James 1972, 5). The central importance of the women’s movement, thus, resided in their 
attempt to put forth a solution to women’s liberation in their relation to capital that was 
equally important to all aspects of working class liberation.  
 In her seminal article, The power of women and the subversion of the community, 
Mariarosa Dalla Costa expanded the workerist understanding of class by incorporating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Lotta Femminista, in 1972, along with groups from England, the United States, and 
France gave birth to the International Woman’s Collective. Selma James was the most prominent 
and well-known member from this collective who founded the “wages for housework” campaign 
on the international stage (Malos 1980).  
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the realm of capitalist reproduction into the analysis of the social factory. The initial 
problem taken up by Lotta Femminista was how to understand the relationship between 
women and capital as a question for class analysis. Operaismo had opened the door to 
analyzing capital as a social relation and, early on, included the entirety of capitalist 
circulation as the basis for accumulation and exploitation of the working class. The 
theoretical import of Dalla Costa’s article derived from this aspect of workerist thought 
as she incorporated domestic work into the creation of surplus value. In this sense, her 
contribution to the understanding of the social factory was to introduce a new social 
subject, the housewife, as a central agent, challenging the notion of worker centrality of 
the factory worker, or the “mass worker.” In doing such, she broadened the theoretical 
basis for a working class attack on capital to include the community and the home. Years 
later, reflecting on the founding of Lotta Femminista and their theoretical contribution, 
Dalla Costa, wrote: 
In the Fordist society of those years, we had revealed that production roughly revolved 
around two poles: the factory and the house; and that woman, because her work produced 
the fundamental commodity for capitalism, labor power, had a fundamental lever of 
social power in her hands: she could refuse to produce. In this, she constituted the central 
figure of ‘social subversion’… (2002). 
 
Women’s relation to capital ultimately centered on the housewife as a producer of labor 
power; the basis of the community resided in the figure of the housewife, the capitalist 
family, and the broader social services that reproduced the working class. Ultimately, 
Dalla Costa provided a theoretical justification for the inclusion of woman within a class 
analysis that broadened working class antagonism away from the historically privileged 
site of the factory and those at the immediate point of production to include women’s 
relation to capital.  
 The demand of “wages for housework” espoused by Lotta Femminista needs to be 
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qualified. It was not a claim for equality to wage labor, that the housewife should be 
recognized by capital as a figure containing a “saleable commodity”—labor power. 
Against the idea that liberation meant turning housewives into labor power, or wage 
earners, Dalla Costa wrote: “the independence of the wage earner means only being a 
“free individual” for capital, no less for women than for men…. Slavery to an assembly 
line is not a liberation from slavery to a kitchen sink” (1972, 33). The integration of 
women into society could not proceed along the lines dictated by capital. Any 
understanding of women’s liberation had to have as its basis the shattering of the role of 
the housewife as a contributor to social production. Importantly, this position was quite 
aware of the need to not lend itself to capital’s power over the class, i.e., a recomposition 
of the class. The demand was part of the recognition of women’s “level of social power” 
in refusing to contribute to capitalist accumulation (Federici 2000, 1-3).161  For Dalla 
Costa, recognition of this position could never be considered liberating, as “woman is the 
slave of a wage slave, and her slavery ensures the slavery of her man” (1972, 39). 
 Wages were considered to represent a form of power, of economic independence 
for the housewife, not only from her husband but also as a means to establish an identity 
in society through the establishment of a “new degree of social power” (Ibid, 34-5).162 
Wages were considered as a mechanism to be utilized in order to alter their social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161  Silvia Federici, in her contribution to the first international conference of the 
committee on the salary, emphasized this point: “It needs to be clear, still, that when we struggle 
for the salary we are not struggling to enter into the relations of capitalist production because we 
were never outside of them. Instead, we struggle to destroy the plan of capital on women, which 
is an essential movement of the division of labor and of social power internal to the working 
class, a division through which capital has been able to maintain its power” (1974, 127-8, 
emphasis added).   
 
162 For further discussion of the practical needs of the women’s movement and its relation 
to the demand for wages see Del Re’s interview in Futuro Anteriore (2000, 2).  
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standing as created by capital through the family and wage labor. In Dalla Costa’s 
argument, capital had created a regime of “separation and exclusion” in which the family 
was segmented in its social relations through temporal, spatial, psychological and 
emotional components. The call for wages was akin to the mass worker’s demand for 
higher wages: as a strategic demand designed to increase their size of power as 
understood by the central role of the wage within capital.  
Lotta Femminista was in a polemical discussion with those that the workerists 
identified as “reformist” (read: socialist, or the planning function of capital) as contrasted 
with revolutionary. Just like the demands of the “mass worker” for “more wages, less 
work,” the women’s movement demand wages for housework so that they could control 
their contribution to social production. For Dalla Costa and Lotta Femminista: 
The challenge to the women’s movement is to find modes of struggle that, while they 
liberate women from the home, at the same time avoid on the one hand a double slavery 
and on the other prevent another degree of capitalistic control and regimentation. This 
ultimately is the dividing line between reformism and revolutionary politics within the 
women’s movement (Ibid, 48, italics in original). 
 
The new women’s movement was expressed as inherently incorporated into the overall 
class struggle: the rejection of capitalist work ethic, of the logic of productivity, of 
discipline. Liberation could only occur through the “refusal of work” for both the 
housewife and the factory worker as a negation of capitalist despotism and as creating 
new forms of social control by the working class. Importantly, much of their alternative 
was based on overcoming the exclusionary features of capitalist society that also entailed 
certain forms of dependency. This required, however, an autonomous understanding of 
women and their relation of capital. It was the women’s movement and their capacity for 
claiming a form of separation, analytically, that made possible the expansion of the 
“social factory” to theoretically incorporate the household and community within 
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considerations of class composition on its own terms and not subservient to the factory 
worker, or wage labor.163 As a movement of the excluded, Dalla Costa wrote, we “are 
taking the initiative in this struggle so that all other excluded people, the children, the old 
and ill, can re-appropriate the social wealth; to be re-integrated with us and all of us with 
men, not as dependents but autonomously, as we women want for ourselves” (1972, 38).  
The role of the housewife was fundamental, as part of the social factory, and was as 
central to class politics as the wage laborer. Lotta Femminista had put forth a coherent 
explanation of how the social factory included both production and reproduction within 
the circulation of capital accumulation.  
 The extra-parliamentary left had difficulty incorporating the contribution of the 
women’s movement into their analysis. That is, perhaps the most dynamic feature of the 
Italian left was virtually neglected by the movements that emerged out of the “hot 
autumn.” With the end of Potere Operaio, which is discussed immediately below, and the 
rise of autonomia, the dynamism generated by the women’s movement was mostly lost. 
Sergio Bianchi, in the opening essay of the series on The Autonomists by 
DerriveApprode, accurately noted:  
For a certain period, some sectors of feminism looked with attention and curiosity 
towards the experimentation of the area of autonomy around the themes of liberation, 
sexual difference, desires, and happiness. But it would be a brief relation because the 
components of organized Autonomia did not know how to comprehend the fundamental 
valence of the revolutionary contents in the proposal of the feminist revolt (2007, 18).  
 
For those within Potere Operaio, it was clear that they had not registered the importance 
of Lotta Femminista. Writing in the last issue on the demise of the group, they 
maintained the traditional notion of the factory worker liberating all of society from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Years later Negri recognized this in his letters from prison. Speaking of the feminist 
movement he wrote: “the processes of liberation were moving forward according to a singular 
cultural trajectory, the first sign of which was separation” (1983, 127). 
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capitalist control (albeit not through its productive prowess, but because of its 
understanding of liberation via the “refusal of work”): “the conflict with the state is born 
in the factory and extends to society carrying the entire force of the proletariat against the 
institutions” (1973, 6).164 They had not forgotten the importance of the community 
struggles, but had certainly overlooked the role of housewives. Perhaps this was a result 
of their weakness within the factory as unions had witnessed a renewed stronghold 
between 1971-1973, but within the community they were wedded to “worker centrality”: 
“the worker’s attack on income is developed more outside than within the factory” 
through a “generality of behaviors that a small nucleus attack work with actions that 
reflect on all of the productive structures”—i.e., absenteeism, refusal to pay for services 
and such (Ibid, 7).  
By the middle of 1973 these sentiments expressed the practical reality that the 
extra-parliamentary groups had exhausted themselves and that the turn towards 
centralization was at odds with the base of the workers’ movement.165 For its part, Potere 
Operaio was internally rift by dissension over the questions of centralization, class 
behavior, and organization (Wright 2002, 151; Negri 2007, 111-2; Borio et al 2002, in 
passim). Not without irony, their dissolution was influenced by the occupation of 
Mirafiori in 1973 in which a new generation of workers demonstrated the superfluity of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Toni Negri, in Partito operaio contro il lavoro (Workers’ party against work) [June 1, 
1973], adhered to the factory-centered logic, despite his later turn of hand. He wrote: “the 
privileged site of both the refusal of labor and the attack upon the rate of profit” remains the 
factory (2005, 77).  
 
165 Internal to Potere Operaio, a damning critique came from Franco Berardi who later 
wrote: “Potere operaio was looking for the Promethean conflict, the possibility of a heroic stand 
out of the revolutionary will based on an undifferentiated view of daily life” (1998, 122).  
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the extra-parliamentary groups (Balestrini and Moroni 1988, 436-7). 166  In his 
interpretation of the affair, Franco Berardi wrote:  
In the workers’ protest not only was there the will to impose on the bosses better work 
and pay conditions, but there was also the sentiment of a radical refusal of the workers’ 
condition and of its industrial form… 
 The new workers of Mirafiori were in good part young people who participated 
in the upheaval of ’68…. And in the explosion at Turin of March ’73 the claim of time 
for life [tempo di vita] from the trappings of productivity means also a consciousness of a 
maturity in social and technological knowledge that was sufficient to place liberty from 
work as the order of the day in terms of history and politics (2007, 53). 
 
For Negri and his following within Potere Operaio the lesson was clear: the struggle 
remained entirely within the workers’ initiative and expressed a capacity for mass action 
that demonstrated a exercise of workers’ power by a new strata of workers who 
demonstrated the behavior of the new working class (Negri 1973a). Beyond its 
significance for pointing out the superfluity of Potere Operaio, the “party of Mirafiori,” 
for Negri, reaffirmed the notion that offensive actions served a “unifying function” as the 
basis of organization. We will return to this later with the concept of the “social worker,” 
but it remains important here to point out that Negri was being consistent in his reduction 
of value to the question of power that we discussed earlier in his “Crisis of the planner-
state” (Wright 2002, 154-8). In the middle of 1973 Potere Operaio dissolved itself as a 
political group. For most of the members—whether they adhered to what has been called 
the Negrian faction and the Scalzone or Roman faction—within a relatively short period 
they would be part of the burgeoning “Area of Autonomy,” yet few others, most notably 
Massimo Cacciari, would follow Tronti’s decision years earlier and join the PCI in hopes 
of finding space to radicalize the party as it made a push into government as part of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 For documentation of the struggle at Fiat between autumn 1972 and march 1973, see 
the journal “Controinformazione”, n. 0, Milano, October 1973. 
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well-known “Historic Compromise” (see below).   
The “Area of Autonomy” and working class revolt against the “social factory” 
The rise of Autonomia167 was not a linear process that derived from the dissolution of 
groups like Potere Operaio and, shortly after, Gruppo Gramsci. In terms of continuity 
with the tradition of workerism or autonomous Marxism, the rise of autonomia occurred 
within the same milieu (i.e, the factory struggles of the late 1960s and local base 
committees) but also consisted of a different composition. Without getting into the 
differences of periodization and historiography, and as the previous chapter discussed, 
Autonomia was partly the product of the crisis of class composition and organization that 
was occurring within groups such as Potere Operaio (Bologna 1978; Cuninghame 1995). 
In the same sense, it was also a response to the increasing centralization within the extra-
parliamentary left as an overarching whole (Alfa Romeo 1974, 134). In addition, 
Autonomia emerged as a response to the historical situation of the class movement in that 
particular moment, the key characteristics of which were: restructuration, increased 
unemployment, the oil crisis, inflation, austerity, the ascent of political and labor leaders 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 The literature on Autonomia is in its initial stages within Italy and is virtually absent 
from the Anglophone world. What exists is largely memorialistic, autobiographical, and 
testimonial. For the most part, research has focused on the “hot autumn” which dates from 1969-
1973 and then focuses on the “movement of ’77.” Yet, it is the intermediary years that are 
important for the theoretical and practical transformations within the Italian working class 
movement. Patrick Cuninghame’s unpublished dissertation is the lone exception (2002). In Italy, 
this lacuna has begun to get some attention with the multi-volume series published by 
DerriveApprodi that treats the theory, struggles, and history of autonomia (2007, 2007a, 2008). 
Equally important and somewhat overlooked was the experience of Rosso, one of the more 
theoretically dynamic and experimental journals within workers’ autonomy (Guizzardi et al 
2008). Rosso had a more direct lineage of classic operaismo and was constituted by former 
members of Lotta continua and Potere operaio in Milan and members from Potere operaio who 
were in agreement with Negri in Padua (Bianchi and Caminiti 2007a, 59). In his 1978 interviews, 
Negri commented that this period—’73-’77—was a “very felicitous situation from a theoretical 
point of view,” and that the role of Rosso was on par with the importance of Quaderni Rossi a 
generation earlier (2007, 127). This unexplored material awaits more extensive research and 
academic consideration (Funaro 2007).  
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within the state and factory, and State terror (Bianchi 2007, 68-72). Yet the movement as 
a whole—if it can generically be described as such—demonstrated in theory and practice 
a patronage to workerist thought around the categories of “refusal of work” (Castellano 
1980), a critique of capitalist technology, and a rejection of a productivist ethics 
(Balestrini and Moroni 1988). The main point of this section is to demonstrate how the 
incorporation of the “social factory” as a critique of political economy, informed the 
theory and practice of Autonomia, and how the concept was given new meaning around 
the thematic of needs and the consequent understanding of working class liberation.  
 Autonomia emerged as a response to the organizational, social, economic, and 
political factors present in the workers’ struggles following the “hot autumn.” Yet, what 
is intended by the term Autonomia? Throughout this work the word “autonomy,” or the 
phrase “workers’ autonomy,” has been used to express a few different meanings. Its most 
common usage within the Marxist left had been associated with the idea of trade union 
independence from the political parties. This was evident up through the founding of 
Quaderni Rossi. Within the latter the term also began taking on the theoretical 
importance of the working class as a distinct and independent category of analysis. 
Following Tronti and, later Negri, working class autonomy was embedded within the 
class-capital dynamic with a working class unto itself. Lastly, we saw immediately 
above, the women’s movement introduced the concept as a term of separation, both 
practical and analytic, to distinguish the role of women in the relation to capital and 
introduce the household and community as part of working class composition. The 
theoretical import of what, in the section, is the rise of the “area of autonomy” or the 
movement of Autonomia, is discussed below.   
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In discussing “autonomia” first and foremost is the importance of understanding 
that it was a loose network of workplace and social collectives (Cuninghame 1995). It 
follows from this localism that there was a wide array of political ideologies, beliefs, and 
practices depending on the particular group and its immediate history (Bianchi and 
Caminiti 2007; 2007a). Thus, there is no “autonomia” but rather the plural “autonomie.” 
Patrick Cuninghame, in his unpublished dissertation, located autonomia in five separate 
categories that reflect the chronology of the movement as well: 1) a network of 
workplace collectives based in the factory; 2) regional groups within what was known as 
the “Area of Autonomy”; 3) localized social collectives that focused on social services 
and the appropriation of social goods; 4) “creative” groups who worked on community 
radio and “free radio” forms of militant communication; 5) a dispersed formation of 
clandestine groups who formerly were derived from the self-defense formations [servize 
d’ordine] of the extra-parliamentary groups (Cuninghame 2002).168 Within this diverse 
collection of groups—what has been roughly grouped as an “autonomy of the social” and 
“workers’ autonomy”—there remained an intersection of political activity and a core of 
shared beliefs, which demonstrates the influence of workerist thought as a form of the 
continuity of ideas. In his introduction to the history and documentation of “Organized 
Autonomy,” Luciano Castellano identified these in terms of: the refusal of labor; 
thematic of needs against production and capital; an understanding of capital as a social 
relation; and the reading of the “state-form” (1980, 7-21; Wright 2005). While it would 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Sergio Bianchi explains the historical origins of autonomia as deriving, initially, from 
operaismo, and a diverse set of groups with leanings towards Marxist-Leninist, anarcho-
syndicalist, libertarian, and radicals. The movement would later develop along elements that were 
counter-cultural, feminist, and ecological (2007, 10-11). A large part of the theoretical work in 
these years concerned this development within autonomia as an attempt to understand the new 
behaviors and attitudes of the changes occurring within the composition of the working class.  
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be misleading to lump these groups together and slide into the Calogero Theorem169 and 
the persecution of the autonomists around the April 7, 1979 arrests, there was a consistent 
set of ideas that brought the group together. It is important to stress this point here in lieu 
of the lurid history associated with the popular mystifications of the movement that was 
intimately tied into the climate of terror in 1970s Italy.170 What I want to emphasize is 
that the “area of autonomy” shared a set of beliefs and ideas, that these derived to some 
extent from workerist theory, and that the theoretical adherence and political practice of 
these ideas was determined by quite specific local histories.  
In order to frame the theoretical cohesiveness of Autonomia it is useful to begin 
with Franco Berardi’s synthesis where he identified multiple ideas uniting the general 
Area (2007). The first two points that he identified—im-mediatezza and de-regolazione—
relate to the movement’s origins within the immediate point of production and allude to 
the workerist influence on the early formation. The first concept, immediacy, was 
understood as the “affirmation of a particular interest”—the workers’ interest as 
understood through the slogan “liberation from work”—against the general interest of 
capitalist society (Ibid, 41). Since Tronti’s “Copernican revolution,” the working class 
had been given analytical priority and autonomy. Its claim for itself as a particular 
interest rendered the working class as a political subject, removed from the subordinate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Named after the Paduan prosecutor Pietro Calogero, this “theorem” asserted that there 
existed a line of continuity between the “red terror” of the Red Brigades and the autonomous 
movement. The result was the criminalization of the movement most well known for the April 7, 
1979 mass arrests of Negri and his colleagues at the Institution of Political Science at the 
University of Padua (Negri 2005, ix-xxii).  
 
170 The renewed interest in autonomia in the last decade, sparked mostly from the 
publishing house DeriveApprodi in Rome, and was reflected by the interest of the younger 
generations who were and are part of the global justice movement, the occupy movement, and the 
“disobedient” and “indignant” movements, has, inter alia, sought to rectify the epithets and 
accusations surrounding autonomia operaia.  
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position as labor-power under the command of capital. On the heels of the “hot autumn,” 
demands such as “more money less work” reflected not only the need for less hours of 
work, but also for the expansion of time spent not working. The Roman section—or 
Volsci as they were known, because of the location of their office—noted that the 
demand for the reduction of work hours entailed “the affirmation of a new will of the 
liberation of man at this stage of his evolution and of a new asset of work and of socially 
useful production” (Comitati Autonomi Operai 1976, 35). 171  The potency of this 
understanding of time liberated from capitalist work took on an increasing importance 
within the social factory: “when the interests of social life becomes subsumed within the 
process of producing value, there is an implicit and immediate political power in the 
workers’ refusal to put themselves under this mode of work” (Berardi 2007, 42). It is 
important to bear in mind that this understanding united not only the early components, 
which were more factory-centered, but also by the mid-1970s the counter-cultural 
movement which sought to “appropriate” cultural activity (i.e., music, radio, food, 
cinema, technology, intellectuals, etc…) and strip it of capital’s logic of production 
(Bianchi and Caminiti 2008 in passim). Thus, the notion of immediacy, in the sense of 
asserting a political subjectivity, united the broad movement against the expansion of 
capital’s tentacles within the broader social factory, loosely understood in terms of 
interests and needs of the working class and the consciousness of this that was 
exemplified in practice, or “social life.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 Toni Negri introduced the conception of time in his attempt to formulate a new class 
composition based on social labor (1982, 219-224). Time, as an expressed “need” within the 
working class struggle, was perhaps first discussed within workerism by Mariarosa Dalla Costa 
and Lotta Feminista (see above).  
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The second unifying concept identified by Berardi was “de-regolazione,” or a 
breaking of the rules or principles of capitalist production, including institutional 
mediation. In the early 1970s this was intended within Autonomia as a critique of the 
capitalist organization of work, and was intimately connected to the understanding and 
practice of the “refusal of work.” Lucio Castellano highlighted the importance of this 
concept as demonstrating continuity between the workers’ base committees that were 
forming in 1968 and autonomia. Providing a broad understanding of the concept, 
Castellano wrote:  
…the history of “autonomia” is constituted by an arch of articulated and differing 
political experiences that cover the whole arch of the 1970s and which their identity 
centers around the forceful idea of the “refusal of work.” It is not only an ideology of 
emancipation, but a way of reading capitalist society, of its protagonists, of the way 
power is distributed in it, of the dynamic of its development and of its end, that 
constitutes their scheme of orientation and the hegemonic connective fiber that covers ten 
years of political confrontation with the organized workers’ movement (1980, 8).  
 
The refusal of work signified the capacity of worker’s power to alter the power 
relationships in the daily practice of exploitation and resistance to the production of 
surplus value. In practical terms, this alluded to the introduction of new forms of 
technology and a general restructuring of the production process as well as the formation 
of new regulations that respond to the spirit of individualism that underpins the rejection 
of rules. But the concept also pointed the way towards liberation from work that included 
a reduction of work time and a general flexibility of labor. [It is worthwhile to point out 
that this aspect of Autonomia anticipated the neo-liberal configuration of deregulation of 
enterprises and liberty from the state along with the privatization of social services and 
social safety net programs.] However, while this capitalist aspect shares the liberating 
theme of deregulation, this was more a response to the workers’ movement and it took 
place after a certain shift in the balance of power between the two classes in favor of 
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capital by the late 1970s. Similarly, the push for flexibility of labor shifted from the 
working class goal that intended to break capitalist discipline—and in fact celebrated 
precarious labor with precario è bello (precarious is beautiful), a slogan of the 
movement—and with a shift in power relations between class and capital it produced an 
anxiety-laden conception of precariousness. Pointing to the defeat of Autonomia on these 
matters, Berardi wrote: “perhaps the more profound indication and more melancholic of 
the political and cultural defeat of autonomia remains in the fact that” at the turn of the 
millennium “the request that is pressing from the youth movement is that of a guaranteed 
post of dependent work, the request of a fair relation of exploitation and subordination”  
(Berardi 2007, 44).  
 The third and fourth concepts uniting the “area of autonomy” deal with the 
conception of history and historical processes and the consequences of this within 
juridical, political, and economic rules. With regard to history, the movement based itself 
on Marx’s dictum on communism as the “real movement that abolishes the present state 
of things” (1998, 57). This was not understood in a totalizing fashion where history was 
conceived as a continuous historical progress with revolution as a clean break ridding the 
new society of past forms. Rather, the “present state of things” was understood as the 
form of exploitation under the existing form of capitalist social relations. Moreover, with 
the expanse of class analysis and the widening definition of class composition to include 
new social formations, there emerged the understanding that social formations were not 
present as totalities—that the mass worker still existed even while it was being 
superseded by a new, dominant, class composition. In this sense, the historical process 
was seen as “a differentiated overlap of stratifications, of the survival and intertwining of 
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forms that appear to have declined, but never disappear from the living memory of 
society” (Berardi 2007, 45).  
With the rejection of a teleological and dialectic understanding of historical 
processes it followed that the rules governing the social order were recognized as 
arbitrary, rather than following a rational progression. Within the historical context and 
the overall transformations in the production process, in part derived from the end of the 
Bretton Woods order of fixed exchange rates tied to the United States dollar, there 
emerged the recognition that the productive rules and regulation of value was also 
arbitrary and capable of being transgressed or challenged and that it was possible to 
affirm new values. The novelty for Autonomia resided in the recognition that the law of 
value was arbitrary and in the rejection of the command exercised by capital via the 
function of money and the wage. They started from Marx’s depiction of the classical 
form of industrial capitalism that identified the time of socially necessary labor and the 
determination of value as the key variables determining prices, salary, and profit. But 
technological innovations in microelectronics and robotics challenged this depiction, 
bringing Marx’s analysis “beyond Marx” (Negri 1991; Negri 1982, 224). Negri depicted 
this transformation as establishing a situation where the “conditions for the extraction of 
surplus value now exist only in the form of a general social relation” and that it 
completely “eliminates the idea that a “natural rate” can exist between” profit and wage 
(1982, 224-5) Echoing the sentiments expressed in his earlier work, Crisis of the 
Planner-State, the conclusion derived from this “uncertainty of value” by Autonomia was 
quite similar: the uncertainty within the conception of value was stabilized “with 
violence, deception, and falsehood” (Berardi 2007, 48).  
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This theoretical unity gave expression to a general configuration of political 
practice: workers autonomy existed for itself as an independent political force that sought 
to impose its own values on the production process. Two aspects in which this position 
was challenged occurred around inflation and rising unemployment, especially among the 
youth. The first was a direct challenge to the wage gains of the “hot autumn”—in Italy, 
wage costs per unit produced rose 47.1 percent from 1968-1973 (Barkan 1984, 93-4). The 
second moved throughout the 1970s developing a labor force that was divided between 
“guaranteed” and “non-guaranteed” labor, part of what Asor Rosa described in his book 
La Due Società (The two societies) [1977, 63-68]. These two components produced 
within Autonomia a debate around the question of a “guaranteed salary.” First, the 
demand for a guaranteed salary demonstrated the offensive nature that the movement had 
developed coming out of the hot autumn; this demand went well beyond the traditional 
claim for “bread and work,” as a content wage-slave. Second, the demand for a 
guaranteed wage was viewed as the refusal to pay for the crisis, that the working class 
would not buckle under a regime of austerity, price increases, and wage reduction. Third, 
it was a demand for the emancipation from the capitalist cycle. Last, it was not a defense 
of a salary; rather, it was viewed as a unifying aspect of the class in its political 
recomposition as a means for demonstrating what they called proletarian power. In short, 
the guaranteed salary was seen as constructing a form of space outside of the logic of 
capitalist production, by which the proletariat could satisfy its own “needs,” the extension 
of which speaks to their understanding of the “social factory,” understood as the capacity 
of capital to penetrate the “pores” of society (Comitati Autonomi Operai 1974, 110-112). 
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Within this strategy for a “guaranteed salary” the fissures of class composition 
were evident, with various sectors of the working class providing a different 
understanding of who composed the class, and, specifically, the relationship of class to 
the factory, or the immediate point of production. As part of the view that “politics is 
personal,” that part of the women’s movement understood that the demand for a salary 
for domestic work was part of the liberation of their existence—mentally, bodily, and 
emotionally—from the “specific function” that capitalist society had imposed on women 
(Federici 1974, 128). Theoretically, the autonomous workers’ assembly at Alfa Romeo in 
Rome understood this in a similar fashion, in that they understood the significance of a 
“guaranteed salary” as permitting the ability 
…to unleash in this society the workers’ condition of work, as an egalitarian thematic of 
remuneration according to needs: communist refusal of tying life to a determinant 
activity, naturally alienated, that is called salaried work (1974, 131).  
 
In practice, however, the conception of class politics at Alfa Romeo was more centered 
on the workplace, with the position that class-consciousness had to be connected to the 
overcoming of alienated labor, or salaried work, and that it could only stem from labor-
power. For example, while outside of the factory/workplace, groups were practicing 
direct re-appropriation according to there perceived needs, from the first acts of 
organized “proletariat shopping”—where groups would select groceries that they wanted 
and then pay what they thought they should—to all sorts of practices of autoriduzione 
(self-reduction) and occupations (i.e., the birth of social centers and other “liberated 
spaces”), the assembly at Alfa Romeo did see the importance of struggles in the social 
terrain, but they subordinated these to the factory worker as the subject who must 
exercise “direction and control” of the overall movement (Ibid, 134). Thus, the debate 
over the “guaranteed salary” revealed a shared understanding of capital’s extension into 
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society with a broadened conception of the class struggle. At the same time, however, 
traditional claims of the factory worker, or the workerist’s “mass worker,” remained 
within the movement, privileging this social subject as more important in class 
composition than those members of the working class in the social terrain.  
 In part, this adherence to the “mass worker,’ and privileging of the immediate 
point of production as normatively and existentially more connected to the concept of 
class composition fed into the strategy of the historic left, particularly the PCI. By the fall 
of 1973—within the context of the Pinochet coup in Chile in September, and increasing 
violence, state and para-state—the Communist Party made its case for entrance into the 
government as part of the “historic compromise” (Ginsborg 1990, 354-8, 388-90; Negri 
1976, 19-23). As an attempt to overcome the crisis of governance that was afflicting 
Italy, Enrico Berlinguer, the recently elected party secretary, proposed the historic 
compromise in which the PCI, PSI, and the DC would govern the country, laying the 
foundations for “economic development, social renewal, and democratic progress” (in 
Ginsborg 1990, 356). Within the official workers’ movement the “historic compromise” 
entailed a rigid disciplining of the workforce based on a program of austerity and 
sacrifice—a vision of a working class that was cemented in the centers of production 
posed against the new ethic of consumer capitalism. The trade union, in this program, 
was utilized to ensure a “guaranteed salary” that was intimately connected to the job and 
the contract, representing the traditional view of labor-power as the working class, as an 
economic category. The Autonomous movement had an overall hostile view of the PCI, 
as a party bound up with the institutions of state capitalism; part of the broader currents 
that came out of 1968 in what has been called the “anti-communist” left. Within Italy, 
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Negri accurately characterized the historic compromise as “terrorism of social 
democracy” in which the PCI would control the working class in order to participate in 
the economic development of capital (1976, 15). Its sense of “worker centrality” was 
wedded to the factory and the immediate point of production, and, as Asor Rosa argued, 
viewed the social sector as problematic and in antagonism to labor-power (1977, 64).  
 The question of “worker centrality” arose from the PCI’s “historic compromise” 
and signified the capacity of state institutions and labor unions to ensure or guarantee a 
contracted salary. In 1977 the Gramsci Institute held a seminar on “Operaismo e 
centralità operaia” (Workerism and worker centrality) [1978]. In large measure the 
contribution of the convention was a reiteration of themes derived from Togliatti’s 
unfolding of the “Italian way to socialism” in the immediate postwar period. The 
workerist critique, despite the inclusion of such intellectuals as Mario Tronti, Massimo 
Cacciari, and Albert Asor Rosa, remained bound within the party as the political organ of 
the class. Practically, the debate emerged as recognition of the declining power of the 
factory worker, or “mass worker,” as an antagonistic subject in the class struggle. That is, 
after the contracts of 1972-3, factory worker’s relative power in social struggles declined. 
Whereas the workerists who moved into the “area of autonomy” focused on the shifting 
class composition, those who went into the PCI bemoaned the turn away from the 
factory, as an intellectual betrayal and abandonment (Tronti 1978, 18-19). In short, the 
PCI remained wedded to the factory worker as one of the components in its push into 
government. 
Yet, the question of “worker centrality” was bound up with the conceptualization 
of the “social factory,” and its importance not only as a critique of political economy, but 
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also as a basis for discerning class composition. Writing in the journal Primo Maggio, 
Marco Revelli and Marcello Messori argued in favor of an episodic explanation of the 
importance of the social terrain as part of capitalist transition and command over labor:  
The current intertwinement between the sphere of reproduction and of immediate 
production, with an apparent preeminence of the first on the second, that seems to lead to 
the drowning of the factory in the magmatic complex of the social structure, offers a 
glimpse of a characteristic that has appeared in all of the phases of capitalist transition 
from a given level of command on labor power, to pass to a qualitatively new level of 
subsumption of labor to capital, this is assisted by a massive mobilization and an open 
use of the social terrain external to the factory… (1978, 61). 
 
For Revelli and Messori, the expanse into the realm of reproduction by capital was an 
ephemeral and epiphenomenal occurrence within capitalism connected to the technical 
recomposition of labor-power in order to maintain capital’s command function within an 
overall set of social relations. The question of “worker centrality,” in this view could be 
reduced to the position that the “factory constitutes the workers’ universe … even in the 
process of social reproduction” (Ibid, 43). Yet, there was something afoot in Autonomia 
that suggested the social terrain was taking on its own importance, outside, or 
antagonistic to, the play of capital, where social subjects were emerging within a new 
working class composition. For example, the review A/traverso published its first issue in 
May 1975, from the autonomous movement in Bologna, as an attempt to overcome 
barriers between political militants, diverse subjectivities, and social language (the group 
from Bologna also founded Radio Alice as a “free radio station” the following year).172 
The official press in Italy, around the same time, began speaking of “creative autonomy” 
and the “desiring movement” (movimento desiderante). Franco Berardi aptly noted the 
importance and novelty of this turn in the movement for the concept of class: “The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  For an introduction to Radio Alice, see the existent webpage at 
http://www.radioalice.org/ (last visited May 25, 2013).  
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concept of class became rethought beginning from the irreducible multiplicity of 
existential practices: drugs, irregular sexuality, absenteeism from work, produced a 
continuous recomposition of the subjective horizon of autonomia” (2007a, 291). Within 
the autonomous movement the question of “worker centrality” was only of importance 
insofar as the concept of class expanded to the social terrain. For those who shared the 
patrimony of operaismo and its basic theoretical foundations, Toni Negri put forth the 
most ambitious attempt to understand the new class composition as the operaio sociale 
(social worker). It is to his argument, and, importantly, to the basis of class composition, 
in his understanding of the social factory, that we now turn to.  
Antonio Negri’s “operaio sociale” and the “fabbrica diffusa”  
Toni Negri, long in polemic with Tronti and the “autonomy of the political,” was quick to 
point out the basic contradiction put forth by those in the PCI who were introducing a 
debate on the conception of “worker centrality”:  
The thing that seems rather strange is that, the same folks who today are bringing up 
“worker centrality,” in the 1960s [they] recognized that fundamentally the productive 
nature of work was immediately social; also, the fundamental thesis, on which is 
constructed all of the theory of operaismo, is, if you will, that of a successive abstraction 
of work, that runs in parallel to its socialization (2007, 19). 
  
That is, the “social factory” as the “successive abstraction of work” was the fundamental 
thesis of operaismo based on its understanding of political economy in terms of power 
and social relations. Given this tendency toward socialization and abstraction of work, 
Negri argued that “worker centrality” was nothing more than mere tautology: that all of 
the conditions which reproduced the factory worker extended to society merely 
recognized the point that capital was “hegemonic and commands those conditions” (Ibid). 
Against this usage of “worker centrality” he asserted an “effective worker centrality” 
where the characteristics of “abstract labor,” such as “social mobility” were the 
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centerpieces of the socially extended process of class recomposition and were capable of 
“representing the generality of exploited labor” (Ibid, 20). Yet, it was unclear what this 
subject was or how it could be identified. Negri attempted to provide an answer, the 
operaio sociale, in his important book Proletari e Stato (Proletarians and the State) 
[1976].173  
 The central importance of this work in Negri’s contribution to the social factory 
resided in his analysis of crisis and restructuration as driving forth the proletarian nature 
of society; that is, the bosses’ response to the hot autumn—the analysis of which was 
treated in his Crisis of the planner-state—brought into material actuality the proletarian 
character of society and this subject revealed itself by its daily practice of antagonism to 
the command of capital. His reading of the social factory is therefore intimately bound up 
in his treatment of restructuration and the recomposition of the working class within 
capital’s falling rate of profit. In short, the central problem of the crisis was the fall of the 
rate of profit; this could only be overcome by increasing the process of the socialization 
of living labor; and, as capital extended into society, the process of worker antagonism 
grew leading toward the “intensification of the potentially revolutionary unity of living 
labor” (2005, 125). Thus, following the mass workers’ antagonism during the 1960s, 
capital, Negri wrote, was “faced with modifications imposed and provoked—or in the 
process of being brought about—by restructuring,” and as a result “the body of the 
working class expands and articulates itself into the body of the social class, into the 
proletariat” (Ibid, 126). Importantly, Negri brought the concept of class composition in 
line with the concept of the “social factory” for the first time within operaismo. However, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Proletarians and the State was completed on August 1, 1975 and published by 
Feltrinelli publishing in March 1976. The second edition is now reproduced in English in Books 
for Burning (Verso, 2005). All citations will be from the latter, English edition.  
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it is necessary to look more closely at the argument and then place it within some 
historical context in order to understand more fully the significance of his resurrection of 
the proletariat as the proper class composition within the political economy of the “social 
factory.”  
Negri’s understanding of the “social factory” within the crisis and process of 
restructuring contained within it original configurations. In the first instance, the 
expansion of capital into society was the direct result of socialization of labor as a 
component of the process of restructuration and reorganization of industry. Thus, unlike 
Panzieri, Tronti, and to go a bit further, Gramsci—who had set forth the concept of 
“rational demographic composition”—this understanding was not connected to a 
particular industry, such as the highest development of capitalism—the Fordist-taylorist 
model with Fiat’s automobile production as the staple of much of operaismo’s analysis. 
Rather, Negri’s depiction was broad in nature, encapsulating the entirety of living labor, 
which lacked the material homogeneity of the mass worker, but still offered a “network 
of class interests”—albeit abstract—that revealed a “unitary potential of struggle” (Negri 
2005, 145). Moreover, the function of command was not tied to the concentration of 
capital in industry, or to the immediate process of production, but occurred two-fold: “as 
mediation between the function of productive restructuring (energy, automation) and the 
function of political reorganization (social democracy, terrorism)” [Ibid, 132 emphasis in 
original; Wright 2002, 162-66]. Last, and perhaps most importantly, the wage was not the 
centerpiece of the social factory. Going against what Steve Wright accurately identified 
as “one of the central workerist categories,” Negri, following the demands of the 
movement, called for the valorization of the proletariat’s “needs” as distinct from the 
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logic of capital, including the demand for a wage; that is, to a new form of needs distinct 
from those of the mass worker.   
Whereas the “needs” of the mass worker were identified with the wage as, in 
Tronti’s terms, a polemical demand the “social worker” embodied more concrete 
demands such as the liberation of “life-time” from capitalist production. For the new 
class composition, their consciousness arose not, as the workers’ assembly at Alfa Romeo 
believed, from the experience of wage labor, but from the demand for liberation from 
capitalist work (Negri 2005, 146). Within this, Negri found the constructive aspect of the 
new working class as a moment of “invention,” as the creativity and productive 
expression of productivity outside the demands of capitalist production and reproduction. 
The “refusal of work” as a strategy of working class resistance for the mass worker 
became a project of liberation towards a new society. In this sense, the subversion of 
capitalist needs became paramount. This is not to deny that within capitalist social 
relations needs cannot be met. Derived from Marx’s analysis in the Grundrisse, even 
capital allows—“when business is good”—for the cultural advancement of the proletariat 
(Marx 1973, 287). Such was his interpretation of the 150-hour program achieved by the 
struggles of the hot autumn. However, with the rise of consumer society, this wealth was 
identified as the proletariat’s wealth: “the greater extent to which historic needs—needs 
created by production itself, social needs—needs which are themselves the offspring of 
social production and intercourse, are posited as necessary, the higher the level to which 
real wealth has become developed” (Ibid, 527 emphasis in original). This explains the 
demand of the burgeoning counter-cultural movement that sought to free cultural 
expression from the commodity nature of capitalist society and to appropriate it towards 
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their own use and understanding. Negri understood this as the rejection of capitalist use 
value, as the “refusal of work and the development of labor’s own creative value” (Ibid, 
151).  
For Negri, however, the discourse around needs was intimately bound up with 
capitalism’s category of use value via exchange value. Against this he argued for the 
supersession of such categories by the social worker’s “system of struggles” (Ibid, 154-
5). Given his reduction of money into its dualistic command function he asserted the 
proletariat’s need to re-appropriate the social wealth as the basis for a communist 
program. Against the traditional workerist focus on the wage, he wrote:  
the general prospect of the revolutionary passage can no longer be envisioned except 
from within the advance of proletarian power, from within the struggles and moments of 
the re-appropriation of social wealth and the productive forces. To imagine a different 
passage is pure illusion, it risks defeat, when it is not simply mystification and betrayal 
(Ibid, 158).  
 
In this perspective, the new formation of working class liberation occurred through the 
practice of labor as a “pure creative force of production and invention” (Ibid, 151). 
Liberated spaces, against the institutional structures of capitalism, and, importantly, the 
state, were the basis of the liberation of living labor, the edifice of a new, post-capitalist 
society. In this practice—and this would become even more important with the rise of 
intellectual labor and what much later would be termed as “immaterial labor”—the 
contribution of the social worker to a new form of social needs outside the dictates of 
capitalist production and reproduction formed the basis of working class liberation within 
the social factory of money/state command.  
 Yet, if direct appropriation was the “essence” of the communist program, as Negri 
maintained, what was its connection to the material reality (Ibid, 157)? His 
conceptualization of the “social worker” was met with considerable skepticism. First, this 
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new class composition contained a great deal of abstraction that, despite Negri’s claim to 
empirical verification, bore scant traces within the actual workers’ movement (Wright 
2002, 167). Roberto Battaggia, writing within Primo Maggio, pointed out the futility of 
trying to connect the “social worker” to the “mass worker,” as the former lacked the 
“material homogeneity” of the latter (1980-1, 74). Even more, the “physical components 
[of the social worker] are not tied either to the material condition of exploitation or to 
immediate political objectives” (Ibid, 75). For Battaggia, lacking was the connection 
between the material conditions and the political behaviors of the class (Ibid, 74). Yet 
others were even less impressed. Sergio Bologna noted that Negri seemed obsessed with 
theoretical unity and the need for synthesis rather than explaining or understanding the 
“disarray and confusion” within the workers’ movement as the result of the capitalist 
offensive following the hot autumn (1976, 27). At the moment when the mass worker 
was under attack, Negri chose to focus on constructing a new theoretical basis for class 
composition as a way to move forward and find a working class antagonism within the 
capitalist crisis.  
More poignant, given the diversity of such an abstract category as the “social 
worker,” was Negri’s attempt to locate a “unity within diversity” of such a heterogeneous 
figure as the social worker. If capitalist restructuration had propelled political economy to 
entail the social realm, and the social realm had fought back—i.e., the woman’s 
movement, student’s movement, and counter-cultural movement—his argument reduced 
this diversity to an abstract conception of labor without regard to the concerns that other 
sectors of the autonomous movement had introduced.  At best, he recognized this in a 
theoretically abstract manner, acknowledging that contradictions were part and parcel of 
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working class theory: “it needed to be recovered, beyond all the ideologies, including 
worker centrality, the courage of living with contradictions, and of living with them as 
real contradictions, and to verify whether or not these real contradictions could become 
antagonistic…. A one-dimensional solution of the revolutionary process never gives 
[that] (Negri 2007, 102-3).  
Concluding remarks 
To such heavens did the journey of the social factory bring working class theory; 
it established the framework with a unitary basis for an overall proletarian struggle 
against capitalist social relations. The Italian “orthodoxy” with its focus on property 
relations was overturned within a generation that experienced post-fascism and the 
“economic miracle” bringing the awareness of workers’ power as an antagonistic subject 
to produce a sustained movement longer than any other experience in the industrial west 
during the 1960s and 1970s. This story ends with the “social worker” as the culminating 
working class subjectivity within the social factory. Within Italy, this political practice 
found a new and distinct trajectory in the “movement of ‘77” of which the “social 
worker” was only anticipatory. To the merit of Negri’s abstraction, his analysis of the 
“social factory” pointed to the power of capital to utilize the state—what he later termed 
the “enterprise-state”—in order to command the social production and reproduction of 
capital, and to the micro, or “molecular” struggles waged against it. That Italy was 
brought to the brink of civil war in the 1970s is important, but that experience entails 
much more than what the analysis of the social factory permits us to delve into. 
Importantly, after almost twenty years of re-examining Italian Marxism, the analysis 
brought forth by operaismo highlighted the political and conceptual autonomy of the 
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working class and armed this subject with the theoretical tools to capture its liberation for 
itself in terms of political power in order to remake itself according to its own needs and 
desires. Freed from the entrapments of productivity and the category labor-power, work 
could now be conceived in terms of human being’s creative and inventive aspects. 
Whether this movement “succeeded” or won is not the point, as should be clear from the 
analytical framing of class relations that Tronti and Panzieri introduced. More to the point 
was that the working class, in its antagonism—via the refusal of work—expressed the 
need for liberation from capitalist work as the basis for the material passages to a post-
capitalist and communist future. The end of this story occurs in the midst of the abolition 
of the “present state of things.” That the story does not end there is only evidence to the 
merits of capitalism as a relation of power and its formation of social relations. The 
continuity of that story is still present in contemporary society, as are the legacies of 
autonomous Marxism and the need to liberate the working class from capitalist 
despotism. The “social factory” introduced us to a heuristic device to be utilized in 
furthering the struggles of working class liberation from within that particular social 
formation.  
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CONCLUSION 
The traditional understanding of capitalist political economy has long been shaped by the 
classical political economist’s focus on private property and the relations that are 
derivative of this juridical principle. Within the history of Western Marxism this focus 
lent itself to the neglect of understanding capitalist social relations beyond the juridical 
form (whether or not these derive from the property relation are beside the point). The 
central contribution of postwar Marxism stems from the understanding of Marxism as 
sociology. As part of this impulse, the “sociology from the base”—workers’ inquiry, 
conricerca, and what is now called “militant research”—had the impact of meeting a 
group of young socialist and communist intellectual-activists who were looking for a 
new, more democratic and worker-centered politics. The birth of Quaderni Rossi was 
central to this development and remains so until at least the journal Rosso, which is not 
discussed in this dissertation, but marks the next point in the story, leading to the 
movement of ’77. In this milieu of searching for a more democratic and anti-authoritarian 
left, and in conjunction with the radical upheaval that was part of the generation of the 
“economic miracle,” the “social factory” as a critique of political economy was central.  
 This dissertation has reconstructed the principle individuals, groups, and journals 
around which the “social factory” influenced or shaped the viewpoint of Italian neo-
capitalism. The three central individuals who developed the social factory were Raniero 
Panzieri, Mario Tronti, and Antonio Negri; others, such as, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, and 
Guido Viale, extended previous definitions of the concept. Raniero Panzieri and Mario 
Tronti were the early exponents of the “social factory” and offered two different 
understandings of the term: the former examined the effects of the law of concentration 
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on capital’s ability to extend its tentacles into society as a controlling and despotic force; 
the latter understood it in terms of the increased proletarian character of society. Yet, both 
of these formulations established the foundations for rethinking class composition, 
organization, the goals and object of working class liberation, technology and “dead 
labor,” social capital, and the “refusal of labor.”  
 The dissertation proceeded chronologically in order to tell a story that sought to 
capture the dynamics of workerist thought as well as highlight the heterogeneous nature 
of its participants. The experience of Classe Operaia was pivotal, but only insofar as 
Tronti’s influence remained dominant. The experience between CO and PO was telling 
and it gave rise to a myriad of formations. Out of this situation, focus was placed on the 
journal La Classe and the student movement. In this period, the “social factory” began to 
be appropriated by new actors who broadened the concept to include education and put it 
forward in political practice (recall that Panzieri had included educational institutions in 
his view of the term). It was the student movement that gave real credence to include the 
reproduction of capital as part of the “social factory” and that this should have 
consideration within a definition of “class composition.” The explosion of the “hot 
autumn” rendered the workers’ struggles dominant in the period. Ironically, at the 
moment where there was massive experimentation and militancy, there emerged a return 
to the party-form and centralization within what was called the “extra-parliamentary left.”  
 The discussion of the “hot autumn” and the student movement was essential 
insofar as it invoked crisis and restructuring as the bosses’ counteroffensive aimed at 
controlling the class movement. The last two chapters capture the radical rupture within 
the social relations of neo-capitalism. In this regard, Toni Negri formulated the “social 
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factory” in a system without a theory of value and based on power: capitalist command 
and working class antagonism. At the same time, he theorized a proletariat that 
encapsulated both production and reproduction in the circulation of capital. The “social 
factory,” Negri argued, had taken on the actuality of the abstraction of work theorized by 
Marx in the Grundrisse. In the last chapter, the important experiences of the “new 
women’s movement” and the movement of Autonomia, respectively, shed light on the 
position of women in relation to capital, and on the political practice of the new working 
class within the social factory. Both of these movements remain of central importance for 
current political theory and working class politics. I chose to treat both movements only 
in terms of their contribution to the “social factory” without developing their political 
practice beyond that. Such an endeavor would have brought this work too close to 
another movement, one which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, yet it lurks around 
the corner: the movement of ’77.  
 If both the Italian women’s movement and the movement of Autonomia have 
pertinence in today’s political practice, then this dissertation and exegesis of the “social 
factory” should remain useful as a form or method of approaching contemporary critiques 
of political economy. On the other hand, I hope to have shed light on a concept that was 
created within a laboratory of radical politics in the transition from one form of 
production to another, offering a glimpse into the enduring class struggles that constitute 
capitalist social relations.  
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